Cette étude porte sur la place qui revient à la Société philosophique de l’Université de Vienne dans l’évolution de l’histoire de la philosophie en Autriche jusqu’à la formation du Cercle de Vienne en 1929. Nous examinerons plus particulièrement trois aspects de la relation entre le Cercle de Vienne et la Société philosophique qui ont fait l’objet de plusieurs études par les historiens de l’empirisme logique : le premier aspect concerne la thèse d’un proto-Cercle de Vienne formé principalement par H. Hahn, (...) P. Frank et O. Neurath ; le deuxième aspect porte sur la thèse suivant laquelle le chaînon manquant entre le Cercle de Vienne et la tradition bolzanienne en Autriche est l’étudiant de Brentano et de Meinong, A. Höfler ; nous examinerons enfin le lien établi par plusieurs historiens entre l’annexion de la Société philosophique à la Kant-Gesellschaft en 1927 et la fondation du Cercle de Vienne en 1929. Nous voudrions montrer que cette institution a joué un rôle clé dans l’histoire de la philosophie en Autriche et qu’elle est en partie responsable de la formation du Cercle de Vienne.This study examines the place of the Philosophical Society of the University of Vienna in the evolution of the history of philosophy in Austria up to the formation of the Vienna Circle in 1929. I will examine three aspects of the relationship between the Austrian members of the Vienna Circle and the Philosophical Society, which has been emphasized by several historians of the Vienna Circle : the first aspect concerns the theory of a first Vienna Circle formed mainly by H. Hahn, P. Frank and O. Neurath ; the second aspect is the contention that the missing link between the Vienna Circle and the Bolzano tradition in Austria is Alois Höfler, a student of Brentano and Meinong ; I will finally examine the link they established between the annexation of the Philosophical Society to the Kant-Gesellschaft in 1927 and the founding of the Vienna Circle in 1929. I will argue that this institution played a key role in the history of philosophy in Austria and is partly responsible for the formation of the Vienna Circle. (shrink)

John Dewey’s theory of truth is widely viewed as proposing to substitute “warranted assertibility” for “truth,” a proposal that has faced serious objections since the late 1930s. By examining Dewey’s theory in its historical context – and, in particular, by drawing parallels with Otto Neurath’s concurrent attempts to develop a non-correspondence, non-formal theory of truth – I aim to shed light on Dewey’s underlying objectives. Dewey and Neurath were well-known to each other and, as their writing and correspondence make clear, (...) they took similar paths over the mid-century philosophical terrain. I conclude that Dewey’s account of truth is more principled, and more relevant to historical debates, than it first appears. (shrink)