This study examined whether worktime control buffered the impact of worktime demands on work-family interference (WFI), using data from 2,377 workers from various sectors of industry in The Netherlands. We distinguished among three types of worktime demands: time spent on work according to one's contract (contractual hours), the number of hours spent on overtime work (overtime hours), and the number of hours spent on commuting (commuting hours). Regarding worktime control, a distinction was made between having control over days off and (...) vacations (leave control) and having control over starting and finishing times (flextime). These three worktime demands were expected to have separate as well as joint effects on WFI, whereas worktime control should buffer these adverse effects of worktime demands on WFI. Stepwise regression analyses showed that working high numbers of contractual and overtime hours was indeed associated with high WFI. Further, worktime control indeed made a difference in terms of WFI: whereas leave control contributed directly to lower WFI, flextime buffered the adverse effects of long contractual workhours. Our results suggest that very long working days should be prevented, and that worktime control may be a powerful tool to help workers maintaining a good work-family balance. (shrink)

Stewart's purpose is to show that Hume is not a political conservative, but is better understood as a liberal. The author is reacting against several recent works on Hume: David Miller's Philosophy and Ideology in Hume's Political Thought, Donald W. Livingston's Hume's Philosophy of Common Life, and Frederick G. Whelan's Order and Artifice in Hume's Political Philosophy. These "all share, with variations, the nineteenth-century view that Hume's epistemology led him to conservatism". Stewart acknowledges that the term "conservative" is used in (...) different ways by these authors, but not so differently that they cannot be collectively refuted by showing Hume to be a liberal, that is, one "who thought that major reforms were highly desirable in the United Kingdom in the late-eighteenth and early-nineteenth centuries". Stewart is referring here to substantial "economic and political reforms," but not to "socialist, Marxist, or neoliberal reforms.". (shrink)

My discussion of this theme falls into two parts. In the first part, starting from the assumption that we do in fact tend to respond favourably to the idea, vague though it may be, that “persons are to be respected, simply as persons”, I endeavour to clear my mind a little about our warrant for speaking in this way; and to do this is at the same time to clarify in some measure our understanding of what such language means. But (...) of course, since it is the language of practical principle, or precept, there can be no full understanding of its meaning without a grasp of its “working value”, of its significance as a clue to the proper directing and assessing of conduct. The second, and briefer, part of the discussion, accordingly, which is reserved for a subsequent article, is devoted to the question of the practical import of the principle of respect, the sort of guidance that it may provide in the actual business of life. (shrink)

In Part I of this discussion I considered the nature and validity of the principle of respect for persons as distinguished from its practical import and application. Before I proceed to that second topic let me draw together in summary fashion the main points of the view I have put forward.

It may be as well to begin from the locus classicus , Engels to Mehring, July 14th, 1893: “Ideology is a process accomplished by the so-called thinker consciously, it is true, but with a false consciousness. The real motive forces impelling him remain unknown to him; otherwise it simply would not be an ideological process”.

Bits and snatches of the poetry, drama, philosophy, history and oratory of Greek literature are gathered with minimal biographical and introductory notes. Only one translation is acknowledged, that of Aristophanes' The Birds. The selection, though varied, shows no underlying plan.—W. G. E.

This is the third volume of the four volume history of philosophy being prepared under Gilson's editorship. There is no explicit mention of the division of labor between Gilson and Langan in the authorship of the present volume. The book is characterized throughout by the usual Gilsonian clarity and urbanity of style and, perhaps less fortunately, by the distinctively psychological-sociological approach he tends to take to non-medieval periods in the history of philosophy. Attention is directed to the evolutionary continuity of (...) major philosophic themes. Accordingly, the minor stepping-stone figures ordinarily omitted in general histories of philosophy are given full treatment--Montaigne, the Cambridge Platonists, Condillac, the Encyclopedists, Vico, Montesquieu, Condorcet, Lessing and Herder. This approach permits a more integrated picture of an historical period, but it also forces the authors to compress their treatment of the major philosophers, sacrificing the painstaking detail and relying on the insightful and suggestive thematic interpretation. The notes provide a real treasury of information, almost worth the price of the book.--W. G. E. (shrink)

Philosophers traditionally have tried to establish general principles on solid grounding that would validly state and clarify what actually happens and what should happen in a polis. Infrequently, they sullied their hands with attempts to apply their general principles to specific, complex, time-bound, exigent, controversial situations. Now, however, numbers of professional philosophers have turned to the difficult task of applying broad generalizations to thorny issues of the day. Eleven attempts to carry out that task—essays on reform, principled law-breaking, violence, revolution, (...) and the responsibilities of philosophers vis-à-vis public affairs—are included in the present volume. Noam Chomsky, in an essay on philosophers and public policy, wistfully describes as having "a great deal of force," and then rejects, the argument that the only duty of a philosopher qua philosopher, in a time of turmoil, is to do his work with integrity. Of the essays on civil disobedience, one by Gordon J. Schochet critically examines, and in the end comes close to defending once more, the often-defended assumption that the practitioner of civil disobedience should accept the standard penalty. These eleven essays are partisan and practical in that, instead of examining the presuppositions or meaning or bearing of political judgments or ideologies, they present and vigorously support specific judgments, mostly unorthodox judgments, about political issues. This is a distinctly useful and needed book; but more clarification should be forthcoming on the extent to which philosophers as philosophers should take stands on political controversies.—W. G. (shrink)

"The intent of this book," according to the author, "is to document the existence in man of two major modes of consciousness: one is analytic, the other holistic." They are sometimes called, he observes, "the ‘rational’ and ‘intuitive’ sides of man." In this connection, he adduces Roger Bacon’s apposite dictum: "There are two modes of knowing, those of argument and experience." A notable recent finding on the brain correlates of reason and intuition is summarized in the present book as follows: (...) "The left hemisphere of the cortex, which subtends language and mathematics, seems to process information in a linear, sequential manner... The right side of the cortex processes its input more as a ‘patterned whole'." That is, science, for example, uses the left side of the brain, while nonrational meditation exercises, procedures for expansion and concentration of consciousness, and the mystic experience, for example, involve the right side. The author sympathetically describes and analyzes a large variety of meditation methods as illustrating the intuitive path to knowledge, reports pertinent findings on biofeedback phenomena and other scientific grapplings with awareness disciplines and nonattachment systems, and concludes with a plea to scientific psychologists to train themselves rigorously in esoteric techniques. He also suggests, à propos of the "unitive" character of the mystic experience: "A shift toward a consciousness of the interconnectedness of life... might enable us to take those ’selfless’ steps that could begin to solve our collective problems." For philosophers who are open-minded on other ways of studying or making contact with reality than controlled observation, analysis, induction, theory-making, verification, and revision, this book should prove useful, both because it provides a rich collection of data and because it suggests directions for achieving a synoptic view.—W. G. (shrink)

This paper outlines the qualitative foundations of a “quasiclassical” theory in which particles are pictured as spatially extended periodic excitations of a universal background field, interacting with each other via nonlinearity in the equations of motion for that field, and undergoing collapse to a much smaller volume if and when they are detected. The theory is based as far as possible directly on experiment, rather than on the existing quantum mechanical formalism, and it offers simple physical interpretations of such concepts (...) as mass, 4-momentum, interaction, potentials, and quantization; it may lead directly to the standard equations of quantum theory, such as the multiparticle Schrödinger equation, without going through the conventional process of “quantizing” a classical theory. The theory also provides an alternative framework in which to discuss wave-particle duality and the quantum “measurement problem”; in particular, it is suggested that the unpredictability of quantum phenomena may arise from “deterministic chaos” in the behavior of the background field. (shrink)

The author has recently proposed a “quasi-classical” theory of particles and interactions in which particles are pictured as extended periodic disturbances in a universal field χ(x, t), interacting with each other via nonlinearity in the equation of motion for χ. The present paper explores the relationship of this theory to nonrelativistic quantum mechanics; as a first step, it is shown how it is possible to construct from χ a configuration-space wave function Ψ(x 1,x 2,t), and that the theory requires that (...) Ψ satisfy the two-particle Schrödinger equation in the case where the two particles are well separated from each other. This suggests that the multiparticle Schrödinger equation can be obtained as a direct consequence of the quasi-classical theory without any use of the usual formalism (Hilbert space, quantization rules, etc.) of conventional quantum theory and in particular without using the classical canonical treatment of a system as a “crutch” theory which has subsequently to be “quantized.” The quasi-classical theory also suggests the existence of a preferred “absolute” gauge for the electromagnetic potentials. (shrink)

Since its publication in 1965, Brian Barry's seminal work has occupied an important role in the revival of Anglo-American political philosophy. A number of ideas and terms in it have become part of the standard vocabulary, such as the distinction between "ideal-regarding" and "want-regarding" principles and the division of principles into aggregative and distributive. The book provided the first precise analysis of the concept of political values having trade-off relations and its analysis of the notion of the public interest has (...) also been significant. (shrink)

The two basic forms of action distinguished in the preceding articles, viz., moral action, where praxis is for praxis sake, and action for a good, where praxis is for the sake of theôria, are found in close relationship to one another in human life. The part they play is rather that of abstract moments in a practical process than that of self-contained and isolable bits of conduct. No philosopher is likely to discount the importance of thus analysing the concrete into (...) its factors before he rectifies the abstraction by showing how they co-operate in actual experience. In any individual biography we can find acts and courses of action in which duty is the dominant motive, and others in which the dominant motive is desire of good. Similarly, when we compare different biographies with one another, some exemplify most strikingly the struggle for righteousness against unruly passion, others the spontaneous aspiration of the soul to attain the goal of its desire. But neither the moral law nor the summum bonum wields an exclusive sovereignty. St. Paul and Luther, in their warfare against carnal desire, drew strength from the ideal vision; nor were St. Bernard or Spinoza, for all their absorption upon union with the divine, strangers to the call of moral obligation. In the lives of ordinary men, the types of conduct are, perhaps, more evenly balanced; yet here also the distinction is discernible. Moreover, it is easy to see how, despite their intrinsic difference, they come to be associated and “by just exchange” to effect a mutual enrichment. (shrink)