Sewall Wright first encountered the complex systems characteristic of gene combinations while a graduate student at Harvard's Bussey Institute from 1912 to 1915. In Mendelian breeding experiments, Wright observed a hierarchical dependence of the organism's phenotype on dynamic networks of genetic interaction and organization. An animal's physical traits, and thus its autonomy from surrounding environmental constraints, depended greatly on how genes behaved in certain combinations. Wright recognized that while genes are the material determinants of the animal phenotype, operating with great (...) regularity, the special nature of genetic systems contributes to the animal phenotype a degree of spontaneity and novelty, creating unpredictable trait variations by virtue of gene interactions. As a result of his experimentation, as well as his keen interest in the philosophical literature of his day, Wright was inspired to see genetic systems as conscious, living organisms in their own right. Moreover, he decided that since genetic systems maintain ordered stability and cause unpredictable novelty in their organic wholes, it would be necessary for biologists to integrate techniques for studying causally ordered phenomena and chance phenomena. From 1914 to 1921 Wright developed his "method of path coefficient", a new procedure drawing from both laboratory experimentation and statistical correlation in order to analyze the relative influence of specific genetic interactions on phenotype variation. In this paper I aim to show how Wright's philosophy for understanding complex genetic systems logically motivated his 1914-1921 design of path analysis. (shrink)

The difference between a scientific system and the non scientific system is only a matter of forms of rationality: so also the difference between empirical system and non empirical system explainable in terms of the kinds of rationality systems in their structures. Similarly, the classification of civilized cultures and primitive cultures or the black civilization and western civilization is all about forms of rationalizations. That is because the form of explanation of European Society is different from the form of explanation (...) of the Black African animistic society. However, structural functionalism is an attempt on a large scale to combine the methods of both functionalism and structuralism which is not only extant in African philosophy but also embedded in the practice of tradition. Indeed Theistic Panpsychic rationality is culturally structural and functional thereby qualifying to be described as structural functional Panpsychic communicative animism. (shrink)

This article suggests that nature awareness and panpsychic gratitude transform a wounded mechanistic reductionist worldview into creative regenerative participation with the more-than-human world. Four practical keys are shared that have proven to be helpful in resuscitating the indigenous heart and cultivating greater empathy, love, compassion, and insight into the metaphoric resonance and teachings of the natural world. This inquiry situates the human family as vital consciousness tendrils of the living planet in this critical time of shifting climate patterns, loss (...) of biodiversity due to human presence, geopolitical conflicts, and other challenges as we step into the Ecozoic Era. (shrink)

Sewall Wright first encountered the complex systems characteristic of gene combinations while a graduate student at Harvard's Bussey Institute from 1912 to 1915. In Mendelian breeding experiments, Wright observed a hierarchical dependence of the organism's phenotype on dynamic networks of genetic interaction and organization. An animal's physical traits, and thus its autonomy from surrounding environmental constraints, depended greatly on how genes behaved in certain combinations. Wright recognized that while genes are the material determinants of the animal phenotype, operating with great (...) regularity, the special nature of genetic systems contributes to the animal phenotype a degree of spontaneity and novelty, creating unpredictable trait variations by virtue of gene interactions. As a result of his experimentation, as well as his keen interest in the philosophical literature of his day, Wright was inspired to see genetic systems as conscious, living organisms in their own right. Moreover, he decided that since genetic systems maintain ordered stability and cause unpredictable novelty in their organic wholes (the animal phenotype), it would be necessary for biologists to integrate techniques for studying causally ordered phenomena (experimental method) and chance phenomena (correlation method). From 1914 to 1921 Wright developed his "method of path coefficient" (or "path analysis"), a new procedure drawing from both laboratory experimentation and statistical correlation in order to analyze the relative influence of specific genetic interactions on phenotype variation. In this paper I aim to show how Wright's philosophy for understanding complex genetic systems (panpsychic organicism) logically motivated his 1914-1921 design of path analysis. (shrink)

In this book, Maduabuchi Dukor presents a comprehensive interpretation of African Philosophy that is informed by the idea that everything in the universe includes a 'spiritual' dimension, what he calls theistic humanism. Imperceptible agents such as God, lesser divinities, and ancestors, as well as forces such as witchcraft and magic, play prominent roles in Dukor's accounts of not just metaphysics, but also ethics, aesthetic, and epistemics. By highlighting the diversity in intellectual world currents philosophy stimulates intercultural dialogue, African Philosophy in (...) the Global Village. Theistic Panpsychic Rationality, Axiology and Science is a response to major contemporary socio-cultural challenges in the global village. (shrink)

The article deals with panpsychic conceptions in contemporary analytical philosophy of mind. According to some influential philosophers, panpsychism has theoretical resources for solving both the old riddle of R. Descartes about the causal relationship between the realms of the mental and the physical, and the hard problem of consciousness by D. Chalmers — "Why do some physical systems generate conscious experience?". In the second half of the twentieth century, there were heated discussions in analytical philosophy about whether certain aspects (...) of conscious metal states, the phenomenal properties of experience, are irreducible to anything physical or functional. The strategy of contemporary supporters of panpsychic conceptions is to try to reasonably expand our ontology. They add to the microlevel a primitive analogue of the conscious experience possessed by such fundamental physical entities as elementary particles. Thus, phenomenal consciousness in its microform not only becomes a fundamental and irreducible element of reality, but also receives its causal relevance at the macro level. Nevertheless, all varieties of panpsychism face the combination problem: "How does the combination of the experience of fundamental physical entities lead to the emergence of consciousness?". The article assesses the plausibility of the main responses to different variations of the combination problem. It is shown that after revision, panpsychic conceptions lose their advantage over dualism and physicalism for various reasons. In the case of emergent and autonomous panpsychism, the concept of micro-experience becomes theoretically useless. S. Coleman's answer through the elimination of microsubjects leads to the rejection of panpsychism, and the idea of a phenomenal combination of P. Goff is burdened by the fact that we are, in principle, epistemically closed to its understanding. The author comes to the conclusion that the difficult problem of consciousness is not solvable due to the inevitability of its epistemological component, and not metaphysical or empirical. Until then, the question of the form is "does object X really have a phenomenal first-person perspective?" makes sense, we will somehow be inclined to believe that the hard problem of consciousness has not yet been solved. (shrink)

Henri Bergson (1859-1941) was once the most famous philosopher in the world, but his reputation waned in the latter half of the 20th century. Barry Allen here makes the case for Bergson as a great philosopher, one whose thought has much to contribute to contemporary philosophical questions. Living in Time presents chapters on each of Bergson's four major works, explaining his theories of time, perception, memory, and panpsychic consciousness, his innovative concept of virtual existence, his objection to Darwin, his (...) controversy with Einstein, his philosophy of creative evolution, and his social philosophy of closed and open society. In particular Allen focusses on Bergson's powerful ideas on time. Classical arguments for determinism fallaciously apply spatial concepts to consciousness; once we take time seriously, which means acknowledging its reality as duration and its difference from space, Bergson showed that the arguments for determinism become insupportable. Bergson's ideas on time and evolution offer a comparison with Nietzsche, which Allen develops, exposing both philosophical concurrence and systematic difference. The book's conclusion discusses the question of Bergson and naturalism and summarizes the ontology of the virtual that emerges as a core part of Bergson's thought. (shrink)

In this response to 32 commentators, I start by clarifying the overflow argument. I explain why the distinction between generic and specific phenomenology is important and why we are justified in acknowledging specific phenomenology in the overflow experiments. Other issues discussed are the relations among report, cognitive access, and attention; panpsychic disaster; the mesh between psychology and neuroscience; and whether consciousness exists.

Idealism tackles the mind-body problem by giving precedence to mind and relegating matter to a dependent status. Contrary to popular opinion, idealism need not deny the existence of matter nor dispute the realist contention that objects exist independently of perceptual experience. However, idealism requires that matter and external objects are experiential or mind-dependent in a fundamental way. I develop a form of idealism that affirms the existence of an external world, but makes it experiential. The characteristics of the external experience (...) are taken to be akin to those of perceptual experience, but attention is given to some likely differences. An attempt to accommodate modern physics in the experiential account yields an idealism with panpsychic features. (shrink)

Theories about what a mind is entail views about who (or what) has a mind and vice versa. This chapter reframes the classic problem of how the mind interacts with the body in terms of the question of mental attribution: Which bodies have minds? Critical social theorists’ descriptions of mental attribution associated with the bodies of women, Black people, colonized people, laborers, and others, reveals three metaphysical components of mental attribution that are respectively associated with experiences of immanence and non-being, (...) dehumanization, and objectification and hypermateriality: (1) the ratio component, (2) the comparison component, and (3) the constitution component. A theory’s approach to each of these components collectively forms its “attribution pattern.” Physicalist panpsychisms provide ready examples of attribution patterns that apply to the set of all bodies that exist. Russellian panpsychism illustrates a “selective” attribution pattern that attributes minds (or mentality) only to certain bodies, while Cavendishian panpsychism exhibits an “unrestricted” attribution pattern that attributes a mind to each and every body. These contrary views help to establish a taxonomy of mental attribution patterns that promises to inspire fresh theories of mind and liberatory configurations of the social. (shrink)

Author David Skrbina argues that all of technology is metaphysically driven by a panpsychic force called the Pantechnicon.

This research paper proceeds in three parts. After a brief presentation of Bernard Palissy, the first part examines his panpsychic ideas, the second part his ideas on art, which I connect in the third part to some of his remaining works and projects.

The Illusion of the Body: Introducing the Body Alive Principle is the divinely inspired work of author David Almeida. This book opens the door to a new understanding in metaphysical thinking. The author draws on the philosophy of panpsychism to support his contention that an unseen ocean of consciousness exists all around us, and within our own bodies (i.e. cells, organs, and systems). The author refers to the Body Alive Principle as “panpsychic healing.” This text offers proven techniques for (...) communicating with the body intelligences the author terms the “little minds.” This process is intended to bring healing to those with both minor and severe medical conditions. Some of the most common medical complaints treated by the Body Alive Principle includes:1. Back or neck pain2. Allergies3. Arthritis/rheumatism4. Difficulty walking5. Headaches6. Lung problems7. Digestive8. Gynecological9. Anxiety disorders10. Heart conditionsThe author contends that even the most nefarious medical issues are curable or can be successfully managed using the Body Alive Principle. This is accomplished through the action of human “super mind”, which will at times consciously supervise the activities of the little minds. The Illusion of the Body instructs its Body Alive practitioners to approach their recovery using several time-tested techniques. Three widely recognized methods are employed in the application of the panpsychic healing philosophy. These modalities are creative visualization and empathetic listening followed by affirmative commands. Each technique is essential to the effectiveness of the Body Alive Principle.This book also discusses guilt and its deleterious effect on the body. True guilt has a beneficial quality when it prevents us from repeating an unacceptable behavior. Beyond this, guilt causes us to become ineffectual. The author holds that this antiquated form guilt needs to be purged, so that we may move on with our lives. A step-by-step process for liberating oneself from the chains of guilt is provided.There is also a section dedicated to trauma because of its potential to immobilize an affected person. Traumatic experiences suddenly unleashed on the body may produce waves of acute anxiety, which wreak havoc on its finely tuned systems. The author recounts his personal experience of negotiating the discharge of negative experiences with the entities supporting them.The Body Alive Principle promotes the importance of adhering to high moral standards in order to maintain homeostasis within ourselves. Integrity is of the outmost importance to the little minds. The author emphasizes the necessity for one to act within the domain of moral excellence. However, the author makes it clear that integrity is a process we work to perfect throughout our lives.The Illusion of the Body represents the author's many years of metaphysical study and experimentation. The author hopes to generate a greater awareness and appreciation of our precious bodily intelligences. The organic vessels that contain our consciousness are alive. They are almost countless in number. If we, the super mind can learn to communicate with the little minds in a positive way, we can ensure ourselves of a more comfortable journey. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Some think we should look at aspects of what is commonly thought of as non‐sentient nature as having a value in themselves apart from the use or recreation they provide for humans or even animals. But to what extent does nature, in the character it presents to us, exist apart from presence to consciousness such as ours? Surely at least many of its aspects cannot. However, that does not stop them having a genuinely intrinsic value, just as works of (...) art do, whose existence also is impossible apart from their display to a consciousness such as ours. But can nature, as it exists quite apart from human or animal consciousness, have any intrinsic value? It is suggested that only a panpsychic, and perhaps pantheist, view of nature (a view for which there are excellent metaphysical grounds) can give a positive answer, and even that must be a very vague one [1]. (shrink)

La physique panpsychiste de Ruyer est fondée sur deux arguments : la science, par méthode, ne peut que méconnaître les formes, ne connaît que les structures, et toute réalité ne peut être qu'en se possédant activement, c'est-à-dire comme domaine, ou subjectivité, ou présence. La critique décisive du parallélisme psycho-physique montre que la philosophie de l'esprit, ou le fameux mind-body problem, n'est qu'un catalogue de faux problèmes . Mais, s'agissant de la personne humaine, le spiritualisme ruyérien continue la tradition empiriste en (...) faisant du « je » un point de perspective mythique et provisoire. Le « je » émerge pragmatiquement de la présence, ne la constitue pas et disparaît avec elle. Peut-on opposer à ce spiritualisme sans sujet personnel un « je » distant et séparé de la seule présence ? À distance par là même de l'activité qui, au lieu de la substance, est la catégorie fondamentale de l'ontologie ruyérienne. Ruyer's panpsychical physics is based on two arguments: science, by its method, can only underestimate the forms, can only know the structures, and any reality can exist only by controlling itself actively, that is as a domain, a subjectivity, or a presence. The crucial criticism of psycho-physical parallelism shows that the philosophy of mind, or the famous mind-body problem, is only a catalog of non-problems . However, with respect to the human person, Ruyerian spiritualism continues the empiricist tradition by turning the « I » into a mythical and temporary focal point. The « I » pragmatically emerges from the presence, it does not constitute it and it disappears with it. Can we oppose to this spiritualism deprived of any personal subject an « I » far more distant and separated from presence only? Does is exist severed from activity, which, replacing substance, is the fundamental category of Ruyerian ontology? (shrink)

What if subconscious brain processes are actually independent consciousnesses, each resembling an independent advisor whispering advice to the main consciousness, or “I”? This multi-consciousness model would support free will, as our choices are informed by other consciousnesses, not the subconscious. Each independent consciousness allows a movable perspective through its rich representation of the world and constantly seeks harmony and resonance between its internal concepts, other consciousnesses, external reality, and the genetic worm hole to the evolutionary past.