The chief aim of the paper is to extend the calculusDSC 1 (see [4]) in such a way as to satisfy all the requirements listed in [4] as well as a further stipulation — called the principle of uninvolvement — to the effect that neither deontic compatibility nor deontic incompatibility of codes (see [2]) should be presupposed in deontic logic.

Some requirements concerning deontic logic are formulated and discussed. Stress is laid on the need to distinguish between theories and deductive systems. It is argued that deontic theories need not be closed under the rule of detachment. Two deontic calculi, called DSC1, DSC2, are presented and talked over.

SummaryMain theses and assumptions: I. The so called sense‐data do not exist; II. In sensory cognition we perceive immediately objects, their features and relations; III. Each simple cognitive situation comprises cognitive conditions. Accordingly, a full simple sentence ought to have the shape: p“under conditions C” where p has one of the forms ‐ ; IV The subject should be treated as an abstract entity, not be identified with the man; V. Existence is an empirical feature; VI. Reality is the totality (...) of all existing objects; VII. Truth is accordance of the contents of sentences with reality.Some consequences of I‐VII have been investigated in the paper. (shrink)

This volume may be of interest for all those who wish that philosophy had a scientific character. As an adherent of the Polish Lvov-Warsaw Philosophical School, the author of this collection of papers endeavours to clarify some basic notions of epistemology, ontology and psychology of cognitive acts, such as judgment, existence, being etc. In his investigations he refrains from unnecessary rejection of common-sense knowledge but at the same time searches for suitable patterns in contemporary sciences. Regarding formal logic as a (...) fundamental tool for the precise expression and justification of thoughts, the author tries to clear logic from ontological commitments, shows how to construct logic of norms and how to use safely different definitions in research works. The book presents a new conception of antinomies and an innovatory approach to realistic epistemology. Moreover, some applications of logical methods are illustrated by examples of semantical analyses of the general notion of similarity and the biological concept of homology. (shrink)

The aim of the paper is to extend the calculus DSC1 in such a way as to satisfy all the requirements listed in [2] as well as a further stipulation { called `the principle of unionvolvement' { to the eect that neither deontic compatibility nor deontic incompatibility of codes should be presupposed in deontic logic. The observation that sentences of the form PKuw are stronger than it was suggested in [1] has been the point of departure.

Growing powers to manipulate human bodies and minds, not merely to heal disease but to satisfy desires, control deviant behavior, and to change human nature, make urgent questions of whether and how to regulate their use, not merely to assure safety and efficacy but also to safeguard our humanity. Oversight in democratic societies rightly belongs to the polity, not merely to self-appointed experts, scientific or ethical. Yet the task of governing the uses of dangerous knowledge is daunting, and there is (...) little evidence that we have the will or the wisdom to do it well. (shrink)

The so-called “disquotational theory of truth” has not previously been developed much beyond the thesis that saying, for example, that ‘Snow is white’ is true amounts only to saying that snow is white. Marian David has set out to see what further sense can be made of the disquotational theory, and to compare its merits with those of correspondence theories of truth. His prognosis is that an intelligible disquotational theory of truth can be developed but will suffer from drastic shortcomings (...) that make it all but unusable. (shrink)

Most American young people, like their ancestors, harbor desires for a worthy life: a life of meaning, a life that makes sense. But they are increasingly confused about what such a life might look like, and how they might, in the present age, be able to live one. With a once confident culture no longer offering authoritative guidance, the young are now at sea--regarding work, family, religion, and civic identity. The true, the good, and the beautiful have few defenders, and (...) the higher cynicism mocks any innocent love of wisdom or love of country. We are super-competent regarding efficiency and convenience; we are at a loss regarding what it's all for. Yet because the old orthodoxies have crumbled, our "interesting time" paradoxically offers genuine opportunities for renewal and growth. The old Socratic question, "How to live?," suddenly commands serious attention. Young Americans, if liberated from the prevailing cynicism, will readily embrace weighty questions and undertake serious quests for a flourishing life. All they (and we) need is encouragement. This book provides that necessary encouragement by illuminating crucial (and still available) aspects of a worthy life, and by defending them against their enemies. With chapters on love, family, and friendship; human excellence and human dignity; teaching, learning, and truth; and the great human aspirations of Western civilization, it offers people who are looking on their own for meaning, and as well as to people who are looking to deepen what they have been taught or to square it with the spirit of our time. (shrink)

Excerpt from La Théorie Platonicienne des Idées Et des Nombres d'Après Aristote: Étude Historique Et Critique La théorie phtonioionno de l'amour. Vol. Ia-8 de la Collection historique des grands philosophes 3 fr. 75. About the Publisher Forgotten Books publishes hundreds of thousands of rare and classic books. Find more at www.forgottenbooks.com This book is a reproduction of an important historical work. Forgotten Books uses state-of-the-art technology to digitally reconstruct the work, preserving the original format whilst repairing imperfections present in the (...) aged copy. In rare cases, an imperfection in the original, such as a blemish or missing page, may be replicated in our edition. We do, however, repair the vast majority of imperfections successfully; any imperfections that remain are intentionally left to preserve the state of such historical works. (shrink)

First published in 2000. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

This book presents a study of the nature and conditions of historical knowledge, conducted through a study of the relevant theories of Hume, Hegel and Vico. It is usually thought that in order to establish historical facts, we have to have a theory of human nature to support our arguments. Hume, Hegel and Vico all subscribed to this view, and are therefore discussed in detail. Professor Pompa goes on to argue that there is in fact no way of discovering anything (...) about human nature except through historical investigation. It is necessary therefore to find a different way of thinking about how we discover historical facts. This is done in the last chapter where, in opposition to almost all present views, it is argued that we must have a framework of inherited knowledge before we can believe in anything which results from historical enquiry. (shrink)