Le monde muséal a considérablement évolué ces dernières années ; des notions telles que le développement touristique et économique, ou la performance, ont largement pris le pas sur les préoccupations sociales, voire sur la conservation du patrimoine. Dans une logique mondialisée, quelques grands « musées superstars », à l’instar du musée Guggenheim de Bilbao, imposent largement leur logique de fonctionnement, au détriment de nombre d’établissements de taille plus modeste. Le rôle particulier de l’État, en France, contribue au développement d’une infrastructure (...) muséale exceptionnelle, partiellement pour maintenir sa position dominante au niveau des flux de migration touristique. Mais ce renouveau patrimonial induit également un changement de culture sur le plan organisationnel. Des personnels purement administratifs remplacent les personnels scientifiques à la tête des établissements. L’autorité publique et l’intérêt économique encourent le risque de prendre le dessus sur l’intérêt scientifique et patrimonial.The world of museums has changed considerably in recent years, with concerns for tourist and economic development, or performance, largely overshadowing social and even heritage conservation concerns. Following the logic of globalisation, a few “superstar museums”, like the Guggenheim in Bilbao, have been imposing their own modus operandi to the overall detriment of more modest establishments. The particular role of the State, in France, has contributed to the development of an outstanding museum infrastructure, in part to sustain a dominant position in terms of incoming tourist flows. However, this new perspective on heritage has also brought a change in the culture of museum organisation. As scientific staff are replaced by purely administrative staff at management level, the interests of the public authorities and the economy are increasingly liable to outweigh the interests of science and heritage. (shrink)

In this challenging study, André Gallois proposes and defends a thesis about the character of our knowledge of our own intentional states. Taking up issues at the centre of attention in contemporary analytic philosophy of mind and epistemology, he examines accounts of self-knowledge by such philosophers as Donald Davidson, Tyler Burge and Crispin Wright, and advances his own view that, without relying on observation, we are able justifiably to attribute to ourselves propositional attitudes, such as belief, that we consciously (...) hold. His study will be of wide interest to philosophers concerned with questions about self-knowledge. (shrink)

We explore the notion that culture influences people’s values, and their subsequent ideologies and ethical behaviors. We present the idea that culture itself changes with time, and explore the influence of culture and generational markers on consumer ethics by examining differences in these ethical dimensions between Australians, Indonesians, and Indonesian Migrants in Australia, as well as differences between Generation X versus Generations Y and Z. The present study addresses the need to investigate the role that culture plays in consumer ethics, (...) and the interaction between culture and generational attitudes in determining consumer ethics. Results established a distinct multiculturality in our three cultural samples, including a generational cohort differences. This suggests that culture and generational markers influence ethical beliefs, ideologies, and consumer ethics. It further indicates that Indonesian Migrants have acculturated to Australian society both in terms of their values and consumer behaviors, illustrating a crossvergence effect; scores indicate that these Migrants have the highest cultural intelligence among our samples. Implications of the findings for consumer ethics theory and practice are considered and future directions identified. (shrink)

This paper advances the conception of social entrepreneurs as caring entrepreneurs. We argue that the care ethics of social entrepreneurs, implying the pursuit of caring goals through caring processes, can be challenged when they engage in the process of scaling up their ventures. We propose that social entrepreneurs can sustain their care ethics as the essential dimension of their venture only if they are able to build a caring enterprise. Organizational care designates the set of organizing principles that facilitate the (...) embedding of care ethics at an organizational level, beyond the imprinting induced by social entrepreneurs’ personal ethics. (shrink)

Wellman identified three types of conductive arguments, the third of which contains both pro and counter-considerations in the same piece of reasoning. This paper provides a pragma-dialectical analysis of this type of argumentation, with special focus on argumentation reconstruction. It argues that the account of pro/con argumentation in the framework of argument-as-product has problems solvable by a pragma-dialectical approach. The paper asserts that pro/con argumentation should be analyzed as a dialectical strategy of a protagonist, where acknowledgement of counter-considerations shows that (...) the antagonist’s reasons have been taken into consideration, although the pro-considerations override them. Thus, the pro-considerations of pro/con argumentation should be interpreted as the protagonist’s overriding defeaters of the antagonist’s counter-arguments, the protagonist incorporating the latter as counter-considerations. The paper further argues that the pragma-dialectical framework needs an additional conceptual tool to properly reconstruct complex forms of pro/con argumentation. Finally, the pragma-dialectical approach to reconstruct pro/con argumentation has several advantages, especially to a more logical-structural approach to complex pro/con argumentation. (shrink)

Recently advocates of the propensity interpretation of fitness have turned critics. To accommodate examples from the population genetics literature they conclude that fitness is better defined broadly as a family of propensities rather than the propensity to contribute descendants to some future generation. We argue that the propensity theorists have misunderstood the deeper ramifications of the examples they cite. These examples demonstrate why there are factors outside of propensities that determine fitness. We go on to argue for the more general (...) thesis that no account of fitness can satisfy the desiderata that have motivated the propensity account. (shrink)

This paper is an attempt to put forward a new kind of partial model for representing belief states. I first introduce some philosophical motivations for working with partial models. Then, I present the standard (total) model proposed by Hintikka, and the partial models studied by Humberstone and Holliday. I then show how to reduce Hintikka’s semantics in order to obtain a partial model which, however, differs from Humberstone’s and Holliday’s. The nature of such differences is assessed, and I provide motivations (...) for using the newly proposed semantics rather than the existing ones. Finally, I review some promising philosophical applications of the ideas developed throughout the discussion. (shrink)

This paper aims at answering some of the objections to the NIP’s criticism of the idea of rights of future persons. Those objections usually adopt different perspectives depending on how they understand differently the nature of the correlativity between rights and duties – some adopt a present-rights-of-future-persons view, others a future-rights-of-future-persons view, others a transitive present-rights-of-present-persons view, and others still an eternalist view of rights and persons. The paper will try to show that only a non-transitive present-rights-of-present-persons view can survive (...) the challenges posed by the notion of correlativity inherent in the NIP, and thus preserve rights language when discussing the future. This view is proved also more suitable for the legal and political realms, where policies and law-making are usually more concerned with present addressees and short term effects. (shrink)

Dans Logique du pire, Clément Rosset analyse une causalité conçue sans l’ombre d’une loi transcendantale, qui se fait par l’enchaînement des choses dans l’immanence actuelle. Rosset aperçoit cette causalité immanente dans la psychanalyse de Freud, non dans le concept lacanien du réel. Une telle conception de la causation recoupe celle du hasard, qui indique que les choses sont, tout simplement, sans raison d’être – ce en quoi consiste le tragique. Dans toute l’histoire de la philosophie, le philosophe qui a le (...) plus radicalement compris ce qu’est le hasard fut paradoxalement celui qui le définit comme nécessité absolue : Spinoza, « penseur tragique par excellence ». Nous énonçons et analysons les implications épistémiques et thérapeutiques qui découlent de cette compréhension. (shrink)

Resumo: Reconstruiu-se a semiologia geral elaborada nos escritos inacabados e indiretos de Saussure, recolocando sua noção de sentido próxima à de Deleuze e explicando-a por meio deste. Defende-se que toda teoria baseada na noção de “diferença” precisa dar conta do processo de individuação e, junto disso, por meio da descrição de dois níveis de diferenciação. Demonstra-se que isto é realizado por ambos os autores, para além e mesmo junto de suas divergências. Assim, o artigo recoloca a teoria do valor de (...) Saussure na aurora de uma filosofia da diferença, mostrando que este inaugura e mesmo “repete” as teses que Deleuze explicitamente defende, nos anos 1960.: The paper reconstruct the general semiology elaborated in Saussure’s unfinished and indirect writings, replacing his notion of meaning next to that of Deleuze, and explaining it through the latter. We argue that any theory based on the notion of “difference” needs to account for the individuation process and, together, through the description of two levels of differentiation. We demonstrate that this is accomplished by both authors, beyond and even with their disagreements. Thus, the article puts Saussure’s theory of value on the dawn of a philosophy of difference, showing that it inaugurates and even repeats the theses that Deleuze explicitly defends in the 1960s. (shrink)

Presenting a fascinating analysis of the idea of what can't be said, this book ascertains whether the notion of there being a truth, or a state of affairs, or knowledge that can't be expressed linguistically is a coherent notion. The author distinguishes different senses in which it might be said that something can't be said. The first part looks at the question of whether ineffability is a coherent idea. Part two evaluates two families of arguments regarding whether ineffable states of (...) affairs actually exist: the argument from mysticism and the argument from epistemic boundedness. Part three looks more closely at the relation between mystic and non-mystic stances. In the fourth and final part the author distinguishes five qualitatively different types of ineffability. _Ineffability and Philosophy_ is a significant contribution to this area of research and will be essential reading for philosophers and those researching and studying the philosophy of language. (shrink)

Os PCN e o Programa Educação para o Pensar podem colaborar singularmente para a prática do ensino de matemática, uma vez que objetivam desenvolver no aluno um espírito crítico e uma atenção ao contexto no qual se inserem.

Our reasoning evolved not for finding the truth, but for social bonding and convincing. This book highlights the consequences of these facts for scientific practice, and suggests how to correct the mistakes we still make.

Preface de Pierre-Francois Moreau Beaucoup l'ont constate: il y a un air de famille entre spinozisme et psychanalyse. Meme remise en cause des attributs classiques de la subjectivite (libre-arbitre et transparence de la conscience a elle-meme); meme valorisation de l'affectivite du sujet (et notamment de la force de son desir); meme apprehension materialiste des phenomenes theologico-politiques (a travers l'analyse de la puissance de l'imaginaire); et dans une certaine mesure, meme visee therapeutique... Les deux grands noms de la psychanalyse, Freud et (...) Lacan, n'ont d'ailleurs pas cache, au moins a une certaine periode de leur parcours intellectuel, une proximite avec la pensee spinoziste. Soit. Mais ces grandes lignes de rapprochement entre psychanalyse et spinozisme permettent-elles autre chose que de dessiner une vague parente, dont il serait tout aussi aise, sinon plus, de souligner les lignes de fracture? Pour ne pas en rester a ce niveau de generalite, il est necessaire d'analyser precisement les notions, les problemes, les theses et les textes a travers lesquels cette confrontation entre spinozisme et psychanalyse prend sens et devient fructueuse. C'est le defi qu'entend relever le present recueil, le premier consacre a une telle confrontation. (shrink)

La risa caníbal -- Chaplin vs. Hitler : un estudio sobre la parodia -- En el interior de <> -- Sobre el chiste como una de las bellas artes -- La vida privada de los cómicos -- De muñecos y hombres -- El pensamiento cínico o el arte de la performance -- George Bush, o el payaso involuntario -- Prohibir la risa : el 11 de septiembre y la comunidad herida -- El político humorista, el humorista encarcelado: psoverdad, política (...) y humor -- Hombres que se ríen de los dioses -- <> feminista: el caballo en la ciudad sitiada -- Agradecimientos. (shrink)

Presenting a fascinating analysis of the idea of what can't be said, this book ascertains whether the notion of there being a truth, or a state of affairs, or knowledge that can't be expressed linguistically is a coherent notion. The author distinguishes different senses in which it might be said that something can't be said. The first part looks at the question of whether ineffability is a coherent idea. Part two evaluates two families of arguments regarding whether ineffable states of (...) affairs actually exist: the argument from mysticism and the argument from epistemic boundedness. Part three looks more closely at the relation between mystic and non-mystic stances. In the fourth and final part the author distinguishes five qualitatively different types of ineffability. _Ineffability and Philosophy_ is a significant contribution to this area of research and will be essential reading for philosophers and those researching and studying the philosophy of language. (shrink)

O artigo visa identificar traços da fenomenologia de Max Scheler na obra de Henrique Cláudio de Lima Vaz. Pretende-se aprofundar a compreensão do pensamento deste filósofo brasileiro ainda pouco estudado através da aproximação de outras fontes filosóficas implícitas em sua sua escritura ética. No primeiro passo, trata-se de investigar a influência do personalismo moral de Scheler sobre a questão ética em Lima Vaz. No segundo passo, intenciona-se propugnar o ineditismo da Ética filosófica em relação ao pensamento scheleriano graças ao sistema (...) ético-filosófico do autor que faz com que seu pensamento possa ser situado numa esfera mais elaborada do saber filosófico. (shrink)

La délicate mise en rapport de la philosophie nietzschéenne et de l’économie est d’une pratique récente. Dans ce contexte, cet article est motivé par l’introduction du traitement nietzschéen de la « destruction créatrice » en économie et la manière de justifier philosophiquement cette référence. Pour cela, nous mettons en concurrence les interprétations évolutionnistes et nietzschéennes de la destruction créatrice. Ces deux métaphores nous semblent difficilement conciliables et nous avançons des arguments en faveur de la volonté de puissance, contre la lutte (...) pour la vie, pour mieux interpréter le mécanisme de destruction créatrice. (shrink)

Religion is presented as a family of religions, identified by a cluster of religion-making features, most but not all of which must be present, involving beliefs and practices which are diverse and often in conflict. Because of differences in scope, application of scientific method, and vocabulary, science can also be regarded as a family—this time a family of sciences. The universality of the physical sciences contrasts with the more restricted scope of the earth sciences and the human sciences. Their relationship (...) can be shown by a three-tiered pyramid, with the physical sciences at the base, the human sciences at the top, and the earth sciences in the middle. Despite three notable differences between science and religion, science and religion are not, as popularly believed, in conflict. The contrary view, espoused by the “new atheists,” is shown to be based on oversimplified views of religion and science. There are nontheistic religions and science is committed, not to metaphysical naturalism (“scientism”), but only to methodological naturalism. Stephen Jay Gould escapes the conflict view by proposing that science and religion are independent “magisteria”, science being occupied with facts and religion with values. In divorcing the realm of facts from the realm of values, he too distorts their complex nature, for science is not devoid of values and religion makes claims about the facts. As Hume long ago suggested, facts and values are interconnected. While a fact is not the same as a value, a fact cannot support a value without presupposing another value in turn. Interaction between facts and values is here to stay. (shrink)

Why is it that forgetting moral knowledge, unlike other paradigmatic examples of knowledge, seems so deeply absurd? Previous authors have given accounts whereby moral forgetting in itself either is uniformly absurd and impossible (Gilbert Ryle, Adam Bugeja) or is possible and only the speech act is absurd (Sarah McGrath). Considering findings in moral psychology and the experimental philosophy of personal identity, I argue that the knowledge of some moral truths—especially those that are emotional, widely held, subjectively important, and contribute to (...) social relationships—cannot be forgotten because they’re too tightly tied to one’s true self. Moral knowledge at the level of individual propositions, when it does not have these attributes and so is not so tied to the agent’s identity, can sometimes be forgotten. I identify two such cases: (1) where the moral knowledge results partly from an emotional trigger that has been forgotten, and (2) where the moral knowledge results partly from a process of reflection that has been forgotten. (shrink)

This selection of some of the best writings on Spinoza's philosophy of law shows how Spinoza was able to deliver a revolutionary idea of natural law that breaks away from the traditions of natural law and of legal positivism. The collection includes several essays that have never been published in the English language before, and features an introduction which places Spinoza's writing in the context of modern jurisprudence, as well as an extensive bibliography.

On sait que, selon Rousseau, la voix de la conscience se prononce dans l'instant et ratifie immédiatement le bien que la raison lui présente. La corruption tenace que fortifie le progrès des connaissances, le tumulte des conversations ou des spectacles empêchent cependant l'homme moderne d'écouter sa conscience, au moment où la société requiert son engagement: l'actualité des rapports corrompus qui enserrent l'individu prend le pas sur la présence en son coeur des impératifs moraux. C'est la rajson pour laquelle la philosophie (...) morale de Rousseau ne peut nullement se dispenser d'une théorie de la mémoire: celle-ci permet de dégager le dictamen de la conscience des passions passagères qui nous asservissent aux contemporains; elle dégage l'horizon d'une liberté authentique et d'une responsabilité qui fait toute la permanence de la personne, au regard de l'immortalité de l'âme. En somme, nous montrons ici qu'aux yeux de Rousseau, la réforme s'accomplit dans un récit de cor version. (shrink)