Aristóteles ha sido considerado como el más grande biólogo de la antigüedad clásica, el primer zoólogo y el fundador de la anatomía comparada. En el presente ensayo examinaremos en qué medida el modelo normativo estipulado en los tratados lógicos se conforma a la recogida de datos empíricos presente en los tratados biológicos. En la segunda parte de la investigación examinaremos cómo los tratados lógicos habrían condicionado la explicación del funcionamiento del cerebro, llevando a Aristóteles a cometer un “error escandaloso”.

El artículo intenta indagar la naturaleza y la peculiaridad de las obras de Alejandro de Afrodisia. Botter argumenta que, como expresión de una cultura nueva, la cultura del “comentario”, las obras de Alejandro de Afrodisia representan una forma de cultura original y diferente respecto de la idea tradicional del desarrollo de las doctrinas de los grandes Maestros del pasado. La práctica de Alejandro apunta a aclarar Aristóteles a través de Aristóteles, modelando, en la medida de lo posible, el comentario (...) a los textos originales por medio de un fatigoso trabajo filológico de confrontación de cada frase singular con todo el resto del corpus de los tratados y con las principales interpretaciones de los predecesores. Según Botter, en el corpus de los comentarios Alejandro trata de aclarar las posiciones de Aristóteles con el objetivo de facilitar la comprensión del texto mismo. El comentario no consiste, por tanto, en una simple repetición, sino en una investigación incesante del significado originario del texto detrás de las interpretaciones históricas y de las intromisiones de otros intérpretes. (shrink)

Resumo: Neste artigo apresentamos um quadro geral da defesa de Aristóteles da teleologia natural em Physica II 8, analisando a aporia que ele levanta, neste contexto, no que diz a respeito do fenômeno da chuva e do vir a ser das partes dos animais. Em primeiro lugar, indicaremos os problemas envolvidos, e logo em seguida apresentaremos a nossa soluçáo para eles. Palavras-chave: Causas. Fenômeno acidental. Necessidade. Teleologia.

A partire dall’analisi di alcuni passi del Timeo, il testo propone lo studio delle cause e dei tipi di infermità che affliggono la salute umana al fine di mostrare che la maniera in cui il filosofo concepisce le malattie è una chiave per approfondire l’antropologia e l’etica dell’ultimo Platone. Presupposto della ricerca è la visione olistica che caratterizza il Timeo, in cui la condizione umana influenza il livello socio-politico e il livello cosmico, i quali, a loro volta, condizionano e sono (...) condizionati dalla presenza dell’uomo. Per finalizzare lo studio abbiamo circoscritto l’analisi ai passi 69c-90c del Timeo. Starting with the analysis of some Timaeus passages, the text proposes the study of the causes and of the types of infirmity that afflict human health in order to demonstrate that the way the philosopher conceives illnesses is a key to get a deeper knowledge of the anthropology and ethics of the last Plato. Premise of the research is the holistic vision that characterizes the Timaeus, in which the human condition affects the socio political level and the cosmic level which, in their turn, affect and are affected by the human presence. To finalize the study, we analyzed the pages 69c-90c of the Timaeus. A partire dall’analisi di alcuni passi del Timeo, il testo propone lo studio delle cause e dei tipi di infermità che affliggono la salute umana al fine di mostrare che la maniera in cui il filosofo concepisce le malattie è una chiave per approfondire l’antropologia e l’etica dell’ultimo Platone. Presupposto della ricerca è la visione olistica che caratterizza il Timeo, in cui la condizione umana influenza il livello socio-politico e il livello cosmico, i quali, a loro volta, condizionano e sono condizionati dalla presenza dell’uomo. Per finalizzare lo studio abbiamo circoscritto l’analisi ai passi 69c-90c del Timeo. (shrink)

The aim of this text is to investigate if it is possible to attribute to Plato a dualistic conception of human nature, that is, whether the philosopher can be inscribed in the line of thinkers who establish the so-called “Mind-Body Problem”. In various passages of Platonic Dialogues we can see that the body and the soul constitute two different and quite incompatible natures. On the other hand, the relationship between body and soul is constitutive of human being and is unquestionable (...) in the act of perception. Our study develops in three moments. At a first time we explain the reasons why it is justified to claim that there is in Plato’s Dialogues a difference between soul and body; afterwards, we analyze the relationship between soul and body just as an essential attribute of human nature; we bring about the investigation with the analysis of the “Plato’s pineal gland”, specifically, the element that allow us to consider the liaison between soul and body as a “dual relationship”, that is, not as an undifferentiated unit, nor as a juxtaposition of elements unrelated to each other. Our proposal consists in showing that the mathematical structure, proportional, harmonic and musical crosses all reality: the cosmic body and soul, as well as the human body and soul. (shrink)

Aristóteles foi o primeiro filósofo que articulou uma taxonomia da ciência: os quatro livros que compõem os Analíticos oferecem uma teoria do conhecimento científico e os critérios que uma disciplina deve respeitar para receber a designação de ciência. Aristóteles, porém, foi também o fundador da ciência zoológica e o pai da anatomia comparada. Trata-se de uma questão já clássica, saber se o modo pelo qual Aristóteles desenvolve sua ciência dos animais na Historia Animalium e no De Partibus Animalium conforma-se aos (...) critérios científicos estabelecidos nos Analíticos Posteriores. Na primeira parte deste artigo, evidenciamos a relação entre as normas estipuladas nos Analíticos para a investigação científica e as pesquisas relatadas nos tratados naturais. Na segunda parte, examinamos a explicação fornecida pelo Estagirita acerca da função do cérebro, a qual leva o filósofo a incorrer num erro considerado escandaloso pelos pensadores que lhe sucederam. (shrink)

Tradizionalmente esiste uno spartiaque fra la dottrina dell’azione attribuita a Socrate e quella attribuita a Platone ed esso è stato stabilito per la prima volta da Aristotele, a detta del quale Socrate ha difeso una dottrina intellettualista dell’agire umano, mentre Platone a partire dalla Repubblica distingue la parte razionale dell’anima da quella irrazionale, alla quale appartengono forze passionali che influenzano l’azione. Attraverso una rivisitazione della dottrina etica nel Protagora, difenderemo l’idea che l’intellettualismo pervade interamente la teoria dell’azione di Platone; ma (...) che, all’interno di esso, ragione e desiderio concorrono ad una azione congiunta. (shrink)

In the three books of the De Anima Aristotle ranges over a diverse array of philosophical and scientific topics, such as the nature of life, self-movement, the senses, perception, imagination, thought, and the relation between mind and body. As a result, this work may seem to be a strange collection of only marginally related philosophical and biological topics given our modern sensibilities. Nonetheless it is united by Aristotle's basic concern for the nature and functioning of life in all its diverse (...) forms. This inquiry offers modern readers significant insight into contemporary debates in the philosophy of mind. (shrink)

L’obiettivo del testo è di indagare se sia possibile attribuire a Platone una concezione dualista della natura umana, quindi se il filosofo possa essere inscritto nella linea dei pensatori che si sono posti il cosiddetto “Mind-Body Problem”. In molteplici passi dei dialoghi platonici si rinviene l’affermazione che il corpo e l’anima costituiscono due nature differenti e, in certa misura, incompatibili. D’altro canto, la relazione fra corpo e anima è costitutiva dell’uomo e si rende manifesta nell’atto della percezione. La presente riflessione (...) si svilupperà in tre momenti. Dapprima esporremo le ragioni per cui è giustificato affermare che esiste in Platone una differenza fra anima e corpo; quindi analizzeremo l’unione di anima e corpo come attributo essenziale della natura umana; termineremo l’indagine attraverso la ricerca della “ghiandola pineale platonica”, ossia l’elemento che permette di parlare di anima e corpo come di una relazione duale che si costituisce non come una unità indifferenziata, né come una giustapposizione di fattori estranei l’uno all’altro. La nostra proposta consiste nel mostrare che lo scambio di informazioni fra anima e corpo avviene attraverso una modifica nelle proporzioni matematico armoniche che articolano entrambe le potenze. (shrink)

The name tells the thing if it's a name. If it doesn’t tell the thing, it isn’t a name. This is the puzzling and enigmatic theory proposed by Cratilo in the homonymous Plato’s dialogue. The thesis in Hermogenes already sounds hermetic, an "oracle" which requires the presence of an interpreter to clarify what remains hidden in the terms of the sentence. According to the disciple of Heraclitus, the names are by nature guaranteed to impart pure truths, that is, they are (...) all right, at least as many as are real names. An imperfectly fitting name isn’t an inappropriate name. It would not be a name at all. In this text we would like to examine the Platonic Cratylus with respect to the meaning that lies behind the words of Cratylus and clarify his position in face of Socrates's refutation. We will therefore concentrate our attention on the last section of the dialogue devoted to the exchange between Cratylus and Socrates, especially pages 427e-440e. (shrink)

Aristóteles foi o primeiro pensador que articulou uma taxonomia do conheci-mento científico: os quatros livros dos Segundos Analíticos descrevem os critérios que uma disciplina qualquer deve respeitar e satisfazer para legitimamente receber a designação de ciência teorética. Mas Aristóteles é mesmo o criador das “ciências particulares”, ou seja, a biologia, a psicologia, a zoologia e, em geral, as ciências naturais. Trata-se de uma questão já clássica saber se o modo pelo qual Aristóteles desenvolve sua ciência dos animais con-forma-se aos padrões (...) normativos estipulados pela teoria da ciência nos Analíticos. Na men-talidade de muitos intérpretes ficou a convicção de que as obras biológicas de Aristóteles conformam-se a um padrão que utiliza apenas dados empíricos, ao passo que o conheci-mento nos Analíticos é estabelecido a partir de premissas primeiras e imediatas. Agora, nos Segundos Analíticos, encontramos exemplos provenientes da meteorologia, da botânica, da zoologia ao lado de exemplos matemáticos. Fica a pergunta: a metodologia axiomática de estilo matemático que o Estagirita propõe nos Analíticos é totalmente independente e ina-dequada para o estudo da biologia? Se for assim, Aristóteles não teria conseguido encaixar as ciências naturais nos padrões normativos expostos nos Segundos Analíticos. No presente estudo, pretendemos, pelo contrário, ressaltar o fato de que é razoável tomar os textos aristotélicos como orbitando em torno de uma mesma e grande pesquisa, a pesquisa cientí-fica, que inclui os Analíticos, assim como os tratados naturais.Aristotle was the first Greek thinker to articulate a taxonomy of scientific pursuits: the four books of the Analytics present a theory of scientific knowledge with a rigorous ac-count of what a body of propositions must be like in order to count as a theoretical science. But Aristotle was also the originator of “special sciences”. A longstanding problem about Aristotle’s philosophy of science is to understand if there is a conflict between the account of scientific explanation in the Posterior Analytics and the investigations reported in treatises such as the History of Animals, Parts of Animals, Generation of Animals 1. The Analytics restricts knowledge to what has been demonstrated from self-evident first principles. The sciences of nature seem to secure their results without such demonstrations: there are not axioms, nor theorems or proofs, nor definitions. Yet many of the examples in the Posterior Analytics are drawn from meteorology, botany and zoology, and are discussed side by side with mathe-matical examples. It is curious that a philosopher as systematic as Aristotle could formulate the first rigorous theory of scientific inquiry and demonstration, pepper the treatise in which he does so with biological examples, and not aim to structure his science of animals in ac-cordance with that theory. In this investigation I want to show that there is a relation betwe-en Aristotle’s official account of the definition in Posterior Analytics and the nature and the role assigned to definition in the Natural Treatises. (shrink)

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Individual objects have potentials: paper has the potential to burn, an acorn has the potential to turn into a tree, some people have the potential to run a mile in less than four minutes. Barbara Vetter provides a systematic investigation into the metaphysics of such potentials, and an account of metaphysical modality based on them. -/- In contemporary philosophy, potentials have been recognized mostly in the form of so-called dispositions: solubility, fragility, and so on. Vetter takes dispositions as her (...) starting point, but argues for and develops a more comprehensive conception of potentiality. She shows how, with this more comprehensive conception, an account of metaphysical modality can be given that meets three crucial requirements: Extensional correctness: providing the right truth-values for statements of possibility and necessity; formal adequacy: providing the right logic for metaphysical modality; and semantic utility: providing a semantics that links ordinary modal language to the metaphysics of modality. -/- The resulting view of modality is a version of dispositionalism about modality: it takes modality to be a matter of the dispositions of individual objects. This approach has a long philosophical tradition going back to Aristotle, but has been largely neglected in contemporary philosophy. In recent years, it has become a live option again due to the rise of anti-Humean, powers-based metaphysics. The aim of Potentiality is to develop the dispositionalist view in a way that takes account of contemporary developments in metaphysics, logic, and semantics. (shrink)

The natural rights with which we have been dealing are, however, inseparably connected, in the very person who is their subject, with just as many respectiveduties; and rights as well as duties find their source, their sustenance and their inviolability in the natural law which grants or enjoins them.Since men are social by nature they are meant to live with others and to work for one another’s welfare. A well-ordered human society requires that men recognize and observe their mutual rights (...) and duties. It also demands that each contribute generously to the establishment of a civic order in which rights and duties are more sincerely and effectively acknowledged and fulfilled. (shrink)

Dispositions are modal properties. The standard conception of dispositions holds that each disposition is individuated by its stimulus condition(s) and its manifestation(s), and that their modality is best captured by some conditional construction that relates stimulus to manifestation as antecedent to consequent. I propose an alternative conception of dispositions: each disposition is individuated by its manifestation alone, and its modality is closest to that of possibility — a fragile vase, for instance, is one that can break easily. The view is (...) expounded in some detail and defended against the major objections. (shrink)

Abilities are in many ways central to what being an agent means, and they are appealed to in philosophical accounts of a great many different phenomena. It is often assumed that abilities are some kind of dispositional property, but it is rarely made explicit exactly which dispositional properties are our abilities. Two recent debates provide two different answers to that question: the new dispositionalism in the debate about free will, and virtue reliabilism in epistemology. This paper argues that both answers (...) fail as general accounts of abilities, and discusses the ramifications of this result. (shrink)

This book presents the most important problems of reference and considers their solution. It presupposes no technical knowledge, presents analyses from first principles, illustrates every stage with examples, and is written with verve and clarity. This is the ideal introduction to reference for students of linguistics and philosophy of language.

It is a familiar point that many ordinary dispositions are multi-track, that is, not fully and adequately characterisable by a single conditional. In this paper, I argue that both the extent and the implications of this point have been severely underestimated. First, I provide new arguments to show that every disposition whose stimulus condition is a determinable quantity must be infinitely multi-track. Secondly, I argue that this result should incline us to move away from the standard assumption that dispositions are (...) in some way importantly linked to conditionals, as presupposed by the debate about various versions of the ‘conditional analysis’ of dispositions. I introduce an alternative conception of dispositionality, which is motivated by linguistic observations about dispositional adjectives and links dispositions to possibility instead of conditionals. I argue that, because of the multi-track nature of dispositions, the possibility-based conception of dispositions is to be preferred. (shrink)

Combining knowledge of social policy and practice with insights from poststructural and feminist theory, the text demonstrates how democratic citizens and the political are continually recreated.

Williamsonian modal epistemology is characterized by two commitments: realism about modality, and anti-exceptionalism about our modal knowledge. Williamson’s own counterfactual-based modal epistemology is the best known implementation of WME, but not the only option that is available. I sketch and defend an alternative implementation which takes our knowledge of metaphysical modality to arise, not from knowledge of counterfactuals, but from our knowledge of ordinary possibility statements of the form ‘x can F’. I defend this view against a criticism indicated in (...) Williamson’s own work, and argue that it is better connected to the semantics of modal language. (shrink)