This study focuses on Charles Renouvier’s Manuel de philosophie moderne, in which he first sketches a philosophical systemSystem in dialogue with the “great men of learned Germany” presented as “DescartesDescartes, René’s disciples”. I argue that, although RenouvierRenouvier, Charles aims to present France as the “mother of all philosophies”, these great German men do have a significant and unique influence on the development of his early thought. Ultimately, in fact, although RenouvierRenouvier, Charles wishes to claim that he later (...) turns his back on his early HegelianismHegelianism because of his rejection of “philosophies of the infinite”, this rejection in fact only reinforces the FichteanFichte, Johann Gottlieb and HegelianHegelianism influences on his philosophy. (shrink)

This article examines the arguments used by the French philosopher Charles Renouvier to support the notion of a 'conservative Republic' during the formative years of the French Third Republic. After documenting Renouvier's accommodation to the linking of conservatism and republicanism and his defence of opportunism, the author argues that while this accommodation was motivated by his determination to help consolidate the new Republic, it was nevertheless consistent with Renouvier's moral and political philosophy with its focus on liberty, equality and (...) individual rights, particularly the 'right of defence' in the 'state of war'. Moreover, in applying this philosophy to the politics of the 1870s, Renouvier elaborated an original theory of republican governance which differed in a number of fundamental respects from the support for republicanism provided by the majority of Renouvier's contemporaries. The article concludes with some observations on the relevance of Renouvier's political thought during this period to modern political philosophy. (shrink)

Excerpt from Charles Renouvier's Philosophie der Praktischen Vernunft Kritisch Beleuchtet Als die notwendigen und ausreichenden Grundlagen der Sittlichkeit gibt R. Im 1. Kapitel seiner "reinen rationalen Moral die zwei Tatsachen an: I. Der Mensch ist mit Vernunft begabt, 2. Der Mensch hält sich für frei. About the Publisher Forgotten Books publishes hundreds of thousands of rare and classic books. Find more at www.forgottenbooks.com This book is a reproduction of an important historical work. Forgotten Books uses state-of-the-art technology to digitally (...) reconstruct the work, preserving the original format whilst repairing imperfections present in the aged copy. In rare cases, an imperfection in the original, such as a blemish or missing page, may be replicated in our edition. We do, however, repair the vast majority of imperfections successfully; any imperfections that remain are intentionally left to preserve the state of such historical works. (shrink)

Pour traiter de la question singulière de la relation entre James et Renouvier à la lumière de cette préoccupation plus générale, nous choisirons ici une période un peu plus limitée que la carrière de James dans son ensemble : depuis ses premiers écrits jusqu’à la série d’articles de 1884-1885, qui allaient être si importants à la fois pour la psychologie et pour l’oeuvre philosophique, c’est-à-dire précisément jusqu’au point où les itinéraires philosophiques de James et de Renouvier commencent à diverger. Il (...) s’agit de voir en quoi la Critique philosophique est un cadre hospitalier pour le jeune James, mais aussi en quoi, dès la fin de cette période, des différends importants se font jour, sur la conscience notamment, ce qui donne lieu à une situation paradoxale où l’organe même qui a contribué à faire connaître James se retrouve à rebours de plusieurs de ses thèses importantes, avant la publication des Principles of Psychology (1890) et encore plus avant le Pragmatisme (1907). (shrink)

This article considers Henri Poincaré’s conventionalism in historical context by comparing his use of such terms as “convention” and “conventional” with Charles Renouvier’s. As Renouvier was very influential in late nineteenth-century France, this comparison can provide some insight into how the terms were understood at the time. Renouvier was a political philosopher as well as a philosopher of science. He drew an analogy between the conventions or social contracts that govern society at large and the conventions that governed communities (...) of researchers in mathematics and the sciences. Both kinds of conventions were living contracts for Renouvier, subject to revision and change. What emerges from the comparison is an interpretation of Poincaré’s conventionalism that belies the view that it is a rigid, unbending philosophy holding back scientific progress. Rather, it is one according to which scientists come together to form a temporary consensus about particular starting points in order to make research into nature possible yet retain the liberty to try something new when the old set of assumptions no longer proves fruitful. (shrink)

This article investigates the history of the relation between idealism and pragmatism by examining the importance of the French idealist Charles Renouvier for the development of William James's ‘Will to Believe’. By focusing on French idealism, we obtain a broader understanding of the kinds of idealism on offer in the nineteenth century. First, I show that Renouvier's unique methodological idealism led to distinctively pragmatist doctrines and that his theory of certitude and its connection to freedom is worthy of reconsideration. (...) Second, I argue that the technical vocabulary and main structure of the argument from the ‘Will to Believe’ depend upon Renouvier's idealist theory of knowledge and psychology of belief, and that taking account of this line of influence is of crucial importance for establishing the correct interpretation of James's work. (shrink)

This article canvasses the model of history of philosophy developed by the French philosopher Charles Renouvier in the second half of the nineteenth century. Such a model rested on a precise assumption: the entire history of philosophy would be nothing more than the diachronic embodiment of sets of contradictory conceptual pairs, which Renouvier calls “dilemmas” and whose solution would only be practical. The aim of this article is not only to lay out the distinctive traits of Renouvier’s history of (...) philosophy but also to highlight the militant nature of his historiography. In fact, the theory of dilemmas was pitted against the historiographical model that was dominant in Renouvier’s formative years, namely the eclectic spiritualism of Victor Cousin, who rather sought to distil from each philosophical system its truth content. In this context, the history of philosophy, far from being the philological discipline it is for us today, has in fact a primarily instrumental and polemical, if not political, value. (shrink)

Renouvier was among the first philosophers in France to break with the nineteenth-century inductivist tradition and defend the use of hypotheses in science. Earlier in the century, the humanistically-educated eclectic spiritualist philosophers who dominated French academic life had followed Reid in proscribing the use of hypotheses. Renouvier, who was educated in the sciences, took up the Comtean positivist alternative and developed it further. He began by defending hypotheses that anticipate laws governing the phenomena, but then eventually adopted a more liberal (...) attitude towards hypotheses that postulate unobservable entities and processes as well. He also came to the realization that, from an epistemological point of view, all of empirical science is hypothetical. Renouvier used the tentative character of scientific knowledge as a premise from which to critique those who would claim scientific status for their social philosophies, and maintained a distinction between normative philosophical and empirical scientific inquiries.Keywords: Charles Renouvier; Auguste Comte; Positivism; Hypothesis; Eclectic spiritualism. (shrink)

Renouvier's place in nineteenth-century French thought -- Renouvier's critique of Comtean positivism -- Renouvier and mathematics -- Renouvier on evolution -- Kant, free will, and the social contract -- Hypothesis and convention in Renouvier's philosophy of science.

In this chapter, while acknowledging an important and famous early influence of Renouvier on James’s notions of belief and free will, the author documents a major and growing disagreement in their exchanges. The author argues that this disagreement is by no means a peripheral matter, since it involves James’s assessment of Renouvier’s neo-Kantianism. After having presented the core of Renouvier’s main influence in the section “Free Will’s Champion, Kantian Style,” the author gives a brief survey of James’s presence in the (...) Critique Philosophique in the section “James’s Contributions,” and deals, in the following sections, with James’s early criticisms of Renouvier on philosophical method (the section “Methods and Categories”), on the perception of space and time (the section ”Unbounded Spaces”) and on consciousness (the section ”The Stream of Thought”). In order to accomplish this, the author focuses on a more limited period than James' career as a whole: the author follows him from the early writings to the mid-1880s—that is, precisely to the point where James and Renouvier's philosophical itineraries begin to diverge. The author’s larger goal is to illustrate how the Critique Philosophique was at first a hospitable publication for the young James, but also how, from the end of this period on, important disputes emerged, in particular over consciousness, which gave rise to a paradoxical situation: the very organ that contributed to make James known turned out to be at odds with several of his most important theses, before the publication of the Principles, and even more before Pragmatism. (shrink)

In Charles Renouvier we have one of the lone, stern, and indefatigable workers in philosophy in the nineteenth century. His powerful mind, moral earnestness, and intellectual vigour command respect and attention and place him high in the ranks of the philosophical thinkers of his century. He differed profoundly from his English contemporary Spencer and his German contemporary Lotze, both of whom have received more attention than Renouvier. His long and immensely active life fell into periods which coincide with, and (...) partly reflect, the political and intellectual fortunes of his country from the Battle of Waterloo, through the Revolution of 1830, the Second Republic of 1848, the Second Empire, the War and the Commune of 1871, into the Third Republic, with its Dreyfus struggles and its Educational and Disestablishment problems in the early years of the present century. (shrink)

The article analyzes the philosophy of the history of French neo-Kantianism school founder, the creator of the idea of Uchronia, Charles Renouvier. Attention is focused on the theoretical atti­tudes inherent in various stages of the creative development of Renouvier, and on their connection with «utopia in history». In his philosophy of history, Renouvier opposed the concept of predesti­nation, the need for all events taking place. He insisted on the presence of freedom in history, on the possibility of moving along (...) other paths of social reality, not fixed by tradition. In the alter­native version of history depicted by the French thinker, Christianity triumphed not in the West, but in the East. The Crusades took place but were geographically directed in the opposite course. Progress in understanding of religion later returned Christianity to the West in a form cleared of fa­naticism. Renouvier connected the future of human civilization with the republican social struc­ture. He predicted the end of all kinds of wars. In a cautious, veiled form he criticized the Second Empire regime in France. Renouvier’s concept contained both strengths and weaknesses. It is fruit­ful in its call to focus in political life on the idea of the effectiveness of human free will, the idea of maximizing the moral content of the concept of the state. It is vulnerable in its intention to at­tach decisive importance to the intellectual factor in history. (shrink)

Charles Renouvier se bat contre les mystères et la métaphysique en utilisant la méthode scientifique. Il appuie son néocriticisme sur l'esprit de la science. Il n'omet pas d'étudier les premiers principes des sciences, les notions de phénomène et de loi, les catégories. Il articule son phénoménisme entre les catégories de relation, d'où découle l'absurdité de l'infini actuel, et de personne, toute chose étant par le biais de représentations. Il use des principes de relativité et de contradiction, propose un classement (...) des sciences, prenant en compte ses principes et posant la critique comme tronc commun des sciences. Il voit l'objet des mathématiques dans le rapport du multiple à l'un, et le nombre comme un tout d'unités. Sa loi du nombre lui permet de sortir des antinomies kantiennes, de penser les nombres négatifs et fractionnaires. Il analyse les concepts élémentaires de la géométrie, il présente les enjeux du calcul des probabilités et se positionne par rapport aux géométries imaginaires, tout cela en vue de débarrasser les mathématiques de toute métaphysique. Il fait valoir l'hypothèse scientifique dans les sciences expérimentales, s'interroge sur les notions de matière et de force. Considérant la place de la liberté et de la volonté en l'homme, il y voit une différence spécifique d'avec l'animal. Il montre le lien entre croyance et savoir, et il milite pour une religion raisonnée et un progrès moral."--P. [4] of cover. (shrink)

In this paper, I'm giving an account of William James's reception in the columns of Charles Renouvier's journal, La Critique philosophique. The papers explores the discussions between James and Renouvier on Free Will, Philosophical systems, Consciousness and Pluralism.

The article analyzes the features of understanding of the history of philosophical process by the leading representative of French Neo-Kantianism. The binary scheme, thoroughly substantiated by Renоuvier in the “Sketch of the Systematic Classification of Philosophical Doctrines”, was a certain result of his previous creative way. In the “Textbook of Philosophy of the New Age”, he, highlighting the pantheism–idealism dilemma, expresses his sympathies for eclecticism. In the “Textbook of Ancient Philosophy”, he advocates giving philosophy a scientific character by combining the (...) laws of reason and history. In “Experiences of General Criticism” he builds a system of neo-criticism, identifying phenomena with reality. Finally, the “Sketch” presents an attempt at an objective consideration of the history of philosophy. Renоuvier identifies six oppositions passing through the entire history of thought (thing–consciousness, infinite–finite, evolution–creation, necessity–freedom, happiness–duty, evidence–belief). The strength of his method is the desire to make a choice between opposing trends, taking into account intellectual motives, passions, practical inducements of varying degrees of community. But both elements of reductionism and unfounded optimism about the lack of influence of all kinds of systems on his own constructions are present in his approach. (shrink)

The article is dedicated to an unexplored subject in the history of spiritualism in the 19th century and considers two of its prominent representatives – the famous French spiritualist Felix Ravais­son (1813–1900) and the Swiss thinker Charles Secrétan (1815–1895). The author uses not only biographical material, but also such unstudied documents as Secretan’s article on the philosophy of Ravaisson and his letter to him, accidentally discovered by Ch. Devivaise in Ch. Renouvier’s archive. The author shows that the dependence of (...) both philosophers on Schelling was not so much the direct influence of the German philosopher on their thought as an internal relationship with his thought. The article shows that Ravaisson’s emphasis on the aesthetic component of understanding the world as the self-development of the spirit contrasts with the moral optics of Secrétan’s meta­physics. In addition, the philosophy of Ravaisson was formed on the basis of the Christianly rethought metaphysics of Aristotle, while the philosophy of Secrétan has as its starting point the moral and religious thought of Kant. However, the pathos of the universal striving for the best, the highest, the excellent on the path of sacrificial service and self-giving indissolubly unites these spiritualist philosophers. In the Appendix to the article, the author gives a translation of the men­tioned letter of Secrétan to Ravaisson. (shrink)

The present paper has two main aims. The first one is philosophical and is related to the general topic of this volume (Logical Empiricism and Pragmatism): I would like to draw attention to the fact that the issue of classical scientific determinism, despite being ‘metaphysical’ and thereby ‘nonsensical’ according to the Vienna Circle's ‘scientific world conception’, bothered philosophers, like William James and Charles Peirce, who were deeply involved in scientific practice. At the end of the paper I shall raise (...) the question of why it was so and what this fact may suggest about the relationship between science and metaphysics. The second main aim of this paper is historico-philosophical: in the time span between the late 1870s and by the turn of 1900 James (1842–1910) and Peirce (1839–1914) contributed repeatedly to the ongoing discussions about scientific determinism. In this paper I give a general overview of their positions based mainly on primary sources and I embed them into the broader context of the history of the concept of scientific determinism, dedicating special attention to their relationship with a particular French anti-deterministic tradition (Renouvier, Poincaré, Boutroux and Bergson). (shrink)

is it possible to have a first-person experience of our own agency? In nineteenth-century France, this question was subject to intense philosophical debate. The two figures primarily associated with each side of the debate were Maine de Biran and Charles Renouvier. Biran developed powerful objections to Hume's arguments that purported to prove the impossibility of the experience of one's inner causal force. These objections were the match that lit this philosophical fire, and formed the foundation of the philosophy of (...) the French spiritualist school; a school that included Félix Ravaisson, Jules Lachelier, Émile Boutroux, and Henri Bergson.1... (shrink)

The present article focuses on American and European personalism during the early part of the twentieth century . The immediate predecessor of the personalist movement as such was the philosopher Rudolf Hermann Lotze who inspired two of his students, Methodist Borden Parker Bowne and Rudolf Eucken. In France, in the meantime, Charles Renouvier published his Le personnalisme in 1903, while Emmanuel Mounier later presented personalism as a new political philosophy under the influence Alexandre Marc’s comments on Nicolai Hartmann’s Ethik. (...) Mounier’s Manifeste au service du personnalisme develops a dialectical critique on both liberal bourgeois individualism and all forms of collectivism, all, in his opinion, ‘inverted theocracies’ with shared dehumanizing tendencies. As alternative, it was necessary for personalism to become the leading spiritual and philosophical guide in order to Refaire la Renaissance . As a matter of fact, Jacques Maritain’s Humanisme intégral might justly be considered a first attempt to describe the nature of a new civilization in any detail. Maritain is more explicit on the Christian face of this new humanism, while refuting any kind of mancentred humanism. Mounier’s and Maritain’s personalist ideas together with Max Scheler’s non-formal ethics of value and his Aktlehre had a considerable influence on Louis Janssens. In Personne et société he not only criticizes several contemporary European ideologies in line with Mounier, but he also accepts that persons can only be really known by co-operation, in line with Scheler’s idea of inter-subjectivity and Aquinas’ idea of the social nature of the human being. Following Maritain, Janssens distinguishes between the human being as individual and the human person. Individuality contains a material component, characterized by its concrete position in space and time, while the person and his/her spiritual component facilitate a movement away from the self towards others in freedom and love. The person is not only understood as the highest value, he/she is able to control the hierarchy of values by his/her ordo amoris, a flexible undertaking influenced by the love of others in which love opens each person for growth towards higher values. (shrink)