Curiosity and creativity are manifestations of novelty-seeking mechanisms, closely intertwined and interdependent. This principle aligns seamlessly with the foundational tenets of Langerian mindfulness, which places novelty seeking as a cornerstone. Creativity, curiosity, openness, and flexibility all harmoniously converge in this framework. Spanning over four decades, research in the realm of mindfulness has diligently delved into the intricate interplay among these constructs.

Bibliographic records published by the British Education Index (BEI) between 1957 and 2000 are analysed in the context of a history of the BEI's changing presentation of information about the field. The value of frequency counts for BEI subject terms is discussed, in relation to their potential for revealing trends in the fields of educational studies and information management.

De verkenning van God als vreeswekkende rechter is diep verankerd in het werk van Wittgenstein. Hiermee wil hij de grenzen van het menselijk denken aftasten.

Michael Moore’s recent book Mechanical Choices: The Responsibility of the Human Machine is full of rich, insightful discussion of many important issues related to free will and moral responsibility. I will focus on one particular issue raised by Moore: the question of whether we can have control over the past. Moore defends a compatibilist account of moral responsibility on which there are some possible cases in which agents do have such control. But Moore seeks to avoid positing too much control (...) over the past. I will argue that Moore’s attempt is not successful. Furthermore, I will try to show that compatibilists in general face a serious challenge regarding control over the past. In sections 1 and 2 I will explore Moore’s views. In section 3 and 4 I will offer a general argument against compatibilism about moral responsibility and determinism. (shrink)

There has recently been a revival of interest in panpsychism as a theory of consciousness. The hope of the contemporary proponents of panpsychism is that the view enables us to integrate consciousness into our overall theory of reality in a way that avoids the deep difficulties that plague the more conventional options of physicalism on the one hand and dualism on the other. However, panpsychism comes in two forms — strong and weak emergentist — and there are arguments that seem (...) to show that weak emergentist panpsychism faces problems analogous to those of physicalism whilst strong emergentist panpsychism faces problems analogous to those of dualism. In this paper, I will develop a new hybrid of the strong and weak emergentist forms of panpsychism, a view according to which subjects of experience are strongly emergent but their phenomenal properties are weakly emergent. I will argue that this hybrid view manages to avoid the challenges facing both physicalism and dualism, and the analogues of those challenges that seem to undermine standard forms of panpsychism. (shrink)

The case of pain asymbolia is a case study that provides evidence of the mechanisms underlying the relationship between bodily experience, affective experience, and self-awareness. On one account pain asymbolia is the result of an affective deficit. Sensory signals of bodily damage are not associated with characteristic negative affect. Cochrane endorses this account as part of his version of a “conceptual act” theory of affective experience. In contrast, I propose an active inference account of affect in general and pain asymbolia (...) in particular. In the active inference framework the self is inferred as the endogenous cause of bodily and affective experience in the process of organismic regulation. This preserves Cochranes ambition to ground affect in bodily regulation but avoids the problem for affective deficit accounts of asymbolia that cannot do justice to the neural correlates. (shrink)

The burden of research ethics review falls not just on researchers, but on those who serve on research ethics committees (RECs). With the advent of automated text analysis and generative artificial intelligence, it has recently become possible to teach models to support human judgment, for example by highlighting relevant parts of a text and suggesting actionable precedents and explanations. It is time to consider how such tools might be used to support ethics review and oversight. This commentary argues that with (...) a suitable strategy of engagement, artificial intelligence can be used in a variety of ways that can genuinely support RECs and manage their workload and improve the quality of review. It would be wiser to take an active role in the development of AI tools for ethics review, rather than to adopt ad hoc tools after the fact. (shrink)

Russellianism is the view that the meaning of a proper name is the individual designated by the name. Together with other plausible assumptions, Russellianism entails the following: Sentences containing proper names express Russellian propositions, which involve the individual designated by the name as a direct constituent, and which can be represented as sets of individuals and properties. Moreover, as they occur in ordinary belief reports, ‘that’-clauses designate Russellian propositions. Such belief reports are true if and only if the subject of (...) the belief report bears the belief relation to the proposition designated by the ‘that’-clause. In defending this doctrine, some Russellians appeal to propositional guises, which, roughly speaking, are ways of grasping propositions. However, some Russellians don’t appeal to such entities. In this paper, I explain the varieties of Russellianism and then argue for Modest Russellianism: Believing a Russellian proposition is essentially mediated by guises, so that an agent can’t believe a Russellian proposition without standing in some appropriate relation to both the proposition and a guise. Nonetheless, guises don’t feature in the semantics of ordinary belief reports, so that an adequate account of the meaning of such belief reports needn’t invoke guises. (shrink)

Panpsychism is the view that consciousness is a fundamental and ubiquitous feature of the physical world. This chapter outlines two major arguments for panpsychism, one in terms of its role in solving the hard problem of consciousness, and two the intrinsic nature argument. It also responds to the worry that panpsychism is too counterintuitive to be true.

Nietzsche’s metaphor of seduction suggests that language catches philosophers in the trap of metaphysics. Nietzsche uses the poetic powers of language to fight against this metaphysical language. However, his use of the metaphor of truth as a woman seems to seduce him back in metaphysics. Metaphors become seductive because of their rhetorical and performative power. One must therefore be wary of the seduction of metaphors when attempting at revaluating the metaphysics of language. Hélène Cixous undertakes such a task, using a (...) poetic language in order to escape the metaphysical dualisms embedded in language without falling back into its traps. (shrink)

Fodor & Pylyshyn (1981) criticize J. J. Gibson's ecological account of perception for failing to address what I call the 'correlation problem' in visual perception. That is, they charge that Gibson cannot explain how perceivers learn to correlate detectable properties of the light with perceptible properties of the environment. Furthermore, they identify the correlation problem as a crucial issue for any theory of visual perception, what I call a 'primary problem'—i.e. a problem which plays a definitive role in establishing the (...) concerns of a particular scientific research program. If they are correct, Gibson's failure to resolve this problem would cast considerable doubt upon his ecological approach to perception. In response, I argue that both Fodor & Pylyshyn's problem itself and their proposed inferential solution embody a significant mistake which needs to be eliminated from our thinking about visual perception. As part of my response, I also suggest a Gibsonian alternative to Fodor & Pylyshyn's primary problem formulation. (shrink)

Four of the commentaries criticised my claim that assisted suicide for the terminally ill is discriminatory. 1 They were united in this judgement roughly because they insisted that assisted suicide is in fact a benefit and not a harm. I concede that if it is a benefit, then there is no way in which the terminally ill can be disadvantaged by it and hence no way it can be an instance of discrimination. I pointed out in the article that this (...) issue is controversial and could not be settled in my article, nor can it be settled in this brief response. Assisted suicide harms the terminally ill in several ways. First, it harms the people who do not adopt it by forcing them to defend their continued existence. Second, it harms many of the people who adopt it in so far as they are deprived of a life... (shrink)

Since the 1970’s there has been a major increase in adventure sports participation but it seems that engagement in such sports comes with a stigma: adventure sports participants are often regarded as reckless ‘daredevils’. We approach the questions about people’s perception of risk and recklessness in adventure sports by combining empirical research with philosophical analysis. First, we provide empirical evidence that suggests that laypeople tend to assess the danger of adventure sports as greater than more mundane sports and judge adventure (...) sports participants as more reckless than participants in non-adventure sports. We contextualise these findings within existing psychological risk perception paradigms and outline new philosophical explanations of the identified pattern in laypeople’s risk perception. (shrink)

Personal AI is a new type of AI companion, distinct from the prevailing forms of AI companionship. Instead of playing a narrow and well-defined social role, like friend, lover, caretaker, or colleague, with a set of pre-determined responses and behaviors, Personal AI is engineered to tailor itself to the user, including learning to mirror the user’s unique emotional language and attitudes. This paper identifies two issues with Personal AI. First, like other AI companions, it is deceptive about the presence of (...) their emotions, which undermines the moral value of companionship. Second, Personal AI leads to a distinctly new form of deception concerning the origins of its emotions. Its emotional attitudes appear to belong to it, when in fact they are only reflections of the user. This results in what I dub “emotional bubbles”—the false impression that personal emotions are externally validated—which have at least two troubling implications. First, emotional bubbles prevent us from encountering emotional attitudes that differ from our own, which is likely to cripple emotional growth and the ability to form diverse social and emotional relationships. Second, if we assume, as some philosophers claim, that shared emotions are constitutive of shared values, it follows that Personal AI subverts joint moral deliberation. Users believe their personal values are externally validated, when they are only validated by themselves. Because of the absence of technovirtues able to handle this problem, I suggest that we proceed very cautiously with the development and marketing of Personal AI. (shrink)

This précis provides a summary of the book, What’s the Use of Philosophy?

There are a number of assumptions made in our accepted psychology of moral decision-making that consequentialism seems to violate:: value connectionism, pluralism and dispositionalism. But consequentialism violates them only on a utilitarian or similar theory of value, not on the rival sort of theory that is sketched here.

This book is a volume in the Penn Press Anniversary Collection. To mark its 125th anniversary in 2015, the University of Pennsylvania Press rereleased more than 1,100 titles from Penn Press's distinguished backlist from 1899-1999 that had fallen out of print. Spanning an entire century, the Anniversary Collection offers peer-reviewed scholarship in a wide range of subject areas.

ABSTRACT“The Birth of Ethics”, which is summarized here, argues that creatures like us who lacked prescriptive concepts of a kind with desirability and responsibility would be robustly likely to develop practices of mutual commitment that would prompt the evolution of such concepts, giving them access to corresponding properties. That development and evolution would be explicable without reliance on prescriptive concepts, supporting a form of naturalistic realism about ethics.

The widespread impression that recent philosophy of science has pioneered exploration of the “social dimensions of scientific knowledge” is shown to be in error, partly due to a lack of appreciation of historical precedent, and partly due to a misunderstanding of how the social sciences and philosophy have been intertwined over the last century. This paper argues that the referents of “democracy” are an important key in the American context, and that orthodoxies in the philosophy of science tend to be (...) molded by the actual regimes of science organization within which they are embedded. These theses are illustrated by consideration of three representative philosophers of science: John Dewey, Hans Reichenbach, and Philip Kitcher.Author Keywords: Social dimensions of science; Logical positivism; Democracy; Context of discovery/justification; Goals of science. (shrink)

It is often argued that human emotions, and the cognitions that accompany them, involve refinements of, and extensions to, more basic functionality shared with other species. Such refinements may rely on common or on distinct processes and representations. Multi-level theories of cognition and affect make distinctions between qualitatively different types of representations often dealing with bodily, affective and cognitive attributes of self-related meanings. This paper will adopt a particular multi-level perspective on mental architecture and show how a mechanism of subsystem (...) differentiation could have allowed an evolutionarily “old” role for emotion in the control of action to have altered into one more closely coupled to meaning systems. We conclude by outlining some illustrative consequences of our analysis that might usefully be addressed in research in comparative psychology, cognitive archaeology, and in laboratory research on memory for emotional material. (shrink)

A correction is needed to our paper: to the definition contained within the statement of Lemma 1.5 and thus arguments around it in §3.

(No abstract is available for this citation).

As Classical Propositional Logic finds its algebraic counterpart in Boolean algebras, the logic of Quantum Mechanics, as outlined within G. Birkhoff and J. von Neumann’s approach to Quantum Theory (Birkhoff and von Neumann in Ann Math 37:823–843, 1936) [see also (Husimi in I Proc Phys-Math Soc Japan 19:766–789, 1937)] finds its algebraic alter ego in orthomodular lattices. However, this logic does not incorporate time dimension although it is apparent that the propositions occurring in the logic of Quantum Mechanics are depending (...) on time. The aim of the present paper is to show that tense operators can be introduced in every logic based on a complete lattice, in particular in the logic of quantum mechanics based on a complete orthomodular lattice. If the time set is given together with a preference relation, we introduce tense operators in a purely algebraic way. We derive several important properties of such operators, in particular we show that they form dynamic pairs and, altogether, a dynamic algebra. We investigate connections of these operators with logical connectives conjunction and implication derived from Sasaki projections in an orthomodular lattice. Then we solve the converse problem, namely to find for given time set and given tense operators a time preference relation in order that the resulting time frame induces the given operators. We show that the given operators can be obtained as restrictions of operators induced by a suitable extended time frame. (shrink)

Orthomodular posets form an algebraic formalization of the logic of quantum mechanics. A central question is how to introduce implication in such a logic. We give a positive answer whenever the orthomodular poset in question is of finite height. The crucial advantage of our solution is that the corresponding algebra, called implication orthomodular poset, i.e. a poset equipped with a binary operator of implication, corresponds to the original orthomodular poset and that its implication operator is everywhere defined. We present here (...) a complete list of axioms for implication orthomodular posets. This enables us to derive an axiomatization in Gentzen style for the algebraizable logic of orthomodular posets of finite height. (shrink)

In this essay, I propose a phenomenological alternative to the established candidates of what grounds moral status, namely the experience of being claimed in immediate response to an Other. Drawing from late-Wittgensteinian moral philosophy, I develop this alternative in critical juxtaposition to theories that aim to derive moral status from values grounded in independently accountable empirical properties. Against such theories, I expound how meaningful talk of moral status must instead be understood to be rooted in the individuals’ morally charged immediate (...) responsiveness to Others, a responsiveness that preconditions the very possibility of separating value and fact. If my analysis is sound, then the empirical property or set of properties that is commonly taken to qualify as a candidate for a ground of moral status in fact presupposes a phenomenological dimension of ‘ethical encounter’. The recognition of this deeper phenomenological level would, while not disposing with the notion of moral status, transform its meaning and, thus, how much of the philosophical debate on moral status is conducted. (shrink)

We construct an existentially undecidable complete discretely valued field of mixed characteristic with existentially decidable residue field and decidable algebraic part, answering a question by Anscombe–Fehm in a strong way. Along the way, we construct an existentially decidable field of positive characteristic with an existentially undecidable finite extension, modifying a construction due to Kesavan Thanagopal.

Organized into easy-to-follow thematic sections, it allows the student to explore Foucault's work without overly technical vocabulary. Barker carefully explains the major strands of Foucault's thought on power and knowledge, discipline and punishment, history and the subject, in a clear and engaging style, providing an easy entry into the complexities of Foucault's thinking for the non-specialist reader. Also included is a chronology of Foucault's life and a bibliography for further study.

Cassius Dio's fragmentary Roman History 15 contains an account of Archimedes’ role in defending Syracuse during the Roman siege of 213–212 b.c., incorporating a legendary tale about a solar reflector Archimedes constructed to burn Roman warships, and including details of his death when the city fell. The textual basis of this famous episode depends on two derivative twelfth-century works: Zonaras’ Epitome of Histories (9.4–5) and Tzetzes’ Chiliades (2.35). After clarifying the present state of enquiry, this paper introduces two new witnesses, (...) overlooked by editors of Dio and extensive scholarship on Archimedes, and assesses their value for reconstructing Dio's text. Comparative analysis of corresponding Dio-derived material in Tzetzes’ Carmina Iliaca and Hypomnema in S. Luciam, especially verbal correspondences with Zonaras’ Epitome, demonstrates that they are independent and, sometimes, superior witnesses to Dio's wording and content, reflecting Tzetzes’ selective use of the Roman History in different verse and prose compositions over several decades. The study considers editorial implications for this section of Dio's work and general characteristics of Tzetzes’ writings as repositories of testimonia and fragments. (shrink)

From the legendary inventor Daedalus to Goethe's tragic Faust, from the automata-making magicians of E.T.A Hoffmann to Mary Shelley's Victor Frankenstein – ...

In a number of works, we have suggested that whereas the ordered field R of real numbers should merely be regarded as constituting an arithmetic continuum (modulo the Archimedean axiom), the ordered field No of surreal numbers may be regarded as a sort of absolute arithmetic continuum (modulo NBG). In the present chapter, as part of a more general exposition of the absolute arithmetic continuum, we will outline some of the properties of the system of surreal numbers that we believe (...) lend credence to this mathematico-philosophical thesis. We will also provide an overview of No’s rich structure as a simplicity-hierarchical (or s-hierarchical) ordered field that recursively emerges from the interplay between its structure as an ordered field and its structure as a lexicographically ordered full binary tree. Finally, we will draw attention to how properties of the system of surreal numbers considered as an s-hierarchical ordered algebraic structure can be appealed to in conjunction with classical relations between ordered algebraic and geometric systems to help resolve, for the surreal case, one of the purported difficulties that lies at the heart of attempts to bridge the gap between the domains of number and of geometrical magnitude. In particular, we will explain how it is possible that despite the fact that every surreal number, considered as a member of an s-hierarchical ordered field, differs from every other in characteristic individual properties, the absolute (Euclidean) geometrical continuum, which is modeled by the Cartesian space over the ordered field No of surreal numbers, appears as an amorphous pulp of points that display little individuality. (shrink)

Is phenomenology a metaphysics of its own type? This is the question that L,szl0 Tengelyi interprets affirmatively in his last oeuvre. Such a type can be characterized as a metaphysics of transgressiveness in contrast to the metaphysics of potentiality. According to Tengelyi, phenomenology must therefore be thought of in the form of a diacritique of world and infinity, which can be seen as the metaphysical architectonics of the transfinite. By relating the difference between thing and world to the difference between (...) transfinite and absolute infinite, it is to be proven that the actual infinite belongs to the reality of the world, precisely in the sense of phenomenology. We want to critically appreciate this attempt of radicalization by confronting it with another radicalization approach: Marc Richir’s phenomenology. This will show that in the starting point of the thing-world difference a subtle subjectivism or quasi-Cartesianism is inherent, which does not do justice to the infinity of the world, one which even includes the radical sense of uninhabitability. (shrink)

Deep convolutional networks exceed humans in sensitivity to local image properties, but unlike biological vision systems, do not discover and encode abstract relations that capture important properties of objects and events in the world. Coupling network architectures with additional machinery for encoding abstract relations will make deep networks better models of human abilities and more versatile and capable artificial devices.