Das "Hegel-Jahrbuch" ist das Jahrbuch der Internationalen Hegel-Gesellschaft. die 1953 von Wilhelm Raimund Beyer in Nürnberg gegründet wurde. Es erscheint seit 1961und wurde bis 1984 von W. R. Beyer, seither vom jeweils amtierenden Vorstand der Gesellschaft herausgegeben. Seit 1994 erscheint das Jahrbuch im Akademie Verlag. Es dokumentiert die Beiträge der Internationalen Hegel-Kongresse, die alle zwei Jahre zu wechselnden Schwerpunktthemen stattfinden.

The Deutsche Hegel-Gesellschaft, which preceded the Internationale Hegel-Gesellschaft, was founded at Nürnberg in 1953. The decision to work on an international scale and to express this also in the name of the society was made at the second congress in Frankfurt am Main in 1958. Wilhelm Raimund Beyer was the founder and chairman of the Hegel-Gesellschaft from the very beginning until 1982, when he was elected chairman of honor. The general line of the Internationale Hegel-Gesellschaft has all (...) the time been to be open to all serious scientific work upon Hegel. The discussions of the meetings have not only always been broad and open but also controversial and to the point. Hegel has been studied historically and as a philosopher who is relevant to actual problems. That his relevancy is mediated with regard to essential points by Karl Marx has been a common opinion from the beginning. (shrink)

I show that centered propositions—also called de se propositions, and usually modeled as sets of centered worlds—pose a serious problem for various versions of Lewis's Principal Principle. The problem, put roughly, is that in scenarios like Elga's `Sleeping Beauty' case, those principles imply that rational agents ought to have obviously irrational credences. To solve the problem, I propose a centered version of the Principal Principle. My version allows centered propositions to be objectively chancy.

In this paper, I give an argument for the view that non-fact entities – such as physical objects, abstract objects, events and so on – can ground other entities. Roughly put, the argument is as follows: those who accept this view can provide a more plausible account of the grounds of identity facts than those who deny this view.