It is one of the distinctive claims of Neurath, though not of the Vienna Circle generally, that the Vienna Circle's philosophy was not really German philosophy at all. The relation is, if Neurath is to be trusted, anything but straight-forward. To understand it, not only must some effort be expended on specifying Neurath's claim, but also on delineating the different party-lines within the Vienna Circle.

[Alan W. Richardson] This essay explores the uses that Michael Friedman and Bas van Fraassen have recently made of the work of Hans Reichenbach. It uses Friedman's work to complicate van Fraassen's invocation of Reichenbach's voluntarism in support of empiricism. It uses van Fraassen's work to motivate a concern with Friedman's neo-Kantian reading of Reichenbach. We are, finally, left with questions about the status and content of the account of the epistemic subject available to an epistemological voluntarist. /// [Thomas (...) E. Uebel] This response considers the question whether empiricists are condemned to silence about the epistemic agency their theories attribute or presuppose. It is argued that, unlike Reichenbach or Carnap, Neurath allowed for and indeed provided specifications of the role of epistemic agency in scientific inquiry. If this is correct, it underscores once more the need to distinguish between the various strands of logical positivism which show different strengths and weaknesses. (shrink)

Four distinguished authors have been brought together to produce this elegant study of a much-neglected figure. The book is divided into three sections: Neurath's biographical background and the economic and social context of his ideas; his theory of science; and the development of his role in debates on Marxist concepts of history and his own conception of science. Coinciding with the emerging serious interest in logical positivism, this timely publication will redress a current imbalance in the history and philosophy of (...) science. (shrink)

While this Journal is not the place for an extended discussion of the exegeticalpoints raised by Thomas Oberdan’s ‘The Vienna Circle’s ‘‘Anti-Foundation-alism’’’ [1998], some brief remarks are required to correct his misunderstand-ing of my position on the relevant issues, to stress the highly controversialstatus of his own interpretation and to counter his portrayal of the dialectics ofthe debate.

Big Ideas for Little Kids includes everything a teacher, a parent, or a college student needs to teach philosophy to elementary school children from picture books. Written in a clear and accessible style, the book explains why it is important to allow young children access to philosophy during primary-school education. Wartenberg also gives advice on how to construct a "learner-centered" classroom, in which children discuss philosophical issues with one another as they respond to open-ended questions by saying whether they agree (...) or disagree with what others have said. (shrink)

THE NATURE OF ART is a collection of 29 seminal, historically-organized readings that are focused on a basic philosophical question: What is Art? Including writings from the Western tradition'both Continental and Analytic traditions'as well as non-Western, minority, and feminist writings, this volume provides students with a rich set of resources to explore this matter both broadly and deeply. Introductions to each reading situate the selection amidst each respective thinker's body of work and the greater philosophical context in which the remarks (...) arose. Reading questions accompany each selection, drawing students' attention to key points to be encountered. Hailed by reviewers and adopters for its clarity and rigor, Wartenberg's THE NATURE OF ART offers a lively and engaging introduction to the philosophy of art. (shrink)

In this book Thomas Wren uncovers and assesses the largely hidden philosophical assumptions about human motivation that have shaped contemporary psychological ...

This chapter talks about Peter Catalanotto's delightfully illustrated picture book, Emily's Art. Traditionally, the philosophy of art was also called aesthetics, a term derived from the ancient Greek. There are many intriguing issues in the philosophy of art. For example, philosophers have proposed various different solutions to the question of what art is. Art is a subject that interests children because they often are engaged in producing it. So an interesting way to begin a discussion of issues in the philosophy (...) of art is to ask the children whether they prefer Kelly's paintings or Emily's and why. Once they explain, ask them whether they think that other people should agree with them, or if it's fine for other people to disagree. And, as usual, ask them to explain why they think what they think. (shrink)

Leo Lionni's charming tale of a mouse, eponymously named Frederick, raises very important questions about the nature of work, a topic addressed in the field of social and political philosophy. A question — one that the mice themselves raise — is whether Frederick is doing work when he gathers the sun, colors, and words. Since the book has used the word “gather” as its way of conceptualizing work, it might seem that Frederick is working, for he, too, is also gathering (...) things, just not the things that all the other mice do. Alternatively, we can say that even though Frederick is doing intellectual, rather than physical work, both types of work are necessary for the continued existence of anything but the most simple society. Children have differing opinions about whether Frederick was working or was just being a slacker. (shrink)

This chapter talks about a picture of Crockett Johnson's book, Harold and the Purple Crayon, where Harold, a young toddler, standing with his body facing to our left but with his head turned slightly to the right. When we see Harold making a drawing with his purple crayon in an illustration by Crocker Johnson, we are witnessing the workings of Harold's imagination. Because of the peculiar metaphysics of his world, objects solve his problems when they morph from drawings into real (...) things. Harold and the Purple Crayon is a testament to the power of children's imaginations, their ability to give reality to things we adults can only dream about. The book gives us an introduction to the metaphysical distinction between real and merely imaginary things, and even criticizes one attempt to develop an account of that distinction. (shrink)

This chapter highlights different ways in which people communicate with one another. Although language is clearly a crucial means of communication, there are many other things that we can do to convey a message to someone. The chapter presents a story of in which Trixie had difficulty communicating to her father that they had left Knuffle Bunny at the Laundromat. Philosophers from earlier centuries would have viewed Trixie's difficulty as stemming from her attaching the wrong sounds (words?) to the ideas (...) she had in her mind. Twentieth‐century philosophers found this view unconvincing. The philosophy of mind investigates questions about the nature of the human mind. Although many different issues are addressed in this area of philosophy, the one that traditionally took pride of place was that of articulating the difference between the mind and the body, and deciding whether either was more basic than the other. (shrink)

This chapter talks about Tony Fucile's amusing book, Let's Do Nothing!. This book straddles the boundary between metaphysics and the philosophy of language, for the concept of nothing has been a very puzzling one to philosophers. But before entering those murky waters, let's see how Sal and Frankie fare in their attempt to do nothing. Sal and Frankie were trapped in their own fly bottle when they tried to do nothing. Sal's discovery — that you can't do nothing — was (...) a philosophical discovery, one that freed him and Frankie from the type of bewitchment that Wittgenstein and other ordinary language philosophers saw embodied in the history of philosophy. Discussion of “Nothing” with children is started by asking the children what are some examples of things that they really like to do. (shrink)

The theory of knowledge attempts to explain the nature and extent of human knowledge. A good place to begin the discussion on this theory is with the Princess Lenore's beliefs about the moon in Many Moons, a children's story on the different conceptions of knowledge. The story raises important questions about the nature of knowledge and those who claim to have it. We can understand the philosophical point that Many Moons makes about knowledge ask why the Jester is able to (...) solve a problem that none of the King's advisors can. An objectivist sees knowledge as something that is independent of any individual's point of view. The Jester has a different conception of knowledge. There are many other issues in the theory of knowledge besides skepticism and relativism. (shrink)

Harry Allard's very engaging and popular picture book Miss Nelson Is Missing! raises an important ethical issue. The issue is whether it is morally permissible to adopt an immoral means if doing so promotes a morally good end. The book shows us how successful deceptive behavior can be and also provides with an opportunity for reflecting on why such behavior is morally wrong. So there is a lesson to be learned about the importance of approaching children's picture books armed with (...) philosophy. If a parent just reads Miss Nelson Is Missing! to a child without raising the issue of whether what Miss Nelson did was moral, the child might come away thinking that her parent approved of Miss Nelson's actions. And, if the child took this to heart, she might think that it was all right to deceive others so long as one did so for their own benefit. (shrink)

People could have mistaken beliefs that they arrive at by faulty reasoning. B.Wiseman's delightful book, Morris the Moose, takes a more detailed look at such reasoning, itself the subject of philosophical logic. Morris explains to the cow why she must be a moose. He draws a false conclusion from true premises: that the cow has four legs, a tail, and horns. His problem could have been remedied by paying more attention to logic. Morris appeals to something like the following principle: (...) Things that look different from each other are really different from each other. The real lesson can take from this story of this stubborn moose is that it can sometimes be hard to admit your mistakes. Our own beliefs have a tenacity that makes it hard to accept contradictory evidence, and we are not always open to finding the truth if it challenges our cherished beliefs. (shrink)

This chapter discusses Arnold Lobel's story “Cookies,” a story about will‐power, a concept central to moral psychology. The question of whether Frog and Toad both, or one or neither, possess will‐power at the end of the story is a good one to begin a discussion of this interesting philosophical topic with children. The concept of will‐power is linked to an important philosophical concept, weakness of the will. The Greek philosopher Aristotle first identified this phenomenon. This area of philosophical investigation bridges (...) the fields of ethics and philosophy of mind, developing an account of the mental faculties necessary for moral — and immoral — behavior. Moral psychology integrates ethics with the philosophy of mind. While ethics discusses questions of right and wrong, moral psychology focuses on what gives us the ability to do what's right despite the attractions of morally problematic courses of action. (shrink)

Shrek! focuses on an issue in the philosophy of language, a relatively new area of philosophical investigation that first emerged during the twentieth century. Some philosophers disagree with the claim that you cannot separate the descriptive and evaluative elements of linguistic statements. This is because they take descriptive statements to be the basic elements of language, to which our subjective attitudes get attached later in a contingent manner. At its most basic level language presents a symbolic picture of facts in (...) the world. Shrek! presents what philosophers call a thought experiment that purports to show that the descriptive and evaluative contents of sentences are really distinct. The chapter ends by suggesting how to discuss the philosophy of language with children. (shrink)

In Daniel Manus Pinkwater's quirkily illustrated book, The Big Orange Splot, a strange accident leads a man to change his life. The book presents an important claim that the existentialists and other philosophers have embraced: That the life of conformity is one that people ought to avoid, despite its attractiveness. Instead of living a life just like everyone else and fulfilling expectations that others have for us, our lives should resemble the transformed facades of all the homes on Mr. Plumbean's (...) street: reflections of our own, individual dreams. (shrink)

The chapter talks about Shel Silverstein's The Giving Tree, which is a favorite of many children, adults, and teachers. The story of a relationship between a boy and a tree is charming for, despite the vicissitudes of the relationship, the two end up together at the end, with the boy — now an old man — sitting contentedly on the tree — itself reduced to a mere stump. The book raises an important issue in the field of environmental ethics. It (...) asks us to recognize that between childhood and old age, people operating within the Western tradition of ethics are not mindful of the value that the non‐human beings in their environment have for them as well as for future generations. Harkening to such warnings, environmental ethicists have attempted to raise important issues about our relationship with the other beings that make up our world. (shrink)

Margaret Wise Brown's The Important Book, which is a childrens' picture book, provides an excellent opportunity to discuss metaphysics. The book opens up for our reflection the viability of a certain metaphysical account of the nature of objects. In making a distinction between the important feature or property of an object and all the others that it simply is or has, The Important Book operates with the assumption that all objects have what metaphysicians call an essential property. As the book (...) has it, while there are many things that are true of any object, only one is essential to it. These other things are accidents or non‐essential properties of the object. Essentialism is the metaphysical view that objects have one property — their essential property — that cannot change while the object remains the same thing. (shrink)

Robert Mursch's picture book, The Paper Bag Princess, inverts many of the gender roles traditionally found in fairy tales: It's a prince (Roland) who gets abducted in this story, not a princess, though it's the princess (Elizabeth) who must come to the rescue and save him. Although these reversals are a source of the book's humor, they also underscore claims made in feminist philosophy, the specific branch of social and political philosophy considered in this chapter. Feminist philosophers and literary scholars (...) have pointed out that happy endings reassert harmful gender norms. Elizabeth's rejection of Roland marks her as a truly feminist hero, for she won't let him treat her in a demeaning manner even though she has staked her own life on saving him. With this story, you can hopefully steer children into a discussion of gender bias and oppression, and how traditional stories function to support it. (shrink)

The Sneetches by Theodor Geisel (otherwise known as Dr Seuss) is a satirical story that targets illicit discrimination. The book presents its parable about discrimination by depicting a society in which one group discriminates against another group because of an easily perceptible difference between them. The real irrationality of discrimination in both The Sneetches and real life is that it is based on the false claim that members of the discriminated‐against group are inferior to members of the discriminating group. The (...) book ends with all of the Sneetches playing with one another, paying no attention to the presence or absence of stars on their bellies. The lesson that children draw from The Sneetches is clear: Discriminating against people in a different social group is wrong. (shrink)

The prelims comprise: Half‐Title Page Title Page Copyright Page Dedication Page Table of Contents Acknowledgments.

In William Steig's inventive book, Yellow and Pink, the debate is played out through a dialogue between two painted wooden puppets. In the book, Yellow (the yellow‐colored puppet) is skeptical of the existence of a God‐like creator. Pink represents the traditional theist, someone who believes in the existence of God. Yellow narrates how he and Pink could have come into being through a series of coincidences. According to Darwin's theory, mutations are selected for in evolution, with the result that a (...) new species comes into being over many generations. This is a theory like Yellow's, one that makes no reference to a divine being who brings human beings (or wooden puppets!) into existence. In discussing arguments for God's existence with children, it is important to acknowledge that the issue at hand is not whether God exists, but whether a specific attempt to prove His existence is convincing. (shrink)

Verificationism has had a bad press for many years. The view that the meaning of our words is bound up with the discernible difference it would make if what we say, think or write were true or false, nowadays is scorned as “positivist” though it was shared by eminent empiricists and pragmatists. This paper seeks to sort through some of the complexities of what is often portrayed as an unduly simplistic conception. I begin with an overview of its main logical (...) empiricist varieties before considering which aspects of it fall victim to which of the three major types of objection that have been raised against it. I will conclude that what is left standing is a modest proposal that seems worth further investigation. (shrink)

Chapter INTRODUCTION: OTTO NEURATH, THE VIENNA CIRCLE AND THE PROTOCOL SENTENCE DEBATE Everybody familiar with contemporary analytical philosophy is likely ...

Discussions of the relation between pragmatism and logical empiricism tend to focus on the period when the logical empiricists found themselves in exile, mostly in the United States, and then attempt to gauge the actual extent of their convergence. My concern lies with the period before that and the question whether pragmatism had an earlier influence on the development of logical empiricism, especially on the thought of the former members of the “first” Vienna Circle. I argue for a substantially qualified (...) affirmative answer. (shrink)

the ready availability of wittgenstein's previously unpublished writings from his so-called middle period of 1929 to 1936 has greatly enriched our understanding of the development of his thought. For obvious reasons, however, it has had little effect on the interpretation of Wittgenstein's contemporaries. At the time, few, even amongst those who had by then taken note of the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, were apprised of the new avenues Wittgenstein's thought had begun to take. One such rare exception was Moritz Schlick, the nominal (...) head of the Vienna Circle and an eminent philosopher of science. Even before Wittgenstein's return to... (shrink)

This volume is a serious attempt to open up the subject of European philosophy of science to real thought, and provide the structural basis for the ...

European Journal of Philosophy, EarlyView.

Do the terms “logical positivism” and “logical empiricism” mark a philosophically real and significant distinction? There is, of course, no doubt that the first term designates the group of philosophers known as the Vienna Circle, headed by Moritz Schlick and including Rudolf Carnap, Herbert Feigl, Philipp Frank, Hans Hahn, Otto Neurath, Friedrich Waismann and others. What is debatable, however, is whether the name “logical positivism” correctly distinguishes their doctrines from related ones called “logical empiricism” that emerged from the Berlin Society (...) for Scientific Philosophy around Hans Reichenbach which included Walter Dubislav, Kurt Grelling, Kurt Lewin and a young Carl Gustav Hempel.1 The .. (shrink)

This paper concerns the issue of whether the so-called left wing of the Vienna Circle (Carnap, Neurath, Frank) can be understood as having provided the blueprint for a bipartite metatheory with a formal-logical part (the “logic of science”) supporting and being supported by a naturalistic-empirical part (the “behavioristics of science”). A claim to this effect was recently met by a counterclaim that there was indeed an attempt made to broaden Carnap’s formalist conception of philosophy by the pragmatist Morris, but that (...) this initiative failed and that Carnap showed no interest in it. To defend the original claim this paper provides an analysis of Carnap and Morris on the subject matter of pragmatics in order to show that and how Carnap adopted Morris’s proposals in so far as they agreed with bipartite metatheory conception. (shrink)

The question of the political potential possessed by the philosophies of the Vienna Circle is complex for more than one reason. It is so partly due to the politically heterogeneous membership of the Circle, partly due to the difficult if not extreme political circumstances under which they had to operate, and partly due to the variable meanings of the parameter "political," some of which are and some of which are not compatible with, in turn, variable versions of the doctrine of (...) the value-neutrality of science. For instance, philosophies of science may steadfastly be standing guard against pseudo-scientific nonsense being paraded as worthy of credence in public discourse, this concern for intellectual hygene... (shrink)

Considerable unclarity exists in the literature concerning the origin and authorship of Wissenschaftliche Weltauffassung. Der Wiener Kreis, the Vienna Circle’s manifesto of 1929 and on the extent of and the reasons for the mixed reception it received in the Circle itself. This paper reconsiders these matters on the light of so far insufªciently consulted documents.

This paper considers the charge that—contrary to the current widespread assumption accompanying the near-universal neglect of his work—Wilhelm Jerusalem (1854–1923) cannot count as one of the founders of the sociology of (scientific) knowledge. In order to elucidate the matter, Jerusalem’s “sociology of cognition” is here reconstructed in the context of his own work in psychology and philosophy as well as in the context of the work of some predecessors and contemporaries. It is argued that while it shows clear discontinuities with (...) the present-day understanding of the sociology of (scientific) knowledge, Jerusalem’s sociology of cognition was not only distinctive in its own day but also anticipated in nuce a much-discussed theme in current history of science. (shrink)