_Confines of Democracy_ is a collection of critical assessments and interpretations of Richard J. Bernstein’s extensive and illuminating work on pragmatism, epistemology, hermeneutics, and social and political theory, including Bernstein’s replies to the contributors.

In this paper I take Rorty’s self-description as a “hedgehog” as the starting point for a portrait of his intellectual temperament. I re-examine in the first instance Isaiah Berlin’s contrast between hedgehogs and foxes as inspired by the proverb of Archilocus. I then analyze, in philosophical terms, some differences between foxes and hedgehogs. I distinguish different types of hedgehogs in order to make clear exactly what kind of hedgehog Rorty was. In spite of his multiple interests and conversations, I argue, (...) Rorty portrayed himself as a hedgehog with only one important idea: the need to overcome notions such as Truth and Reason and to promote a less cruel and more anti-authoritarian way of living. I claim that this single idea is better understood when we pay special attention as to why Rorty gave priority to literature over philosophy, why he made distinctions between different types of writers, and why one of his favorite writers, Nabokov, was only apparently a fox. (shrink)

Gardens on Fire. Fahrenheit 451 Revisited Resumen: En este trabajo proponemos una reconsideración de una de las historias distópicas más populares y discutidas desde mediados del siglo XX, Fahrenheit 451, del escritor y ensayista estadounidense Ray Bradbury. Aunque esta historia ha atraído desde su publicación la atención del pensamiento político y social, creemos que ha sido ampliamente simplificada. A diferencia de ciertos críticos, no creemos que la fábula política de Bradbury fomente, como muchas otras distopías, una falta de perspectiva histórica (...) o una insuficiente comprensión del presente. Si la visión política y cultural de Bradbury es criticable no lo es por su evasión de la historia, sino más bien por una visión histórica demasiado optimista. También queremos mostrar que Bradbury no fue un humanista enemigo de la cultura de masas, ni de la tecnología. El examen en profundidad de su novela y de numeroso material complementario permitirá explicar porqué su historia sobre el sombrío futuro de la sociedad industrial también contenía elementos para imaginar un futuro alternativo. Gracias a ese examen, finalmente, concluiremos que en el caso de Bradbury la ciencia-ficción no solo sirve para imaginar un futuro indeseable, sino, sobre todo, para mantener vivas y transformar tradiciones con las que fabricar un futuro deseable.: In this paper we propose a reconsideration of one of the most popular and discussed dystopian stories since the mid-20th century, Fahrenheit 451, by the American writer and essayist Ray Bradbury. Although this novel attracted the attention of political and social thought since its publication, we think that it has been largely simplified. Unlike some critics, we do not consider that Bradbury's political fable, like many other dystopias, fosters a lack of historical perspective or an insufficient understanding of the present. If Bradbury's political and cultural vision is open to criticism, it is not only for his evasion of history, but rather for an overly optimistic historical vision. We also make clear that Bradbury was not a humanist enemy of mass culture and technology. A close reading of his novel and numerous supplementary material make us to elucidate why his story about the bleak future of industrial society also contains elements to envisage an alternative future. Thanks to this examination we will conclude that, in the case of Bradbury, science-fiction does not serve just to foretell an undesirable future, but it significantly helps to keep alive and to transform traditions with which to manufacture a desirable future. Palabras clave: distopía, tecnologías, libros, memoria, Bradbury. Keywords: dystopia, technologies, books, memory, Bradbury. (shrink)

El presente ensayo reconsidera las críticas de John Dewey a Walter Lippmann tomando como eje los argumentos esgrimidos en las sucesivas reseñas que Dewey fue haciendo de las obras de Lippmann. Se sostiene que las críticas que Dewey lanzó en estas reseñas, así como luego en The Public and its Problems (1927) ya apuntaban en una dirección que quedó más explícita en los años treinta, cuando Dewey respondió con lenguaje socialista a un Lippmann que apelaba a algo más que a (...) la autoridad de expertos para contrarrestar las derivas de la democracia. En el debate que mantuvieron, no solo se pusieron en juego dos visiones de la relación entre democracia y voluntad popular, sino dos concepciones discrepantes sobre las bases económicas de una sociedad abierta y las condiciones necesarias para el ejercicio de la libertad. (shrink)

Mi propósito en este trabajo es reconsiderar una de las lecturas más relevantes y provocativas que se han hecho sobre John Dewey en el mundo de habla hispana. En la primera parte reconstruyo las circunstancias que rodearon la difusión, interpretación y traducción de las obras de Dewey en el México de mediados de los años 1940, y en concreto las razones que llevaron a que la visión sociológica que José Medina Echavarría quiso dar de Dewey fuera finalmente desplazada por la (...) filosófica de José Gaos. En la segunda parte analizo la traducción y lectura que Gaos hizo de Experience and Nature de Dewey, teniendo muy presente sus comparaciones con Sein und Zeit de Heidegger . Finalmente, propongo algunas críticas a la visión que Gaos transmite de Dewey como un pensador carente de un tipo de "soberbia diabólica" propia de la verdadera gran filosofía. The purpose of this work is a reconsideration of one of the most relevant and provocative readings of John Dewey written in the Hispanic World. In the first part I reconstruct the circumstances which surrounded the publicity, interpretation and translation of John Dewey's works in the Mexico of the middle 1940's, particularly the reasons why the sociological reading of Dewey that José Medina Echavarría proposed was finally displaced by the metaphysic perspective of José Gaos. In the second part I reconsider Gaos' own translation and interpretation of Experience and Nature, taking in consideration his comparisons with Heidegger's Sein und Zeit . Finally I analyze critically Gaos' view of Dewey as a thinker whose philosophy lacked the "diabolical arrogance" that true great philosophy would seem to require. (shrink)

We propose a reconsideration of John Dewey’s criticisms of Walter Lippmann’s ideas taking as guiding theme the arguments put forward in the successive reviews that Dewey wrote on Lippmann’s works. We maintain that the ideas that Dewey launched in these reviews pointed in a direction that became more explicit in the 1930s, when Dewey responded with socialist discourse to a Lippmann who appealed to something more that the authority of trained experts to counteract the drifts of democracy. According to our (...) view, the debate they held not only revealed two visions of the relationship between democracy and popular will, but also two discrepant conceptions about the economic bases of an open society and the necessary conditions for freedom exercise. (shrink)

Sabemos que la conformación de la música tradicional en México, así como en la mayoría de los países latinoamericanos, se debe a la aportación musical europea y africana principalmente. El danzón tradicional, género musical cubano y adoptado en México como propio, es una forma que resultó de la síntesis de patrones rítmicos africanos y formas musicales europeas. Nuestro interés por la obra musical sinfónica Danzón 2 de Arturo Márquez se debe al hecho de que, al mismo tiempo que es una (...) expresión artística, es portadora de elementos tradicionales, los cuales nos permiten apreciar una carga identitaria representativa de nuestro país. Una de las formas que nos permite determinar la expresión de identidad en la música contemporánea es la presencia de elementos musicales tradicionales. En este trabajo se pretende demostrar que el Danzón 2 se constituye, entre otros elementos, por formas musicales y células rítmicas de nuestra tradición. Creemos que una manera de enfrentar los retos que surgen en el siglo XXI, respecto a los temas del universalismo y la cuestión de la identidad, es a través de una actitud abierta y reflexiva en la que se replanteen los patrones tradicionales musicales creativamente. Nuestra visión es que el Danzón 2 –obra creada en 1994– del compositor mexicano Arturo Márquez, lejos de ser una de las manifestaciones político-nacionalistas (que sólo tratan de difundir ciertos patrones " convenientes " para los intereses del Estado o de sus instituciones, anunciándose dentro de la vena de la globalización como multiculturalismo), es una pieza sinfónica que se nos muestra como una obra de arte... (shrink)

Resumen: Este texto consiste básicamente en una presentación general de la corriente filosófica del nuevo realismo surgida en 2007 y en la que participan autores europeos y norteamericanos. Un punto en común de las diversas posiciones dentro de esta corriente es el deslinde crítico frente a la filosofía posmoderna y a la filosofía moderna en general. Explico esta crítica y sus implicaciones para la posibilidad de un restablecimiento en la filosofía contemporánea del pensamiento metafísico.: This text is basically an overview (...) of philosophical new realism which emerged in 2007 and involves European and American authors. A common point to the various positions within this current is a critical detachment from postmodern philosophy and modern philosophy in general. i explain this criticism and its implications for the possibility of a restoration in contemporary philosophy of metaphysical thought. (shrink)

This significant book is the main outcome of an international research program on “Public Sphere, Value-Conflict, and Social Experience: A Pragmatist Approach,” conducted in 2008-11 by Ramón del Castillo. Within this framework, the editors of the book organized, in 2010, an international conference on the philosophy of Richard J. Bernstein. The conference became the highlight of the program as far as the American philosopher not only represents a key-figure of the American philosophical tradi...

Linguistics of Saying is to be analyzed in the speech act conceived as an act of knowing. The speaking, saying and knowing subject, based on contexts and the principles of congruency and trust in the speech of other speakers, will create meanings and interpret the sense of utterances supplying the deficiencies of language by means of the intellective operations mentally executed in the act of speech. In the intellective operations you can see three steps or processes: first the starting point, (...) intuition or aísthesis; second, the process of abstraction; and third, the inverse: the process of determination or fixing the construct created. (shrink)

Linguistics of saying studies language in its birth. Language is the mental activity executed by speaking subjects. Linguistics of saying consists in analyzing speech acts as the result of an act of knowing. Speaking subjects speak because they have something to say. Tthey say because they define themselves before the circumstance they are in. And this is possible because they are able to know. Speaking, then, is speaking, saying and knowing. In this sense there is a progressive determination. Knowing makes (...) possible saying, and saying determines speaking, or, in other words: speaking involves saying and knowing, and saying involves knowing. The problem thus is to determine the meaningful intentional purpose of the individual speaker to say something in every speech act. (shrink)

Language is nothing but human subjects in as much as they speak, say and know. Language is something coming from the inside of the speaking subject manifest in the intentional meaningful purpose of the individual speaker. A language, on the contrary, is something coming from the outside, from the speech community, something offered to the speaking subject from the tradition in the technique of speaking. The speech act is the performance of an intuition by the subject, both individual and social.

Linguistics of saying studies language in its birth. Language is the mental activity executed by speaking subjects. Linguistics of saying consists in analyzing speech acts as the result of an act of knowing. Speaking subjects, speak because they have something to say; they say something because they define themselves before the circumstance they are in; and this is possible because they are able to know. Speaking, then, is speaking, saying and knowing. In this sense there is a progressive determination. Knowing (...) makes possible saying, and saying determines speaking. The problem thus is to determine the linguistic intention of the individual speaker to say something in every speech act. (shrink)

The human subject in as much as he knows transforms the sensitive and concrete (the thing perceived) into abstract (an image of the thing perceived), the abstract into an idea (imaginative representation of the thing abstracted), and ideas into contents of conscience (meanings). The last step in the creation of meanings, something being executed in the speech act, consists in fixing the construct mentally created thus making it objectified meanings in the conscience of speakers. The interchange amongst the different steps (...) in the creation of meaning manifests lógos, the state lived by speakers in their interior when speaking, created and developed in words and because of words. (shrink)

Speakers live language, that is, they intuit, create, acquire, perform, speak and say, interpret, use, evaluate and, even, speak of language. The real language is the language lived by speakers. On the contrary linguists, who at the same time are speakers and linguists, study language as something manifesting of front of them. In order to study language it is necessary to determine the degree of reality of the thing called language as the reality lived and used by speakers.

Meaning defines language because it is the internal function of language. At the same time, meaning does not exist unless in language and because of language. From the point of view of the speaking subject meaning is contents of conscience. From the point of view of a language, meaning is the objectification of knowledge in linguistic signs. And from the point of view of the individual speaking subject, meaning is the expressive intentional purpose to say something.

When we speak of language we usually use the concept of a particular language. In this sense the concept denoted with the word language may vary from one language to another. Real language (=the language spoken) on the contrary is the reality lived by speakers thus encompassing complex and multifarious activities. Depending on the language spoken, the modes of thinking, modes of being in the conception of things, and systems of beliefs transmitted by means of particular languages, denote the living (...) reality of language with different grammatical categories. The concept “language” is expressed sometimes with a noun, thus denoting something existing in it; sometimes with a verb, thus denoting an action or an activity; and sometimes with an adverb, thus denoting the mode of an activity. The reality or degree of reality implicit in these grammatical categories involves a particular mode of thinking, prompted with a particular mode of being in the conception of things. Because of this it is necessary to distinguish the concept of language as something different from the reality of language. But first of all it is necessary to determine the reality or degree of reality of both the reality lived by speakers and the thing usually conceived of as language or a language. (shrink)

The most comprehensive manifestation of language can be seen in the activity of speaking. In it the activity of speaking cannot be understood unless it is referred to the concepts of language and a language. Anything in language can be found in the activity of speaking. Because of this you can find what language is if you abstract from the innumerable manifestations of the activity of speaking.

Meaning as the original function of language is the arrangement of internal things on the part of the creative and historical individual subject who speaks a particular language. Meaning constitutes the series of contents making up the linguistic world human subjects can manage real things with. Real things are not described with meanings but merely represented and designated. Meanings represent the essence of things thus making them members of a category. In this sense, meaning is the base to create things (...) in as much as they constitute entities. Only through the operation of determination can meanings designate individual real things. Since meaningful categories are intended to particular purposes, meaning is intentional and inclusive. (shrink)

Unfortunately, there are still cases of domestic violence or situations where it is necessary to call for help without arousing the suspicion of the aggressor. In these situations, the help signal devised by the Canadian Women’s Foundation has proven to be effective in reporting a risky situation. By displaying a sequence of hand signals, it is possible to report that help is needed. This work presents a vision-based system that detects this sequence and implements it in a social robot, so (...) that it can automatically identify unwanted situations and alert the authorities. The gesture recognition pipeline presented in this work is integrated into a cognitive architecture used to generate behaviours in robots. In this way, the robot interacts with humans and is able to detect if a person is calling for help. In that case, the robot will act accordingly without alerting the aggressor. The proposed vision system uses the MediaPipe library to detect people in an image and locate the hands, from which it extracts a set of hand landmarks that identify which gesture is being made. By analysing the sequence of detected gestures, it can identify whether a person is performing the distress hand signal with an accuracy of 96.43%. (shrink)

The changes known as the loss of inflexions in English (11th- 15th centuries, included) were prompted with the introduction of a new mode of thinking. The mode of thinking, for the Anglo-Saxons, was a dynamic way of conceiving of things. Things were considered events happening. With the contacts of Anglo-Saxons with, first, the Romano-British; second, the introduction of Christianity; and finally with the Norman invasion, their dynamic way of thinking was confronted with the static conception of things coming from the (...) Mediterranean. The history of English from the 11th to the 15th century meant the introduction, confrontation and adoption of a new mental conception of things, the static way of conceiving of things, both modes of thinking defining the language today. (shrink)

Mi concepción sobre el lenguaje parte de tres realidades ciertas: el hablar (Coseriu), el decir (Ortega y Gasset), y el conocer (Descartes, Kant, Ortega y Gasset), tres realidades tan ciertas como que yo vivo porque estoy haciendo algo ahora mismo. Y este hacer algo constituye mi vida (Ortega y Gasset). Yo soy porque vivo y porque tengo la necesidad de hablar con otros seres humanos, quienes constituyen mi circunstancia, para definirme a mí mismo (decir) sobre aquello de lo que hablo (...) para conseguir un fin, aunque este sólo sea pasajero y volátil. La aparición del hablar, decir y conocer en el acto lingüístico nos revela el pensamiento y lo que llamamos el lenguaje y la lengua. Además, estas realidades radican en mí, en el ser humano, y manifiestan la condición de ser del ser humano, quien es capaz de conocer creativamente, definirse ante la situación que analiza antes de hablar (=decir), y de hablar utilizando palabras que no son suyas sino de la comunidad lingüística (=la lengua, Coseriu) en la que vive (Ortega y Gasset). Así, pues, considero el lenguaje como realidad que subyace en la conciencia del ser humano individual que habla, dice y conoce. (shrink)

El decir es anterior y va más allá del hablar, se vale del hablar y constituye la determinación del hablar. No hay un hablar sin un decir y sí puede haber un decir sin un hablar. El acto lingüístico es la manifestación del lenguaje, la lengua, el pensamiento y el conocimiento. Es fruto de un hablar, está determinado por un decir, presupone un conocer y revela la actitud del hablante, un sujeto libre e histórico, que es, a la vez, sujeto (...) hablante, dicente y cognoscente, ante la realidad y el mundo. De la misma manera que no se da un hablar sin un decir, tampoco se da un decir sin un conocer. En su génesis más profunda el conocer determina al decir y éste al hablar. Así, pues, el «ser hablante» (Coseriu) es, a la vez, el sujeto «dicente» (Ortega y Gasset) y el sujeto cognoscente (Coseriu, Ortega y Gasset, Heidegger, Aristóteles), porque se realiza a sí mismo en el acto del hablar y éste está determinado por el acto del decir y en última instancia por el acto del conocer. El decir define al hablante ante la realidad y el mundo y da soporte a lo que es la realidad y el mundo, que no es más que aquello a lo que el sujeto hablante, dicente y cognoscente le atribuye el ser o realidad. El ser humano, «coexistencia actuante de mí o yo con la circunstancia o mundo» (Ortega y Gasset), se libera de la necesidad vital en la que está inmerso, de la circunstancia a la que está inexorablemente ligado, mediante el conocer. Por el conocer el ser humano atribuye a eso que le rodea y afecta «el ser», haciendo de ello «cosas» y «mundo» constituido por «cosas». Todo esto se manifiesta en el acto lingüístico, que es un acto creador en un triple sentido: crea las cosas y el mundo (contenidos de conciencia, significados), crea la realidad de las cosas y el mundo, y crea la expresión de lo que es las cosas y el mundo (el lenguaje y la lengua) mediante lo dicho (lektón) determinado esto por el pensamiento (lógos). El acto lingüístico es creación (poiesis) y es manifestación (apóphansis), acto de crear un mundo y acto de desvelar el mundo interior del sujeto hablante, dicente y cognoscente, acto de desvelar lo que está oculto y que ahora es no-oculto o verdadero (a-lethés). El hablar, el decir y el conocer son acciones vitales del ser humano. El hablar es una acción vital del sujeto creador que le viene de fuera, de la comunidad; el decir es la acción vital que le viene de dentro y que proyecta él mismo hacia fuera, hacia la comunidad; y el conocer es el acto mismo de creación de un sujeto, que es, opuestamente, libre e histórico, absoluto y limitado, creador de formas y participante de formas comunes creadas en la comunidad. El hablar en sí mismo, al igual que la lengua, es a-circunstancial y tiene que ver con la creación en términos absolutos e históricos. El decir como manifestación del interior del sujeto hablante, dicente y cognoscente tiene que ver con la verdad o aquello que se manifiesta desvelándose (a-létheia). De esta manera, podemos ver dos clases de pensamiento o logos: el logos a-circunstancial o intersubjetivo o histórico, lógos semantikós, y el logos que manifiesta una realidad interior y crea una realidad exterior desde el interior del sujeto creador o lógos apophantikós. La lingüística del decir que ahora se presenta recoge una propuesta en el mismo sentido hecha por Ortega y Gasset y es la continuación de la lingüística del hablar de Coseriu. Hace un replanteamiento de la realidad radical, el ser hablante de Coseriu, que es concebido ahora como el sujeto hablante, dicente y cognoscente. Estudia el acto lingüístico, acto del hablar, decir y conocer, como la manifestación primera de la intención significativa de cada sujeto. Se basa en los principios de la lingüística del hablar de Coseriu, especialmente en los que describen el plano universal e individual del hablar, es decir, los principios de la confianza en el hablar del otro y de la congruencia y coherencia en el hablar. Mira, por consiguiente, al acto lingüístico como «producción», como aquello que se crea en el acto único del hablar, decir y conocer. La finalidad de la lingüística del decir es llegar la génesis misma del lenguaje, que no es más que la génesis del acto lingüístico. Analiza el acto lingüístico como la manifestación del acto del conocer, el cual partiendo de la aísthesis o intuición sensible (Ortega y Gasset, Heidegger, Aristóteles) o intuición inédita del hablante (Coseriu), se descompone en una serie de operaciones intelectivas, cada una de las cuales contribuye a configurar de una manera dada la «aprehensión del ser» inicial e inédita. Estas operaciones intelectivas son: la selección, el establecimiento de una designación, la creación de una clase o esencia, la relación, la nominación y la determinación. Tras la presentación y justificación de lo que es cada uno de los conceptos indicados arriba (los cuatro primeros capítulos), el libro dedica un capítulo a cada una de estas operaciones intelectivas, analizada e ilustrada con ejemplos. Como ilustración de lo que puede ser el análisis aquí propugnado, se dedica un capítulo al análisis del adjetivo 'brisk’, adjetivo de conducta de la lengua inglesa. (shrink)

Accurate measurement of livestock weight is a primary indicator in the meat industry to increase the economic gain. In lambs, the weight of a live animal is still usually estimated manually using traditional scales, resulting in a tedious process for the experienced assessor and stressful for the animal. In this paper, we propose a solution to this problem using computer vision techniques; thus, the proposed procedure estimates the weight of a lamb by analysing its zenithal image without interacting with the (...) animal, which speeds up the process and reduces weighing costs. It is based on a data-driven decision support system that uses RGB-D machine vision techniques and regression models. Unlike existing methods, it does not require walk-over-weighing platforms or special and expensive infrastructures. The proposed method includes a decision support system that automatically rejects those images that are not appropriate to estimate the lamb weight. After determining the body contour of the lamb, we compute several features that feed different regression models. Best results were achieved with Extra Tree Regression ($R^{2}$=91.94%), outperforming the existing techniques. Using only an image, the proposed approach can identify with a minimum error the optimal weight of a lamb to be slaughtered, so as to maximise the economic profit. (shrink)

Quality standards fulfilment is an essential task in manufacturing processes that involves high costs. One target is to avoid the presence of burrs in the edge of machine workpieces, which reduce the quality of the products. Furthermore, they are not easily removed since the part can even be damaged. In this paper, we propose an optimized Convolutional Neural Network, to detect the presence of burrs in images of milling parts. Its design is focused on the optimization of classification (accuracy) and (...) performance metrics (training time and number of trainable parameters). The proposed architecture identifies burrs with a 91.16% accuracy in the test set, outperforming existing models as EfficientNetB0. It also reduces the number of trainable parameters from other models as AlexNet by 1.5 million. The prediction process just takes 48.39 milliseconds per image. Finally, in order to check if the model gets a high activation in the region of interest, a visual explanation of the model is also carried out by using Gradient-weighted Class Activation Mapping. (shrink)

A theory of knowledge is the explanation of things in terms of the possibilities and capabilities of the human way of knowing. The human knowledge is the representation of the things apprehended sensitively either through the senses or intuition. A theory of knowledge concludes about the reality of the things studied. As such it is a priori speculation, based on synthetic a priori statements. Its conclusions constitute interpretation, that is, hermeneutics. Linguistics as the science studying real language, that is, the (...) language spoken, reverts to human subjects in as much as they speak, say and know. Language thus must be studied as a theory of knowledge. (shrink)

Language is nothing but human subjects in as much as they speak, say and know. Language is something coming from the inside of the speaking subject manifest in the meaningful intentional purpose of the individual speaker. A language, on the contrary, is something coming from the outside, from the speech community, something offered to the speaking subject from the tradition in the technique of speaking. The speech act is nothing but the development of an intuition by the subject thus transforming (...) it in words of a language. It is both individual and social. Since human subjects are free and historical, the study of speech acts is hermeneutics, that is, interpreting speech acts with knowing and the human reality. (shrink)

Language exists because human subjects define themselves in the circumstance they are in. This is possible because they are able to know, not directly through their senses only, but adding something new to the construct they create in their conscience. The main thing they add to the construct created is categories, something invented or fabricated by the human subject at the moment of speaking.

El acto lingüístico como acto de hablar, decir y conocer es una actividad que realiza el sujeto desde lo profundo de su conciencia. Consiste en la síntesis cognoscitiva que realiza el hablante de su intuición y de lo que añade mediante su imaginación y su razón, convirtiéndola en palabras de una lengua. El acto lingüístico y, por tanto, el lenguaje, es la proyección hacia las cosas de lo que el sujeto realiza en su interior. Las cosas así tienen un grado (...) de realidad relativo, el que el sujeto les da proyectando su intención significativa hacia lo que le rodea, utilizando para ello las palabras de una lengua, creando así su verdad o su logos. Mi intención en este artículo es reflexionar sobre la realidad humana del acto lingüístico en cuanto que es la respuesta del sujeto que vive una situación dada. (shrink)

Human beings make themselves with language in history. Language defines human beings making them subjects of their being and mode of being. In this sense language is essential and exclusive of humans. The problem with language consists in explaining the reality of language, something internal to speakers but manifesting itself as external to them.