Fra gli arredi marmorei di età romana si distingue un gruppo di sostegni realizzati in marmo Giallo antico, che presentano caratteristiche comuni di lavorazione e di decorazione, i cui esemplari sono stati ritrovati nel Mediterraneo occidentale (Sardegna, Francia meridionale, Spagna), con una concentrazione in alcuni centri antichi. Si propongono considerazioni su produzione, circolazione e riuso di questi oggetti di lusso.

Bohmian mechanics is a realistic interpretation of quantum theory. It shares the same ontology of classical mechanics: particles following continuous trajectories in space through time. For this ontological continuity, it seems to be a good candidate for recovering the classical limit of quantum theory. Indeed, in a Bohmian framework, the issue of the classical limit reduces to showing how classical trajectories can emerge from Bohmian ones, under specific classicality assumptions. In this paper, we shall focus on a technical problem that (...) arises from the dynamics of a Bohmian system in bounded regions; and we suggest that a possible solution is supplied by the action of environmental decoherence. However, we shall show that, in order to implement decoherence in a Bohmian framework, a stronger condition is required rather than the usual one. (shrink)

In this paper, we explore how the prospect of artificial placenta technology (nearing clinical trials in human subjects) should encourage further consideration of the loss experienced by individuals when their pregnancy ends unexpectedly. Discussions of pregnancy loss are intertwined with procreative loss, whereby the gestated entity has died when the pregnancy ends. However, we demonstrate how pregnancy loss can and does exist separate to procreative loss in circumstances where the gestated entity survives the premature ending of the pregnancy. In outlining (...) the value that can be attached to pregnancy beyond fetal-centric narratives, we illustrate how pregnancy loss, separate to procreative loss, can be experienced. This loss has already been recognised among parents who have experienced an unexpected early ending of their pregnancy, resulting in their child being cared for in neonatal intensive care unit. Artificial placentas, however, may exacerbate these feelings and make pregnancy loss (without procreative loss) more visible. We argue that pregnancy is an embodied state in which gestation is facilitated by the body but gestation itself should be recognised as a process—and one that could be separable from pregnancy. In demarcating the two, we explore the different ways in which pregnancy loss can be understood. Our objective in this paper goes beyond contributing to our philosophical understanding of pregnancy towards practical-orientated conclusions regarding the care pathways surrounding the artificial placenta. We make recommendations including the need for counselling and careful consideration of the language used when an artificial placenta is used. (shrink)

This paper aims to clarify some conceptual aspects of decoherence that seem largely overlooked in the recent literature. In particular, I want to stress that decoherence theory, in the standard framework, is rather silent with respect to the description of (sub)systems and associated dynamics. Also, the selection of position basis for classical objects is more problematic than usually thought: while, on the one hand, decoherence offers a pragmatic-oriented solution to this problem, on the other hand, this can hardly be seen (...) as a genuine ontological explanation of why the classical world is position-based. This is not to say that decoherence is not useful to the foundations of quantum mechanics; on the contrary, it is a formidable weapon, as it accounts for a realistic description of quantum systems. That powerful description, however, becomes manifest when decoherence theory itself is interpreted in a realist framework of quantum mechanics. (shrink)

... Le figure del terzo legislatore e del terzo giudice costituiscono la garanzia che la tutela dei deboli non renda debole né il dovere né il diritto, ma ne fortifichi la consapevolezza responsabile in ognuno di noi, mostrando il significato giuridico del ‘dono di senso’, nucleo, nella mia interpretazione dell’intenso magistero di Bruno Romano. (Dalla Presentazione di L. Avitabile).

Bioethics scholarship considering the possibility of gestating an embryo to full term in an artificial womb (ectogenesis) often overstates the capacities of current technologies and underestimates the barriers to the development of full ectogenesis. Moreover, this debate causes harm by (1) neglecting more immediate problems in the development of artificial wombs, (2) treating abortion as a “problem with a technological solution,” bolstering anti-abortion rhetoric, and (3) presuming the stability of women’s reproductive rights. The ectogenesis conversation must consider anticipated uses of (...) the technology (neonatal intensive care) and acknowledge the immediate context (recognizing abortion as essential healthcare and existing reproductive inequities). (shrink)

A bold, insightful book that rejects the myth of America the Unphilosophical, arguing that America today towers as the most philosophical culture in the history of the world, an unprecedented marketplace of truth and argument that far surpasses ancient Greece or any other place one can name.Publisher's description.

Premessa - Capitolo primo. Questioni di filosofia del diritto - Capitolo secondo. Filosofia, scienza, diritto - Capitolo terzo. Relazione, pretesa, diritto - Capitolo quarto. Determinazione e diritto - Capitolo quinto. Gioco, amore, diritto - Capitolo sesto. Terzietà nella relazione. Aspettative cognitive e normative - Capitolo settimo. Qualificazioni della terzietà - Capitolo ottavo. Differenza di senso e differenza nomologica - Capitolo nono. Genesi e uso del diritto - Capitolo decimo. Ortonomia delle leggi istituite. Natura, linguaggio, tecnica - Capitolo undicesimo. Linguaggio dei (...) sistemi sociali. Diritto, mercato, globalizzazione - Indice analitico e dei nomi. (shrink)

Faut-il définir la phénoménologie comme une discipline transcendantale? Si toute phénoménologie consiste en un " dire les phénomènes " (legein ta phainomena) qui les approche et les décrit tels qu'en eux-mêmes, le logos phénoménologique doit-il être compris exclusivement - ou même principalement - en référence à la logique mathématique issue de Frege? Enfin, qu'en est-il de la phénoménologie dans son rapport à la métaphysique, non pas au sens " scolaire " du terme, mais dans celui - que lui ont conféré (...) Nietzsche, Bergson et Heidegger - d'une configuration historique unitaire de la pensée occidentale dans son ensemble? Ces trois questions parcourent ce recueil d'études et lui confèrent sa cohésion interne. À travers elles, il s'agit de se frayer un chemin vers la question de l'apparaître en tant que tel, qu'Héraclite a placée au ceux du questionnement de la " philosophie " naissante, et que l'entreprise phénoménologique ne peut manquer de soulever et, à son tour, de perpétuer. (shrink)

The paper explains why the de Broglie–Bohm theory reduces to Newtonian mechanics in the macroscopic classical limit. The quantum-to-classical transition is based on three steps: (i) interaction with the environment produces effectively factorized states, leading to the formation of _effective wave functions_ and hence _decoherence_; (ii) the effective wave functions selected by the environment—the pointer states of decoherence theory—will be well-localized wave packets, typically Gaussian states; (iii) the quantum potential of a Gaussian state becomes negligible under standard classicality conditions; therefore, (...) the effective wave function will move according to Newtonian mechanics in the correct classical limit. As a result, a Bohmian system in interaction with the environment will be described by an effective Gaussian state and—when the system is macroscopic—it will move according to Newtonian mechanics. (shrink)

Claude Romano seeks to change all that, to describe precisely what sort of phenomenon an event is and to establish how it can be grasped via a phenomenology.

Preguntarse por la libertad es hacerlo a la razón y al corazón de nuestra vida. Reconocer el valor de ser, sentirse y vivir libre es reconocerse como humano y por ello aceptar el compromiso feliz e inexcusable del esfuerzo continuado. Una tarea para toda la vida. Es el tema de este libro. Para empezar, ingenuamente, puede plantearse así: ¿En qué consiste la libertad? ¿Existe realmente la libertad, ¿es algo que tengo antes de saberlo, algo que sólo adquiero al saber que (...) lo tengo o algo que para tenerlo debo renunciar a saber con precisión qué es? ¿Soy capaz de libertad o soy libertad y por ello capaz de ser humano? Y tantas, tantas: demasiadas preguntas.. En la primera parte se intenta una antropología a partir de la libertad, es decir considerando la libertad como diferencia específica del género humano. Cuestiones sobre la elección, lo voluntario e involuntario, la intención, el azar,?ayudarán a comprender qué es. En la segunda parte se presenta un breve repertorio de opciones libres argumentadas, destinadas a comprometer las abstracciones de la primera con la peripecia actual que vivimos y en la que somos. Se ofrecen algo así como unos "ejercicios de libertad". ". Es una incitación a continuar pensando y repensando. La filosofía nunca es para mí la cancelación definitiva que nos permite salir de dudas sino el acicate que nos arroja a ellas, permitiéndonos vivir con dignidad inteligente en la ausencia de certidumbres absolutas" (F.Savater). (shrink)

Le stanze del canto. La musica e l'indicibile ; Il linguaggio degli angeli ; Musica e utopia ; Musica e prassi analitica ; Un sogno musicale -- Variazioni sul tema. Musica, mistero e mondo femminile in E.T.A. Hoffmann ; Thomas Bernhard e l'estetica del narcisismo ; I tragitti di Orfeo -- Coda : Dialogo di Eusebio e Florestano -- Appendice : La principessa nascosta : psicoterapia e fare poetico.

The pandemic motivated nutrition and healthy living to maintain a healthy lifestyle. The objective is to analyze and describe the perspectives of post-pandemic lifestyles of university students, using the quantitative cross-sectional method with non-probabilistic sampling and survey that measures the nutritional level and level of physical activities, 1033 university students participated. The results showed that the measurement instrument in the Peruvian context is acceptable and that the level of lifestyle is moderate. In conclusion, nutritional policies and physical activities should be (...) considered in universities so that university students practice a healthy lifestyle and take care of their health. (shrink)

Digital competencies were part of online education and now when returning to the classroom what will happen or what we expect for the future in education. The objective is to analyze and describe the perspectives of the level of digital competence, the non-experimental descriptive quantitative methodology is used with 1987 university students. Resulting that the instrument adapted to the Peruvian version is adequate according to statistics such as Cronbach's Alpha. Concluding that the digital competences improved the academic quality and have (...) a good level. Society is waiting for the next step to know what is presented to us in education. (shrink)

In 2017, a Philadelphia research team revealed the closest thing to an artificial womb the world had ever seen. The ‘biobag’, if as successful as early animal testing suggests, will change the face of neonatal intensive care. At present, premature neonates born earlier than 22 weeks have no hope of survival. For some time, there have been no significant improvements in mortality rates or incidences of long-term complications for preterms at the viability threshold. Artificial womb technology, that might change these (...) odds, is eagerly anticipated for clinical application. We need to understand whether AWT is an extension of current intensive care or something entirely new. This question is central to determining when and how the biobag should be used on human subjects. This paper examines the science behind AWT and advances two principal claims. First, AWT is conceptually different from conventional intensive care. Identifying why AWT should be understood as distinct demonstrates how it raises different ethico-legal questions. Second, these questions should be formulated without the ‘human being growing in the AW’ being described with inherently value laden terminology. The ‘human being in an AW’ is neither a fetus nor a baby, and the ethical tethers associated with these terms could perpetuate misunderstanding and confusion. Thus, the term ‘gestateling’ should be adopted to refer to this new product of human reproduction: a developing human being gestating ex utero. While this paper does not attempt to solve all the ethical problems associated with AWT, it makes important clarifications that will enable better formulation of relevant ethical questions for future exploration. (shrink)

Le temps est-il fondamentalement une détermination du sujet? A la suite d'Augustin, des philosophies aussi différentes que celles de Bergson, Husserl ou Heidegger n'hésitent pas à le soutenir : le temps n'est pas d'abord dans les choses, mais il provient, plus originairement, des actes, des attitudes ou des comportements par lesquels un sujet (ou, éventuellement, un Dasein) s'attend ou se souvient, anticipe des possibles ou décide de lui-même, c'est-à-dire temporalise dans leur unité indissoluble l'avenir, le passé et le présent. C'est (...) cette thèse que le présent ouvrage s'efforce de discuter et de soumettre à un examen critique. Quelle compréhension du temps au cours de la métaphysique a rendu possible sa " subjectivation "? N'est-ce pas d'abord une certaine saisie du phénomène temporel comme phénomène intratemporel? Et cette interprétation, dont il devient possible d'entreprendre une généalogie à la lumière des analyses de Platon, Aristote et Augustin, ne prescrit-elle pas son cadre conceptuel à la métaphysique elle-même? Mais, si la temporalité n'est pas pensable à l'aune de la subjectivité métaphysique (dont le Dasein, à certains égards du moins, constitue l'ultime figure), n'est-il pas requis, pour tenter d'en produire une phénoménologie, de changer de fil conducteur? C'est en ce point que le présent ouvrage rejoint le projet de L'événement et le monde, celui d'une herméneutique événementiale de l'humain, dont il constitue à la fois l'approfondissement et l'achèvement. (shrink)

Throughout most of human history women have been defined by their biological role in reproduction, seen first and foremost as gestators, which has led to the reproductive system being subjected to outside interference. The womb was perceived as dangerous and an object which husbands, doctors and the state had a legitimate interest in controlling. In this article, we consider how notions of conflict surrounding the womb have endured over time. We demonstrate how concerns seemingly generated by the invisibility of reproduction (...) and the inaccessibility of the womb have translated into similar arguments for controlling women, as technology increases the accessibility of the female body and the womb. Developments in reproductive medicine, from in vitro fertilisation to surrogacy, have enabled women and men who would otherwise have been childless to become parents. Uterus transplants and ‘artificial wombs’ could provide additional alternatives to natural gestation. An era of ‘womb technology’ dawns. Some argue that such technology providing an alternative to ‘natural’ gestation could be a source of liberation for female persons because reproduction will no longer be something necessarily confined to the female body. ‘Womb technology’, however, also has the potential to exacerbate the labelling of the female body as a source of danger and an ‘imperfect’ site of gestation, thus replaying rudimentary and regressive arguments about controlling female behaviour. We argue that pernicious narratives about control, conflict and the womb must be addressed in the face of these technological developments. (shrink)

A large body of literature considers the ethico-legal and regulatory issues surrounding assisted conception. Surrogacy, however, within this body of literature is an odd-fit. It involves a unique demand of another person—a form of reproductive labour—that many other aspects of assisted conception, such as gamete donation do not involve. Surrogacy is a form of assisted gestation. The potential alternatives for individuals who want a genetically related child but who do not have the capacity to gestate are ever increasing: with the (...) advent of uterus transplantation, and the anticipated development of artificial placentas.In this paper, I highlight the pertinent conceptual differences between technologies assisting conception and those assisting gestation to demonstrate that distinct issues arise when assisted gestative technologies are used. I argue that there is utility in considering AGTs as a genus of technologies. These technologies perform the same function from the perspective of putative parents and might exist on a spectrum of alternatives when they become more available. Moreover, since many of the same or very similar ethical, social and legal issues are raised by surrogacy, UTx and ectogestation, analysis of these issues will be better contextualised by considering these technologies together. Many of the matters currently being highlighted for reform in the context of surrogacy will inevitably impact on how other forms of assisted gestation are governed. The conversation should be broadened; we should consider how far other emerging technologies might be accommodated in revised regulatory schemes. (shrink)

In a recent publication, I argued that there is a conceptual difference between artificial womb (AW) technology, capable of facilitating gestation ex utero, and neonatal intensive care, providing incubation to neonates born prematurely. One of the reasons I provided for this distinction was that the subjects of each process are different entities. The subject of the process of gestation ex utero is a unique human entity: a ‘gestateling’, rather than a fetus or a newborn preterm neonate. Nick Colgrove wrote a (...) response to my paper, claiming that my distinction between the subject of an AW and a newborn (in intensive care) was false. He claims that I have not accounted for the proper definition of ‘birth’ and that gestatelings are not a distinct product of human reproduction. Further, Colgrove posits that even if I can successfully distinguish gestatelings from preterms, such a distinction is morally irrelevant because the entities would have the same moral status. In this paper, I address the three challenges raised and defend the claim that gestatelings are unique entities. Moreover, I argue that moral status should not be considered ipso facto determinative in the debate about AWs. (shrink)

In his paper, ‘Twin pregnancy, fetal reduction and the ‘all or nothing problem’, Räsänen sets out to apply Horton’s ‘all or nothing’ problem to the ethics of multifetal pregnancy reduction from a twin to a singleton pregnancy. Horton’s problem involves the following scenario: imagine that two children are about to be crushed by a collapsing building. An observer would have three options: do nothing, save one child by allowing their arms to be crushed, or save both by allowing their arms (...) to be crushed. Horton offers two intuitively plausible claims: it is morally permissible not to save either child and it is morally impermissible to save only one of the children, which taken together lead to the problematic conclusion that if an observer does not save both children, then it is better to save neither than save only one. Räsänen applies this problem to the case of 2-to-1 MFPR, arguing ultimately that, in cases where there is no medical reason to reduce, the woman ought to bring both fetuses to term. We will argue that Räsänen does not provide adequate support for the claim, crucial to his argument, that aborting only one of the fetuses in a twin pregnancy is wrong, so the ‘all or nothing’ problem does not arise in this context. Furthermore, we argue that the scenario Räsänen presents is highly unrealistic because of the clinical realities of 2-to-1 MFPR, making his argument of limited use for real-life decision making in this area. (shrink)

In this commentary, I consider how Giulia Cavaliere’s arguments about the limited reach of the current justifications offered for full ectogenesis in the bioethical literature apply in the context of partial ectogenesis. I suggest that considering the extent to which partial ectogenesis is freedom or equality promoting is more urgent because of the more realistic prospect of artificial womb technology being utilised to facilitate partial gestation extra uterum as opposed to facilitating complete gestation from conception to term. I highlight concerns (...) about potentially harmful social narratives surrounding pregnancy and about the current legal framework surrounding gestation limiting access to technology in the advent of partial ectogenesis. I do not advocate that these concerns mean that we ought not develop artificial wombs, but like Cavaliere I suggest that we must be mindful of these concerns, and I posit that legal reform must accompany technological developments. Ectogenesis as a political perspective, through which we consider the value in social reproduction and the experiences of pregnant people, is useful to prevent political capture of this technology for regressive policies. Using this perspective to examine the law is also a useful tool to expose just how restrictive the law is in relation to gestation and female reproductive health. (shrink)

In the United Kingdom the law and medical guidance is supportive of women making choices in childbirth. NICE guidelines are explicit that a competent woman’s informed request for MRCS should be respected. However, in reality pregnant women are routinely denied MRCS. In this paper I consider whether there is sufficient justification for restricting MRCS. The physical and emotive significance of childbirth as an event in a woman’s life cannot be understated. It is, therefore, concerning that women are having their wishes (...) ignored, and we must ascertain whether the denial of agency is justifiable. To answer this question I first demonstrate that access to MRCS is a lottery in the UK. Second, I argue that there is nothing unique about pregnancy that displaces the ethical norm of respecting patents’ sufficiently autonomous choices. Thus, the starting presumption is that all informed choices regarding MRCS should be respected. To ascertain whether any restriction of MRCS is justifiable the burden of proof must be placed on those who argue that MRCS is ethically impermissible. I argue that the most common justifications in the literature against MRCS are insufficient to displace the presumption in favour of autonomous choice in childbirth. I conclude that MRCS should be available to pregnant women, and we must strive to reduce the lottery in access to choice. (shrink)

English law is unambiguous that legal personality, and with it all legal rights and protections, is assigned at birth. This rule is regarded as a bright line that is easily and consistently applied. The time has come, however, for the rule to be revisited. This article demonstrates that advances in fetal surgery and (anticipated) artificial wombs do not marry with traditional conceptions of birth and being alive in law. These technologies introduce the possibility of ex utero gestation, and/or temporary existence (...) ex utero, and consequently developing human beings that are novel to the law. Importantly, therefore, the concepts of birth and born alive no longer distinguish between human beings deserving of legal protection in the way originally intended. Thus, there is a need for reform, for a new approach to determining the legal significance of birth and what being legally alive actually encompasses. Investigating the law of birth is of crucial importance, because of the implications of affording or denying the subjects of new reproductive technologies rights and protections. A determination of the legal status of the subject of fetal surgery or an artificial womb will determine what can and cannot be done to each entity. Moreover, the status afforded to these entities will drastically impact on the freedoms of pregnant women. (shrink)

In this paper, I explore how viability, meaning the ability of the fetus to survive post-delivery, features in the law regulating abortion provision in England and Wales and the USA. I demonstrate that viability is formalized differently in the criminal law in England and Wales and the USA, such that it is quantified and defined differently. I consider how the law might be applied to the examples of artificial womb technology and anencephalic fetuses. I conclude that there is incoherence in (...) the meaning of viability and argue that it is thus a conceptually illegitimate basis on which to ground abortion regulation. This is both because of the fluidity of the concept and because how it has been thus far understood in the law is unsupported by medical realities. Furthermore, it has the effect of heavily diluting pregnant people’s rights with overly moralistic limitations on access to healthcare. (shrink)

In 2017 and 2019, two research teams claimed ‘proof of principle’ for artificial womb technology (AWT). AWT has long been a subject of speculation in bioethical literature, with broad consensus that it is a welcome development. Despite this, little attention is afforded to more immediate ethical problems in the development of AWT, particularly as an alternative to neonatal intensive care. To start this conversation, I consider whether experimental AWT is innovative treatment or medical research. The research–treatment distinction, pervasive in regulation (...) worldwide, is intended to isolate research activities and subject them to a greater degree of oversight. I argue that there is a tendency in the literature to conceptualize AWT for partial ectogenesis as innovative treatment. However, there are sufficiently serious ethical concerns with experimental AWT that mean that it must not be first used on humans on the basis that it is a ‘beneficial treatment’. First, I outline the prospects for translation of AWT animal studies into treatment for human preterms. Second, I challenge the conceptualizations of experimental AWT as innovative treatment. It must be considered medical research to reflect the investigatory nature of the process and guarantee sufficient protections for subjects. Identifying that AWT is research is crucial in formulating further ethico‐legal questions regarding the experimental use of AWT. Third, I demonstrate that clinical trials will be a necessary part of the clinical translation of AWT because of requirements laid out by regulators. I consider the justification for clinical trials and highlight some of the crucial ethical questions about the conditions under which they should proceed. (shrink)

Corporate social responsibility research has focused often on the business returns of corporate social initiatives but less on their possible social returns. We study an actual company–consumer partnership CSR initiative promoting ecologically correct and conscious consumption of bottled mineral water. We conduct a survey on adult consumers to test the hypotheses that consumer skepticism toward the company–consumer partnership CSR initiative and the moral emotion of elevation mediate the relationship between company CSR motives perceived by consumers and consumer behavioral responses following (...) this CSR initiative. Favorable consumer behavioral responses, in turn, relate positively to consumer support of other green products. The results provide scholars and managers with means of improving their understanding and handling of company–consumer partnership CSR initiatives. (shrink)

In their paper, ‘How to reach trustworthy decisions for caesarean sections on maternal request: a call for beneficial power’, Eide and Bærøe present maternal request caesarean sections (MRCS) as a site of conflict in obstetrics because birthing people are seeking access to a treatment ‘without any anticipated medical benefit’. While I agree with the conclusions of their paper -that there is a need to reform the approach to MRCS counselling to ensure that the structural vulnerability of pregnant people making birth (...) decisions is addressed—I disagree with the framing of MRCS as having ‘no anticipated medical benefit’. I argue that MRCS is often inappropriately presented as unduly risky,without supporting empirical evidence,and that MRCS is most often sought by birthing people on the basis of a clinical need. I argue that there needs to be open conversation and frank willingness to acknowledge the values that are currently underpinning the presentation of MRCS as ‘clinically unnecessary’; specifically there needs to be more discussion of where and why the benefits of MRCS that are recognised by individual birthing people are not recognised by clinicians. This is important to ensure access to MRCS for birthing people that need it. (shrink)

For females without a functioning womb, the only way to become a biological parent is via assisted gestation—either surrogacy or uterus transplantation (UTx). This paper examines the comparative impact of these options on two types of putative ‘womb‐givers’: people who provide gestational surrogacy and those who donate their uterus for live donation. The surrogate ‘leases’ their womb for the gestational period, while the UTx donor donates their womb permanently via hysterectomy. Both enterprises involve a significant degree of self‐sacrifice and medical (...) risk in order to enable another person(s) to become a parent by either providing gestational labour or enabling the other person to undertake gestation themselves. In this paper, we explore the burdens and the benefits from the perspective of the womb‐giver in order to inform ethical debate about assisted gestation. This is a perspective that is often neglected in the bioethical discourse. With both surrogacy and UTx, when success follows the womb‐giver’s sacrifice, the key benefit is delivered to the intending parent(s), but as this article examines, the womb‐giver may also enjoy some unique (relational) benefits as a result of their sacrifice. Ultimately, the choice of how a womb‐giver lends assistance in gestation will impact on their bodily autonomy; some will prefer to carry a pregnancy and others to donate their uterus. We argue that the perspective of the womb‐giver is crucial and thus far has not been afforded sufficient consideration in ethical discussion. (shrink)