Cet article décrit le développement de la conscience critique ainsi que les traditions intellectuelles qui tentent d’expliquer la compréhension du concept. Parmi les plus importantes sont la philosophie analytique, le pragmatisme américain, et la théorie critique de l’École de Francfort. En particulier, deux actions déterminantes sont analysées : la volonté d’examiner nos propres suppositions et celles d’autrui à l’égard de nos pensées et de nos actions et l’ouverture aux autres perspectives et points de vue. L’auteur examine le moyen dont la (...) tradition de la théorie critique souligne la déconstruction du pouvoir et du contrôle idéologique. Il s’appuie sur sa propre expérience de la dépression clinique comme illustration. Avant de comprendre sa propre dépression, il maintient qu’il fallait être prêt à poser un regard critique sur l’idéologie dominante de la patriarchie qui a bloqué une analyse critique de sa condition mentale. (shrink)

Stephen Brookfield offers a distinctive conceptualization of and approach to teaching critical thinking. In this review I highlight some major aspects of his approach, and critique his baseline conception. I conclude that, while evaluating assumptions is an important aspect of critical thinking, it is not as important as Brookfield maintains. Instructors of critical thinking should read his book, but they should remain skeptical of its major substantive theoretical commitments.

The aim of this paper is to introduce a correction into the notion of self-directed adult learning by way of conjoining it with philosophically elaborated notions of autonomy, self-reflectiveness, and maturity. The basic premise of this intervention is that in andragogical theorizing, learners’ self-directedness ought not to be thought as obvious and thus beyond question. Since adult selves are not transparent but socially, culturally, and discoursively constructed, adult educators are encouraged to think of themselves as facilitators of adult learners’ self-awareness (...) and self-directedness in their learning processes. Adult learners need to be assisted in developing critical skills that can be used to eliminate distortions in their perception of social reality, in understanding their own personalities, their needs and decisions concerning continuing education. The problematization of the concept of human autonomy amid external influences, is first discussed in Immanuel Kant’s idea of maturity as an ability to use one’s understanding without guidance from another. I then turn to Habermas’s philosophy of communicative action and three knowledge-constitutive interests where the human interest in emancipation comes to the fore. Its significance for critical adult learning is further emphasized in line with Stephen Brookfield’s and Jack Mezirow’s association of self-directed learning with empowerment, understood as freeing consciousness from its dependence on hypostatized powers. Drawing on Foucault’s work, I argue that attaining the state of autonomy requires practice in “the care for oneself” which amounts to the lifelong endeavor to create and govern oneself and to learn how not to be governed. The agenda for adult education for citizenship opted for in this paper attributes essential significance to learnable skills of critical reasoning, deliberation, and self-reflectiveness which all operate within three proposed dimensions of adult education: experiential learning, literacy, and vocationalism. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to introduce a correction into the notion of self-directed adult learning by way of conjoining it with philosophically elaborated notions of autonomy, self-reflectiveness, and maturity. The basic premise of this intervention is that in andragogical theorizing, learners’ self-directedness ought not to be thought as obvious and thus beyond question. Since adult selves are not transparent but socially, culturally, and discoursively constructed, adult educators are encouraged to think of themselves as facilitators of adult learners’ self-awareness (...) and self-directedness in their learning processes. Adult learners need to be assisted in developing critical skills that can be used to eliminate distortions in their perception of social reality, in understanding their own personalities, their needs and decisions concerning continuing education. The problematization of the concept of human autonomy amid external influences, is first discussed in Immanuel Kant’s idea of maturity as an ability to use one’s understanding without guidance from another. I then turn to Habermas’s philosophy of communicative action and three knowledge-constitutive interests where the human interest in emancipation comes to the fore. Its significance for critical adult learning is further emphasized in line with Stephen Brookfield’s and Jack Mezirow’s association of self-directed learning with empowerment, understood as freeing consciousness from its dependence on hypostatized powers. Drawing on Foucault’s work, I argue that attaining the state of autonomy requires practice in “the care for oneself” which amounts to the lifelong endeavor to create and govern oneself and to learn how not to be governed. The agenda for adult education for citizenship opted for in this paper attributes essential significance to learnable skills of critical reasoning, deliberation, and self-reflectiveness which all operate within three proposed dimensions of adult education: experiential learning, literacy, and vocationalism. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to introduce a correction into the notion of self-directed adult learning by way of conjoining it with philosophically elaborated notions of autonomy, self-reflectiveness, and maturity. The basic premise of this intervention is that in andragogical theorizing, learners’ self-directedness ought not to be thought as obvious and thus beyond question. Since adult selves are not transparent but socially, culturally, and discoursively constructed, adult educators are encouraged to think of themselves as facilitators of adult learners’ self-awareness (...) and self-directedness in their learning processes. Adult learners need to be assisted in developing critical skills that can be used to eliminate distortions in their perception of social reality, in understanding their own personalities, their needs and decisions concerning continuing education. The problematization of the concept of human autonomy amid external influences, is first discussed in Immanuel Kant’s idea of maturity as an ability to use one’s understanding without guidance from another. I then turn to Habermas’s philosophy of communicative action and three knowledge-constitutive interests where the human interest in emancipation comes to the fore. Its significance for critical adult learning is further emphasized in line with Stephen Brookfield’s and Jack Mezirow’s association of self-directed learning with empowerment, understood as freeing consciousness from its dependence on hypostatized powers. Drawing on Foucault’s work, I argue that attaining the state of autonomy requires practice in “the care for oneself” which amounts to the lifelong endeavor to create and govern oneself and to learn how not to be governed. The agenda for adult education for citizenship opted for in this paper attributes essential significance to learnable skills of critical reasoning, deliberation, and self-reflectiveness which all operate within three proposed dimensions of adult education: experiential learning, literacy, and vocationalism. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to introduce a correction into the notion of self-directed adult learning by way of conjoining it with philosophically elaborated notions of autonomy, self-reflectiveness, and maturity. The basic premise of this intervention is that in andragogical theorizing, learners’ self-directedness ought not to be thought as obvious and thus beyond question. Since adult selves are not transparent but socially, culturally, and discoursively constructed, adult educators are encouraged to think of themselves as facilitators of adult learners’ self-awareness (...) and self-directedness in their learning processes. Adult learners need to be assisted in developing critical skills that can be used to eliminate distortions in their perception of social reality, in understanding their own personalities, their needs and decisions concerning continuing education. The problematization of the concept of human autonomy amid external influences, is first discussed in Immanuel Kant’s idea of maturity as an ability to use one’s understanding without guidance from another. I then turn to Habermas’s philosophy of communicative action and three knowledge-constitutive interests where the human interest in emancipation comes to the fore. Its significance for critical adult learning is further emphasized in line with Stephen Brookfield’s and Jack Mezirow’s association of self-directed learning with empowerment, understood as freeing consciousness from its dependence on hypostatized powers. Drawing on Foucault’s work, I argue that attaining the state of autonomy requires practice in “the care for oneself” which amounts to the lifelong endeavor to create and govern oneself and to learn how not to be governed. The agenda for adult education for citizenship opted for in this paper attributes essential significance to learnable skills of critical reasoning, deliberation, and self-reflectiveness which all operate within three proposed dimensions of adult education: experiential learning, literacy, and vocationalism. (shrink)

Mark Colyvan (2010) raises two problems for ‘easy road’ nominalism about mathematical objects. The first is that a theory’s mathematical commitments may run too deep to permit the extraction of nominalistic content. Taking the math out is, or could be, like taking the hobbits out of Lord of the Rings. I agree with the ‘could be’, but not (or not yet) the ‘is’. A notion of logical subtraction is developed that supports the possibility, questioned by Colyvan, of bracketing a theory’s (...) mathematical aspects to obtain, as remainder, what it says ‘mathematics aside’. The other problem concerns explanation. Several grades of mathematical involvement in physical explanation are distinguished, by analogy with Quine’s three grades of modal involvement. The first two grades plausibly obtain, but they do not require mathematical objects. The third grade is likelier to require mathematical objects. But it is not clear from Colyvan’s example that the third grade really obtains. (shrink)

Kripke, argued like this: it seems possible that E; the appearance can't be explained away as really pertaining to a "presentation" of E; so, pending a different explanation, it is possible that E. Textbook Kripkeans see in the contrast between E and its presentation intimations of a quite general distinction between two sorts of meaning. E's secondary or a posteriori meaning is the set of all worlds w which E, as employed here, truly describes. Its primary or a priori meaning (...) is the set of all w such that if w is actual, then E is true. "Conceivability error" occurs when a primary possibility is mistaken for a secondary one. Textbook Kripkeanism is rejected on the grounds that it makes meaning too modal and modality too much a matter of meaning. (shrink)

Many topics have not been covered, in most cases because I don't know quite what to say about them. Would it be possible to add a decidability predicate to the language? What about stronger connectives, like exclusion negation or Lukasiewicz implication? Would an expanded language do better at expressing its own semantics? Would it contain new and more terrible paradoxes? Can the account be supplemented with a workable notion of inherent truth (see note 36)? In what sense does stage semantics (...) lie “between” fixed point and stability semantics? In what sense, exactly, are our semantical rules inconsistent? In what sense, if any, does their inconsistency resolve the problem of the paradoxes?The ideals of strength, grounding, and closure together define an intuitively appealing conception of truth. Nothing would be gained by insisting that it was the intuitive conception of truth, and in fact recent developments make me wonder whether such a thing exists. However that may be, until the alternatives are better understood it would be foolish to attempt to decide between them. Truth gives up her secrets slowly and grudgingly, and loves to confound our presumptions. (shrink)

ontology metaontology wright platonism fregean existence epistemology.

Essence and causation are fundamental in metaphysics, but little is said about their relations. Some essential properties are of course causal, as it is essential to footprints to have been caused by feet. But I am interested less in causation's role in essence than the reverse: the bearing a thing's essence has on its causal powers. That essencemight make a causal contribution is hinted already by the counterfactual element in causation; and the hint is confirmed by the explanation essence offers (...) of something otherwise mysterious, namely, how events exactly alike in every ordinary respect, like the bolt'ssuddenly snapping and its snapping per se, manage to disagree in what they cause. Some prior difference must exist between these events to make their causal powers unlike. Paradoxically, though, it can only be in point of a property, suddenness, which both events possess in common. Only by postulating a difference in themanner — essential or accidental — of the property's possession is the paradox resolved. Next we need an account of causation in which essence plays an explicit determinative role. That account, based on the idea that causes should becommensurate with their effects, is thatx causesy only if nothing essentially poorer would have done, and nothing essentially richer was needed. (shrink)

I. The Conscious Mind is a hugely likable book. Perceptive, candid, and instructive page by page, the work as a whole sets out a large and uplifting vision with cheeringly un-Dover-Beach-ish implications for “our place in the universe.” A book that you can’t helping wanting to believe as much as you can’t help wanting to believe this one doesn’t come along every day. It is with real regret that I proceed to the story of why belief would not come.

For serious yoga practitioners curious to know the ancient origins of the art, Stephen Phillips, a professional philosopher and sanskritist with a long-standing personal practice, lays out the philosophies of action, knowledge, and devotion as well as the processes of meditation, reasoning, and self-analysis that formed the basis of yoga in ancient and classical India and continue to shape it today. In discussing yoga's fundamental commitments, Phillips explores traditional teachings of hatha yoga, karma yoga, _bhakti_ yoga, and tantra, and (...) shows how such core concepts as self-monitoring consciousness, karma, nonharmfulness, reincarnation, and the powers of consciousness relate to modern practice. He outlines values implicit in _bhakti_ yoga and the tantric yoga of beauty and art and explains the occult psychologies of _koshas_, _skandhas_, and _chakras_. His book incorporates original translations from the early Upanishads, the _Bhagavad Gita_, the _Yoga Sutra_, the _Hatha Yoga Pradipika_, and seminal tantric writings of the tenth-century Kashmiri Shaivite, Abhinava Gupta. A glossary defining more than three hundred technical terms and an extensive bibliography offer further help to nonscholars. A remarkable exploration of yoga's conceptual legacy, _Yoga, Karma, and Rebirth_ crystallizes ideas about self and reality that unite the many incarnations of yoga. (shrink)

Some skeptical theists use Wykstra’s CORNEA constraint to undercut Rowe-style inductive arguments from evil. Many critics of skeptical theism accept CORNEA, but argue that Rowe-style arguments meet its constraint. But Justin McBrayer argues that CORNEA is itself mistaken. It is, he claims, akin to “sensitivity” or “truth-tracking” constraints like those of Robert Nozick; but counterexamples show that inductive evidence is often insensitive. We here defend CORNEA against McBrayer’s chief counterexample. We first clarify CORNEA, distinguishing it from a deeper underlying principle (...) that we dub “CORE.” We then give both principles a probabilistic construal, and show how, on this construal, the counterexample fails. (shrink)

In this paper I distinguish three alternatives to the functionalist account of qualitative states such as pain. The physicalist-functionalist holds that (1) there could be subjects functionally equivalent to us whose mental states differed in their qualitative character from ours, (2) there could be subjects functionally equivalent to us whose mental states lacked qualitative character altogether and (3) there could not be subjects like us in all objective respects whose qualitative states differed from ours. The physicalist-functionalist holds (1) and (3) (...) but denies (2). The transcendentalist holds (1) and (2) and denies (3). I argue that both versions of physicalist-functionalism inherit the problem of property dualism which originally helped to motivate functionalist theories of mind. I also argue that neither version of physicalist-functionalism can distinguish in a principled way between those neurophysiological properties of a subject which are relevant to the qualitative character of that subject's mental states and those which are not. I conclude that the only alternative to a functionalist account of qualitative states is a transcendentalist account and that this alternative is not likely to appeal to the critics of functionalism. (shrink)

The real distinction between mind and body -- Is conceivability a guide to possibility? -- Textbook kripkeanism and the open texture of concepts -- Coulda, woulda, shoulda -- No fool's cold : notes on illusions of possibility -- Beyond rigidification : the importance of being really actual -- How in the world? -- Mental causation -- Singling out properties -- Wide causation -- Causal relevance : mental, moral, and epistemic.