Das Menschliche ist dadurch charakterisiert, dass der Mensch über sich selbst und seine Verfasstheit sowie seine Gemeinschaft und Kultur nachdenken kann, ja, muss. Er ist das Wesen, das sich selber immer wieder zum Problem geworden ist und wird, das nicht selbstverständlich einfach so dahinlebt oder -existiert, sondern in gewisser Weise ein reflektierendes Wesen ist, das sich nach sich selber befragt, nach dem Sinn seiner Existenz, seines Lebens, seiner Verfasstheit als eines geschlechtlichen Wesens usw. Das sind Gesichtspunkte, die natürlich immer nur (...) in einer kulturellen und einer traditions-gesellschaftlichen Welt eingenommen bzw. gewonnen werden können. Aufgabe einer philosophischen Anthropologie ist es nun - so Hans Lenk - das Wissen um die Lage und die Fähigkeiten des Menschen in ein Gesamtbild zu bringen. Mit anderen Worten, sie muss sich interdisziplinär verstehen und die Ergebnisse der Wissenschaften, soweit sie für das Thema Mensch und die umfassende Behandlung und Integration aller Aspekte in diesem Zusammenhang wichtig sind, mit einbeziehen. (shrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: Wittgenstein-Studien Jahrgang: 5 Heft: 1 Seiten: 1-26.

Non-available common goods or: private non-availability of merit common goods The traditional emphasis on the individualistic concept of property stressed and analyzed by Locke and Kant led to a devaluation in philosophy and economy of traditionally usual forms of collective property, in particular of land, e. g., in form of the so-called "commons". Under the auspices of successful liberal and social market economy - though at times with the emphasis on "property obliges the owner" - private capitalism as the dominant (...) economy and a certain kind of value-neutral conception - and thus free availability - of nature consequently implied that the merit character of collective goods pertaining to nature and natural landscapes etc. was not taken seriously anymore New developments in jurisprudence and economy however show that even in principle a total private allocation of collective goods like the environment is neither possible nor meaningful, e. g. as regards the protection of the environment as an extremely important orientation at the common weal, in particular with respect to succeeding generations. In media coverage regarding environment problems, external effects and social traps should be taken into consideration regarding the aspect of a collective good including the necessary evaluation under common interests, i. e. the merit aspect should be more explicitly taken into account than hitherto. Das positive gesetzte Recht, in der Gesetzgebung festgelegt, ist weitgehend - zumindest was die Menschen- und Grundrechte angeht - von allgemeinen sittlichen Werten geprägt. So ist das Prinzip der Gerechtigkeit ethischer Maßstab des positiven Rechts und findet als Gebot der Gleichbehandlung Eingang in die Verfassung. Ethische Normen werden soziokulturell relativ sanktioniert; es sind soziokulturell relative Aussagen, die jedoch mit dem Anspruch auf allgemeine Geltung und Verbindlichkeit formuliert werden. Auch das Recht als Teil der Kultur ist sozial konventionalisiertes Menschenprodukt, obgleich doch jeder einzelne davon geprägt ist. (shrink)

Keine ausführliche Beschreibung für "Kritik der logischen Konstanten" verfügbar.

This book shows that classic Chinese philosophy is as rational as Western approaches dealing with the problems of logic, epistemology, language analysis, and linguistic topics from a philosophical point of view. It presents detailed analyses of rational and methodological features in Confucianism, Taoist philosophy, and the School of Names as well as Mohist approaches in classical Chinese philosophy, especially in regard to ideas of valid knowledge. The authors also provide new arguments against cultural relativism and antirational movements like religious fundamentalism (...) that do not pay due attention to what all human beings have in common-- to cultural universals. (shrink)

Interpretari necesse est (Interpretation is necessary). This slogan is summarizing the methodological and epistemological essay concentrating on what can be called a transcendental interpretationism and a methodological interpretationism. This approach is combining a pragmatic interpretive approach with a constitutional quasi Kantian but more pluralistic and flexible epistemology. It takes up the assets of Nietzsches radical interpretationism without ending up in an interpretationist idealism. Though a basic fundamental insight is a statement of the interpretation-impragnatedness of any knowledge and experience whatsoever, there (...) is nevertheless a possibility to combine a kind of critical realism with this interpretationist approach. Though we are always obliged to use interpretation-dependent epistemological schemata and concepts as well as theories (we have no non-interpretive concepts, theories and ways of gaining and constructing knowledge), we have still, for practical reasons, to presuppose an external independent world which can however only be described in interpretation-dependent terms. Even this epistemological model is certainly an interpretive one. If we distinguish between different levels of more or less variable interpretations (we cannot, by our very biological constitution, change primary interpretations built in to our biological constitution and make-up of sense-organs etc.), we can analyse and define truth as a relation between different levels and types of interpretations. The ideal of truth makes some sense of a concept of correspondence, though in the last analysis it is a combination of coherence-theoretical and pragmatic-constructivist ideas. — The model of an epistemological interpretationism has the advantage (by contradistinction, e.g., with critical rationalism) to be consistently applied to itself: The interpretive epistemology is certainly but an interpretational model itself. — The sketched interpretationism has certain similarities with Nelson Goodman's constructive interpretive pluralism and Hilary Putnam's internal realism, although there are slight, but decisive differences to be carefully observed. The differences have to do with the mentioned practical realism and the presupposition of one world in which we live. The similarities are greater with respect to internal realism. A decisive difference is only that you cannot, according to methodological and transcendental interpretationism, compel somebody towards the uniqueness of language use. There are always degrees of freedom and variation to change the usage of signs. There is no socially intended uniqueness and compulsory usage of signs and their meanings. Even within the language community the rules are always only conventionally realized and actualized. There is no real correspondence between signs and signs (or interpretive constructs, for that matter). Any correspondence whatsoever can only refer to interpretational constructs itself. Any classification, verification, selection and identification of facts, even any thinking of data and facts as such is in the last analysis dependent on interpretations. Even the conception of an epistemological subject is but an interpretational construct on a higher level. (shrink)

Goldman (1971) analyzed interrelations between act-statements by inducing a structure by means of the relationship by, e.g.: "He turned on the light by flipping the switch." Generally, the structure is represented by act-diagrams, e.g. act-trees. In the present article the mathematical theory of directed graphs (digraphs), specifically the concepts of partially or strictly ordered sets, graph-theoretical trees, semi-lattices etc. are shown to be applicable and conducive to the formal and a more general description of networks of act statements generated by (...) a (relative) basic actionstatement and by the relation by. The well-known problem of identity of acts described by corresponding statements connected by by is differentiated by introducing the graph-theoretical equivalence relation of belonging to the same-graph {graph-sameness or graph-identity) admitting of a more refined classification and logical description of the interdependence of actions, acttypes, act-properties etc. (shrink)

The paper discusses Giere’s perspectivism in philosophy of science. Giere is certainly right in judging that, even within perspectives, the strongest possible conclusion is that some model provides a good but never perfect fit to aspects of the world, but its agency-laden “modelism” and realistic instrumentalism should be extended to a comprehensive general perspectivist and “indirect” realistic epistemology and embed it in an anthropology proper of the man as “flexible multiple human being”. Scheme-interpretations and specific perspectives are necessary for any (...) cognition in any science—natural and social, but also for everyday conceptions, modeling and practical acting as well as in philosophy and philosophy of science. (shrink)

The Proceedings of the Karlsruhe Academic Session of the International Academy of the Philosophy of the Sciences cover the topic of philosophy of technology. Half a dozen of other pertinent topical papers have been added in order to extend the topics dealt with and to reach a rather comprehensive overview of this multi-ramified field. Nowadays philosophy of technology is not only confronted with new, anthropological and social as well as political problems to deal with, but also with methodological problems of (...) the mutual interactions between science and technology, with problems of reliability and viability of technology assessment, e. g. with risks, environmental and social impact assessments. The importance and necessity of a philosophy and a practice-oriented ethics of technology will drastically rise and grow in the near future. (shrink)

Summary Interpretari necesse est (Interpretation is necessary). This slogan is summarizing the methodological and epistemological essay concentrating on what can be called a transcendental interpretationism and a methodological interpretationism. This approach is combining a pragmatic interpretive approach with a constitutional quasi Kantian but more pluralistic and flexible epistemology. It takes up the assets of Nietzsches radical interpretationism without ending up in an interpretationist idealism. Though a basic fundamental insight is a statement of the interpretation-impragnatedness of any knowledge and experience whatsoever, (...) there is nevertheless a possibility to combine a kind of critical realism with this interpretationist approach. Though we are always obliged to use interpretation-dependent epistemological schemata and concepts as well as theories (we have no non-interpretive concepts, theories and ways of gaining and constructing knowledge), we have still, for practical reasons, to presuppose an external independent world which can however only be described in interpretation-dependent terms. Even this epistemological model is certainly an interpretive one. If we distinguish between different levels of more or less variable interpretations (we cannot, by our very biological constitution, change primary interpretations built in to our biological constitution and make-up of sense-organs etc.), we can analyse and define truth as a relation between different levels and types of interpretations. The ideal of truth makes some sense of a concept of correspondence, though in the last analysis it is a combination of coherence-theoretical and pragmatic-constructivist ideas. — The model of an epistemological interpretationism has the advantage (by contradistinction, e.g., with critical rationalism) to be consistently applied to itself: The interpretive epistemology is certainly but an interpretational model itself. — The sketched interpretationism has certain similarities with Nelson Goodman's constructive interpretive pluralism and Hilary Putnam's internal realism, although there are slight, but decisive differences to be carefully observed. The differences have to do with the mentioned practical realism and the presupposition of one world in which we live. The similarities are greater with respect to internal realism. A decisive difference is only that you cannot, according to methodological and transcendental interpretationism, compel somebody towards the uniqueness of language use. There are always degrees of freedom and variation to change the usage of signs. There is no socially intended uniqueness and compulsory usage of signs and their meanings. Even within the language community the rules are always only conventionally realized and actualized. There is no real correspondence between signs and signs (or interpretive constructs, for that matter). Any correspondence whatsoever can only refer to interpretational constructs itself. Any classification, verification, selection and identification of facts, even any thinking of data and facts as such is in the last analysis dependent on interpretations. Even the conception of an epistemological subject is but an interpretational construct on a higher level. (shrink)