In this paper, we propose meaningfulness as one important evaluative criterion in individual climate ethics and suggest that most of our greenhouse gas emitting actions, behaviours, and lives are the opposite of meaningful: anti-meaningful. We explain why such actions etc. score negatively on three important dimensions of the meaningfulness scale, which we call the agential, narrative, and generative dimensions. We suggest that thinking about individual climate ethics also in terms of (anti-) meaningfulness illuminates important aspects of our troubled ethical involvement (...) with CC and can make a fresh and fruitful contribution to existing discussions, which tend to focus on moral responsibility and obligations. (shrink)

This paper describes the disorienting aesthetics of some environments that are characteristic of the Anthropocene. We refer to these environments as 'mashed-up' and present three dimensions - phenomenological, epistemological and narrative - of the aesthetic disorientation they can trigger. We then advance the suggestion that a rich, nuanced and meaningful aesthetic experience of mashed-up Anthropocene environments (MAEs) calls for a mode of appreciation grounded on performative practices of aesthetic familiarisation with particular MAEs and entities and processes thereof. Familiarisation with MAEs, (...) we further note, can have disorienting codas of its own. It can reveal and highlight, rather than eliminate or alleviate, the solid strangeness of Earth even in the systemically humanised world of the Anthropocene, and it can expose and tie at least some of our agency, identity and sources of meaning in life to the same unstable evolvability of particular MAEs. (shrink)

The paper discusses some difficulties that life in Anthropocene poses to our ethical thinking. It describes the sort of ethical task that individuals find themselves confronting when dealing with the planetary environmental quandaries that characterise the new epoch. It then asks what, given the situation, would count as environmentally virtuous ways of looking at and going about our lives, and how relevant virtues can be developed. It is argued that the practice of gardening is distinctively conducive to that objective. Finally, (...) some garden virtues that will be of special importance in the Anthropocene, but have so far been largely neglected by environmental ethicists, are listed and described. (shrink)

Large parts of our world are filled with plants, and human life depends on, interacts with, affects and is affected by plant life in various ways. Yet plants have not received nearly as much attention from philosophers and ethicists as they deserve. In environmental philosophy, plants are often swiftly subsumed under the categories of "all living things" and rarely considered thematically. There is a need for developing a more sophisticated theoretical understanding of plants and their practical role in human experience. (...) Plant Ethics: Concepts and Applications aims at opening a philosophical discussion that may begin to fill that gap. The book investigates issues in plants ontology, ethics and the role of plants and their cultivation in various fields of application. It explores and develops important concepts to shape and frame plants-related philosophical questions accurately, including new ideas of how to address moral questions when confronted with plants in concrete scenarios. This edited volume brings together for the first time, and in an interdisciplinary spirit, contemporary approaches to plant ethics by international scholars of established reputation. It will be of great interest to students and scholars of Philosophy and Ethics. (shrink)

​This book proposes and defends the practice of urban gardening as an ecologically and socially beneficial, culturally innovative, morally appropriate, ethically uplifting, and politically incisive way for individuals and variously networked collectives to contribute to a successful management of some defining challenges of the Anthropocene – this new epoch in which no earthly place, form, entity, process, or system escapes the reach of human activity – including urban resilience and climate change.

Vast and pervasive environmental problems such as climate change and biodiversity loss call every individual to active stewardship. Their magnitude and causal and strategic structures, however, pose powerful challenges to our moral psychology. Stewardship may feel overburdening, and appear hopeless. This may lead to widespread moral and political disengagement. This article proposes a resolve to garden practices as a way out of that danger, and describes the ways in which it will motivate individuals to so act as to coordinate on (...) behavioural patterns that will significantly alleviate grave, but seemingly distant and intractable environmental quandaries. (shrink)

This article discusses the encounter between virtue ethics and environmental ethics and the ways in which environmental virtue ethics confronts nonhuman axiology and the controversial theme of moral anthropocentrism. It provides a reasoned review of the relevant literature and a historical–conceptual rendition of how environmental and virtue ethics came to converge as well as the ways in which they diverge. It explains that contrary to important worries voiced by some non-anthropocentric environmental ethicists, environmental virtue ethics enables and requires a rich (...) and nuanced engagement with nonhuman values of all sorts—intrinsic as well as extrinsic, moral as well as nonmoral, anthropocentric as well as non-anthropocentric—and neither presupposes nor implies moral anthropocentrism in its normativity. Finally, the article considers the fortunes of, and some challenges for, environmental virtue ethics in its application to the ethics of climate change, an increasingly central topic in environmental ethics. This article proceeds as follows: the first section introduces virtue ethics; the second section looks at axiological and normative themes in environmental ethics; the third section discusses environmental virtue ethics; and the fourth section considers its application to climate change. The fifth section draws some conclusions. (shrink)

This volume provides a rigorous philosophical investigation of the rationales, challenges, and promises of the coming Space Age. Over the past decade, space exploration has made significant and accelerating progress, and its potential has attracted growing attention from science, states, businesses, innovators, as well as the media and society more generally. However, philosophical theorizing concerning the premises, values, meanings, and impacts of space exploration is still in its infancy, and this potentially immense field of study is far from mainstream yet. (...) This book advances outer space philosophy by integrating key scientific and societal debates sparked by recent developments in space research and activities with conceptual, existential, ethical, aesthetic, and political themes and concerns. It maps various regions of philosophical exploration, reflection, and speculation regarding humanity's present and future irradiation into outer space, to promote a broad, rich, and nuanced societal debate regarding this transformative enterprise, which is as stimulating as it can be disorienting. This book will be a fascinating philosophical and ethical exploration for academics, researchers and students interested in philosophy, space studies, science and technology studies, future studies, and sustainability. (shrink)

Il saggio difende l'idea che i contesti più congeniali allo sviluppo ed e- sercizio di un carattere virtuoso dal punto di vista ambientale siano i giar- dini – e il modo migliore per sviluppare ed esercitare tale carattere sia con- servare specie botaniche, coltivandone esemplari con le proprie mani. La coltivazione di un giardino permette, e richiede, una certa comprensione e accettazione di importanti dimensioni del rapporto uomo-natura, le quali innescano comportamenti positivi che, consolidandosi nel tempo attraverso abitudine e riflessione, (...) diventano veri e propri tratti caratteriali virtuosi. Le virtù sviluppate ed esercitate in giardino contribuiranno in modo decisivo alla buona riuscita dei nostri futuri sforzi verso la sostenibilità, perché avranno un prezioso aspetto operativo, assente dalle virtù ambientali tipi- camente contemplative che l'individuo può invece sviluppare ed esercitare in aree naturali non umanizzate.The paper argues that gardens are contexts obviously congenial to the de- velopment and exercise of a virtuous environmental character, and the practice most conducive to such objective is that of conserving botanical species in them, cultivating specimens with one's own two hands. Garden practices enable and require a certain understanding and acceptance of a number of crucial dimension of the man-nature relationship, triggering re- current positive environmental behavior that, through reflective habituation, eventually solidifies into environmentally virtuous character traits. The virtues developed and exercised in gardens will greatly contribute to our future efforts towards sustainability, for they will possess a precious operative dimension, absent from the typically contemplative virtues that an individual can instead develop and exercise in non- humanized natural areas. (shrink)

Il saggio difende l'idea che i contesti piů congeniali allo sviluppo e all'esercizio di un carattere virtuoso dal punto di vista ambientale siano i giardini e che il modo migliore per sviluppare ed esercitare tale carattere sia conservare specie botaniche, coltivandone esemplari con le proprie mani. La coltivazione di un giardino permette, e richiede, una certa comprensione e accettazione di importanti dimensioni del rapporto uomo-natura, le quali innescano comportamenti positivi che, consolidandosi nel tempo attraverso abitudine e riflessione, diventano veri e (...) propri tratti caratteriali virtuosi. Le virtů sviluppate ed esercitate in giardino contribuiranno in modo decisivo alla buona riuscita dei nostri futuri sforzi verso la sostenibilitÀ, perché avranno un prezioso aspetto operativo, assente dalle virtů ambientali tipicamente contemplative che l'individuo puň invece sviluppare ed esercitare in aree naturali non umanizzate. (shrink)

This short chapter brings the Handbook to a close. It gathers basic takeaways from the volume and offers some general reflections on climate change, the philosophy of climate change and its futures, and the experience of editing a Handbook on the Philosophy of Climate Change.

Climate change is a key challenge in the contemporary world. This volume studies climate change through many lenses: politics, law, ethics, philosophy, religion, and contemporary art and culture. The essays explore alternatives for sustainable development and highlight oft-overlooked issues, such as climate change refugees and food justice. Designed as four parts, the volume: first, offers an astute diagnosis of the political and moral intricacies of climate change; second, deals specifically with topics in the political theory of climate change governance; third, (...) focuses on the moral theory of climate change; and, finally, analyzes the specific ramifications of the climate change problem. With contributions from experts across the world, this will be especially useful to scholars and students of climate change studies, development studies, environmental studies, politics, and ethics and philosophy. It will also interest policy-makers, social activists, governmental and non-governmental agencies, and those in media and journalism. (shrink)

This paper focuses on a specific proposal connected with the issue of mitigating climate change by reducing GHG concentrations in the atmosphere. The idea of campaigning in favour of a temporary reproductive suspension, to be addressed to a range of citizens of developed countries , is explored. Some details of the proposal are specified, and the proposal itself is defended against four objec- tions: 1. that it encroaches reproductive freedom; 2. that it subtracts from the overall value the value of (...) future lives; 3. that it is costly and ineffectual; 4. that it is unfair, especially when women are considered. (shrink)

This Handbook offers a broad yet unified treatment of all the philosophical issues connected with climate change, ranging from foundational puzzles to detailed applications. It addresses the philosophical foundations of the discussion on the ethical, social, political and legal impacts of climate change. It covers all branches of philosophy that are relevant to the understanding of the premises and implications of the impacts on human, animal and natural life on Earth. More specifically, the Handbook examines the scientific accounts of climate (...) change as well as its causes. It explores the tools offered by social sciences and humanities to study the societal impact of climate change. It studies the ethical and political issues connected with and resulting from climate change, and puts it all in an environmental and historical context. In addition, the book offers solutions to the main philosophical puzzles and problems, and provides paths of interaction between philosophy and other disciplines. The discussion about climate change and the mitigation/adaptation policies spans many areas and levels – from abstract science and philosophy to current on-the-ground politics. However, climate change is also a great a philosophical puzzle. Indeed, its existential and practical relevance can be thought to largely derive from the philosophical complications it engenders. Climate change is applied philosophy par excellence. Preventing dangerous anthropogenic climate change needs very good philosophy applied to concrete and specific practical issues. Climate change is an area where scholars from very different provenances should cooperate on equal terms, having in view a common, and really important, purpose – contribute to preventing great burdens and even the extinction of humankind and the destruction of hospitable and valuable non-human nature. (shrink)

This Handbook offers a broad yet unified treatment of all the philosophical issues connected with climate change, ranging from foundational puzzles to detailed applications. It addresses the philosophical foundations of the discussion on the ethical, social, political and legal impacts of climate change. It covers all branches of philosophy that are relevant to the understanding of the premises and implications of the impacts on human, animal and natural life on Earth. More specifically, the Handbook examines the scientific accounts of climate (...) change as well as its causes. It explores the tools offered by social sciences and humanities to study the societal impact of climate change. It studies the ethical and political issues connected with and resulting from climate change, and puts it all in an environmental and historical context. In addition, the book offers solutions to the main philosophical puzzles and problems, and provides paths of interaction between philosophy and other disciplines. The discussion about climate change and the mitigation/adaptation policies spans many areas and levels – from abstract science and philosophy to current on-the-ground politics. However, climate change is also a great a philosophical puzzle. Indeed, its existential and practical relevance can be thought to largely derive from the philosophical complications it engenders. Climate change is applied philosophy par excellence. Preventing dangerous anthropogenic climate change needs very good philosophy applied to concrete and specific practical issues. Climate change is an area where scholars from very different provenances should cooperate on equal terms, having in view a common, and really important, purpose – contribute to preventing great burdens and even the extinction of humankind and the destruction of hospitable and valuable non-human nature. (shrink)

This Handbook offers a broad yet unified treatment of many philosophical issues connected with climate change, ranging from foundational puzzles to detailed applications. It extends to many branches of philosophy that are relevant to the understanding of the premises and implications of the impacts of climate change on human and nonhuman life on Earth. More specifically, the handbook examines the scientific accounts of climate change as well as its causes. It explores the tools offered by social sciences and humanities to (...) study the societal premises and impacts of climate change as well as delving deeper into the ethical and political issues connected with and resulting from climate change. By doing so, it puts it all in an ecological and historical context. In addition, the book offers solutions to some important philosophical puzzles and problems, and indicates paths of interaction between philosophy and other disciplines. The discussion about climate change and the mitigation/adaptation policies spans many areas and levels – from abstract science and philosophy to current on-the-ground politics. However, climate change is also a great a philosophical puzzle. Indeed, its existential and practical relevance can be thought to largely derive from the philosophical complications it engenders. Climate change is applied philosophy par excellence. Preventing dangerous anthropogenic climate change needs very good philosophy applied to concrete and specific practical issues. Climate change is an area where scholars from very different provenances should cooperate on equal terms, having in view a common, and really important, purpose – contribute to preventing great burdens and even the extinction of humankind and the destruction of hospitable and valuable non-human nature. (shrink)

Dominical categories are categories in which the notions of partial morphisms and their domains become explicit, with the latter being endomorphisms rather than subobjects of their sources. These categories form the basis for a novel abstract formulation of recursion theory, to which the present paper is devoted. The abstractness has of course its usual concomitant advantage of generality: it is interesting to see that many of the fundamental results of recursion theory remain valid in contexts far removed from their classic (...) manifestations. A principal reason for introducing this new formulation is to achieve an algebraization of the generalized incompleteness theorem, by providing a category-theoretic development of the concepts and tools of elementary recursion theory that are inherent in demonstrating the theorem.Dominical recursion theory avoids the commitment to sets and partial functions which is characteristic of other formulations, and thus allows for an intrinsic recursion theory within such structures as polyadic algebras. It is worthy of notice that much of elementary recursion theory can be developedwithout referencetoelements.By Gödel's generalized incompleteness theorem for consistent arithmetical systemTwe mean any statement of the following sort: if every recursive set is definable inT, thenTis essentially undecidable [41]; or if all recursive functions are definable inT, thenTis essentially undecidable [41]; or if every recursive set is definable inT, thenT0andR0 are recursively inseparable [39]; or if all re sets are representable inT, thenT0is creative [28], [39]; or ifTis a Rosser theory, thenT0andR0are effectively inseparable [39]. (shrink)

R. M. Friedberg demonstrated the existence of a recursive functional that agrees with no Banach-Mazur functional on the class of recursive functions. In this paper Friedberg's result is generalized to both α-recursive functionals and weak α-recursive functionals for all admissible ordinals α such that $\lambda , where α * is the Σ 1 -projectum of α and λ is the Σ 2 -cofinality of α. The theorem is also established for the metarecursive case, α = ω 1 , where α (...) * = λ = ω. (shrink)

Examples in the history of Automated Theorem Proving are given, in order to show that even a seemingly ‘mechanical’ activity, such as deductive inference drawing, involves special cultural features and tacit knowledge. Mechanisation of reasoning is thus regarded as a complex undertaking in ‘cultural pruning’ of human-oriented reasoning. Sociological counterparts of this passage from human- to machine-oriented reasoning are discussed, by focusing on problems of man-machine interaction in the area of computer-assisted proof processing.

Smith argues that, unlike other forms of evidence, naked statistical evidence fails to satisfy normic support. This is his solution to the puzzles of statistical evidence in legal proof. This paper focuses on Smith’s claim that DNA evidence in cold-hit cases does not satisfy normic support. I argue that if this claim is correct, virtually no other form of evidence used at trial can satisfy normic support. This is troublesome. I discuss a few ways in which Smith can respond.

Suppose one hundred prisoners are in a yard under the supervision of a guard, and at some point, ninety-nine of them collectively kill the guard. If, after the fact, a prisoner is picked at random and tried, the probability of his guilt is 99%. But despite the high probability, the statistical chances, by themselves, seem insufficient to justify a conviction. The question is why. Two arguments are offered. The first, decision-theoretic argument shows that a conviction solely based on the statistics (...) in the prisoner scenario is unacceptable so long as the goal of expected utility maximization is combined with fairness constraints. The second, risk-based argument shows that a conviction solely based on the statistics in the prisoner scenario lets the risk of mistaken conviction surge potentially too high. The same, by contrast, cannot be said of convictions solely based on DNA evidence or eyewitness testimony. A noteworthy feature of the two arguments in the paper is that they are not confined to criminal trials and can in fact be extended to civil trials. (shrink)

Many oppose the use of profile evidence against defendants at trial, even when the statistical correlations are reliable and the jury is free from prejudice. The literature has struggled to justify this opposition. We argue that admitting profile evidence is objectionable because it violates what we call “equal protection”—that is, a right of innocent defendants not to be exposed to higher ex ante risks of mistaken conviction compared to other innocent defendants facing similar charges. We also show why admitting other (...) forms of evidence, such as eyewitness, trace, and motive evidence, does not violate equal protection. (shrink)

The literature on algorithmic fairness has examined exogenous sources of biases such as shortcomings in the data and structural injustices in society. It has also examined internal sources of bias as evidenced by a number of impossibility theorems showing that no algorithm can concurrently satisfy multiple criteria of fairness. This paper contributes to the literature stemming from the impossibility theorems by examining how informational richness affects the accuracy and fairness of predictive algorithms. With the aid of a computer simulation, we (...) show that informational richness is the engine that drives improvements in the performance of a predictive algorithm, in terms of both accuracy and fairness. The centrality of informational richness suggests that classification parity, a popular criterion of algorithmic fairness, should be given relatively little weight. But we caution that the centrality of informational richness should be taken with a grain of salt in light of practical limitations, in particular, the so-called bias-variance trade off. (shrink)

Many philosophers have pointed out that statistical evidence, or at least some forms of it, lack desirable epistemic or non-epistemic properties, and that this should make us wary of litigations in which the case against the defendant rests in whole or in part on statistical evidence. Others have responded that such broad reservations about statistical evidence are overly restrictive since appellate courts have expressed nuanced views about statistical evidence. In an effort to clarify and reconcile, I put forward an interpretive (...) analysis of why statistical evidence should raise concerns in some cases but not others. I argue that when there is a mismatch between the specificity of the evidence and the expected specificity of the accusation, statistical evidence—as any other kind of evidence—should be considered insufficient to sustain a conviction. I rely on different stylized court cases to illustrate the explanatory power of this analysis. (shrink)

Car driving is considered a very complex activity, consisting of different concomitant tasks and subtasks, thus it is crucial to understand the impact of different factors, such as road complexity, traffic, dashboard devices, and external events on the driver’s behavior and performance. For this reason, in particular situations the cognitive demand experienced by the driver could be very high, inducing an excessive experienced mental workload and consequently an increasing of error commission probability. In this regard, it has been demonstrated that (...) human error is the main cause of the 57 % of road accidents and a contributing factor in most of them. In this study, 20 young subjects were involved in a real driving experiment, performed under different traffic conditions (rush hour and not) and along different road types (main and secondary streets). Moreover, during the driving tasks different specific events, in particular a pedestrian crossing the road and a car entering the traffic flow just ahead of the experimental subject, were acted. A Workload Index based on the Electroencephalographic (EEG), i.e. brain activity, of the drivers has been employed to investigate the impact of the different factors on the driver’s workload. Eye-Tracking technology and subjective measures were also employed in order to have a comprehensive overview of the driver’s perceived workload and to investigate the different insights obtainable from the employed methodologies. The employment of such EEG-based Workload index confirmed the significant impact of both traffic and road types on the drivers’ behavior (increasing their workload), with the advantage of being under real settings. Also, it allowed to highlight the increased workload related to external events while driving, in particular with a significant effect during those situations when the traffic was low. Finally, the comparison between methodologies revealed the higher sensitivity of neurophysiological measures with respect to Eye-Tracking and subjective ones. In conclusion, such an EEG-based Workload index would allow to assess objectively the mental workload experienced by the driver, standing out as a powerful tool for research aimed to investigate drivers’ behavior and providing additional and complementary insights with respect to traditional methodologies employed within road safety research. (shrink)

According to the principle of epistemic closure, knowledge is closed under known implication. The principle is intuitive but it is problematic in some cases. Suppose you know you have hands and you know that ‘I have hands’ implies ‘I am not a brain-in-a-vat’. Does it follow that you know you are not a brain-in-a-vat? It seems not; it should not be so easy to refute skepticism. In this and similar cases, we are confronted with a puzzle: epistemic closure is an (...) intuitive principle, but at times, it does not seem that we know by implication. In response to this puzzle, the literature has been mostly polarized between those who are willing to do away with epistemic closure and those who think we cannot live without it. But there is a third way. Here I formulate a restricted version of the principle of epistemic closure. In the standard version, the principle can range over any proposition; in the restricted version, it can only range over those propositions that are within the limits of a given epistemic inquiry and that do not constitute the underlying assumptions of the inquiry. If we adopt the restricted version, I argue, we can preserve the advantages associated with closure, while at the same time avoiding the puzzle I’ve described. My discussion also yields an insight into the nature of knowledge. I argue that knowledge is best understood as a topic-restricted notion, and that such a conception is a natural one given our limited cognitive resources. (shrink)

The primary aim of this chapter is to explain the nature of evidential reasoning, the characteristic difficulties encountered, and the tools to address these difficulties. Our focus is on evidential reasoning in criminal cases. There is an extensive scholarly literature on these topics, and it is a secondary aim of the chapter to provide readers the means to find their way in historical and ongoing debates.

This note discusses three issues that Allen and Pardo believe to be especially problematic for a probabilistic interpretation of standards of proof: (1) the subjectivity of probability assignments; (2) the conjunction paradox; and (3) the non-comparative nature of probabilistic standards. I offer a reading of probabilistic standards that avoids these criticisms.

Philosophical Issues, Volume 31, Issue 1, Page 41-65, October 2021.