: From 1902 onward, Peirce viewed esthetics, ethics, and logic as "normative sciences," interconnected spheres of philosophical inquiry that constitute his main work in value theory. The normative sciences provide the basis for a theoretical investigation of questions of value detached from practical interests. Because the normative sciences maintain Peirce's well-known insistence on realism, they set his pragmaticism apart from the more "nominalistic" pragmatism of James and Dewey. The paper aims to clarify Peirce's idea of the normative sciences, to show (...) how his realism applies in the sphere of value, and to explore his views on the proper relation between theory and practice. The concluding section suggests examples of how we might understand Peirce's rich and innovative concept of normative esthetics.Resumo: De 1902 em diante, Peirce considerava a estética, a ética e a lógica como "ciências normativas", esferas interconexas de inquirição filosófica que constituem seu principal trabalho em teoria do valor. As ciências normativas fornecem a base para uma investigação teorética de questões sobre valor independentes de interesses práticos. Porque as ciências normativas mantém a notória insistência de Peirce no realismo, elas colocam seu pragmaticismo à parte do pragmatismo mais "nominalista" de James e Dewey. O artigo almeja esclarecer a idéia de Peirce das ciências normativas, mostrar como seu realismo se aplica à esfera do valor, e explorar suas visões da própria relação entre ciência e prática. A seção concludente sugere exemplos de como podemos entender o rico e inovador conceito peirciano de estética normativa. (shrink)

Often an argument will rely on the hearer’s knowing something obvious or implied. Such knowledge is said to be contained in an unstated or missing premise.

As became clear in the wake of Joseph Brent 's presentation to this Society a year ago, the question of the relevance of biography to philosophy is a point of some controversy.0 On the one hand, the logic books warn us that it is an error either to condemn or praise a system of ideas on the basis of its author's life. In that direction lie the ad hominem, ad populum, and empty arguments from authority. We do well to beware (...) of the genetic fallacy. On the other hand, we believe that philosophical ideas do have consequences for life, and we are right to look to their originators' lives for some indication of the consequences a system of ideas may have. Philosophers cannot stubbornly ignore Heidegger's association with the Nazis, or Jefferson's slaveholding. In such cases, biographical fact properly forces us to ask what a person was really thinking when he or she expressed some idea, or remained silent on a point we feel should obviously have been addressed. The context of signs that can be relevant for interpreting a philosopher's work does not consist only of written texts, as Peirce scholars should perhaps know better than anyone else. (shrink)

This 1945 “Preface” is intended to answer the question “What is phenomenology?” and to justify it as the methodology of the long work of philosophical psychology to follow. Merleau-Ponty approaches this task by first setting out the apparent paradoxes and contradictory claims that have been advanced by phenomenology, in a long and eloquent survey section that is built on a series of “X, but also Y” rhetorical devices. He then surveys four prominent themes of phenomenology. Just as he does in (...) the introductory section of the essay “The Philosopher and His Shadow,” Merleau-Ponty here presents himself as the chief interpreter and champion of Husserl's later philosophy. The first major theme considered is that phenomenology is a matter of describing the field of perception. This sets it in contrast to the prevalent explanatory methodologies of a) scientific empiricism and b) metaphysical idealism. Empirical science (such as mathematical physics) begins with observation, but then abstracts entirely from lived experience to consider idealized schematic cases (such as motion across a frictionless surface) that may reveal universal laws. Such a methodology is obviously fruitful in important respects, but is nonetheless naïve and dishonest in its renunciation of the specifics of observed events. The metaphysical idealism of Kant or Descartes likewise abstracts from the experienced particularity of perception to posit an “inner man” that constitutes the world according to 2 internal, transcendental principles. Merleau-Ponty's criticism is the same, whether these principles are “reason” of Rationalism, “the categories of understanding” of Critical Rationalism, or the rules governing the “association of ideas” posited by Empiricism. Phenomenology indicates that perception is not an act but a fact; the world is not an object but rather the unified setting of perception; and the inner man is a myth, along with his allegedly privileged access to univocal truth. The second theme is the technique of “phenomenological reduction,” the suspension of belief in the assemblage of everyday assumptions known as the “natural attitude.” Husserl's understanding of the reduction long led him to an idealist position: that all particular consciousnesses are united in a transcendental ego.. (shrink)

Sustainable growth is emerging as a normative concept in recent work in economics and environmental philosophy. This paper examines several kinds of growth, seeking to identify a sustainable form which could be adopted as normative for human society. The conceptions of growth expressed in standard economic theory, in the writings of John Dewey, and in population biology, each suggest particular accounts of how the lives of individuals and communities ought to be lived. I argue that, while absolute sustainablity is not (...) possible, the latter two conceptions together suggest a regulative ideal of sustainable growth which is acceptable at the social level, and which encourages the development of genuine community. (shrink)

of some controversy.0 On the one hand, the logic books warn us that it is an error either to condemn or praise a system of ideas on the basis of its author’s life. In that direction lie the ad hominem, ad populum, and empty arguments from authority. We do well to beware of the genetic fallacy. On the other hand, we believe that philosophical ideas do have consequences for life, and we are right to look to their originators’ lives for (...) some indication of the consequences a system of ideas may have. Philosophers cannot stubbornly ignore Heidegger’s association with the Nazis, or Jefferson’s slaveholding. In such cases, biographical fact properly forces us to ask what a person was really thinking when he or she expressed some idea, or remained silent on a point we feel should obviously have been addressed. The context of signs that can be relevant for interpreting a philosopher’s work does not consist only of written texts, as Peirce scholars should perhaps know better than anyone else. (shrink)

The phrase "applied ethics" has lost much of the charm it initially had for philosophers. Alasdair MacIntyre, Tom Beauchamp, and others pointed out a decade ago that it is a mistake to think of ethics as a body of theory that can be carted in, when necessary, to sort out some particularly messy real-world moral dilemma.(1) According to these critics' line of thought there may be good reasons to distinguish pure from applied mathematics, for example, but ethics is not (and (...) should not pretend to be) the same sort of inquiry as mathematics. Every time we advertise a course in applied ethics, we implicitly suggest a separation between theory and practice. This separation rings especially false for those of us whose philosophical orientation derives from the work of the classical American pragmatists. In this paper I want to discuss a conception of applied ethics -- call it "applying ethics" -- that is rooted in pragmatic philosophy, and to suggest a kind of practice which I think could be quite valuable both for society at large and for the society of philosophers concerned with ethics. (shrink)

Recent severe environmental crises have brought us to recognize the need for a broad reevaluation of the relation of humans to their environments. I suggest that we consider the human-nature relation from two overlapping perspectives, each informed by the pragmatic philosophy of expeIience. The first is an anthropology, according to which humans are viewed as being radically continuous with their environments. The second is a comprehensive ecology, according to which both “natural” and “nonnatural” environments are studied as artificial habitats of (...) the human organism (i.e., as artifacts). The pragmatic approach has two features which make it promising as a way to ground environmental thinking. First, it allows us to avoid a human-nature dichotomy and the many problems which that dichotomy has traditionally engendered. Second, it ties environmental questions to a common cultural experience and a philosophical position from which environmentalists can effectively engage mainstream educational and political discussions. (shrink)

Recent severe environmental crises have brought us to recognize the need for a broad reevaluation of the relation of humans to their environments. I suggest that we consider the human-nature relation from two overlapping perspectives, each informed by the pragmatic philosophy of expeIience. The first is an anthropology, according to which humans are viewed as being radically continuous with their environments. The second is a comprehensive ecology, according to which both “natural” and “nonnatural” environments are studied as artificial habitats of (...) the human organism. The pragmatic approach has two features which make it promising as a way to ground environmental thinking. First, it allows us to avoid a human-nature dichotomy and the many problems which that dichotomy has traditionally engendered. Second, it ties environmental questions to a common cultural experience and a philosophical position from which environmentalists can effectively engage mainstreameducational and political discussions. (shrink)

"This book is about a tradition in American philosophy, running through the writings of Ralph Waldo Emerson, William James, and John Dewey, that has its origins in Romanticism as a movement in European thought". Goodman's study of these thinkers develops out of his concern to identify a distinctively American philosophy, "a philosophy... not embarrassed by literature or by the idea of searching 'for the best human life'". Goodman makes a strong case for regarding Romanticism as the key element in such (...) a philosophy. (shrink)