Leo Strauss is known primarily for reviving classical political philosophy. Strauss recovered that great tradition of thought largely lost to the West by beginning his study of classical thought with its teaching on politics rather than its metaphysics. What brought Strauss to this way of reading the classics, however, was a discovery he made as a young political scientist studying the obscure texts of Islamic and Jewish medieval political thought. In this volume, Joshua Parens examines Strauss's investigations of medieval political (...) philosophy, offering interpretations of his writings on the great thinkers of that tradition, including interpretations of his most difficult writings on Alfarabi and Maimonides. In addition Parens explicates Strauss's statements on Christian medieval thought and his argument for rejecting the Scholastic paradigm as a method for interpreting Islamic and Jewish thought. Contrasting Scholasticism with Islamic and Jewish medieval political philosophy, Parens clarifies the theme of Strauss's thought, what Strauss calls the "theologico-political problem," and reveals the significance of medieval political philosophy in the Western tradition. (shrink)

1 The Roots of the Laws Perhaps the most ready assumption of any reader of the Laws-it only because of its title-is that its primary purpose is to provide a ...

This volume is a collection of essays by various contributors in honor of the late Laurence Berns, Richard Hammond Elliot Tutor Emeritus at St. John's College, Annapolis. The essays address the literary, political, theological, and philosophical themes of his life's work as a scholar, teacher, and constant companion of the "great books.".

A whirl surrounds Maimonides’ Guide of the Perplexed 1.2. He seems to argue, there, that good and evil are merely concerns of the imagination. In the prophetology, Guide 2.32–48, Maimonides never refers to practical intellect or prudence. Recent interpreters have inferred that the imagination takes the place of practical intellect in Maimonides’ practical teaching. This paper seeks to show that, in keeping with earlier works such as Eight Chapters, Maimonides continues to rely on practical intellect throughout the Guide as an (...) integral part of his teaching on true prophecy and the best regime ruled by divine law. (shrink)

A whirl surrounds Maimonides’ Guide of the Perplexed 1.2. He seems to argue, there, that good and evil are merely concerns of the imagination. In the prophetology, Guide 2.32–48, Maimonides never refers to practical intellect or prudence. Recent interpreters have inferred that the imagination takes the place of practical intellect in Maimonides’ practical teaching. This paper seeks to show that, in keeping with earlier works such as Eight Chapters, Maimonides continues to rely on practical intellect throughout the Guide as an (...) integral part of his teaching on true prophecy and the best regime ruled by divine law. (shrink)

Desire (shahwa) and spiritedness (ghaḍab) vs. conatus -- Veneration vs. equality -- Forms vs. laws of nature -- Freedom vs. determinism -- Teleology vs. imagined ideal -- Prudence vs. imagination -- Epilogue -- Appendix: Richard Kennington's Spinoza and esotericism in Spinoza's thought.

Most recent interpreters of Maimonides argue that his ethical views develop from support of the mean in Eight Chapters to support of asceticism in "Laws Concerning Character Traits" and the Guide. This article challenges that interpretation: first, through a reconsideration of Aristotle's views on the mean and the relation of the ethically virtuous life to the contemplative life, and, second, through a reconsideration of Maimonides' texts. One riddle recommends we not jump to conclusions about Maimonides' views: In Eight Chapters he (...) appears to advocate the mean, on the basis of Aristotelian sources. In the Guide he ascribes his most ascetic recommendations to Aristotle. (shrink)

A new edition of the classic anthology of Christian, Muslin, and Jewish political philosophy in the Middle Ages.

Based on the ostensible fact that truly Socratic dialogue entails a considerable inequality between participants, Parens explores Socrates’s reasons for conversing dialectically with those who are manifestly his philosophic inferiors. Contrary to many Plato scholars who emphasize Socrates’s self-reported ignorance and, hence, the “Sisyphean” character of his philosophic activity, Parens intends to show—with the help of Maimonides—that Socrates is an “overflowing” philosopher, who cannot help but share his wisdom with others.