In the still highly politicized question of rupture or continuity between the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union, elements of continuity are not hard to find, nor should this be a surprise, since a new state arose in the same geographical space and made use of the economic, intellectual, and demographic resources inherited from the Russian Empire. At the same time, the Soviet Union could not have been more different than the Russian Empire. It (...) rejected a number of key elements of the sociopolitical project that underlay the nationalizing tsarist empire and introduced radically new political and social principles for organizing that space. In particular, the Bolsheviks purposefully engaged in dismantling the tsarist efforts to build a great ethnic-Russian nation to stand at the center of the Russian Empire’s nationalities policy. The irreversible disintegration of post-Soviet space into separate nationalizing states became possible only toward the end of the twentieth century. At the same time, the imperial nature of the modern post-Soviet Russian core permits us to say that the imperial logic has survived. This is where we can find an element of inescapable continuity. We present studies of “continuities” and “ruptures” in modern academic discourse and in an updated format, gravitating toward “empirically nuanced” tools for analyzing multiple historical temporalities. (shrink)

The purpose of the article is to identify and investigate the first attempts to institutionalize non-state communities of engineers and technicians in the Russian Empire, and to determine whether the Russian Technical Society was the first center to unify the engineering community. The period covered in this study (1850s–1860s) refers to the initial period of the emergence of scientific and technical societies in the Russian Empire, which are considered as a new type of a structural (...) organization of science and technology. The article reveals that the first attempts to institutionalize non-state engineering and technical communities were successful in Livland and Kherson provinces. It has been confirmed that the preferred hypothesis in the matter of the Russian Technical Society does not correspond to historical reality. Two scientific and technical societies of Livland and Kherson provinces were analyzed in the article: the Society of Technicians in Riga and Odessa Society of Engineers and Architects. It was found that the mentioned societies, established in Riga and Odessa, can be considered almost the first scientific and technical societies in the Russian Empire, created even before the Russian Technical Society commenced its activities. For the first time, a detailed study of the process of their organization and activity was carried out. The article also highlights the legislative principles of the activities of the mentioned societies. A comparative analysis of their statutes was carried out, identifying the common and distinctive features. The study proved the polytechnic nature of their activity and determined its priorities. Despite the fact that the Russian Technical Society turned out to be the most powerful scientific and technical society of the Russian Empire, attention is focused on the fact that the Society of Technicians in Riga continued its activities as an independent scientific and technical association. The article highlights the inaccuracies and some false statements about the studied societies. The attempt of marine engineers in the city of Mykolaiv to establish an independent public scientific and technical society in 1864 is also discussed. (shrink)

This article is based on archival sources and examines the role of Hryhorii Poletyka in the creation of the Naval Corps in St. Petersburg, the highest marine educational institution in Russia. The authors consider his role in the development of the teaching system of the Naval Cadet Corps and the way in which he introduced methods of the Kyiv-Mohyla Academy, including the study of languages, the establishment of a library, an own publishing house and the like. This study shows the (...) importance of Ukrainian educational culture and its impact on the development of the Russian Empire. (shrink)

A prevailing belief among Russia’s cultural elite in the early twentieth century was that the music of composers such as Sergei Rachmaninoff, Aleksandr Scriabin, and Nikolai Medtner could forge a shared identity for the Russian people across social and economic divides. In this illuminating study of competing artistic and ideological visions at the close of Russia’s “Silver Age,” author Rebecca Mitchell interweaves cultural history, music, and philosophy to explore how “Nietzsche’s orphans” strove to find in music a means to (...) overcome the disunity of modern life in the final tumultuous years before World War I and the Communist Revolution. (shrink)

Historiography of the development of probability and statistics in the Russian Empire focusses on the contributions of the central figure Pafnutiy Lvovich Chebyshev and his successors. The purpose of this article is to concentrate on an earlier period which culminates with Chebyshev, and specifically on two less-than-well-explored aspects.

In this paper, private gardens are portrayed as spaces and implements of aristocratic passion for plant collecting, of competition within the gentry, as well as of scientific professionalisation for botanists. This paper traces the early history of botanical collections in the Russian Empire from the 18th to the early 19th century as part of an elite culture which encouraged amateur patrons to invest in expeditions, gardens, and, consequently, in professionals to manage such projects. Young graduates of European universities (...) who began their careers working at private botanical institutions could later successfully apply for academic positions. The circulation of specimens had developed as a key element of botanical collection and an important basis for the networking of professionals and amateurs around the world. This paper argues that collecting plant specimens became an important means for engaging in “power games” and even “plant diplomacy.” These new responsibilities significantly increased botanists' status as experts. A diverse group of personalities, such as the Empress Catherine II, King George III of England, the industrialist Prokophy Demidov, aristocrat Alexei Razumovsky, Joseph Banks, President of the Royal Society, the academician Peter Simon Pallas—all shared a passion for botanical collecting and were engaged in power games at different levels, using botany as an instrument of influence. (shrink)

ABSTRACT This article surveys recent work on oracular prophecies and their role in Greek perceptions of Russia in the early modern period. Drawing on this survey, the article provides a critical assessment of the historiographical paradigm of the ‘Russian Expectation’ offered by Paschalis Kitromilides for the analysis of Greek-Russian relations. Finally, the article proposes that scholars should focus on the concept of protection as an aspect of political language, this providing an explanation for particular Greek and also (...) class='Hi'>Russian interpretations of the Treaty of Kuçuk-Kaynardja of 1774. (shrink)

Devetnaesti vek za Rusku i Tursku carevinu predstavlja period donosenja reformskih zakona sa ciljem da se drzave modernizuju i, koliko mogu, odgovore duhu vremena. Premda su u Rusiji reforme kocene rezimom arakcejevstine i reakcionarnom politikom Nikolaja I, drzava je nacinila ozbiljan korak u borbi protiv sistemske korupcije donosenjem Krivicnog zakonika 1845. godine. Sa druge strane, Turska je bila pod nesumnjivo vecim stranim pritiskom kada je proces modernizacije bio u pitanju. Period tanzimata oznacava krupno razdoblje u kome se Turska, izmedju ostalog, (...) suocila sa sveprisutnom korupcijom. Krunu turskog reformatorskog rada na ovom polju predstavlja donosenje Krivicnog zakonika 1856. godine. U radu se analiziraju konkretni zakoni kojima je korupcija sankcionisana u ove dve carevine. (shrink)

The European Legacy, Volume 17, Issue 5, Page 714-715, August 2012.

In this article I have dealt with empirical proofs for the Russian religious renaissance which came after the fall of the Soviet socialistic empire and carried on all through the nineties as a pro-religious consensus and a religious belief. Likewise, I have dealt with proofs suggesting certain limitations of the renaissance in question which manifested mainly in irregular fulfillment of religious duties. U ovom clanku autor se bavi empirijskim dokazima za rusku religioznu renesansu koja je nastupila nakon urusavanja (...) sovjetske socijalisticke imperije i kao proreligiozni konsenzus i religijsko verovanje odrzala se tokom 90-ih godina proslog veka. Takodje, autor se bavi i dokazima koji upucuju na izvesna ogranicenja pomenute renesanse, ponajvise izrazena kroz problematicnu redovnost ispunjavanja verskih duznosti. (shrink)

L’article étudie comment les idées de la France des Lumières et de la France révolutionnaire ont contribué au changement de la langue sociopolitique russe, comment elles ont interféré avec le processus littéraire du romantisme en Russie et ont finalement contribué au changement du paradigme intellectuel en Russie dans la deuxième moitié du XIXe siècle. L’histoire des concepts de citoyen, de société, d’opposition politique est retracée de la deuxième moitié du XVIIIe siècle – à travers des documents officiels (Instructions, par Catherine (...) II), des textes littéraires (A. Radichtchev) – jusqu’au premier tiers du XIXe siècle – à travers les écrits politiques des décembristes. En conclusion, il est soutenu que l’échec du républicanisme des décembristes inspiré par la France des Lumières a orienté, dans la deuxième moitié du XIXe siècle, la pensée russe vers la problématique de la diversité humaine et de la nationalisation de l’Empire. Les principes universels du siècle des Lumières sont remplacés par l’intérêt porté à la diversité humaine de l’Empire russe, ce qui nécessitera, à son tour, l’élaboration d’un langage spécifique et de ses concepts. Cependant, ce tournant serait une conséquence du processus de réception des idées et des concepts de la France des Lumières et aurait été accéléré par la Révolution française. (shrink)

Summary: The article explores deployment of the Darwinian narrative of the “natural history of humanity” in Russian physical anthropology in the late nineteenth to the early twentieth century. It traces two narratives developed by the leading Russian school of physical anthropology: one narrative advanced a universalist vision of collective scholarly enterprise working toward clarifying the missing links in the a priori accepted developmental evolutionary model. The other constructed a new language that undermined the idea of species/subspecies/races/nations/ as stable, (...) externally bounded, and internally homogeneous units and attempted to rationalize imperial hybridity. The article's main focus is on the latter classificatory narrative, its relational methodology, and the protostructuralist units of comparison that it produced. (shrink)

Despite the fact that there is now a general public agreement in Ukraine regarding the need to oppose the “russian world”, there are quite diverse and sometimes contradictory proposals among Ukrainian citizens regarding the ways to implement such an opposition. In state policy, the main line of implementing such countermeasures is gradually beginning to emerge, however, it is necessary to logically and organizationally substantiate the main stages of its implementation. The essence of opposition to the “russian world” lies (...) in the consistent implementation of decolonization in Ukraine, since it was russia that for centuries carried out the largest and for a long time quite successful project of colonization of Ukraine. The purpose of the article is to clarify the post-colonial situation for Ukraine, and, accordingly, the tasks of decolonization for it as a key direction of counteraction to the “russian world” in Ukraine. The degree of colonization of Ukraine is analyzed on the basis of a comparative analysis with other known histories of colonization in the world. Thanks to this, the degree of applicability of postcolonial studies and the theory of decolonization to modern Ukraine has been clarified. Ukraine repeats many classic features of a post-colonial country, but has every chance to make a significant new contribution to the theory of decolonization – thanks to its success in confronting the russian empire, which is now the russian federation, in its expansionist militarist foreign policy. Decolonization in Ukraine is carried out in three stages, during each of which the necessary institutional changes are successively implemented, each of which makes it impossible to return to the previous stage. Thus, the mirror opposition to russian colonization, the adoption of the best world experience of decolonization, and finally, the development of a self-sufficient Ukrainian world are three stages of successful decolonization in Ukraine, which can become a model for other former colonies. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Journal of the History of Ideas 62.2 (2001) 335-358 [Access article in PDF] Between East and West: Hegel and the Origins of the Russian Dilemma Ana Siljak Nikolai Berdiaev, the eminent twentieth-century Russian philosopher, wrote that the "problem of East and West" was an "eternal" one for Russia. 1 Attempting to make sense of the violent upheavals that shook Russia in 1917, Berdiaev believed that the source (...) of Russian troubles lay in the "inconsistency of the Russian spirit" due to the "conflict of the Eastern and Western elements in her." 2 Russia, he argued, always contained within its wide territory an invisible and shifting border between two continents, and thus Russian society was forever torn between two cultures. Berdiaev insisted that Russia could not discover its true calling or its place in the world until it resolved its internal conflict between East and West. 3Berdiaev was contemplating the course of the nineteenth century, when Russia's geographical destiny had deeply troubled Russian intellectuals. In the late 1830s Russian thinkers began their minute analyses of cultural and historical sources, hoping to determine the essential character of their nation and believing that their research would enable them to predict Russia's future. Often, diverse questions of progress and stagnation, tradition and innovation, and the individual and society were all framed within this overarching problem of East versus West.It is tempting to see this Russian dilemma as longstanding and natural, given Russia's position between two continents. Indeed, many recent scholars have argued that Russian encounters with Asia, taking place within the framework of Russia's territorial expansion eastward, forced Russians to examine their relationships [End Page 335] with the Eastern, Asian world. 4 It is true that European geographers and historians have debated the location of the border between Asia and Europe since the Middle Ages. But before the nineteenth century this ambiguity hardly troubled Russian minds. The Muscovite state of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, for example, was well acquainted with cultures and lands to its East, engaging in trade and diplomatic relations with Muslim Tatars and others. Yet there is little evidence to suggest that Muscovy was concerned about its position between Eastern and Western countries. 5 Even Peter the Great, whom historians have credited for bringing European customs into Russia, was little concerned with the European/Asian divide in Russian culture. For him the most important geographical question was Russia's place among the northern states, and he was particularly obsessed with Sweden as Russia's primary military rival. 6After Peter's reign, educated Russians, as they became increasingly acquainted with Western European culture, experienced their first pangs of envy and self-doubt in the face of perceived European superiority. Nonetheless, throughout the eighteenth century few cultured Russians had trouble embracing a diverse historical legacy and national character--German, Slavic, Asian. After all, Europeans themselves were proud of their barbarian past. Peter the Great's chief historian, V. N. Tatishchev, wrote with full confidence and little concern that the Russian empire was located "in both Europe and Asia," noting that though more Russian people lived in Europe, Russia had more territory in Asia. In passing he mentioned that "where the border between these two large and most important cultures is located, no one has as yet determined for certain." 7 According to him, the Slavic people as a whole could be divided into Asian and European branches, thus both cultures were of importance in Russian history. 8The first of the great nineteenth-century Russian historians, Nikolai Karamzin, was proud of Russia's diverse heritage. Russia, he wrote, [End Page 336] raising its head between the Asiatic and European kingdoms, represented within its civic life the characteristics of these two parts of the world: a mixture of old Eastern customs, brought by the Slavs into Europe and renewed, so to speak, by our long connection with the Mongols; Byzantine customs borrowed by the Russians along with the Christian religion, and some German customs imparted by the Varangians.... 9This cultural "mixture... (shrink)

Britain in the fin de siècle was home to many significant communities of political émigrés. Among Russian revolutionaries who made London their home were Sergei Stepniak and Feliks Volkhovskii, forced to flee Russia as a result of their revolutionary activities in the 1870s. Britain became a symbol of liberty in their writings as a source of comparison with tsarist rule. These comparisons also supported their justifications of the use of terrorism by Russian revolutionaries when writing for audiences with (...) concerns about the use of terrorism in Britain. The emphasis on Russian otherness in these comparisons also helped to justify their opposition to Russian imperialism, while at the same time praising a benevolent imperialism rooted in social and cultural activism. Their thought represents a blending of liberal and socialist ideas employed to place the Russian experience beyond the scope of modernity and liberal political understanding. (shrink)

The study of the cultural activity of the Spiritual missions of the Russian Orthodox Church in various regions of Russia is one of the urgent tasks in the context of the problematic field of the theory of regionalism, cultural studies and socio-philosophical knowledge. Russian settlements on the territory of the Yenisei River basin and the entry of ethnic groups and territories of Yakutia and Buryatia into the Russian Empire has become one of the most important stages (...) of the integration of the ethnic groups of Siberia into a single statehood. The Irkutsk Spiritual Mission received a more perfect organization, institutionalized by increasing the number of missionary camps, which for successful Christian activities carried out among pagans allowed the formation of school educational institutions for the education and upbringing of a new Buryat generation of children in the doctrinal Orthodox canons, and Russian cultural traditions. In this regard, one of the key tasks of the missionaries was to establish a rational view of further life in new Christian-type formations, which was realized in socio-cultural activities: providing medical care to sick representatives of other ethnic groups, a friendly attitude to people of a different faith and a sincere desire to guide them on the path of righteousness, etc. It should be noted that the largest share of foreigners in this territory belonged to Buddhists, which was reflected in the influence of lamas on doctrinal issues, including economic ones. Since Buddhism in the Russian Empire belonged to the section of tolerant religions, direct (administrative) pressure on it was impossible. There remained funds of an exclusively spiritual nature, to which Orthodox missionary work was directed. Today in the Russian Federation, Buddhism, as well as Islam, Catholicism and Protestantism, as well as some other faiths belong to the category of traditional religions, which organizationally operate within the framework of the modern Russian Constitution. (shrink)

Introduction. One of the drivers of the Russian regions’ development is traditionally considered to be local universities and the scientific activity development, in particular. However, such a belief is usually based on speculative conclusions and is not subjected to detailed empirical testing. The purpose of the study is to assess the relationship between the development of science in universities in Russian regions and indicators of regional development according to 2017—18 data. Methods. The authors use methods of generalization, grouping, (...) assessment of indicators of central tendency and variations, as well as methods of correlation analysis. The study is based on the data from regional statistics presented on the official website of Russian Statistics Agency, as well as data from monitoring the universities effectiveness, commissioned by the Ministry of Science and Higher Education of the Russian Federation. Scientific novelty of the research. For the first time, the authors present an empirical analysis of the relationship between indicators of socioeconomic development of Russian regions and indicators of scientific activity in universities in the region. The study is characterized by using a sample of homogeneous regions. The sample excluded regions that did not have significant scientific results, as well as regions that are leaders in economic development. As a result, a “core” of 57 Russian regions with similar characteristics of both economic development and the results of scientific activity was investigated. This increased the practical significance of the conclusions and their reliability. Results. As a result of the study, it was found out that there is a statistically significant relationship between all indicators of regional development and science in universities. However, a deeper analysis made it possible to establish that this relationship is indirect. In some cases, we can talk about the opposite influence - regional development on scientific results in universities. Conclusions. It was found that the indicators used in the public administration system for assessing the effectiveness and efficiency of scientific activity are not key in terms of their impact on regional development. It was revealed that publications in leading world databases and in the Russian Science Citation Index (RSCI) are equally related to regional development. It has been determined that in a number of cases, within the considered sample, it is possible to distinguish two groups of regions with a different nature of the relationship between regional development and science in universities. (shrink)

Path dependency is a most valuable tool for understanding Russian history since 1480, which coincides with the ending of the “Mongol yoke,” Moscow’s annexation of northwest Russia, formerly controlled by Novgorod, and the introduction of a new method for financing the cavalry—the core of a new service class. The cavalry had to hold off formidable adversaries for Muscovy to retain its independence. Russia in 1480 was a poor country lacking subsurface mineral resources and with a very poor climate and (...) soil for the support of agriculture. These basic problems inspired autocratic power and by 1515 an ideology was in place justifying it. Religion, literature, and law were employed to support the autocracy. A variant of a caste society was created to support the army. This made up the substance of the first service-class revolution in which all resources were mobilized to support a garrison state. After 1667 the external threats to Muscovy diminished, but the service class kept its privileges, especially the land fund and the peasant-serfs. Russia faced major foreign threats again in 1700 and in the 1920s and 1930s. Those threats precipitated the second and third service-class revolutions. The second and third service-class revolutions broadly paralleled the first. Reinvigorated service classes were created with state institutions to support them. As society became more complex, so did the service classes and their privileges. Ideologies were converted into devices to support the infallible autocratic ruler and his elites. Almost the entire population was bound to state service, either directly, working to support the service state, or paying taxes. The church and clergy were harnessed first by Peter’s Holy Synod and then Stalin’s Department 5 of the Secret Police after he revived the church during World War II. Writers and artists were also put into uniform, until they finally rebelled—but the arts retained their civic functions, first supporting the regime, and then criticizing it. Finally, law retained its traditional programmatic functions in regimes themselves beholden to no law. As the foreign threats diminished, the service classes lost their function, but the elite servicemen kept their privileges as the service states disintegrated and the service classes lost their collective élan. Both the Russian Empire and then the Soviet Empire collapsed almost without a whimper. (shrink)

1. IntroductionCan the discourse of tianxia (“All-under-Heaven”) provide a peaceful resolution to the “Taiwan problem”? This article seeks to address this question. The urgency of such a resolution seems to be evident at this moment: since the Russian invasion of Ukraine, starting on February 24, 2022, observers of international politics have focused on the People’s Republic of China (PRC) with regard to its position on Russia’s aggression, on the one hand, and to its decision on Taiwan, on the other. (...) Consequently, the question of “Will Taiwan be the next Ukraine?” was raised so frequently that the PRC’s former minister of foreign affairs had to urge other states to stop drawing a comparison between Taiwan and Ukraine.1 However, such a call has not eased the concern over the PRC’s potential invasion of Taiwan, as key actors in international politics, such as the United States, the European Union, and the United Kingdom, continue to reiterate their position regarding a peaceful resolution between China and Taiwan,2 suggesting the lack of it to this day. (shrink)

Summary Russian intellectuals like to appeal to examples of foreign history. Lev Gumilev's views on history are a good example. Gumilev was one of the most well-known representatives of Eurasianism, which was in turn one of the most interesting intellectual constructs in Russian historiography. Gumilev believed that Russia was born not from Kievan Rus—the view of the majority of Russian historians of his time—but from the empire of the Mongols. While Gumilev saw Europe as a hostile (...) entity to Russia/eurasia, this was not the case with the neo-Eurasianists of the Yeltsin era. This article examines Gumilev's Eurasianism and its influence on modern Russian national identity. (shrink)

The Russian philosopher and cultural theorist Mikhail Bakhtin has traditionally been seen as the leading figure in the group of intellectuals known as the Bakhtin Circle. The writings of other members of the Circle are considered much less important than his work, while Bakhtin's achievement has been exaggerated in proportion to the downgrading of the thinkers with whom he associated in the 1920s. This volume, which includes new translations and studies of the work of the most important members of (...) the Circle, sets out to correct the distortions in the established representations of its activity. The original contributions to literary and linguistic theory made by Valentin Voloshinov and Pavel Medvedev (but frequently credited to Bakhtin) are assessed, and the distinctiveness of their approaches is highlighted. (shrink)

The task of this article is to clarify the appropriateness and adequacy of peace-making (confessional) rhetoric in the situation of the war of aggression of the Russian Federation against Ukraine, in particular, the meaningful correspondence of the concept of «peace» in its application or reading by the bearers of different worldview paradigms. The «russkii mir» cannot be translated either as «Russian peace» or as «Russian world». This is because the scope and content of these concepts are different. (...) Rus (Kyiv`s Rus) — a thousand-year-old princely state with its center in Kyiv, where the ancestors of modern Ukrainians lived, baptized by Prince Volodymyr in 988. Rus is not Russia. But Muscovy adopted the name Russia to derive its historiography from Rus. «Russkii mir» actually refutes the axiological principles laid down by ancient Rus’s civilization (freedom, dignity, partnership, co-creation, mutual responsibility). «Russkii mir» destroys peace in global or any local images, trying to grab the territory it decided to own. «Russkii mir» encroaches on world domination and therefore tries to impose its rules of the game on the world, which would reshape the world structure according to the wishes of the Russian dictators. For this, «russkii mir» uses any means and institutions as a tool: the army, weapons of mass destruction, atrocities, terror, lies, propaganda, the church and peace-making rhetoric. The goal is not to restore peace, but to establish the world domination of the Russian Empire in any of its variants (Muscovy, Russian Empire, Soviet Union, Russian Federation or Orthodox Civilization). Russian Orthodox Church plays a leading role in this — it uses religious rhetoric to formu- late a worldview model of the «russkii mir», consolidates the Russian population for a war of aggression, and justifies the atrocities of the Russian military with the sacred mission of restoring the Holy Rus’. Russian Orthodox Church justifies the «civilizing mission» of the Russian troops, actually calls to protect «our Common Russian Fatherland» by killing Ukrainians on the territo- ry of Ukraine. False messianism, manichaeism, paternalism, hatred of the civilized world that lives by democratic standards and respects the dignity and freedom of the individual, Russian arrogance, conceit, supremacy and egomania — this is what Russian Orthodoxy promotes with its religious rhetoric. Therefore, if we hear calls for «peace» from the bearer of the «russkii mir»’s worldview, it actually means a demand to come to terms with all their whims, to give up one’s own identity, one’s own world, one’s own life, if they do not fit into the concept of «russkii mir». (shrink)

The study presents the Russian historical-philosophical process in the context of the discovery of a new object, themes, personae, set of reactions and formation of a product for the intellectual community. The author's reliance on philosophical empirical material and appropriate hermeneutics in its processing allows the author to highlight those factors that influenced individual and collective reception. The author sees as a convenient case study the “discovery” by the Russian philosophical community of the early 20th century of both (...) American philosophy in general and C.S. Peirce in particular. Since the beginning of the 19th century, Russian thinkers have turned their attention to American philosophy in all the diversity of its manifestations. Russian intellectuals paid special attention to American pragmatism and everything associated with it. In Russia, in addition to translations, numerous reviews of foreign publications on this topic are appearing. Of particular interest to us in the Russian “collective reflection” of American ideas is the system of preferences for ideas, texts, events, and names. The point is that what might have been a priority for a European thinker, for a Russian one turned out to be on the “periphery” of his consciousness, as well as vice versa. While James appeared among the priority figures for Russian thinkers, Peirce was in his “shadow”. Using rich empirical material, the author shows all the stages of Peirce’s image formation in the Russian intellectual community. The research shows that “image” of Peirce, which represents not so much the thinker himself, but characterizes the intellectual community that turned to him. The results of the study may be useful both for contemporary foreign and Russian interpreters of Peirce and for historians of philosophy who are rethinking the past and forming in the present new objects of reception and reflection. (shrink)

This article examines Russian engineers’ social imagination about the future through the professional discussions held at the electrotechnical congresses in the nineteenth century. Formulating the prospective future of the industry, the state and society was a collective endeavor, a process in which the identity and mission of engineers were crystallized. Through envisioning the future of technology and its role in the society, engineers revealed their cultural role as mediators between technological innovation, and both the wider public and the state. (...) In order to better understand the manifestations of the shared cultural understandings of a desirable future and social order, the article resorts to Sheila Jasanoff’s concept of sociotechnical imaginaries. The engineering community’s sociotechnical imagination about electricity was shaped around the transformative possibilities of this technology. It was believed that electrical engineering was able not only to accelerate industrial production, but also to solve social, medical and cultural problems, thereby uniting the Russian Empire. Descriptions of the rational, comfortable and beautiful world of the electrified future overlapped in engineering discussions, journalism and science fiction. Positive scenarios emphasized the advantages of electrical engineering and bypassed the problems associated with electrification, constructing an idea of its inevitability. The electrical engineer became a kind of a new cultural hero, who knew how to make a working device or system, and also filled the task of linking the development of technology to the development of society. (shrink)

The paper discusses the philosophical and historical doctrine of the Russian philosopher and historian George Petrovich Fedotov. The author focuses on the analysis of imperial issues in the works of G.P. Fedotov, especially of his views on the cultural history of the Russian empire and the essence of imperial project in Russia. Fedotov reconsiders the historical experience and revolutionary catastrophe of Russia and searches for the foundations of the social and cultural processes determining the events of (...) class='Hi'>Russian history. Fedotov’s works offer a variety of interpretations of the political and cultural phenomenon of empire. This reflects his evolution as a philosopher of history: the focus of his vision shifts from the Medieval Rus to the Empire of Peter the Great, then to the collapsed empire of Nicholas II and finally to the USSR. Fedotov’s concept of Empire evolves into a timeless cultural-philosophical phenomenon but originates from the historical description of the centralization of power in the feudal monarchy of Ivan the Terrible. The evolution of the philosophical and historical views of Fedotov is influenced by the changes of his attitude to the historical conception of Klyuchevsky. In the 1940s Fedotov considers the empire as a universal idea. The concept of empire proposed by Fedotov gives an understanding of the Russian historical development, especially the causes of the decline and fall of the Russian Empire. Fedotov associates the cause of the salvation of Russia with the study of ancient Russian culture, in which he founds a moral and political ideal of the “Republic of Saint Sophia.” The paper shows heuristic potential of Fedotov’s cultural and philosophical ideas on the vocation of spiritual elite and the creative role of personality in the process of nation-building. (shrink)

L'objet de cet article est de déterminer et d'analyser l'image de la Vierge Marie dans la piété russe. Dans cette culture marquée par l'Empire Byzantin et la religion chrétienne orthodoxe, la figure de la Vierge Marie n'a pas, comme dans l'occident catholique, été supplantée par des idéalisations comme Béatrix pour Dante ou l'amour courtois pour le Moyen-Age, de sorte que son image a continué de jouer un rôle prépondérant dans la piété populaire russe.

The article reveals the value and contribution of A.I. Vvedensky in the formation of Russian neo-Kantianism on the example of a systematic and integrated review of his research. The author reveals the significance of A.I. Vvedensky critical methodology for the subsequent development of Russian neo-Kantianism in the first third of the XX century. The method of “logicism” is designated as an integral part of criticism, which consists in the elimination of dogmatic foundations from philosophical discourse. In turn, the (...) critical methodology, understood as a theoretical tool for constructing a holistic picture of the world on the principles of science, serves as the basis for identifying the problems of the correlation of the rational and the irrational. The indicated problem in the works of A.I. Vvedensky becomes the beginning of the formation of Russian neo-Kantianism, which is opposed to dogmatism and religious and philosophical research. Developing a critical methodology, the Russian philosopher turns to the consideration of the role of philosophy in the formation of ideological foundations. The contents of the article consistently reveal the key provisions of the philosophy of A.I. Vvedensky, from raising the question of the methodological foundations of criticism to identifying the specifics of philosophy in relation to scientific disciplines, on the example of experimental psychology, based mainly on empirical methods. In conclusion, the article indicates the prospect of further comprehensive study of the works of A.I. Vvedensky in order to establish a reliable understanding of the development of the national philosophy of thought. (shrink)

In the history of Russia’s development, there are clear, unchanging constants of empire, autocracy, and property as power. These are persistent structures that have existed over a long historical period, which are created by the state and society, and are upheld by tradition. On the one hand, they are restrictive, but on the other hand, they guide the direction of socioeconomic, sociopolitical, and cultural development, and also facilitate the emergence of the corresponding social actors and institutions. During the (...) class='Hi'>Russian revolutionary process, which spanned 1905–1922 and reached its apex in the October Revolution, an attempt was made to change these constants. However, this attempt failed, and Russia returned to its traditional path of development. (shrink)

In this article, I discuss a relatively recent development of Russian interest in Kyiv as a place with symbolic and historical significance for Russian history, which makes it a desirable target in an ongoing war. I trace the changing attitude of Russian travelers towards Kyiv’s history from the mid-eighteenth to the early nineteenth century. Earlier generations of visitors came to Kyiv primarily to visit holy places, with no knowledge of the city’s historical significance, and because it was (...) a more affordable alternative to travel abroad. However, at the end of the eighteenth century, after Catherine II’s royal visit, the publication of guidebooks, and the ascend of history as a discipline, and interest among Russian educated elites, Kyiv’s past became an obsession for many Russian travelers. Their travel accounts were motivated by a search for the past glory of Kyiv. For Russian travelers and authorities, history became one of the key means of appropriation of Kyiv, with a new generation of travelers searching for material evidence connecting Kyivan Rus to the Russian past. However, they were unable to find much material evidence and often used their imagination to present Kyiv as a site of Kyivan Rus history, ignoring the city’s non[1]Russian heritage. (shrink)

The article is devoted to the "subjective method" and the role of value preferences, as underscored in Russian proto-sociology, developed by the populists in discussions with the "ethical Marxism," on the one hand, and with positivists, on the other. The main issue—how was the apologia of individual in these studies connected to the ideals of social development?— leads to the question, whether such ideals could be based on an inborn moral law or "universal good" in the spirit of empirical-positivist (...) theories. Is the use of ethical categories in scientific knowledge admissible in principle, and if so, to what degree? How should the measure of subjectivity in historical or sociological studies be "regulated," and are there universally binding solutions to these problems? (shrink)

The article is devoted to the "subjective method" and the role of value preferences, as underscored in Russian proto-sociology, developed by the populists in discussions with the "ethical Marxism," on the one hand, and with positivists, on the other. The main issue—how was the apologia of individual in these studies connected to the ideals of social development?— leads to the question, whether such ideals could be based on an inborn moral law or "universal good" in the spirit of empirical-positivist (...) theories. Is the use of ethical categories in scientific knowledge admissible in principle, and if so, to what degree? How should the measure of subjectivity in historical or sociological studies be "regulated," and are there universally binding solutions to these problems? (shrink)

The article brings Laclau and Mouffe’s discourse theory into the empirical context of contemporary Russia to analyse the complex relationships between the state and alternative media. In contrast to the mainstream narrative that paints the picture of a strong authoritarian state with a grip over democratic liberties and civil society, we suggest a more nuanced perspective on the subject that focuses on the struggle over the articulation of the identity of the state. Through an ethnography (combined with interviews and textual (...) analysis) of three Russian alternative media outlets – Avtonom, Discours and DOXA – this article demonstrates how they critique the hegemonic state discourse, how they evade it through their practices, and how they perform counter-hegemonic alternatives. Even if their resistance is severely countered by the state, their practices are seen to de-naturalise the nodal points of centrality and unity which constitute the hegemonic state discourse. As these practices contain alternative articulations of the state discourse, the importance of alternative media for rethinking the state (and resisting it) should not be underestimated. (shrink)