Substitution and simple sentences -- Simple sentences and semantics -- Simple sentences and implicatures -- The enlightenment problem and a common assumption -- Abandoning (EOI) -- Beyond matching propositions -- App. A : extending the account -- App. B : belief reporting.

Philosophers of language have long recognized that in opaque contexts, such as those involving propositional attitude reports, substitution of co-referring names may not preserve truth value. For example, the name ‘Clark Kent’ cannot be substituted for ‘Superman’ in a context like:1. Lois believes that Superman can flywithout a change in truth value. In an earlier paper, Jennifer Saul demonstrated that substitution failure could also occur in ‘simple sentences’ where none of the ordinary opacity-producing conditions existed, such as:2. Superman (...) leaps more tall buildings than Clark Kent does.Accounts focusing on opacity were unable to explain our ‘anti-substitution intuitions’ in such cases.In Simple Sentences, Substitution, and Intuitions, Saul extends her earlier work. She provides a comprehensive presentation and criticism of recent accounts of simple sentence substitution failure, and proposes a new approach drawing on psychological evidence about cognitive processing. Saul's purpose is not merely to solve the substitution puzzle cases, but to make …. (shrink)

Many competent speakers initially judge that (i) is true and (ii) isfalse, though they know that (iii) is true. (i) Superman leaps more tallbuildings than Clark Kent. (ii) Superman leaps more tall buildings thanSuperman. (iii) Superman is identical with Clark Kent. Semanticexplanations of these intuitions say that (i) and (ii) really can differin truth-value. Pragmatic explanations deny this, and say that theintuitions are due to misleading implicatures. This paper argues thatboth explanations are incorrect. (i) and (ii) cannot differ intruth-value, yet (...) the intuitions are not due to implicatures, but ratherto mistakes in evaluating (i) and (ii). (shrink)

Semanticists face substitution challenges even outside of contexts commonly recognized as opaque. Jennifer M. Saul has drawn attention to pairs of simple sentences - her term for sentences lacking a that-clause operator - of which the following are typical: -/- (1) Clark Kent went into the phone booth, and Superman came out. (1*) Clark Kent went into the phone booth, and Clark Kent came out. -/- (2) Superman is more successful with women than Clark Kent. (2*) Superman (...) is more successful with women than Superman. -/- She challenges us to explain why the upper and lower sentences in each pair differ, or at least appear to differ, in their truth-values and hence truth-conditions. This appearance of substitution failure is inherently puzzling. Moreover, it is taken by Saul to generate a dilemma for anyone hostile to direct reference accounts of that-clause constructions. Direct reference theorists regard the appearance of substitution failure in that-clause contexts as mere appearance, to be dealt with pragmatically rather than semantically. -/- Critics of such accounts need to say something about simple-sentence cases. If they choose to allow that intuitions of substitution failure can be over-ridden and explained away pragmatically in simple-sentence cases but not in that-clause cases, they lay themselves open to the charge of operating a double standard. But if they do not choose this option, they must offer a semantic explanation of apparent substitution failure in simple-sentence cases - no easy task, it turns out. Other respondents to Saul's challenge have sought to provide elaborate semantic treatments. In contrast, this paper proposes a far simpler pragmatic explanation of intuitions of substitution failure in simple sentences, an explanation that deploys no more resources than are to be found in Grice's 'Logic and Conversation'. Ironically, this proposal turns out to be incompatible with a direct reference perspective. So if it is, as I maintain, the most plausible treatment of simple-sentence cases available, Saul's initial thought gets turned around 180 degrees: the phenomenon she has drawn attention to ends up representing a challenge to supporters of direct reference theories. (shrink)

Philosophers of language have long recognized that in opaque contexts, such as those involving propositional attitude reports, substitution of co-referring names may not preserve truth value. For example, the name ‘Clark Kent’ cannot be substituted for ‘Superman’ in a context like:1. Lois believes that Superman can flywithout a change in truth value. In an earlier paper , Jennifer Saul demonstrated that substitution failure could also occur in ‘simple sentences’ where none of the ordinary opacity-producing conditions existed, such as:2. (...) Superman leaps more tall buildings than Clark Kent does.Accounts focusing on opacity were unable to explain our ‘anti-substitution intuitions’ in such cases.In Simple Sentences, Substitution, and Intuitions, Saul extends her earlier work. She provides a comprehensive presentation and criticism of recent accounts of simple sentence substitution failure, and proposes a new approach drawing on psychological evidence about cognitive processing. Saul's purpose is not merely to solve the substitution puzzle cases, but to make …. (shrink)

This paper replies to a number of objections brought against the solution to Jennifer Saul's puzzle of failure of substitutivity in transparent contexts presented in my 2001 paper "Alter Egos and Their Names".

Anti‐substitution intuitions play a central role in discussion of the semantics of propositional attitude ascriptions, and all theorists seem to agree that these intuitions should be explained by either semantic or pragmatic means. Jennifer Saul (2007) has recently argued that it is impossible to explain all our anti‐substitution intuitions thus. In particular, she argues that any account of the semantics of propositional attitude ascriptions faces the ‘Enlightenment Problem’ – i.e. no such account can explain the fact that we have anti‐substitution (...) intuitions about utterances of speakers who are ‘unenlightened’ as to the fact that certain names are co‐referential. In this paper, I suggest an alternative explanation of our intuitions about unenlightened utterances, and in doing so offer an original strategy for explaining truth‐conditional intuitions by either semantic or pragmatic means. (shrink)

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In this chapter, I am going to discuss a very interesting case brought to our attention by Saul and references therein: NP-related substitution failure in simple sentences. Whereas it is well known that opacity occurs in intensional contexts and that in such contexts it is not licit to replace an NP with a co-referential one, one would not expect that substitution failure should also be exhibited by simple sentences in the context of stories about Superman. The (...) suggested explanation of these cases is to posit an embedding explicature, that is to say the insertion of structure that ipso facto creates an intensional context capable of blocking substitution. I consider various complications to this story in the light of important objections by García-Carpintero and, finally, I consider how this story fares when one applies constraints on explicatures along the lines of those proposed by Hall in an interesting paper.In general, this chapter exploits interesting considerations by Norrick on the structural similarities between stories and indirect reports. Norrick believes there are important differences, but he is inclined to concede that we could study structural similarities. An important similarity, brought out by the examples discussed by Saul, is that the narrative frame, once it is inserted into the interaction, can be left implicit and, during the act of narrating or referring to the story, one need not repeat the words ‘the story says’ or ‘we are told that…’ every time. Although implicit, these words are heard because they do some work at the structural level, as is shown by this attempt to resolve an otherwise intractable philosophical problem. The explicatures of simple sentences are perceived because they are integrated into the speakers’/hearers’ perception of the overall plan of discourse, as Haugh most interestingly notes:As Haugh and Jaszczolt note, this means that any putative “communicative intention of A is embedded within his higher-order intention”. In other words, to figure out the implicature that evidently arises here, the participants are necessarily making inferences about some kind of overall aim. According to this view, then, inferences about the intended implicature arise concomitant with inferences about the overall aim of the speaker.It follows from the considerations by Haugh that, since the explicature connected with simple sentences depends on the perception of the overall aim or plan of the conversation, it is not easily cancelled. Readers can check by themselves that the explicatures due to simple sentences cannot be cancelled, as cancelling them would involve returning to illogical discourses.. Haugh’s considerations about the overall aim of the discourse are precious in explaining how the embedding explicatures I posit are calculated once and for all for the whole stretch of the discourse framed by the narrative act. (shrink)

Some Trinitarians, such as Thomas Aquinas, wish to claim that God is mereologically simple; that is, God has no parts distinct from Himself. In this paper, I present Simple Trinitarianism, a view that takes God to be simple but, diverging from Aquinas, does not identify the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit with anything in our ontology. Nonetheless, Simple Trinitarians would like Trinitarian sentences to be true; thus, they must give a non-standard semantics for those (...) class='Hi'>sentences. I will focus on one possible semantics a Simple Trinitarian may give: taking Trinitarian claims to be translatable into feature-placing sentences, which posit property instantiation without requiring commitment to any objects that instantiate those properties. (shrink)

We present various results regarding the decidability of certain sets of sentences by Simple Type Theory. First, we introduce the notion of decreasing sentence, and prove that the set of decreasing sentences is undecidable by Simple Type Theory with infinitely many zero-type elements ; a result that follows directly from the fact that every sentence is equivalent to a decreasing sentence. We then establish two different positive decidability results for a weak subtheory of math formula. Namely, (...) the decidability of math formula and math formula. Finally, we present some consequences for the set of existential-universal sentences. All the above results have direct implications for Quine's theory of “New Foundations” and its weak subtheory math formula. (shrink)

Individual differences in the strategies that control sequential behavior were investigated in an experiment in which participants memorized sentences and then wrote them by hand, in a non‐cursive style. Thirty‐two participants each wrote eight sentences, which had hierarchical structures with five levels. The dataset included over 31,000 letters. Despite the deliberately constrained nature of the task and stimuli, 23 patterns of behavior were identified from the durations of pauses that occurred before the inscription of letters at four chunk (...) levels, spanning letters, words, phrases, and sentences. A critical path task analytic model, Graphical Production of Memorized Sentences (GPoMS), shows that the control of writing relies on cues that continuously switch between motor actions and chunk retrievals in a just‐in‐time fashion at the level of letter information. GPoMS explains the individual differences in terms of variants of a motor production mechanism and variants of a chunk retrieval mechanism, which involve varying degrees of parallelism between cognitive actions and motor actions. A graphical technique for constructing GPoMS models was developed that enabled the estimation of ongoing working memory demands during production. (shrink)

We show that the P 2 0 sentence, and explore some of theconsequences of that fact. This paper summarizes recent workby the author with N. C. A. da Costa on the P

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Consensus has it that generic sentences such as “Dogs bark” and “Birds fly” contain, at the level of logical form, an unpronounced generic operator: Gen. On this view, generics have a tripartite structure similar to overtly quantified sentences such as “Most dogs bark” and “Typically, birds fly”. I argue that Gen doesn’t exist and that generics have a simple bipartite structure on par with ordinary atomic sentences such as “Homer is drinking”. On my view, the subject (...) terms of generics are kind-referring. The interesting truth conditions characteristic of generics arise from the interesting ways in which kinds inherit properties from their members. (shrink)

In this paper, I have proposed a compositional semantic analysis of exception NPs from which three core properties of exception constructions could be derived. I have shown that this analysis overcomes various empirical and conceptual shortcomings of prior proposals of the semantics of exception sentences. The analysis was first formulated for simple exception NPs, where the EP-complement was considered a set-denoting term and the EP-associate was a monadic quantifier. It was then generalized in two steps: first, in order (...) to account for quantified EP-complements, and second, in order to account for polyadic quantifiers as the EP-associates. An additional assumption that was made in several places was that EPs may operate at the level of implications. The consequences of this assumption, though, still have to be investigated. (shrink)

We give Scott sentences for certain computable groups, and we use index set calculations as a way of checking that our Scott sentences are as simple as possible. We consider finitely generated groups and torsion-free abelian groups of finite rank. For both kinds of groups, the computable ones all have computable \ Scott sentences. Sometimes we can do better. In fact, the computable finitely generated groups that we have studied all have Scott sentences that are (...) “computable d-\” sentence and a computable \ sentence). In [9], this was shown for the finitely generated free groups. Here we show it for all finitely generated abelian groups, and for the infinite dihedral group. Among the computable torsion-free abelian groups of finite rank, we focus on those of rank 1. These are exactly the additive subgroups of \. We show that for some of these groups, the computable \ Scott sentence is best possible, while for others, there is a computable d-\ Scott sentence. (shrink)

Neuroimaging evidence suggests that the left inferior frontal gyrus (LIFG) supports temporary storage of linguistic material during linguistic tasks rather than computing a syntactic representation. The LIFG is not activated by simple sentences but by complex sentences and maintenance of word lists. Under this hypothesis, agrammatism should only disturb comprehension for constructions in which storage is essential.

This paper challenges defenders/advocates of the semantic-completeness route towards gluts to explain, in simple and plausible terms, why the ‘trivializer paradox’, framed in terms of closure relatives on theories, fails to undermine their argument.

According to Kirk Ludwig, only primitive actions are actions in a primary and non-derivative sense of the term ‘action’. Ludwig takes this to imply that the notion of collective action is a façon de parler – useful perhaps, but secondary and derivative. I argue that, on the contrary, collective actions are actions in the primary and non-derivative sense. First, this is because some primitive actions are collective actions. Secondly, individual and collective composites of primitive actions are also actions in the (...) primary and non-derivative sense. Hence, individual action and collective action are ontologically on a par. Ludwig also exaggerates the contrast between individual and collective action by introducing a “sole agency requirement” in his account of the semantics of singular action sentences. However, sole agency is merely typically pragmatically implicated by singular action sentences, not entailed by them. If I say, “I turned on the light”, after we each flipped one of two switches that together turned on the light, then I might be misleading the audience, but what I say is true. Finally, I argue that, contra Ludwig, individuals often have “I-intentions” to bring about an event that can be satisfied even if there are co-agents who bring about the event in the same way. (shrink)

We identify complete fragments of the simple theory of types with infinity and Quine’s new foundations set theory. We show that TSTI decides every sentence ϕ in the language of type theory that is in one of the following forms: ϕ=∀x1r1⋯∀xkrk∃y1s1⋯∃ylslθ where the superscripts denote the types of the variables, s1>⋯>sl, and θ is quantifier-free, ϕ=∀x1r1⋯∀xkrk∃y1s⋯∃ylsθ where the superscripts denote the types of the variables and θ is quantifier-free. This shows that NF decides every stratified sentence ϕ in the (...) language of set theory that is in one of the following forms: ϕ=∀x1⋯∀xk∃y1⋯∃ylθ where θ is quantifier-free and ϕ admits a stratification that assigns distinct values to all of the variables y1,…,yl, ϕ=∀x1⋯∀xk∃y1⋯∃ylθ where θ is quantifier-free and ϕ admits a stratification that assigns the same value to all of the variables y1,…,yl. (shrink)

In this paper we will propose a simple linguistic approach to the Knobe effect, or the moral asymmetry of intention attribution in general, which is just to ask the felicity judgments on the relevant sentences without any vignette at all. Through this approach we were in fact able to reproduce the Knobe effects in different languages, with large effect sizes. We shall defend the significance of this simple approach by arguing that our approach and its results not (...) only tell interesting facts about the concept of intentional action, but also show the existence of the linguistic default, which requires independent investigation. We will then argue that, despite the recent view on experimental philosophy by Knobe himself, there is a legitimate role of the empirical study of concepts in the investigations of cognitive processes in mainstream experimental philosophy, which suggests a broadly supplementary picture of experimental philosophy. (shrink)

I argue against a simple contextualist account of epistemic modals. My argument, like the argument on which it is based , charges that simple contextualism cannot explain all of the conversational data about uses of epistemic modals. My argument improves on its predecessor by insulating itself from recent contextualist attempts by Janice Dowell and Igor Yanovich to get around that argument. In particular, I use linguistic data to show that an utterance of an epistemic modal sentence can be (...) warranted, while an utterance of its suggested simple contextualist paraphrase is not. (shrink)

Since the constructibility quantifiers, used in the mathematical system to be developed, will all assert the constructibility of open sentences, an explanation is given of the kinds of open sentences that will be asserted to be constructible. Each of these open sentences will be assigned to a specific ‘level’, depending on the kind of objects or open sentences that can satisfy it, thus providing the basis for the Simple Type Theoretical characteristic of the system to (...) be developed. The satisfaction relation under discussion will be taken to be a primitive of the system. The relevance of Quine's objections to modality for this system is taken up. (shrink)

This research aims to show grammatical relations between the elements of the sentence based around the syntactic connection. The phenomenon of syntactic connection is one of the basic concepts for al-Jurjānī’s theory of nazm (construction). This view, which makes more understanding the structure of Arabic sentence, is studied in the light of the ideas of classic and modernists linguists. This attempt to facilitate Arabic grammar has continued routinely from relationships between grammar and meaning. The integration of grammar, which consists of (...) words, is an important property for native speakers and others. This field is open to new developments considering the successive developments in the field of linguistics. It is important to develop the principles that will help in understanding the grammatical structure of a language in which communication pathways are growing. Reinterpretation of prominent approaches appeared in classical sources and updating the concepts that explain the basic structures of language are needed to increase the effectiveness of Arabic.Summary: The linguists, who accept the language structures as a system of expressing thoughts, search out the relationship between meaning and grammar. The rules of grammar, which maintain its importance from the past to the present is one of the basic language areas. In the looking at the researches in the field of Arabic language, it is seen that the grammatical structures of this language is much emphasized. In this context, the grammatical markers theory, which is trying to explain the connection between the sentence elements in the light of different scientific disciplines, such as philosophy and logic is a theory, which the linguists put to explain the Arabic grammar. The grammatical discussions around the grammatical markers have continued for a long time. ‘Abd al-Qāhir al-Jurjānī (d. 471/1078) is one of the most prominent Arabic grammarians whose opinions are widely mentioned in this field. Al-Jurjānī, who found that the discipline of grammar area was limited, established a new method in language studying. In this context, the linguistic researches continue around the views of al-Jurjānī’s theory of construction. The term of construction, which describes the relationship between meaning and grammar, means composition and arrangement. The current linguistic studies have ensured the magnificence and accuracy of this theory. According to this theory, grammar meaning is arising from the choice of word and grammatical elements. The relation between words in the sentence is explained as a construction. According to al-Jurjānī, grammar is the result of various language skills beyond the distinction of truth and error. This comprehensive language understanding, which evaluates the grammar from a different point of view, has started as of Sībawayhi (d. 180/796). The Arabic linguistic studies from the early period are characterized by taking care of both form and meaning, in addition to semantic.Term of the syntactic connection is one of the basic concepts, which al-Jurjānī focuses on while explaining views on grammar. He gives much importance to the method of linking words and to the way they join each other to form sentences. The syntactic connection is an interaction between words and grammatical meanings. In this process, the mechanism of affixation and association occur between the elements of sentence. The term affixation refers to direct connection relations of the elements of sentence, while the term association refers to indirect relations. This term used to describe the grammar structures, is also closely related with the meanings of the words. The basic sentence in classical Arabic consists of the musnad and the musnad ilayhi. In the Arabic language, besides the basic elements of the sentence, other units are important as well. These units work together to express a central idea that may be further developed or refined by other elements. The factor, which determines the function of a word in the sentence, is the place of word. In this context, the linguistic studies carried out within the syntactic connection will make an important contribution to language teaching.The other thing in the context of the syntactic connection is the terms of “deep and surface structure”, which are the basic concepts of the transformational grammar theory developed by Chomsky. While the deep structure consists of simple sentence structures, the surface structure is composed of sentences. According to the transformational grammar theory, the deep structure is an important factor for determining the meaning. They draw attention to the mental side of the language. It is because the language is a phenomenon, which produces unlimited sentences with limited elements. In this form, the language cannot be explained by a mechanical interpretation. The language should be examined in the light of human dynamics. The competence and performance are the cause of the emergence of deep and surface structure terms. The purpose of the word is effective in determining the structure of speech. The target language is to express unlimited meanings with limited words. Classical Arabic grammarians have introduced the idea of transformation to Arabic grammar – though they may not know this term. The Arabic grammarians have talked about preposing, postposing, deletion, increase and interpretation, which used and developed by Chomsky. Transformational grammar theory has produced a new paradigm in grammar. This theory is widely discussed among modern linguists. The term grammatical coherence is a new terminology used by the modern linguists for definition of sentence structure. This term, which shows evidence and relation between both things, is divided into two namely: verbal and semantic coherence. When the definitions of grammatical terms in the classical grammar sources, it is possible to see the emphasis of the grammatical coherences. This language understanding, which tries to substitute the inflection theory, aims to bring innovations in sentence analysis. The linguists point to the importance of this theory, which bring a new perspective in understanding the Arabic grammar. Tammām Ḥassān (1918-2011) attempts to link the grammatical coherences with ‘Abd al-Qāhir al-Jurjānī’s theory of semantic formation and its relationship to linguistic analysis. Tammām Ḥassān, likened to Sībawayhi, is regarded as one of the most important representatives of the innovative language understanding with his theory. According to him, the system of language, which provides a framework to shape man's thinking, is constituted by three subsystems: phonetics, vocabulary and grammar. Grammar may be defined as a system of word changing and other means of expressing relations of words in the sentence. In this context, the concepts of syntagmatic and paradigmatic structure are important to understand the general structure of languages. According to linguistics, grammar should study both paradigmatic and syntagmatic relations of sentences. The syntagmatic structure refers to the relationship between language units depending on the language system in the language. The relationship network between words that belong to the same semantic field is called paradigmatic structure. The paradigmatic structure provides similar criteria for all languages. Such approaches that introduced by linguistics, provides significant contributions to language learning. The modern linguistic studies have made the sentence a starting point to clarify the linguistic structures and relations to achieve the sound linguistic communication. A sentence is the largest unit in a language described by grammar. (shrink)

Many languages allow for “fake” uses of their past tense marker: the marker: can occur in certain contexts without conveying temporal pastness. Instead it appears to bear a modal meaning. Iatridou :231–270, 2000) has dubbed this phenomenon Fake Tense. Fake Tense is particularly common to conditional constructions. This paper analyzes Fake Tense in English conditional sentences as a certain kind of ambiguity: the past tense morphology can mark the presence of a temporal operator, but it can also signal a (...) specific modal operator. The ambiguity is proposed to be the result of recategorization: the Simple Past develops a second, modal meaning because of structural similarities between the temporal and the modal/epistemic domain. The proposal is spelled out in the generative semantics framework, using the restrictor approach to conditionals Semantics from different points of view, 1979; in: A. von Stechow and D. Wunderlich Semantics: an international handbook of contemporary research, 1991), and building on von Stechows et al.’s recent work on the English tense system The expression of time in language, 2010; Romero and von Stechow, Tense: introduction, 2008). (shrink)

In this paper, following an idea of Christophe Chalons. I propose a new kind of forcing axiom, the Maximality Principle, which asserts that any sentence varphi holding in some forcing extension $V^P$ and all subsequent extensions $V^{P\ast Q}$ holds already in V. It follows, in fact, that such sentences must also hold in all forcing extensions of V. In modal terms, therefore, the Maximality Principle is expressed by the scheme $(\lozenge \square \varphi) \Rightarrow \square \varphi$ , and is equivalent (...) to the modal theory S5. In this article. I prove that the Maximality Principle is relatively consistent with ZFC. A boldface version of the Maximality Principle, obtained by allowing real parameters to appear in φ, is equiconsistent with the scheme asserting that $V_\delta \prec V$ for an inaccessible cardinal δ, which in turn is equiconsistent with the scheme asserting that ORD is Mahlo. The strongest principle along these lines is $\square MP\!_{\!\!\!\!\!\!_{\!\!_\sim}}$ , which asserts that $MP\!_{\!\!\!\!\!\!_{\!\!_\sim}}$ holds in V and all forcing extensions. From this, it follows that $0^\#$ exists, that $x^\#$ exists for every set x, that projective truth is invariant by forcing, that Woodin cardinals are consistent and much more. Many open questions remain. (shrink)

A compositional nihilist believes that the only objects that exist are simples. However, a non-nihilist believes in the existence of composite objects and challenges the nihilist to explain why there are true sentences about chairs, tables, etc., if composite objects do not exist. Different nihilist views have been suggested to explain this (the paraphrase strategy and the truthmaker theory), but I believe that they are unsuccessful (either they do not successfully paraphrase every sentence apparently about composite objects, or they (...) are not precise about the truthmakers of those sentences). I will suggest that a new truthmaker theory, which uses resources from Cameron’s truthmaker theory and van Inwagen’s paraphrase strategy, can give such an explanation and does not face the problems of other theories. Therefore, we have a good reason to accept this truthmaker theory as the best nihilist way to accommodate sentences apparently about composite objects. (shrink)

In this paper, following an idea of Christophe Chalons, I propose a new kind of forcing axiom, the Maximality Principle, which asserts that any sentence φ holding in some forcing extension $V\P$ and all subsequent extensions V\P*\Qdot holds already in V. It follows, in fact, that such sentences must also hold in all forcing extensions of V. In modal terms, therefore, the Maximality Principle is expressed by the scheme $\implies\necessaryφ$, and is equivalent to the modal theory S5. In this (...) article, I prove that the Maximality Principle is relatively consistent with \ZFC. A boldface version of the Maximality Principle, obtained by allowing real parameters to appear in φ, is equiconsistent with the scheme asserting that $Vδ\elesub V$ for an inaccessible cardinal δ, which in turn is equiconsistent with the scheme asserting that $\ORD$ is Mahlo. The strongest principle along these lines is $\necessary\MPtilde$, which asserts that $\MPtilde$ holds in V and all forcing extensions. From this, it follows that 0# exists, that x# exists for every set x, that projective truth is invariant by forcing, that Woodin cardinals are consistent and much more. Many open questions remain. (shrink)

I present here a modal extension of T called KTLM which is, by several measures, the simplest modal extension of T yet presented. Its axiom uses only one sentence letter and has a modal depth of 2. Furthermore, KTLM can be realized as the logical union of two logics KM and KTL which each have the finite model property (f.m.p.), and so themselves are complete. Each of these two component logics has independent interest as well.

It is argued that taken together, two widely held claims ((i) sentences express structured propositions whose structures are functions of the structures of sentences expressing them; and (ii) sentences have underlying structures that are the input to semantic interpretation) suggest a simple, plausible theory of propositional structure. According to this theory, the structures of propositions are the same as the structures of the syntactic inputs to semantics they are expressed by. The theory is defended against a (...) variety of objections. (shrink)

In what is known as the “received view” analysis, logical positivism construed scientific theories TC as being axiomatized in first‐order predicate calculus using proper axioms T (the theoretical laws) and having distinct observational and theoretical vocabularies VO and VT which are related to each other via a dictionary of correspondence rules C (see theories). Prior to 1936 the correspondence rules were required to be equivalences between VT terms and simple or complex observational conditions expressible using just VO terms that (...) provided noncreative explicit definitions of the terms (see craig's theorem). The empirical content of the theory TC was identified with the set O of theorems which contained VO but not VT terms. (shrink)

We identify a number of principles with respect to prediction that, we argue, underpin adult language comprehension: (a) comprehension consists in realizing a mapping between the unfolding sentence and the event representation corresponding to the real‐world event being described; (b) the realization of this mapping manifests as the ability to predict both how the language will unfold, and how the real‐world event would unfold if it were being experienced directly; (c) concurrent linguistic and nonlinguistic inputs, and the prior internal states (...) of the system, each drive the predictive process; (d) the representation of prior internal states across a representational substrate common to the linguistic and nonlinguistic domains enables the predictive process to operate over variable time frames and variable levels of representational abstraction. We review empirical data exemplifying the operation of these principles and discuss the relationship between prediction, event structure, thematic role assignment, and incrementality. (shrink)

Prioritized bases, i.e., weakly ordered sets of sentences, have been used for specifying an agent’s ‘basic’ or ‘explicit’ beliefs, or alternatively for compactly encoding an agent’s belief state without the claim that the elements of a base are in any sense basic. This paper focuses on the second interpretation and shows how a shifting of priorities in prioritized bases can be used for a simple, constructive and intuitive way of representing a large variety of methods for the change (...) of belief states—methods that have usually been characterized semantically by a system-of-spheres modeling. Among the methods represented are ‘radical’, ‘conservative’ and ‘moderate’ revision, ‘revision by comparison’ in its raising and lowering variants, as well as various constructions for belief expansion and contraction. Importantly, none of these methods makes any use of numbers. (shrink)

Most everyday tasks involve multiple modalities, which raises the question of how the processing of these modalities is coordinated by the cognitive system. In this paper, we focus on the coordination of visual attention and linguistic processing during speaking. Previous research has shown that objects in a visual scene are fixated before they are mentioned, leading us to hypothesize that the scan pattern of a participant can be used to predict what he or she will say. We test this hypothesis (...) using a data set of cued scene descriptions of photo-realistic scenes. We demonstrate that similar scan patterns are correlated with similar sentences, within and between visual scenes; and that this correlation holds for three phases of the language production process (target identification, sentence planning, and speaking). We also present a simple algorithm that uses scan patterns to accurately predict associated sentences by utilizing similarity-based retrieval. (shrink)

Serious actualists take it that all properties are existence entailing. I present a simple puzzle about sentence tokens which seems to show that serious actualism is false. I then consider the most promising response to the puzzle. This is the idea that the serious actualist should take ordinary property-talk to contain an implicit existential presupposition. I argue that this approach does not work: it fails to generalise appropriately to all sentence types and tokens. In particular, it fails to capture (...) the right distinctions we ought to make between what I call _typographical sentence types_—an interesting and previously undiscussed class of fine-grained sentence types which are partially individuated by their typography, or how they look when written out. (shrink)

We explored the influence of negation on cognitive dynamics, measured using mouse‐movement trajectories, to test the classic notion that negation acts as an operator on linguistic processing. In three experiments, participants verified the truth or falsity of simple statements, and we tracked the computer‐mouse trajectories of their responses. Sentences expressing these facts sometimes contained a negation. Such negated statements could be true (e.g., “elephants are not small”) or false (e.g., “elephants are not large”). In the first experiment, as (...) predicted by the classic notion of negation, we found that negation caused more discreteness in the mouse trajectory of a response. The second experiment induced a simple context for these statements, yet negation still increased discreteness in trajectories. A third experiment enhanced the pragmatic context of sentences, and the discreteness was substantially diminished, with one primary measure no longer significantly showing increased discreteness at all. Traditional linguistic theories predict rapid shifts in cognitive dynamics occur due to the nature of negation: It is an operator that reverses the truth or falsity of an interpretation. We argue that these results support both propositional and contextual accounts of negation present in the literature, suggesting that contextual factors are crucial for determining the kind of cognitive dynamics displayed. We conclude by drawing broader lessons about theories of cognition from the case of negation. (shrink)

We prove a 0-1 law for the fragment of second order logic SO over parametric classes of finite structures which allow only one unary atomic type. This completes the investigation of 0-1 laws for fragments of second order logic defined in terms of first order quantifier prefixes over, e.g., simple graphs and tournaments. We also prove a low oscillation law, and establish the 0-1 law for Σ14 without any restriction on the number of unary types.