Romero Cuevas, José Manuel, _¿Nietzsche contra Nietzsche? Ensayos de crítica filosófica inmanente_. Madrid, Locus Solus, 2016, 244 págs.

Vogel, Beatrix, Umwertung der Menschenwürde–Kontroversen mit und nach Nietzsche. Mit einem Vorwort von Michael von Brück. Freiburg / München, Karl Alber, 2014, 426 págs.

En este artículo se examina la fundación putnamiana del así llamado "funcionalismo de la tabla de máquina", para después, y sobre todo, pasar revista a las razones que llevaron al pensador americano a abandonar la teoría funcionalista de la mente y a impugnar el programa de naturalización de la intencionalidad. Desde aquí, y a la vista de la pobreza de los argumentos que se le han venido oponiendo a Putnam desde que consumó su ruptura con la ortodoxia funcionalista, y de (...) lo poco convincente de los mismos, se concluye apuntando la necesidad de someter a crítica los presupuestos filosóficos del modelo computacional de la mente en psicología cognitiva como desarrollo sofisticado del materialismo moderno, en el sentido de la crítica de las ideologías. This paper examines in the first place the putnamian foundation of the so-called "table machine functionalism", in order, mainly, to be able to review the reasons that led the American thinker to abandon the functionalist theory of mind, and also to refute all the program of intentionality naturalization. Hereafter, and in view of the fact that the arguments that have been opposed to Putnam ever since are generally poor and not much convincing, the conclusion we arrive to is pointing out the necessity of a critical consideration of the philosophical foundations of the computational model in cognitive psychology, taken as the sophisticated development of modern materialism, in the sense of the critique of ideologies. (shrink)

A critical review of the crucial Freudian change in the general explanation of hysterics and neurosis that took place in 1897 would not let us assess in a definite way the epistemic import of Psychoanalysis. However some difficulties that appear in Freud’s works, related for instance to the no-contradiction principle, demand that we make an epistemic and a moral decision. But only if we wanted to maintain the critical attitude that modern science and philosophy have brought to us, a decision (...) that would allow us to see Freudianism as a faith and as “a testimony of a man in our age”. (shrink)

It is important for society to fight against stupidity because the stupid is constitutively destructive. But the one who fights against stupidity, his own and that of others, is, above all, traditionally the philosopher. Let us note the presence of this struggle in Nietzsche, and realise the relevance it would have in his work, which in general is little emphasised. Nietzsche joins the classical line of denouncing stupidity, although he does so to an extreme by modulating it in terms of (...) his perspectivism as an inability to “get out” of the single perspective. Moreover, he is going to discover a kind of stupidity that accompanies wisdom as its necessary shadow and that would be the one that opens for us, in the face of Pauline and Erasmist Christianity, the possibility of a joyful science. On the other hand, cosmic stupidity would have the beautiful name of “necessity”, and the Dionysian aspect of the thought of the eternal return lies above all in the amor fati, which in our case would be translated as affirmation and even love of stupidity. That is why Nietzsche will say that Dionysian wisdom is the principle of the greatest possible stupidity. (shrink)

En este trabajo se estudia la lectura hermenéutica de la obra freudiana que propusieron pensadores como Habermas o Ricoeur, y su continuación en el llamado "psicoanálisis narrativo", no sólo desde el punto de vista epistemológico sino también como una importante contribución a la discusión sobre la identidad personal.

Este trabajo representa una búsqueda del rasgo negativo esencial que habría venido caracterizando a la actividad filosófica en nuestra cultura: una lucha sin tregua contra la estupidez humana, entendida en sentido profundo como fracaso de la inteligencia, un fracaso que sería sinónimo y compendio de maldad y de fealdad. Al mismo tiempo se atreve a pronosticar un futuro optimista para la filosofía, a pesar de todas las apariencias, por lo menos en la medida en que al estúpido le resultaría imposible (...) ser humanamente feliz. (shrink)

A critical review of the crucial Freudian change in the general explanation of hysterics and neurosis that took place in 1897 would not let us assess in a definite way the epistemic import of Psychoanalysis. However some difficulties that appear in Freud’s works, related for instance to the no-contradiction principle, demand that we make an epistemic and a moral decision. But only if we wanted to maintain the critical attitude that modern science and philosophy have brought to us, a decision (...) that would allow us to see Freudianism as a faith and as “a testimony of a man in our age”. (shrink)

The topos of jews’ blindness, recurrent in adversos iudaeos literature, embodies in the image of blindfold Synagoga in medieval visual arts. The first part of this paper focuses on its integration in different contexts of medieval Spanish art. Diferent, but not less interesting, is the way caecitatis iudeorum is illustrated in some illuminated manuscripts of Breviari d’Amor by Matfre Ermengaud and Fortalitium Fidei by Alonso de Espina, also subject of study throughout these pages.

Insults elicit intense emotion. This study tests the hypothesis that one's social image, which is especially salient in honour cultures, influences the way in which one reacts to an insult. Seventy-seven honour-oriented and 72 non-honour oriented participants answered questions about a recent insult episode. Participants experienced both anger and shame in reaction to the insult. However, these emotions resulted in different behaviours. Anger led to verbal attack (i.e., criticising, insulting in return) among all participants. This relationship was explained by participants’ (...) motivation to punish the wrongdoer. Shame, on the other hand, was moderated by honour. Shame led to verbal disapproval of the wrongdoers behaviour, but only among the honour-oriented participants. This relationship was explained by these participants’ motivation to protect their social image. By contrast, shame led to withdrawal among non-honour-oriented participants. (shrink)

Este artículo analiza ciertas interpretaciones del célebre comentario de Wittgenstein a Drury, sin duda relevantes para comprender el sentido de la filosofía del pensador vienés en su último periodo, según el cual él mismo, sin ser una persona religiosa, no podía evitar contemplar todas las cuestiones desde una perspectiva religiosa. Los pasos para identificar la razón por la que se puede afirmar que la inmunización de la forma de vida religiosa constituye el sentido último de la filosofía concebida como análisis (...) de los juegos de lenguaje serán, en primer lugar, poner en relación el valor supremo de la claridad con la crítica de la actitud explicativa característica de la filosofía convencional y, en segundo término, considerar el análisis del discurso religioso y la peculiar religiosidad del propio Wittgenstein. This paper explores some of the issues related to Wittgenstein's famous comment to Drury -that he himself, while not a religious person, could not avoid contemplating all questions from a religious perspective- that might contribute to an understanding of the final meaning of the philosophical practice distinctive of Wittgenstein's last period. This paper aims at showing that final meaning is the immunization of the religious form of the life. In order to reach this conclusion we will first recall the importance of clarity as an absolute goal of Wittgenstein's philosophy, and see how it is connected to a specific attitude toward the explanatory claims of conventional philosophy. Then we will summarize the essence of Wittgenstein's philosophical analysis of religious discourse and review some crucial texts that highlight the peculiar religiosity unique to Wittgenstein. (shrink)

Resumen: A partir del último libro de La gaya ciencia en este trabajo procedo, en primer lugar, a fijar los rasgos del nuevo entendimiento nietzscheano de la creencia en cuanto un determinar activo contrapuesto a la pretensión de verdad entendida como corrección o ajuste de la representación, es decir, en cuanto contracreencia. En segundo lugar, caracterizo a grandes rasgos lo que hay que considerar como creencia específicamente nietzscheana, constitutiva del sentido nuclear de su producción filosófica. Debemos denominar "fe dionisíaca" a (...) esa "creencia", en el entendido de que resulta imposible fijarla y definirla en un sentido estricto porque no excluiría nada, ni siquiera a sus opuestos.: Based on The Gay Science’s last book, in this paper I proceed, first, to set the features of the new Nietzschean understanding of belief as an active determining opposed to the claim of truth traditionally understood as correction or adjustment of representation. That is to say, belief understood, in an important even though paradoxical sense, as counterbelief. Second, I aim to characterize although roughly what could be considered as the specifically Nietzschean belief, constitutive of his philosophical production’s core meaning. We should call that "belief" the "Dionysian faith", in the understanding that fixing and defining it would be strictly speaking rather impossible, since it does not exclude anything, not even its opposites. (shrink)