Critiques of liberalism are a dime a dozen. With every generation they come in and out of fashion like changing lipstick colors. This does not mean, however, that all is well in a context of perennial cyclic crisis alternating liberalism and conservatism. As Siegel shows in his account of liberalism's recent authoritarian involution, the latest developments mark a sharp departure from some of the better American political traditions. Specifically, the disintegration of pragmatism as a result of the Vietnam fiasco and (...) racial strife in the 1960s contributed to the concretization of what were at least latent anti-democratic tendencies into a procedural elitism oblivious to substantive realities and the human dimension. (shrink)

Histories of literary criticism are rare, and it may be useful to consider why. The initial confrontations between the early modernism of the nascent avant-garde at the turn-of-the-century and the conservatism of the critical establishment which attempted to stifle precisely those aesthetic innovations that subsequently came to be recognized as the classics of the age left a deep impression on literary life. Given this paradigmatic experience, criticism appears as the fundamental antagonist of authentic literature with which a popular taste, infused (...) with an epigonic romanticism which has lost its radical thrust, is always eager to identify. A denigration of literary criticism ensues which, in its kinder moments, views the critic as merely irrelevant but more often denounces him as an evil creature, ontologically inferior to the truly productive creative genius. (shrink)

Probably no doctrine has excited as much horror and abuse as atheism. This first history of British atheism, first published in 1987, tries to explain this reaction while exhibiting the development of atheism from Hobbes to Russell. Although avowed atheism appeared surprisingly late – 1782 in Britain – there were covert atheists in the middle seventeenth century. By tracing its development from so early a date, Dr Berman gives an account of an important and fascinating strand of intellectual history.

The concept of “representation” is used broadly and uncontroversially throughout neuroscience, in contrast to its highly controversial status within the philosophy of mind and cognitive science. In this paper I first discuss the way that the term is used within neuroscience, in particular describing the strategies by which representations are characterized empirically. I then relate the concept of representation within neuroscience to one that has developed within the field of machine learning. I argue that the recent success of artificial neural (...) networks on certain tasks such as visual object recognition reflects the degree to which those systems exhibit inherent inductive biases that reflect the structure of the physical world. I further argue that any system that is going to behave intelligently in the world must contain representations that reflect the structure of the world; otherwise, the system must perform unconstrained function approximation which is destined to fail due to the curse of dimensionality, in which the number of possible states of the world grows exponentially with the number of dimensions in the space of possible inputs. An analysis of these concepts in light of philosophical debates regarding the ontological status of representations suggests that the representations identified within both biological and artificial neural networks qualify as legitimate representations in the philosophical sense. (shrink)

The study considers the topic of linguistic register by examining how schoolchildren, adolescents, and adults vary the texts that they construct across the dimensions of modality and genre . Although register variation is presumably universal, it is realized in language-specific ways, and so our analysis focuses on Israeli Hebrew, a language that evolved under peculiar socio-historical circumstances. An original procedure for characterizing register — as low, neutral, or high — was applied to four text types produced by the same speaker-writers. (...) We found that across all age groups, “neutral“ items constituted the bulk of the material, and that the lexicon accounted for some 80% of variation. Developmentally, we found that acquisition of fully flexible register variation continues beyond adolescence. Finally, we observed that text types range on a cline from everyday colloquial usage in oral narratives to more formal, high-level language in written expository essays. These results are discussed in light of their implications for the nature of register variation, later language development, and the sociolinguistics of contemporary Hebrew. (shrink)

In a popular book and a widely anthologized article, Richard Taylor argues for a materialistic account of human nature based on considerations of common sense. While I do not argue against materialism, per se, I offer an extended critique of Taylor’s position that common sense unambiguously supports his version of materialism. I also argue that his account of the nature of psychological processes is of dubious philosophical value.

In a popular book and a widely anthologized article, Richard Taylor argues for a materialistic account of human nature based on considerations of common sense. While I do not argue against materialism, per se, I offer an extended critique of Taylor’s position that common sense unambiguously supports his version of materialism. I also argue that his account of the nature of psychological processes is of dubious philosophical value.

Berkeley’s passionate devotion to common sense and, hence, opposition to that most odious of doctrines, skepticism regarding the immediate data of experience, requires his acceptance of certain fundamental and common-sensical beliefs in both epistemology and metaphysics which, I shall argue, are together inconsistent. Epistemologically, he is often required to identify and reduce the physical world to the perceptual world. Metaphysically, he must often identify the perceptual world with what we ordinarily think of as the physical world—the everyday world of common (...) sense; this time the reduction works the other way. Since Berkeley is uniformly committed to common sense, both commitments are present in all of Berkeley’s writings, though both are not usually simultaneously dominant. For Berkeleian scholars convinced Berkeley is consistent, the results are predictable. Those who emphasize certain epistemological arguments tend to treat Berkeley as a relativist. Those who emphasize certain metaphysical arguments treat him as a believer in a public world that has a career of its own. Since any attempt consistently to articulate a common-sense view of things is going to run into difficulties, so also is Berkeley’s; his particular attempt runs into serious inconsistencies. (shrink)

This lavishly illustrated book highlights the conservation importance of congregatory animals species--those which gather in vast groups. It also focuses on the irreplaceability of the congregation sites which are able to support such large gatherings of animals, fish, or birds.

"Well-publicized research in psychology tells us that over half of our attempts to change habitual behavior fail within one year. Even without reading the research, most of us will intuitively sense the truth in this, as we have all tried and failed to rid ourselves of one bad habit or another. The human story of habits and the difficulty of change has been told in many books - most of which will make only a quick reference to dopamine or the (...) "lizard brain" before moving on to practical tips and tricks for behavior change. In contrast, Stuck: The Neuroscience of Why Changing Our Behavior is So Hard will tell the brain's story about why behavior is so hard to change. Russell Poldrack offers an in-depth, yet entirely accessible, guide to the neuroscientific research on habits and habit change. Part I introduces the "anatomy of a habit," starting with the argument that the resilience of our habits stems largely from a mismatch between the environment in which our brains evolved and the one in which we now live, and continuing on to introduce current work on fear and anxiety, motivation, and cognitive control that bears on habit formation. Part II focuses on what neuroscience can tell us about breaking habits, introducing evidence-based strategies that give us the best possible chance to break cycles of bad behavior. Throughout the book, Poldrack offers a clear-eyed view of what neuroscience can tell us about habit change, and what it cannot - and importantly, how we know what we know"--. (shrink)

Cognitive neuroscience aims to map mental processes onto brain function, which begs the question of what “mental processes” exist and how they relate to the tasks that are used to manipulate and measure them. This topic has been addressed informally in prior work, but we propose that cumulative progress in cognitive neuroscience requires a more systematic approach to representing the mental entities that are being mapped to brain function and the tasks used to manipulate and measure mental processes. We describe (...) a new open collaborative project that aims to provide a knowledge base for cognitive neuroscience, called the Cognitive Atlas, and outline how this project has the potential to drive novel discoveries about both mind and brain. (shrink)