"À son décès, Julien Freund laissait parmi ses papiers un recueil de textes inédits, sous forme épistolaire, adressés à ses amis et collègues : les Lettres de la vallée. Dans ces méditations, rédigées en sa retraite vosgienne - qui n'est pas sans évoquer la Hütte de Heidegger, de l'autre côté du Rhin - et loin des servitudes propres aux écrits universitaires, l'auteur de L'Essence du politique s'exprime en toute liberté, à bâtons rompus, sur ses sujets de prédilection (le (...) politique, l'idéologie, la guerre, les totalitarismes, l'utopie, la décadence), mais également l'enseignement, le journalisme, la connaissance, le droit, la morale, la métaphysique, les limites... Ce livre forme la clef de voûte où se rejoignent les grands thèmes de sa pensée."--Page 4 de la couverture. (shrink)

Les préoccupations éthiques des scientifiques, l'autonomisation de la technologie par rapport à la technique, l'adoption par les diverses sciences sociales d'éléments du discours philosophique, sont pour beaucoup les indices d'un effondrement de la philosophie. Mais cette fin de la philosophie moderne marque-t-elle la fin de toute philosophie? Julien Freund, après tant d'années consacrées aux sciences sociales et à la polémologie, revient sur son terrain de prédilections : la philosophie. Dans cet essai, qui contient à la fois une histoire (...) de la philosophie moderne et la construction d'une nouvelle métaphysique, il répond que la philosophie entendue comme liberté du présupposé ne doit pas s'évanouir dans d'autres savoirs, mais s'affirmer comme discours spécifique. L'esprit de la métaphysique ne réside pas, comme Heidegger l'a répété après Kant, dans le souci du fondement de l'être, mais dans les diversités de ses expressions, positives ou négatives, logiques ou contradictoires, et dans le contexte inéluctable de l'identité et de l'altérité. Ce qui intéresse le métaphysicien ce sont les immenses possibilités de l'expressivité de l'être. Le philosophe n'a pas pour mission d'expliquer l'être mais de méditer sur lui. Ainsi Julien Freund médite-t-il sur la science et le progrès, sur la foi et la croyance, sur l'humeur et le sentiment et nous offre une remarquable leçon de philosophie philosophique. (shrink)

Pareto isn't interested in the nature of politics but in the political society and in its equilibrium. The method he finally adopted, after some hesitations, is the one he tested in his economical and sociological research work. Analysing the changing of the elites, he stresses the importance of the minority that is in power. However the decline of an oligarchy is always concomitant with the coming up of another one. As far as Pareto's personal political stand is concerned he was (...) neither a fascist nor a democrat but a liberal. This is revealed by a careful analysis of his works, from the first to the last of his writings. (shrink)

L'ouvrage traite essentiellement des grands thèmes de la méthodologie et de l'épistémologie wébériennes, tels que la neutralité axiologique, les processus de rationalisation ou la bureaucratie. Il fait également des incursions dans un de ses domaines de prédilection : la sociologie des religions. Il s'interroge plus particulièrement sur la signification de l'économie dans les religions mondiales et sur sa théorie du polythéisme des valeurs.

En 1993, disparaissait Julien Freund. Onze ans après, en dehors de son ouvrage incontournable L'essence du politique, son œuvre demeure méconnue en France, en dépit de sa grande richesse.

Frecuentemente se ha interpretado la filosofía política de Julien Freund como una lectura decisionista y polemocéntrica de lo político de fuertes ecos schmittianos. Sin entrar en sus raíces intelectuales, pretendo justificar el sentido que asume en su obra la adhesión a la tradición realista, distanciándose sin embargo de una interpretación tanto cratológica como nihilista de la política que tendiera a reducir los asuntos públicos al solo dominio estratégico de los medios. Entiendo, al contrario, que el realismo de (...) class='Hi'>Freund coincide con su perspectiva “mesocrática” o, si se prefiere, “liberal” en un sentido “árquico”, no minarquista o neutralizador. Esto exige un cambio de enfoque en el estudio de su obra que evite fundamentalmente dos extremos: la reducción de lo político a la sola dialéctica del mando y la obediencia, a costa de la integración de todos sus factores, y la sobrevaloración del problema de los medios respecto de los fines. (shrink)

Lo privado es visto comúnmente como el espacio de la libertad y los derechos individuales, mientras lo público se observa como el espacio de la dominación política, por esto resulta necesario ver cuál es en realidad la relación que hay entre la libertad y lo público. En este sentido resulta conveniente revisar el pensamiento de autores contemporáneos como Julien Freund, que piensan la libertad y lo público tomando distancia del pensamiento liberal tradicional que ha determinado la visión actual (...) de las dos esferas mencionadas. En Freund lo público es espacio de libertad en el ámbito político, y garantía de libertad para los demás ámbitos de la vida de las personas. (shrink)

In this paper, we develop a fresh understanding of the sense in which emotions are evaluations. We argue that we should not follow mainstream accounts in locating the emotion–value connection at the level of content and that we should instead locate it at the level of attitudes or modes. We begin by explaining the contrast between content and attitude, a contrast in the light of which we review the leading contemporary accounts of the emotions. We next offer reasons to think (...) that these accounts face substantial problems since they locate the link emotions bear to values at the level of content. This provides the incentive to pursue an alternative approach according to which emotions qualify as evaluations because they are specific types of attitudes, an approach we substantiate by appealing to felt bodily stances. We conclude by considering two reasons why this approach may be resisted; they respectively pertain to the alleged impossibility of drawing the attitude–content contrast in the case of the emotions and to the suspicion that so doing raises qualia-related worries. (shrink)

The safety conception of knowledge holds that a belief constitutes knowledge iff relevantly similar beliefs—its epistemic counterparts—are true. It promises an instructive account of why certain general principles of knowledge hold. We focus on two such principles that anyone should endorse: the closure principle that knowledge is downward closed under competent conjunction elimination, and the counter-closure principle that knowledge is upward closed under competent conjunction introduction. We argue that anyone endorsing the former must also endorse the latter on pains of (...) an unacceptable form of bootstrapping. We devise new formal models to identify necessary and sufficient conditions for these principles to hold on conceptions that construe knowledge in terms of true counterparts. These conditions state that counterparts of premise and conclusion beliefs are coordinated in certain ways whenever these beliefs stand in the relevant inferential relations. We show that the safety conception faces insuperable problems vindicating these coordination principles, because its epistemic counterpart relation is symmetric. We conclude that it thus proves unable to account for minimal closure properties of knowledge. More generally, our formal results establish parameters within which any conception must operate that construes knowledge in terms of true counterparts. (shrink)

Abstract The content of an emotion, unlike the content of a perception, is directly dependent on the motivational set of the subject experiencing the emotion. Given the instability of this motivational set, it might be thought that there is no sense in which emotions can be said to pick up information about the environment in the same way that perception does. Whereas it is admitted that perception tracks for us what is the case in the environment, no such tracking relation, (...) it is argued, holds between one's emotions and what they are about. It is to this worry – that the construal of the emotions as perceptions inevitably raises – that this paper tries to respond. In this paper, I suggest that when it is realized that one dimension of perception itself is directly dependent on the perceiver's perspective on her environment, then emotion, which is also essentially perspectival in this sense, bears the comparison with perception very well. After having clarified the nature and the role that perspective plays in perception, I argue that, in the case of emotions, the same perspectival role can be played by agents’ long-standing evaluative tendencies and character traits. The resulting conception of emotion as perception is then tested against possible objections. (shrink)

This paper investigates the responses of GPT-4, a state-of-the-art AI language model, to ten prominent philosophical paradoxes, and evaluates its capacity to reason and make decisions in complex and uncertain situations. In addition to analyzing GPT-4's solutions to the paradoxes, this paper assesses the model's Theory of Mind (ToM) capabilities by testing its understanding of mental states, intentions, and beliefs in scenarios ranging from classic ToM tests to complex, real-world simulations. Through these tests, we gain insight into AI's potential for (...) social reasoning and its capacity for more sophisticated forms of human-AI interaction. The paper also explores the limitations and biases of AI-generated reasoning and its implications for our comprehension of complex philosophical problems. (shrink)