This paper considers the views of Alexander Dugin, a leading proponent of Eurasianism in contemporary Russia. The point of his teaching is the preservation of the traditional social/cultural make-up of each civilization. He also believes that the Russian Slavs together with the minorities of the Russian Federation constitute a quasi-unity of Eurasian civilization. He emphasizes that globalism, led by the USA, is a mortal threat to the cultural identity of Russia/Eurasia and all other civilizations. For this reason the USA and (...) Russia are locked in mortal conflict with one other. At the outset of his intellectual career, in post-Soviet Russia, Dugin believed that Putin would follow the Eurasian road. It would be wrong to see Dugin as an intellectual guru at the head of the post-Soviet elite. Still, his views are important, for they indicate the kinds of ideas that circulate in the minds of the Russian elite. (shrink)

European thought has had contradictory visions of humanity’s place in the cosmos. Some believed that humanity might survive indefinitely. Yet most of the modern thinkers assumed that humanity, in general, was not different from other species and would eventually disappear. In Russia, a different view prevailed. It was assumed that humanity belonged to a sort of “chosen species” and would have a different destiny from the other species. This idea of “humanity as a chosen species” was supported with the idea (...) of Russia as a “chosen nation” that would lead humanity to mastery over nature and ensure its immortality. The end of the conception of the omega of world history in post-Soviet Russia had led to the discarding of humanity’s mastery over nature and its special position in the cosmos. From then on, it was stressed that humanity was an insignificant and perishable speck, and the future would most likely lead to humanity’s disappearance. (shrink)

European thought has had contradictory visions of humanity’s place in the cosmos. Some believed that humanity might survive indefinitely. Yet most of the modern thinkers assumed that humanity, in general, was not different from other species and would eventually disappear. In Russia, a different view prevailed. It was assumed that humanity belonged to a sort of “chosen species” and would have a different destiny from the other species. This idea of “humanity as a chosen species” was supported with the idea (...) of Russia as a “chosen nation” that would lead humanity to mastery over nature and ensure its immortality. The end of the conception of the omega of world history in post-Soviet Russia had led to the discarding of humanity’s mastery over nature and its special position in the cosmos. From then on, it was stressed that humanity was an insignificant and perishable speck, and the future would most likely lead to humanity’s disappearance. (shrink)

Love and hate follow the same patterns among émigrés as among people in general. Among the several models of the love émigrés feel for a foreign land is pragmatic love, based not so much on real attachment as on interests. For an Orwellian Big Brother this love does not necessarily imply direct material benefits but could be an attempt to justify something that has already occurred—emigration, for example. Pragmatic love for a foreign land and people and a corresponding hatred for (...) one's land of origin raises fewer problems than love for its own sake, which often leads to disappointment and a violent emotional response. Everything is reversed in one's mind: the distant motherland becomes desirable, almost an ideal, whereas the foreign land, the place of residence, is hated and despised. Such was often the case for Russian émigrés to the West from the seventeenth through the nineteenth century. Two nineteenth-century Russian intellectuals—Vladimir Pecherin (1807–55) and Alexander Herzen (1812–70)—though different in many ways, came to a similar conclusion: that the West was not the embodiment of goodness but the dead end of history, and that Russia, which they never visited once they had left it, was the shining star of humanity. (shrink)

Summary Russian intellectuals like to appeal to examples of foreign history. Lev Gumilev's views on history are a good example. Gumilev was one of the most well-known representatives of Eurasianism, which was in turn one of the most interesting intellectual constructs in Russian historiography. Gumilev believed that Russia was born not from Kievan Rus—the view of the majority of Russian historians of his time—but from the empire of the Mongols. While Gumilev saw Europe as a hostile entity to Russia/eurasia, this (...) was not the case with the neo-Eurasianists of the Yeltsin era. This article examines Gumilev's Eurasianism and its influence on modern Russian national identity. (shrink)

Western perceptions of Russia have a long history, starting from the earliest reports in the fifteenth century. For some Westerners Russia appeared as a utopian, harmonious society. For others it appeared as an ideal monarchy. Some, however, saw it as a despotic Asian state. The Western images of Russia from the fifteenth through the seventeenth centuries were thus mixed and ambiguous. The positive image of Russia as the ideal Biblical society that stood outside of history somewhat blurred the differences between (...) Russia and the West. In contrast, for an increasing number of Westerners, especially from the more advanced proto-capitalist countries, Russia was part of the non-Western world, thus emphasizing its difference from the West. Russia was thus assimilated into the Western image of the Orient where repulsion combined with fascination, until, under the impact of Romanticism in the nineteenth century, its foreignness was articulated in terms of civilizational and religious differences. (shrink)

The emergence of Russia as a dominant force in Europe from the early nineteenth century onward was characterized by growing tensions between Russians and Poles as seen in the recurring Russian suppression of Polish uprisings. F. H. Duchinski who, like other Polish intellectuals, tried to uncover the root causes of these political tensions, concluded that Russians were neither Slavic nor European, but Asians, and it was this fact alone, he believed, that accounted for the continuing Russian hostility toward the Poles.

While Western political scientists have a variety of opinions on democracy and how its institutions could be improved, they almost never argue about the validity of democracy as a form of government. Of course, it would be unfair here to ignore the presence of an authoritarian streak in Western thought. Thomas Hobbes comes to mind most immediately. Yet the views of those thinkers with an authoritarian bent have become marginalized in present-day discourse; or, to be more precise, it is assumed (...) that their views on the importance of a strong government are irrelevant to the present. The assumption that a strong regime might be necessary in non-Western societies is thought to be the product of these authoritarian/totalitarian societies' elite classes—that is, a justification for imposing the power of the elite upon the people. Most Western political scientists are convinced that democracy is the best of all possible forms of government. (shrink)