This paper sketches a history of definition of identity from the Aristotle’s Topics down to the modern set theory. The author tries to explain particularly: first, how the transformation of the concept of predicate at the end of the nineteenth century made it necessary to revise the leibnitian definition of the identity of individuals; secondly, why Dedekind, Peano, Schröder, etc. made, between two possible definitions of identity of predicates or of sets, a choice which later made it necessary to postulate (...) in set theory the axiom of extensionality. (shrink)

This paper sketches a history of definition of identity from the Aristotle’s Topics down to the modern set theory. The author tries to explain particularly: first, how the transformation of the concept of predicate at the end of the nineteenth century made it necessary to revise the leibnitian definition of the identity of individuals; secondly, why Dedekind, Peano, Schröder, etc. made, between two possible definitions of identity of predicates or of sets, a choice which later made it necessary to postulate (...) in set theory the axiom of extensionality. (shrink)

L'emploi du raisonnement par l'absurde a été source de contestations au cours de l'histoire des sciences. L'auteur en propose une définition, puis montre comment un tel raisonnement indirect peut se retourner en un raisonnement direct qui lui soit logiquement équivalent, ce dont Aristote avait pressenti la possibilité...

According to the author the nature of promise presents a twofold problem. First refers to the question why and how an utterance may cause action; second – to the question why and how this action may cause a duteous state, or action. The conclusions drawn from these analyses can facilitate legal statements concerning the nature of promise.

The difficulty to interpret the iteration of modalities, already ontic and still more deontic, incites to pay attention to the system B of basic modal logic that John L. Pollock proposed in 1967. The Pollock’s system brought all the theses which, in the classical ontic modal systems, from Sl to S5, contain no iteration of the modal functors. With this basic ontic system we characterize a basic deontic system, and a basic ontico-deontic system, the former including all the theses of (...) the first two. Each of the three systems is based axiomatically and assorted with a semantics for which the soundness and the completeness hold. (shrink)

Georges Kalinowski, né en 1916 à Lublin, est dédédé le 21 octobre 2000 à Dijon, où, depuis la mort de son épouse, il s'était retiré auprès de sa fille, son gendre et ses petits-enfants.

. The aim of this paper is to clarify the logical structure of a code connecting together some distinctions already introduced by different authors: a distinction between primary norms and secondary norms, the latter being implied by the provisions describing institutions in the indicative; a distinction between norms the content of which concerns a state and those the content of which concerns a behaviour which is itself function of several states; a distinction, among the primary norms, of the norms of (...) competence by which a normative power can be delegated to an individual; lastly a distinction between regulative rules and constitutive rules. (shrink)

Celem pracy jest podanie reguł semantycznych dla logik, w których funkcjonują obok siebie funktory modalne i funktory deontyczne. Idea wspólnego traktowania tych funktorów. a w szczególności badania związków między nimi, została zapoczątkowana jeszcze w 1671 r. przez Leibnitza w "Elementa juris naturalis". Autor rozróżnia trzy następujące koncepcje dotyczące wzajemnych relacji między rozważanymi dwoma rodzajami funktorów logicznych: 1) koncepcję Leibnitza, wg. której konieczność implikuje obowiązek; 2) koncepcję, w której konieczność jest nieporównywalna z obowiązkiem; 3) zmodyfikowaną koncepcję [2] drogą pomysłowej modyfikacji znanej (...) semantyki Kripkego - autor wprowadza dodatkowe rozróżnienie światów na pozytywne i negatywne. Interesująco wypadają też porównania reguł semantyk dla trzech wymienionych wyżej koncepcji i rozważania wzajemnych powiązań czterech pojęć deontycznych: silnego obowiązku, silnego zakazu, słabego przyzwolenia i słabej "dowolności" - okazuje się, że spośród szesnastu możliwych relacji aż osiem spełnionych jest równocześnie we wszystkich trzech semantykach, Artykuł kończą uwagi na temat możliwych konsekwencji i zastosowań zaprezentowanego materiału. (shrink)

"Proceedings of the 11th IVR World Congress on Philosophy of Law and Social Philosophy... held on August 14-20, 1983 in Helsinki"--Introd.

In this paper I argue that the rationality of law and legal decision making would be enhanced by a systematic attempt to recognize and respond to the implications of empirical uncertainty for policy making and decision making. Admission of uncertainty about the accuracy of facts and the validity of assumptions relied on to make inferences of fact is commonly avoided in law because it raises the spectre of paralysis of the capacity to decide issues authoritatively. The roots of this short-sighted (...) view are found in primitive mechanical models of relationships in the empirical and social world – those of objective causality and determinism. Insofar as it is believed that if we had sufficient data a clear and unequivocal answer would be available to each question, admission of uncertainty is seen as a sign of insufficiency, incompetence, impotence, and is avoided whenever a decision that must be seen to be based on valid reasons, cannot be avoided. Avoidance of some decisions, duplicity in others, is the result. -/- Decision-making must be restructured to recognize the provisional and context-bound validity and relevance of the models we use to conceptualize and order our understanding of phenomena, and to utilize this awareness as an instrument in the production of legal policies and decisions that will be authoritative precisely because they are honestly accurate and socially responsible. The paper makes a start on such a re-structuring of the legal process by exploring the implications of the observation that if law is to be “just”: 1) legal policy must be based on accurate information and rationally related to social goals; and 2) decisions applying policy to individual fact situations must be based on assumptions that are both relevant and accurate. -/- Reasons for determinations of fact must be given, otherwise the presumption that the trier of fact is “reasonable” is an unconditional licence to use private modes of logic and theories of social and natural science. What is not disclosed cannot be challenged on grounds of invalidity or irrelevance. -/- Use of “objective validity” as a standard to evaluate conclusions made by the trier of fact in contentious cases would only serve to beg all important questions by concealing: 1) fundamental normative conflict, and 2) the limited nature and applicability of many validity claims. -/- Our use of the phrases “undue risk,” “public interest,” “reasonable,” and “necessary,” reflects the weight we choose to give conflicting social values and goals when we must make decisions in relative ignorance of all the consequences. “Objective criteria” are of limited utility in legal decision-making because their social meaning is derivative. Policy generation in the absence of any coherent conceptual-normative framework, use of vague terminology in legislation stating policy, and the absence of rational means to distinguish between individual cases to which decision-makers are required by law to apply policy, make it inevitable that many legal “decisions” made in the guise of determinations of objective fact, are charades, an arbitrary, capricious, intuitive, subjective (and thus private) use of public decision-making power. -/- Law must alter its aspirations and recognize that rational decision-making is a process that can occur only within parameters set by present knowledge and societal preference structures. Only by working with the constraints imposed by these parameters is it possible to achieve “just” decisions. Where no rational basis for differentiating cases exists, “individualized justice” must be avoided and public policy articulated in law applied uniformly to all cases in a class. The terms “reasonable” and “necessary,” used to describe policy and its consequences for specific cases, must be understood to represent provisional societal assessments, attempts to implement societal preference structures in the face of limited knowledge. Heightened awareness of the limited nature of our knowledge can only result in legal policies that have a more explicit normative basis. -/- The volume is is published with an introduction by Michael D. Bayles. It is available in hardback, paperback, and as an ebook. (shrink)

L'article présente les travaux du logicien français Jean-Luois Gardies concernant les logiques deontiques et modales. Dans sa premiére partie on expose une suite des relations entre les termes deontiques et modales introduite par J.L. Gardies. Ces relations illustrées graphiquement se présentent comme des polygones correspondents (carré, hexagone etc.) de méme que les a exposées J.L. Gardies. L'analyse minutieuse de ces relations faite par lui permet de distinguer quelques unes ď entre elles comme les axiomes des systémes (...) de la logique deontique ou modale. J. L. Gardles compare les résultats avec сеuх de l'analyse linguistique effectuée et présentée dans l'article. Cela méne á la formulation par Gardies des quatre méthodes principales de l'analyse des problemes cités ci-dessus, décrites par lui l'une aprés l'autre avec les systémes logiques correspondents, leur axiomatique et leurs matrices appliquées. Enfin on formule et analyse des postulate généraux auxquels, selon J. L. Gardies, doit convenir la logique deontique utile. (shrink)

Issu de la thèse de l'auteur soutenue en 1987, cet ouvrage a pour visée de redéfinir l'anthropologie, en dissipant le malentendu instauré par le modèle galiléen de scientificité appliqué aux sciences sociales afin d'opérer un retour à la fondation historique de la discipline dans l'epistêmê politikê des anciens Grecs. Trois voies d'accès sont parcourues : G. Dumézil, M. Heidegger et G. Guillaume. ©Electre 2018.

Jean-Louis Gardies, professeur émérite de l’Université de Nantes, s’est éteint le 29 août dernier, à l’âge de 79 ans. Il fut, dans les années 1960, l’un des fondateurs du Département nantais de philosophie avec Jeanne Russier et Eugène Leblanc qui nous ont également quittés.Ancien élève de l’École normale supérieure, après avoir dirigé l’Institut français de Hambourg,..