Předkládaná esej se snaží představit koncept identity v kritické perspektivě a v širším kontextu problému demarkace v sociálních vědách. V souladu se známou statí Beyond "Identity" (Brubaker, Cooper) si pokládám otázku, zda je koncept identity nadále užitečný a vhodný coby analytický nástroj ve společenských vědách. Pozornost věnuji jak samotnému zanesení konceptu na pole sociálních věd, tak i srovnání a zhodnocení esencialistického, konstruktivistického a dekonstruktivistického pojetí, přičemž tyto tři způsoby uchopení daného pojmu vnímám zároveň jako reprezentace různých postojů k sociální realitě, (...) k možnosti skutečného poznání (episteme/doxa) a ke vztahu vědeckého a nevědeckého pole. Kriticky reflektuji všechna tři pojetí a argumentuji ve prospěch nahrazení konceptu identity, avšak také ve prospěch posílení (auto)kritického vnímání ve spojitosti k užívaným vědeckým konceptům a nástrojům, jakožto i k vědcům samotným. (shrink)

Robots are becoming more visible parts of our life, a situation which prompts questions about their place in our society. One group of issues that is widely discussed is connected with robots’ moral and legal status as well as their potential rights. The question of granting robots rights is polarizing. Some positions accept the possibility of granting them human rights whereas others reject the notion that robots can be considered potential rights holders. In this paper, I claim that robots will (...) never have all human rights, even if we accept that they are morally equal to humans. I focus on the role of embodiment in the content of the law. I claim that even relatively small differences in the ontologies of entities could lead to the need to create new sets of rights. I use the example of Neanderthals to illustrate that entities similar to us might have required different legal statuses. Then, I discuss the potential legal status of human-like robots. (shrink)

The notion of Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD) may have its origins in 1763, when Scottish physician Sir Arthur Crichton observed people who could be easily distracted to a degree approaching the nature of delirium. Since then, the notion of ADHD matured and aroused controversy concerning whether it is a real illness and the motives behind particular methods of its treatments. Despite the controversy, ADHD is well established as a research subject and a frequently diagnosed disorder. Thus, the aim of (...) this paper is not to deal with controversies but rather to show the evolution of methods used for the detection of this disorder. Literature analysis revealed that those methods varied from classical psychological tests/questionnaires to analyses of: eye-motion, micro-motion, brain activity, and behavioral patterns in virtual reality. The main conclusion is that the above methods tend to be heavily computer-aided and that the future belongs to mobile solutions incorporated into complex e-health systems. (shrink)

Uncontrolled access to information on the Internet has many advantages, but it also leads to the phenomenon of fake news. Fake news is dangerous in many spheres, including that of health. For example, we are facing an increase in the amount of vaccine hesitancy. This has been w considered by the World Health Organization in 2019 as one of the greatest threats to public health. This specific phenomenon is linked with the spread of information on the Internet around that issue. (...) In this paper, I discuss a proposition of new crime, which has the aim of fighting medical fake news by stopping its spread. This proposition should be considered only if other non-criminal measures are inefficient. The proposal is “Whoever publicly disseminates information evidently discrepant with medical knowledge is subject to a penalty.”. (shrink)

Whether or not we call a love-like relationship with robots true love, some people may feel and claim that, for them, it is a sufficient substitute for love relationship. The love relationship between humans has a special place in our social life. On the grounds of both morality and law, our significant other can expect special treatment. It is understandable that, precisely because of this kind of relationship, we save our significant other instead of others or will not testify against (...) her/him. How as a society should we treat love-like relationships humans with robots? Based on the assumption that robots do not have an inner life and are not moral patients, I defend the thesis that this kind of relationship should be protected by criminal law. (shrink)

En las dos últimas décadas, se ha producido dentro de la filosofía analítica un aumento repentino de la investigación sobre la naturaleza y el papel que juea la intuición. Los filósofos empezaron a investigar qué es la intuición, cómo debería definirse, qué papel desempeña en la filosofía, cuál es su estatus epistémico, entre otras cosas. También hay un número creciente de filósofos que sostienen que todo el debate se basa en un error: la intuición en filosofía no desempeña papel alguno (...) y los filósofos no la utilizan como (fuente de) prueba para sus afirmaciones filosóficas. Esta estrategia se lleva a cabo a menudo diferenciando entre los dos sentidos en los que se supone que la intuición desempeña un papel evidencial en filosofía. Así, la intuición puede entenderse como un estado de intuir o como un contenido proposicional que se intuye. En el primer sentido, se argumenta, la intuición no puede ser tratada como evidencia, ya que presentaría el riesgo de psicologizar la evidencia en filosofía. Sin embargo, si tomamos la intuición como evidencia en el segundo sentido, no hay nada distintivo en ella: en última instancia, toda evidencia en filosofía es de naturaleza proposicional, independientemente de la intuitividad de una proposición dada. En mi artículo, sostengo que esta estrategia fracasa y propongo, en su lugar, una visión de la intuición que, en primer lugar, explica por qué la distinción mencionada no hace que la intuitividad del contenido sea irrelevante para su estatus epistémico; en segundo lugar, está de acuerdo con los hallazgos actuales en psicología; y, en tercer lugar, es lo suficientemente mínima como para permitir la incorporación de las diferentes perspectivas sobre las intuiciones. En particular, sostengo que un juicio intuitivo, caracterizado por su no inferencialidad y revocabilidad, sirve de prueba para determinadas afirmaciones filosóficas, mientras que su fuente es una intuición entendida como un estado de carácter no proposicional que puede examinarse empíricamente. (shrink)

At Protagoras 353de, Socrates gives three possible reasons for calling some pleasures `wrong'. Scholarly attention has focused on the second of these, according to which pleasures are `wrong' when they have negative consequences. This paper argues that the first reason (the pleasures are fleeting) corresponds to beliefs held by Democritus, among others; and that the third reason (the pleasant things “give pleasure in whatever way and for whatever reason“) is the view adopted by Socrates in the dialogue.

We examine how social diversity and inclusiveness on corporate boards affect corporate performance and monitoring in Sri Lanka, a country subject to decades of polarization, civil war, and even genocide. Barely more than a decade after the civil war, we find that board social diversity on the basis of ethnicity, religion, language, gender, and nationality of the board members is positively related to corporate performance, both in terms of stock market performance and accounting returns, and to corporate financial stability. The (...) main positive effects of social diversity derive from ethno-linguistic inclusiveness. The results are confirmed by an instrumental variable approach that addresses endogeneity issues. We find no evidence that inter-personal and moral conflicts or communication problems among board members negatively affect firm performance. (shrink)

Profesor Ryszard Panasiuk przez ostatnich kilka dekad należał do grona wiodących polskich filozofów. Jego książki na temat Hegla, ruchu młodoheglowskiego czy Marksa należą do kanonu historiografii idei. Publikowany tutaj obszerny wywiad z Profesorem może stanowić wartościowe i oryginalne źródło do historii inteligencji i humanistyki w tzw. Polsce Ludowej. Profesor Panasiuk opowiada w nim o swojej karierze naukowej, jednocześnie kreśląc obraz przemian akademickiego środowiska filozoficznego w powojennej Polsce. Wiele uwagi poświęca również swojej relacji z Bronisławem Baczką i innymi wybitnym reprezentantami Warszawskiej (...) Szkoły Historii Idei. Ponadto Profesor analizuje proces narastania prądów dysydenckich wśród zwolenników marksizmu po Październiku ’56 i wyjaśnia ostateczny rozkład post-stalinowskiej ortodoksji w polskim życiu intelektualnym tego okresu. Jak również dowodzi, że choć Marks stanowi ważny i wciąż warty badania rozdział w historii filozofii europejskiej, to marksizm, z uwagi na zawarty w nim koncept „radykalnej wspólnoty”, jest ideologią z gruntu utopijną. (shrink)

In recent years a lot of metaphilosophical attention has been paid to the role of thought experiments in philosophical inquiry. According to the popular picture, thought experiments are among the most prominent methods for conceptual analysis. However, it is also often claimed that thought experiments in ethics differ from those that are used in other fields of philosophy as being of a different nature—they are not about the concepts, but rather about the things in the world (what those things exactly (...) are depends on the particular metaethical theory one subscribes to). In the paper I argue that this claim is wrong. Conceptual analysis is of a huge value to ethics for it substantially helps to clarify the concepts one uses while making a moral judgment. It is very often the case that the apparent moral disagreement between two subjects turns out to be superficial since it is rooted in the misunderstanding on the conceptual level, for example when one uses some concept equivocally. Moreover, through thought experiments conceptual analysis can help to bring out the tacit assumptions that relate to the concepts involved. (shrink)