We revisit the foundations of positive model theory, introducing h-inductive sentences. These allow a considerably simplified presentation of positive model theory, as well as a characterisation of Hausdorff cats by an amalgamation property of their h-inductive theory.

In this paper, I analyze some disagreements about scientific ontology as cases of disagreement between epistemic peers. I maintain that the particularities of these cases are better understood if epistemic peerhood is relativized to a perspective-like index of epistemic goals and values. Taking the debate on the metaphysics of laws of nature as a case study, I explore the limits and possibilities of a trans-perspective assessment of positions regarding scientific ontology.

Visual stimuli as well as transcranial magnetic stimulation can be used: to suppress the visibility of a target and to recover the visibility of a target that has been suppressed by another mask. Both types of stimulation thus provide useful methods for studying the microgenesis of object perception. We first review evidence of similarities between the processes by which a TMS mask and a visual mask can either suppress the visibility of targets or recover such suppressed visibility. However, we then (...) also point out a significant difference that has important implications for the study of the time course of unconscious and conscious visual information processing and for theoretical accounts of the processes involved. We present evidence and arguments showing: that visual masking techniques, by revealing more detailed aspects of target masking and target recovery, support a theoretical approach to visual masking and visual perception that must take into account activities in two separate neural channels or processing streams and, as a corollary, that at the current stage of methodological sophistication visual masks, by acting in more highly specifiable ways on these pathways, provide information about the microgenesis of form perception not available with TMS masks. (shrink)

The article addresses the question of how should scientific peers revise their beliefs (if at all) upon recognized disagreement. After presenting the basics of peer disagreement in sections 1 and 2, we focus, in section 3, on a concrete case of scientific disagreement, to wit, the dispute over the evidential status of randomized control trials in medical practice. The examination of this case motivates the idea that some scientific disagreements permit a steadfast reaction. In section 4, we support this conclusion (...) by providing a normative argument in the same direction; if we are correct, typical reasons for conciliation are absent in this kind of scientific disagreements. (shrink)

In a series of papers, 137–158; 1994, Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 23, 61–74, 1999) Fine develops his hylomorphic theory of embodiments. In this article, we supply a formal semantics for this theory that is adequate to the principles laid down for it in. In Section 1, we lay out the theory of embodiments as Fine presents it. In Section 2, we argue on Cantorian grounds that the theory needs to be stabilized, and sketch some ways forward, discussing various choice points (...) in modeling the view. In Section 3, we develop a formal semantics for the theory of embodiments by constructing embodiments in stages and restricting the domain of the second-order quantifiers. In Section 4 we give a few illustrative examples to show how the models deliver Finean hylomorphic consequences. In Section 5, we prove that Fine’s principles are sound with respect to this semantics. In Section 6 we present some inexpressibility results concerning Fine’s various notions of parthood and show that in our formal semantics these notions are all expressible using a single mereological primitive. In Section 7, we prove several mereological results stemming from the model theory, showing that the mereology is surprisingly robust. In Section 8, we draw some philosophical lessons from the formal semantics, and in particular respond to Koslicki’s main objection to Fine’s theory. In the appendix we present proofs of the inexpressibility results of Section 6. (shrink)

General-elimination harmony articulates Gentzen’s idea that the elimination-rules are justified if they infer from an assertion no more than can already be inferred from the grounds for making it. Dummett described the rules as not only harmonious but stable if the E-rules allow one to infer no more and no less than the I-rules justify. Pfenning and Davies call the rules locally complete if the E-rules are strong enough to allow one to infer the original judgement. A method is given (...) of generating harmonious general-elimination rules from a collection of I-rules. We show that the general-elimination rules satisfy Pfenning and Davies’ test for local completeness, but question whether that is enough to show that they are stable. Alternative conditions for stability are considered, including equivalence between the introduction- and elimination-meanings of a connective, and recovery of the grounds for assertion, finally generalizing the notion of local completeness to capture Dummett’s notion of stability satisfactorily. We show that the general-elimination rules meet the last of these conditions, and so are indeed not only harmonious but also stable. (shrink)

Resumen Un diagnóstico más que difundido acerca de la obra de Lakatos señala que su proyecto soslayó por completo la cuestión de la verdad como parte central del análisis del conocimiento científico. En una línea semejante, Hacking afirma que Lakatos encontró en la metodología un sustituto para la verdad. Incluso quienes descreen de estas interpretaciones acuerdan respecto de que Lakatos falla en dar cuenta de la relación entre el desarrollo del conocimiento y el aumento de la verosimilitud. En el presente (...) trabajo argumento que el problema de la verdad es central al proyecto filosófico de Lakatos, y es posible construir una interpretación alternativa en la que su proyecto de establecer un vínculo entre método y verdad pueda tenerse como exitoso. Propongo una lectura davidsoniana que adjudica a Lakatos un realismo epistémico.A widespread interpretation of Lakatos’ work says his project completely sidestepped the question of truth as a central part of the analysis of scientific knowledge. In a similar vein, Hacking states that Lakatos found in methodology a substitute for truth. Even those who are skeptical of these interpretations agree that Lakatos failed to give an account of the relation between the growth of knowledge and increasing verisimilitude. In this paper I maintain that the problem of truth is central to Lakatos’ philosophical project, and it is possible to develop an alternative interpretation in which his project to establish a link between method and truth can be seen as successful. I put forward a Davidsonian interpretation that ascribes to Lakatos an epistemic realism. (shrink)

Serious actualism is the prima facie plausible thesis that things couldn’t have been related while being nothing. The thesis plays an important role in a number of arguments in metaphysics, e.g., in Plantinga’s argument for the claim that propositions do not ontologically depend on the things that they are about and in Williamson’s argument for the claim that he, Williamson, is necessarily something. Salmon has put forward that which is, arguably, the most pressing challenge to serious actualists. Salmon’s objection is (...) based on a scenario intended to elicit the judgment that merely possible entities may nonetheless be actually referred to, and so may actually have properties. It is shown that predicativism, the thesis that names are true of their bearers, provides the resources for replying to Salmon’s objection. In addition, an argument for serious actualism based on Stephanou, 219–250 2007) is offered. Finally, it is shown that once serious actualism is conjoined with some minimal assumptions, it implies property necessitism, the thesis that necessarily all properties are necessarily something, as well as a strong comprehension principle for higher-order modal logic according to which for every condition there necessarily is the property of being a thing satisfying that condition. (shrink)

Los desacuerdos acerca de la ontología científica han sido frecuentemente reconstruidos como el resultado de una disputa entre stances epistémicas rivales. En el presente trabajo, (i) caracterizamos algunos de estos desacuerdos como desacuerdos profundos. Además, (ii) mostramos que los desacuerdos profundos sobre ontología científica pueden surgir no solo de la adopción de diferentes stances epistémicas, sino entre posiciones que se encuadran dentro de una misma stance. El desarrollo de ese punto nos permite, a su vez, establecer una distinción entre tipos (...) de desacuerdos profundos y explorar la posibilidad de que existan diferencias de grado entre ellos. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Nonplaces:An Anecdoted Topography of Contemporary French TheoryBruno Bosteels (bio)In its juridical sense, a non-lieu is a judgment that suspends, annuls, or withdraws a case without bringing it to trial. It is thus a judgment that announces or enunciates that there will be no judgment as to guilt or innocence, a finding that there is no place to judge. It therefore renders justice by refusing to render it under the (...) law, which it does when it pronounces or enunciates the non-lieu.—Peggy Kamuf, "Béance"1Inside the Spatial TurnIf modernity will always be remembered as an era dominated by questions of time and history, then perhaps the steady waning of modern ideals invites us to think of the entry into something called the postmodern as a passage dominated by questions of space and geography. As Michel Foucault once famously observed in a 1967 conference paper, first published two decades ago: "Perhaps we might say that some of the ideological conflicts that animate today's polemics oppose the pious descendants of time and the willful inhabitants of space" ["Of Other Spaces" 22]. This conflict over time and space presupposes a much larger argument that is not only historical but also methodological in nature. What is at stake is both a question of the passage, or transition, from modernity to postmodernity, if that is indeed what we decide to name modernity's aftermath, and a question of the theoretical consequences that follow from giving precedence to space over time in treating this very transition. With regard to this second question, too, Foucault's work stands as exemplary insofar as he was able to show the degree to which a vital emphasis on space, geography, and territoriality [End Page 117] forces us to take leave of the modern paradigm of consciousness—typically associated with the category of time and its unfolding in the mind or spirit—in favor of a situated understanding of knowledge, subjectivity, and power. "Metaphorizing the transformations of discourse in a vocabulary of time necessarily leads to the utilisation of the model of individual consciousness with its intrinsic temporality," Foucault observes in an interview with the editors of the French journal of geography Hérodote, and he continues: "Endeavouring on the other hand to decipher discourse through the use of spatial, strategic metaphors enables one to grasp precisely the points at which discourses are transformed in, through and on the basis of relations of power" ["Questions on Geography" 69–70]. Whether real or metaphorical, a willful displacement of our categorial apparatus from time to space thus might enable one to avoid the idealist temptation inherent in a strictly discursive or textual model, by inscribing all discourses and practices in the geopolitics of power relations.My aim in the following pages is not to go over the much-discussed shift from time to space once more, even as I take advantage of several of its methodological principles along the way. Instead, I want to map out a momentous change of perspective that has been taking place over the past few decades within the parameters of the so-called spatial turn itself. In fact, if and when modernity is coming to an end, both in the sense of completing itself and of revealing its character as a finite historical entity, not only does whatever shape critical thought takes in the face of this turnabout need to be securely fastened onto specific places and spaces but, if we are to believe a growing number of authors, particularly but by no means exclusively in France, the study of art, literature, politics, philosophy, and even anthropology would also require a thorough consideration of so-called "nonplaces" as a rigorous category for critical thinking today [for a brief discussion of the use of "nonplace" in Anglo-American anthropology, including Melvin M. Webber's notion of "nonplace urban realm" from the mid-1960s, see Weiner]. In the end, these proponents of the nonplace confront us with one disarmingly simple question: how can critical thinking in the present time respond to the task of having to work through whatever lies outside of the order that is actually in place?The Exhaustion of... (shrink)

On the classical understanding, an agent is fully excused for an action if and only if performing this action was a case of faultless wrongdoing. A major motivation for this view is the apparent existence of paradigmatic types of excusing considerations, affecting fault but not wrongness. I show that three such considerations, ignorance, duress and compulsion, can be shown to have direct bearing on the permissibility of actions. The appeal to distinctly identifiable excusing considerations thus does not stand up to (...) closer scrutiny, undermining the classical view and giving us reason to seek alternative ways of drawing the justification/excuse distinction. (shrink)

Collaborative inquiry (CI) often prefers using the small group as the main method of investigation serving the twin goals that characterize this type of research—the production of scientific knowledge and the professional development of its participants. The small group offers researchers and practitioners a mutual space for analyzing issues of common interest which arise from the day-to-day experience of the latter. Supporting these groups and their participants can be a major challenge and plays a crucial role in carrying out a (...) CI project. But what exactly do this stance and the work supporting it entail? The authors of this article offer some possible answers to this broad question by drawing on their own experiences in various CI projects and on a systematic approach that they have developed in recent years. Knowledge related to CI— as a methodological approach and as part of the process and goals of experiential learning in particular—made it possible to study support issues, starting with areas of focus that guide researchers and act as reference points in the course of this work. (shrink)

Necessitism, Contingentism, and Theory Equivalence is a dissertation on issues in higher-order modal metaphysics. Consider a modal higher-order language with identity in which the universal quantifier is interpreted as expressing universal quantification and the necessity operator is interpreted as expressing metaphysical necessity. The main question addressed in the dissertation concerns the correct theory formulated in this language. A different question that also takes centre stage in the dissertation is what it takes for theories to be equivalent.The whole dissertation consists of (...) an extended argument in defence of the truth of two seemingly inconsistent higher-order modal theories, specifically: 1.Plantingan Moderate Contingentism, a theory based on Plantinga’s [1] modal metaphysics that is committed to, among other things, the contingent being of some individuals and the necessary being of all possible higher-order entities;2.Williamsonian Thorough Necessitism, a theory advocated by Williamson [3] which is committed to, among other things, the necessary being of every possible individual as well as of every possible higher-order entity.Part of the case for these theories’ joint truth relies on defences of the following metaphysical theses: Thorough Serious Actualism, the thesis that no things could have been related while being nothing, and Higher-Order Necessitism, the thesis that necessarily, every higher-order entity is necessarily something. It is shown that Thorough Serious Actualism and Higher-Order Necessitism are both implicit commitments of very weak logical theories. The defence of Higher-Order Necessitism constitutes a powerful challenge to Stalnaker’s [2] Thorough Contingentism, a theory committed to, among other things, the view that there could have been some individuals as well as some entities of any higher-order that could have been nothing.In the dissertation it is argued that Plantingan Moderate Contingentism and Williamsonian Thorough Necessitism are in fact equivalent, even if they appear to be jointly inconsistent. The case for this claim relies on the Synonymy account, a novel account of theory equivalence developed and defended in the dissertation. According to this account, theories are equivalent just in case they have the same commitments and conception of logical space.By way of defending the Synonymy account’s adequacy, the account is applied to the debate between noneists, proponents of the view that some things do not exist, and Quineans, proponents of the view that to exist just is to be some thing. The Synonymy account is shown to afford a more nuanced and better understanding of that debate by revealing that what noneists and Quineans are really disagreeing about is what expressive resources are available to appropriately describe the world.By coupling a metatheoretical result with tools from the philosophy of language, it is argued that Plantingan Moderate Contingentism and Williamsonian Thorough Necessitism are synonymous theories, and so, by the lights of the Synonymy account, equivalent. Given the defence of their extant commitments made in the dissertation, it is concluded that Plantingan Moderate Contingentism and Williamsonian Thorough Necessitism are both correct. A corollary of this result is that the dispute between Plantingans and Williamsonians is, in an important sense, merely verbal. For if two theories are equivalent, then they “require the same of the world for their truth.”Thus, the results of the dissertation reveal that if one speaks as a Plantingan while advocating Plantingan Moderate Contingentism, or as a Williamsonian while advocating Williamsonian Thorough Necessitism, then one will not go wrong. Notwithstanding, one will still go wrong if one speaks as a Plantingan while advocating Williamsonian Thorough Necessitism, or as a Williamsonian while advocating Plantingan Moderate Contingentism.On the basis of a conception of the individual constants and predicates of second-order modal languages as strongly Millian, i.e., as having actually existing entities as their semantic values, in the appendix are presented second-order modal logics consistent with Stalnaker’s Thorough Contingentism. Furthermore, it is shown there that these logics are strong enough for applications of higher-order modal logic in mathematics, a result that constitutes a reply to an argument to the contrary by Williamson [3]. Finally, these logics are proven to be complete relative to particular “thoroughly contingentist” classes of models. (shrink)

Disagreements about scientific ontology have frequently been reconstructed as the result of a dispute between rival epistemic stances. In this paper, (i) we characterize some of these disagreements as deep disagreements. In addition, we show that deep disagreements about scientific ontology can arise not only from the adoption of different epistemic stances, but also between positions that fall within the same stance. The development of this point allows us, in turn, to establish a distinction between types of deep disagreement and (...) to explore the possibility that there are differences of degree between them. (shrink)

Current debate on Structural Realism starts when Worrall suggest this position is capable of accounting for the central intuitions of both Scientific Realism and Antirealism. Since then, it has become a rich field of debate in which complex disputes have emerged. In this paper I maintain that, despite its recent appearance on the philosophical scene, SR constitutes the crowning of an epistemological trend I propose to call ‘structuralist tradition’. I take as its central feature to put the focus on the (...) relations that exist in the natural world, rather than in the nature of the entities that maintain those relations. But despite this common feature, the various positions that have constituted that tradition in general, and the variants of RE in particular, have not offered a precise and uniform notion of structure. (shrink)

RESUMEN Las teorías de la referencia puramente descriptivistas o causales fracasan a la hora de dar cuenta del modo en que se fija y puede rastrearse la referencia de los términos teóricos. Psillos propuso dos versiones del descriptivismo causal que recogen argumentos presentes en defensas previas de dicha posición. Se trata de una teoría mixta que pretende solucionar el problema y acomodarse a intuiciones presentes en enfoques alternativos, como el que apela a oraciones de Ramsey. El artículo se propone mostrar (...) la insuficiencia del descriptivismo causal como solución al problema de la referencia de los términos teóricos. ABSTRACT Purely descriptivist or purely causal reference theories fail to account for the manner in which the reference of theoretical terms is fixed and can be traced. S. Psillos proposed two versions of causal descriptivism that take up arguments set forth in previous defenses of said position. His is a mixed theory that attempts to solve the problem by adopting insights from alternative approaches, such as those that resort to Ramsey sentences. The objective of the article is to show the insufficiency of causal descriptivism as a solution to the problem of reference of theoretical terms. (shrink)

Do passeio pela filosofia Deleuze-Guattariana ao encontro com o possível conceito de programas de vida Resumo: De todas as maneiras de incursionar uma filosofia, o passeio pareceu ser a abordagem possível diante do emaranhado pensamento de Gilles Deleuze e Félix Guattari. Ainda que alguns se dediquem a localizar onde começa e onde termina a contribuição de cada um nas obras que os dois filósofos escreveram juntos, é nesse entre, no encontro de dois pensadores, que enfrentavam questões específicas em cada campo (...) de ação, mas que foram capazes, por meio da troca, ou melhor do roubo recíproco, como gostava de dizer Deleuze, que se produziu um pensamento que não se acomoda ou se ajusta à tradição. Desse passeio, destaca-se o encontro com um possível conceito presente em diferentes obras desses filósofos que é o programa de vida. Não se trata de um conceito efetivo, pois ele não é alçado a esse status pelos seus autores, ou pelo menos de forma objetiva. Cabe a este artigo, enfim, apresentar um plano sobre o qual esse protoconceito possa ser desenvolvido. Palavras-chave: Programa de vida; Deleuze; Guattari; Intersecção. The stroll of Deleuze-Guattarian philosophy and meeting with the possible concept of life programs: Of all the ways of studying philosophy, the stroll seemed to be the possible approach to the tangled intersected thinking of Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari. Although some are dedicated to locating where each one's contribution begins and ends in the works that the two philosophers wrote together, it is in this between, at the meeting of two contemporary thinkers, that they generally faced questions specific to each field of action. That finally, they were able, through an exchange, or rather reciprocal theft, as Deleuze liked to say, that philosophy has been produced which does not fit but is not excluding from what tradition has conventionally called philosophy - reason. This tour highlights the encounter with a possible concept present in different works of these philosophers, which is the program of life. This is not an effective concept, as it is, they not raised to this status by its authors, or at least objectively. It is up to this article, finally, to present a plan on which this developing of concept. Key Works: Life program; Deleuze; Guattari; Intersection. Le promenade par la philosophie Deleuze-Guattarien à la rencontre avec la possible notion de programme de vie De toutes les manières de connaitre une philosophie, le promenade semblait être l’approche possible devant l’enchevêtrement de pensée intersecté de Gilles Deleuze et Félix Guattari. Encore que certain se consacrent a localiser où commence et termine la contribution de chacun dans les oeuvres que les deux philosophes ont écrit ensemble, c’est dans ce entre, la rencontre de deux penseurs contemporains, qui ont généralement confronté les questions spécifiques a chaque champs d’actions, mais qui à la fin, ont été capable, grâce a l’échange, ou mieux du vol réciproque, comme aimait dire Deleuze, que s’est produite une philosophie que ne s’ajustait pas, mais aussi qui ne s’est exclue pas de ce que la tradition convenu a appelé philosophie- la raison. De ce chemin, ce démarque la rencontre avec une possible notion présente dans différentes oeuvres de ces philosophes qui est le programme de la vie. Il ne s’agit pas d’une notion efficace car il n’est élevé pas à ce statut par ses auteurs, ou au moins de forme objectif. Incombe a cet article, enfin, de présenter un plan sur lequel ce ‘proto-notion’ peut être développé.Mots clés : Programme de vie; Deleuze; Guattari; Intersection. Data de registro: 06/12/2019 Data de aceite: 13/10/2020. (shrink)

The dispute between nomological realists and anti-realists has been reflected in the formulation of various arguments and counterarguments that reach topics as diverse as modality, induction and the very scientific practice. In this context it is common to take the main realist argument –the nomological argument– for an instance of Inference to the Best Explanation, while Nomological Anti-realism is considered a skeptical alternative concerning natural laws, sustained by independent reasons. This paper aims to review that image of the Nomological Realism (...) vs. Anti-realism debate in light of what we believe is an appropriate distinction between abduction and Inference to the Best Explanation. (shrink)

El problema de cómo un modelo teórico —i.e., una entidad matemática—puede representar algo en la naturaleza es central para el EstructuralismoEmpirista (EE) de van Fraassen. Su solución consiste en identificar unelemento indexical presente en toda aserción de la forma “X representa aY”. El presente trabajo pretende mostrar que: (a) dicho problema no es unobstáculo para el realismo más de lo que lo es para el EE; (b) la soluciónde van Fraassen deja al defensor del EE ante un dilema fatal: o (...) bien nopuede dar cuenta de algunos de los supuestos más básicos de su posición,o bien debe conceder demasiado al realismo. (shrink)

Este artigo parte do entendimento de que a cientificidade na pedagogia exigiu desta área do conhecimento suprimir a experiência como elemento vital da formação do homem, enquanto elevava a comprovação e regularidade do experimento ao patamar de destaque nos seus processos. A partir desta consideração, pretende-se tratar da transformação do conceito de experiência no campo educativo. Inicialmente, abordam-se as questões relacionadas à terminologia e significação do conceito “experiência” e sua possível transformação em “experimento”, e os desdobramentos dessa transição no campo (...) pedagógico. Na sequência, analisa-se a transformação do valor da experiência que passa a ser reconhecida enquanto experimento científico aplicado à pedagogia. Para tanto, apresenta-se, a partir da leitura da literatura educacional especializada, sobretudo os manuais dedicados à formação de professores, como é abordada a temática da Pedagogia Científica, ou seja, a construção dos discursos acerca da modernização da educação por meio de obras que apresentaram expressiva circulação no Brasil durante século XX. Dentre os resultados foi possível apreender o estabelecimento de uma pedagogia do experimento, ou, em outros termos, uma biopsicopedagogia como modelo estruturante do campo teórico da pedagogia com repercussão na formação de professores, e na predominância da problemática do ensino e da aprendizagem, ou seja, a intervenção metodológica em detrimento da formação integral do homem. Por fim, chega-se à conclusão de que se está, de um lado, diante dos impeditivos de realização da experiência e, de outro lado, diante de uma demanda, cada vez mais presente, de romper com o modelo pedagógico da modernidade, rumo aos novos desafios da educação de um homem que não se deixa mais ser, simplesmente, formado. Palavras-chave: Experiência. Experimento. Educação. Pedagogia. (shrink)

El realismo estructural epistémico (REE) afirma que el conocimiento que nos brindan las teorías científicas es acerca de la estructura del mundo inobservable, y no sobre su naturaleza. La objeción más importante que esta posición ha enfrentado es el llamado problema de Newman. En el presente trabajo ofrezco una objeción alternativa al REE. Sostengo que su formulación conduce a posiciones escépticas indeseables en dos campos próximos al realismo científico: los debates sobre la modalidad y las leyes de la naturaleza. Muestro (...) además que hay un sentido interesante en el que mi objeción es más fuerte que la formulada por Newman. (shrink)

En el presente trabajo analizo críticamente dos estrategias empleadas para esclarecer la naturaleza modal de las estructuras tal como son concebidas por el realismo estructural óntico (reo) en su versión eliminativista: los patrones reales de Ladyman y Ross (2007) y las leyes y simetrías de French (2014). Ofrezco argumentos para mostrar que ambas resultan incapaces de brindar una caracterización de las estructuras como entidades inherentemente modales. Ese resultado impone serias dificultades al proyecto de presentar el reo como una posición realista (...) acerca del mundo físico. (shrink)

The history of philosophy risks a self-opacity whereby we overestimate or underestimate our proximity to prior modes of thinking. This risk is relevant to assessing Hegel’s appropriation by McDowell and Priest. McDowell enlists Hegel for a quietist answer to the problem with assuming that concepts and reality belong to different orders, viz., how concepts are answerable to the world. If we accept Hegel’s absolute idealist view that the conceptual is boundless, this problem allegedly dissolves. Priest enlists Hegel for a dialetheist (...) answer to the problem with assuming that truth and falsity are mutually exclusive, viz., how certain sentences are both true and false. If we accept Hegel’s dialectical view that certain contradictions are necessary, this problem allegedly dissolves. For both McDowell and Priest, we find a true friend in Hegel. I argue that McDowell’s and Priest’s appropriations of Hegel overestimate Hegel’s affinity with quietism and dialetheism. McDowell reads Hegel as a quietist who silences metaphysical claims and the skeptical questions they raise against commonsense, but neglects Hegel’s adaptation of ancient skepticism against commonsense. Priest reads Hegel as a dialetheist who subordinates formal logic to dialectical logic by affirming the truth of certain contradictions, but neglects Hegel’s commitment to resolving contradictions for the sake of truth qua whole. I diagnose their misreadings in terms of what Hegel regards as the three moments of logic and argue that while McDowell jumps to its third moment, Priest stalls at its second moment. According to Hegel’s Encyclopedia Logic, logic has three “moments”: the abstractive moment of the understanding, which “stops short” at fixed categories; the negative moment of dialectic, which discovers the “genuine nature” of the categories, viz., that each “passes over, of itself, into its opposite”; and the positive moment of speculation, which grasps the “unity” of categories through the “dissolution” of their inner opposition. Hegel warns that if these moments are “kept separate from each other […] they are not considered in their truth”. I suggest that quietist and dialetheist readings of Hegel fail to consider truthfully the unified moments of his logic. In his quietist critique of metaphysics, McDowell enlists Hegel to dissolve the problem with assuming the duality of concept and reality. But McDowell helps himself directly to the third moment of logic, where the unity of the categories, and hence the boundlessness of the conceptual, would be fully articulated. Since he arrives at the third moment prematurely, ignoring its prior moments, he obscures its truth (§1). In his dialetheist critique of formal logic, Priest enlists Hegel to dissolve the problem with assuming the duality of truth and falsity. But Priest restricts himself gratuitously to the second moment of logic, where contradictions within the categories are not yet resolved. Since he stalls at the second moment, severed from its final moment, he obscures its truth (§2). I argue we can extricate Hegel from quietist and dialetheist misreadings only if we grasp the truth of the three moments of logic. (shrink)

This new edition uses the technique of visual masking to explore temporal aspects of conscious and unconscious processes down to a resolution in the...

Using a metacontrast masking paradigm, prior studies have shown that a target’s color information and form information, can be processed without awareness and that unconscious color processing occurs at early, wavelength-dependent levels in the cortical information processing hierarchy. Here we used a combination of paracontrast and metacontrast masking techniques to explore unconscious color and form priming effects produced by blue, green, and neutral stimuli. We found that color priming in normal observers is significantly reduced when an additional paracontrast mask precedes (...) the target at optimal masking SOAs. However, no reduction of form-priming effects was obtained at similar optimal paracontrast SOAs. We conclude that unconscious color priming depends on an early, wavelength- or stimulus-dependent response of color neurons located at early cortical levels whereas unconscious form priming occurs at later levels. (shrink)

Taking up Alain Badiou's project of systematizing the invariant traits of antiphilosophy as based on a radical "act" capable of discrediting and outstripping the philosopher's relation to truth, the author discusses the cases of Nietzsche's archi-political act of "breaking the history of the world into two halves" and Wittgenstein's archi-aesthetic act of "showing" that which one cannot speak of but which alone matters for the sense of the world. The difference between the antiphilosophical "act" and the philosophical treatment of an (...) "event" is best understood in terms of "suture" and "disaster," two concepts which in the process must be thoroughly revised. Finally, the author discusses the extent to which Badiou's own philosophy falls prey to, and even thrives on, an irresistible antiphilosophical element of its own. (shrink)