Science and religion have been described as the “two dominant forces in our culture”. As such, the relation between them has been a matter of intense debate, having profound implications for deeper understanding of our place in the universe. One position naturally associated with scientists of a materialistic outlook is that science and religion are contradictory, incompatible worldviews; however, a great deal of recent literature criticises this “conflict thesis” as simple-minded, essentially ignorant of the nature of religion and its philosophical (...) and theological underpinnings. In this first part of a two-part article, I set out the wide-ranging background required for a proper understanding of the debate as a preliminary for the second part, in which Ian Barbour ’s influential four-fold typology of science-religion relations is critically assessed, leading to the conclusion that the conflict model is not to be so easily dismissed. (shrink)

Clark & Thornton take issue with my claim that parity is not a generalisation problem, and that nothing can be inferred about back-propagation in particular, or learning in general, from failures of parity generalisation. They advance arguments to support their contention that generalisation is a relevant issue. In this continuing commentary, I examine generalisation more closely in order to refute these arguments. Different learning algorithms will have different patterns of failure: back-propagation has no special status in this respect. This is (...) not to deny that a particular algorithm might fortuitously happen to produce the “intended” function in an parity-generalisation task. (shrink)

In the preceding Part 1 of this two-part paper, I set out the background necessary for an understanding of the current status of the debate surrounding the relationship between science and religion. In this second part, I will outline Ian Barbour’s influential four-fold typology of the possible relations, compare it with other similar taxonomies, and justify its choice as the basis for further detailed discussion. Arguments are then given for and against each of Barbour’s four models: conflict, independence, integration and (...) dialogue. In contradiction of the recent trend to dismiss the conflict model as overly “simplistic”, I conclude that it is the clear front-runner. Critical examination reveals that theology (the academic face of religion) typically proceeds by first affirming belief in God and then seeking rationalisations that protect this belief against contrary evidence. As this is the very antithesis of scientific endeavour, the two disciplines are in unavoidable and irreconcilable conflict. (shrink)

Following the “modularity” orthodoxy of some years ago, it has traditionally been assumed that there is a clear and obvious separation between perception and cognition. Close examination of this concept, however, fails to reveal the join. Ballard et al.'s contention that the two “cannot be easily separated” is consistent with nonmodular views of the way that symbol grounding might be achieved in situated systems. Indeed, the traditional separation is viewed as unhelpful.

Uninformed learning mechanisms will not discover “type- 2” regularities in their inputs, except fortuitously. Clark & Thornton argue that error back-propagation only learns the classical parity problem – which is “always pure type-2” – because of restrictive assumptions implicit in the learning algorithm and network employed. Empirical analysis showing that back-propagation fails to generalise on the parity problem is cited to support their position. The reason for failure, however, is that generalisation is simply not a relevant issue. Nothing can be (...) gleaned about back-propagation in particular, or learning in general, from this failure. (shrink)

Locus equations offer promise for an understanding of at least some aspects of perceptual invariance in speech, but they were discovered almost fortuitously. With the present availability of powerful machine learning algorithms, ignorance -based automatic discovery procedures are starting to supplant knowledge-based scientific inquiry. Principles of self-learning and self-organization are powerful tools for speech research but remain somewhat under-utilized.

R.I.G Hughes offers the first detailed and accessible analysis of the Hilbert-space models used in quantum theory and explains why they are so successful.

I shall argue here that the reason supererogatory acts are not obligatory is that they require too much personal sacrifice, and that in order for an act to be supererogatory, it must have a kind of result that you would have an obligation to bring about if you could do so with no personal sacrifice. I further argue that traditional utilitarianism should be modified so as not to treat supererogatory acts as obligatory.

Act Utilitarianism has traditionally been regarded as the view that you should always perform the action that will bring about the greatest possible excess of happiness over unhappiness or, if there is no such alternative, the least possible excess of unhappiness over happiness.1 Following Rawls, I shall call this the classical principle. An alternative which Rawls calls the average principle is the view that you should always do the thing that will bring about the highest possible average happiness level. Rawls, (...) Rescher and Broad2 regard the average principle as superior to the classical principle, and there are considerable grounds for supposing that Mill accepted the average principle.3 Smart favours the classical position but confesses that if someone doesn't feel the same way, he doesn't know how to argue with him.4. (shrink)

I try to show that there is much sap (synthetic a priori) knowledge although one may not find many, or even any, sap true statements in most natural languages. Reasons are given for the difficulty of expressing sap truths in natural languages, but it is argued that these are not necessary features of language as such. There are, then, sap true statements in some possible languages.Admission of the sap gives one a way of distinguishing logical from metaphysical possiblity. Something is (...) metaphysically impossible just in case it is a sap truth that it is impossible. I argue that the realm of logically possible entities is vastly larger than the realm of metaphysically possible entities.My.defence of the sap begins with a partial defence of the analytic/synthetic distinction. In particular, I attack the intentionality circle argument,Quine's indeterminacy thesis and some applications of the Kripke/Putnam theory of meaning for natural kind terms. Without being a conclusive defence of the analytic/synthetic distinction, this section makes the defence of the sap more secure. Arguments are then mounted in direct defence of the sap by showing that the purported reduction of sap truths to analytic truths is mistaken. Examples are adduced to show that, even where expressions of natural language fail, one can stipulate usage in ways that allow expression of sap truths. I then consider and reply to various objections, giving an example of the sort of meaning theory which illegitimately legislates the analyticity of any purported sap true statement. (shrink)

There has been a revival of interest in Hegel of late among English-speaking philosophers. Although he is still regarded as maddeningly obscure, a number of important philosophers have been attracted by a doctrine prominently associated with Hegel, the coherence theory of truth. In order to hold the coherence theory of truth, it is obvious that you must hold what might be called the coherence theory of truth-testing as well: for if this theory is wrong and we can test some statements (...) by, for example, introspection as well as in terms of coherence, truth must involve something more than just coherence. My arguments against the coherence theory of truth-testing, since it is implied by the coherence theory proper, are indirectly against the coherence theory as well. I also argue that unless some version of the Private Language Argument is successful, it is virtually impossible to defend the coherence theory of truth-testing without denying the existence of experiences, thereby committing oneself to materialism. (shrink)

Group size is a function of relative neocortical volume in nonhuman primates. Extrapolation from this regression equation yields a predicted group size for modern humans very similar to that of certain hunter-gatherer and traditional horticulturalist societies. Groups of similar size are also found in other large-scale forms of contemporary and historical society. Among primates, the cohesion of groups is maintained by social grooming; the time devoted to social grooming is linearly related to group size among the Old World monkeys and (...) apes. To maintain the stability of the large groups characteristic of humans by grooming alone would place intolerable demands on time budgets. It is suggested that (1) the evolution of large groups in the human lineage depended on the development of a more efficient method for time-sharing the processes of social bonding and that (2) language uniquely fulfills this requirement. Data on the size of conversational and other small interacting groups of humans are in line with the predictions for the relative efficiency of conversation compared to grooming as a bonding process. Analysis of a sample of human conversations shows that about 60% of time is spent gossiping about relationships and personal experiences. It is suggested that language evolved to allow individuals to learn about the behavioural characteristics of other group members more rapidly than is possible by direct observation alone. (shrink)

There has been a revival of interest in Hegel of late among English-speaking philosophers. Although he is still regarded as maddeningly obscure, a number of important philosophers have been attracted by a doctrine prominently associated with Hegel, the coherence theory of truth. In order to hold the coherence theory of truth, it is obvious that you must hold what might be called the coherence theory of truth-testing as well: for if this theory is wrong and we can test some statements (...) by, for example, introspection as well as in terms of coherence, truth must involve something more than just coherence. My arguments against the coherence theory of truth-testing, since it is implied by the coherence theory proper, are indirectly against the coherence theory as well. I also argue that unless some version of the Private Language Argument is successful, it is virtually impossible to defend the coherence theory of truth-testing without denying the existence of experiences, thereby committing oneself to materialism. (shrink)

R.I.G. Hughes presents a series of eight philosophical essays on the theoretical practices of physics. The first two essays examine these practices as they appear in physicists' treatises (e.g. Newton's Principia and Opticks ) and journal articles (by Einstein, Bohm and Pines, Aharonov and Bohm). By treating these publications as texts, Hughes casts the philosopher of science in the role of critic. This premise guides the following 6 essays which deal with various concerns of philosophy of physics such as laws, (...) disunities, models and representation, computer simulation, explanation, and the discourse of physics. (shrink)

Universal human values-this is one of the most frequently encountered phrases today; we are constantly coming across it on the pages of newspapers and magazines. Its frequency creates the illusion that its content is intuitively clear, attractive, and shared by everyone. However, the various versions of what is understood by universal human values-the good, truth, beauty, freedom, or civil society, a non-nuclear world, ecological protection, pluralism, etc.-show that this is by no means the case.

R.I.G. Hughes presents a series of eight philosophical essays on the theoretical practices of physics. The first two essays examine these practices as they appear in physicists' treatises and journal articles. By treating these publications as texts, Hughes casts the philosopher of science in the role of critic. This premise guides the following six essays which deal with various concerns of philosophy and physics such as laws, disunities, models and representation, computer simulation, explanation, and the discourse of physics.

Data on the number of adults that an individual contacts at least once a month in a set of British populations yield estimates of network sizes that correspond closely to those of the typical “sympathy group” size in humans. Men and women do not differ in their total network size, but women have more females and more kin in their networks than men do. Kin account for a significantly higher proportion of network members than would be expected by chance. The (...) number of kin in the network increases in proportion to the size of the family; as a result, people from large families have proportionately fewer non-kin in their networks, suggesting that there is either a time constraint or a cognitive constraint on network size. A small inner clique of the network functions as a support group from whom an individual is particularly likely to seek advice or assistance in time of need. Kin do not account for a significantly higher proportion of the support clique than they do for the wider network of regular social contacts for either men or women, but each sex exhibits a strong preference for members of their own sex. (shrink)

The Oxford text of this passage reads as follows:This gives the received text and punctuation. No generally agreed meaning has been found in the opening sentence as it thus stands; nor have any of the numerous alternative versions which have been proposed gained widespread support. In this paper I suggest that good sense can, after all, be made of this passage in its received form.

Data from various settings suggest that there is an upper limit of about four on the number of individuals who can interact in spontaneous conversation. This limit appears to be a consequence of the mechanisms of speech production and detection. There appear to be no differences between men and women in this respect, other than those introduced by women’s lighter voices.

It is shown that a formula of modal propositional logic has precisely the same models as a sentence of the first-order language of a single dyadic predicate iff its class of models is closed under ultraproducts. as a corollary, any modal formula definable by a set of first-order conditions is always definable by a single such condition. these results are then used to show that the formula (lmp 'validates' mlp) is not first-order definable.

This volume of recent writings, some previously unpublished, follows the sequence of a typical intermediate or upper-level logic course and allows teachers to enrich their presentations of formal methods and results with readings on corresponding questions in philosophical logic.