In Utopophobia Estlund offers a prominent version of a conditional account of feasibility. I think the account is too permissive. I defend an alternative incentives account of feasibility. The incentives account preserves the spirit of the conditional account but qualifies fewer actions as feasible. Simplified, the account holds that an action is feasible if there is an incentive such that, given the incentive, the agent is likely to perform the action successfully. If we accept that ought implies feasible, then we (...) should reject some normative requirements on agents that Estlund would accept in light of his more permissive conditional account. But we can still recognise normative requirements on individual and collective agents that, if complied with, would result in a world that is radically better than our own. (shrink)

Confirmant notamment les analyses de Pascale Casanova dans La République des lettres , Zofia Bobowicz, traductrice et actuellement conseillère éditoriale aux éditions Noir et Blanc, explique dans cet entretien les difficultés de réception rencontrées par la littérature de l'Europe centrale en France, alors qu'il en va tout autrement dans d'autres pays. Connaissant depuis un quart de siècle l'univers éditorial français de l'intérieur, Zofia Bobowicz souligne le rôle joué par la critique littéraire et la conjoncture politique ou culturelle du (...) moment dans la diffusion de cette littérature, et, par voie de conséquence, dans sa traduction.Confirming such analyzes Pascale Casanova in The Republic of Letters , Zofia Bobowicz, translator and editorial consultant currently published by Black and White, explains in this interview the difficulties encountered by receiving the literature of Central Europe France, while it is quite different in other countries. Knowing the past quarter century French publishing world from the inside, Zofia Bobowicz emphasizes the role played by literary criticism and the political and cultural moment in the dissemination of this literature, and, consequently, in its translation. (shrink)

What duties do people have in the face of noncompliance of others with their duties? The paper defends the duty to take up the slack when slack taking is necessary to assist those in dire need. This duty has been criticized by J. L. Cohen, Liam Murphy and, more recently, David Miller. The duty is defended against arguments that appeal to the structure of the duty to aid, fair shares, responsibility, counterintuitiveness, and perverse consequences. The paper considers the implications of (...) the duty for the case of aiding refugees. (shrink)

The paper reports the results of a comparative analysis of the two groups students coming from temporarily disconnected families due to foreign work parents and teenagers with the same social environment, but without the experience of separation time. The subject of the analysis was: the cohesion of a family from the perspective of the evaluated adolescent and three factors of psychological loneliness: social loneliness, emotional loneliness and existential loneliness. The Loneliness Scale was used based on an original concept of multidimensional (...) sense of loneliness. The questionnaire for the survey of family cohesion were used too. The age, gender, family structure and the family lifestyle were controlled. Obtained results revealed significantly lower cohesion and significantly higher existential loneliness in group of teenagers from temporarily disconnected families. Not confirmed the supposition that made in earlier studies of temporarily disconnected families due to economic migration, that these teenagers suffer from a sense of emotional loneliness There has also confirmed the belief that the level of family cohesion and a sense of loneliness in adolescents is associated with atypical organization of family life associated with the duration of migration of parent/parents, frequency of contact with family members working abroad: mothers, fathers or broth parents, the duration of stays at home. (shrink)

The dead are among us. We are reminded of their names through the books we read, the hoovers we buy, the sandwiches we consume, the tarmac we travel on, the wellingtons we wear, or, frequently, the buildings we visit. Even if we settled on the criteria for being worthy of commemoration, what should we do about the fact that there seem to be so many people who would likely meet them? Commemoration is a form of attention giving, and attention is (...) a scarce resource. It is scarce even if it could be permissibly commanded at will. It is even more scarce when commanding attention may violate someone's freedom to decide for themselves where to bestow it. I will argue that when it comes to public commemorative attention, there are duties that fall on us all to remember the now dead victims of injustice. I will also offer reasons for why such duties would normally mean that we need to prioritize the remembrance of the victims of injustice ahead of remembrance that might be owed to those who had expectations of being remembered or even took steps by donations to secure such remembrance. (shrink)

The dead are among us. We are reminded of their names through the books we read, the hoovers we buy, the sandwiches we consume, the tarmac we travel on, the wellingtons we wear, or, frequently, the buildings we visit. Even if we settled on the criteria for being worthy of commemoration, what should we do about the fact that there seem to be so many people who would likely meet them? Commemoration is a form of attention giving, and attention is (...) a scarce resource. It is scarce even if it could be permissibly commanded at will. It is even more scarce when commanding attention may violate someone's freedom to decide for themselves where to bestow it. I will argue that when it comes to public commemorative attention, there are duties that fall on us all to remember the now dead victims of injustice. I will also offer reasons for why such duties would normally mean that we need to prioritize the remembrance of the victims of injustice ahead of remembrance that might be owed to those who had expectations of being remembered or even took steps by donations to secure such remembrance. (shrink)

A crucial question for egalitarians, and theorists of distributive justice in general, is whether people can be held responsible for disadvantages they bring upon themselves. One response to this question states that it would be inegalitarian to hold people responsible on the basis of their actions if their actions are not ultimately under their control and reflect instead the good or bad luck the agent had in being the type of person who happens to act in a given way. I (...) argue that even if we accept that there is something inegalitarian about holding people responsible on the basis of actions they did not ultimately control, the alternative (that is, not holding people responsible) is even more inegalitarian. Therefore, egalitarians, including so-called luck egalitarians, can and should hold people responsible on the basis of their actions, even if people lack free will and their actions are ultimately a matter of luck. Key Words: responsibility • egalitarianism • luck egalitarianism • fairness • distributive justice. (shrink)

John Rawls tells at the start of A Theory of Justice that his theory is intentionally constrained in two ways: it is ideal and focuses on the justice of the basic structure of society. This chapter begins by evaluating Rawls's claim that ideal theory sets the target of reform for nonideal theory, whose task it is to work out what to do “under less happy conditions.” It states that it is unclear just when ideal theory can inform the priorities of (...) nonideal theory. The chapter also presents discussions on whether the ideal theory is utopian and concessive to human nature. Even the kind of nonideal theory that delivers concrete action‐guidance for “us” remains unhelpfully ideal if it does so merely in the form of policies or institutional arrangements. (shrink)

We try to translate the intuitionistic propositional logic INT into Brouwer's modal logic KTB. Our translation is motivated by intuitions behind Brouwer's axiom p →☐◊p The main idea is to interpret intuitionistic implication as modal strict implication, whereas variables and other positive sentences remain as they are. The proposed translation preserves fragments of the Rieger-Nishimura lattice which is the Lindenbaum algebra of monadic formulas in INT. Unfortunately, INT is not embedded by this mapping into KTB.

We prove that the standard cut is definable in each existentially closed model ofIΔ0+ exp by a (parameter free) П1–formula. This definition is optimal with respect to quantifier complexity and allows us to improve some previously known results on existentially closed models of fragments of arithmetic.

In this article I challenge the claim that nuclearity is a central principle in the organization of texts. I propose the Framework for the Relational Analysis of Texts which accounts for the paratactic and hypotactic realization of coherence relations. Within this framework, the taxis of coherence relations is co-textually dictated. I consider the writer choices in the distribution of discoursal salience and the intertextual and intercultural variation of these choices. It is suggested that divergence between approaches that perceive text as (...) exhibiting both hypotactic and paratactic organization and those that see nuclearity as a basic characteristic of text structure arises from differences in the linguistic corpora examined during the construction of respective theoretical frameworks. (shrink)

We prove that there is infinitely many tabular modal logics extending KB.Alt which have interpolation.

What’s special about human rights? For Rowan Cruft human rights are special because they capture the importance of the good of the right-holder. But his account struggles with explaining the existence of global socioeconomic human rights. I argue that such rights exist and show how we should revise Cruft’s account to accommodate this.

Following wars, what requirements, if any, of remembrance do we – those who live in peacetime – have? On whom do they fall? Who must be remembered? How should they be remembered? Fabre offers us an account of remembrance that answers some of those questions and provides a helpful framework for working through the others. It is philosophically nuanced as well as attuned to the complexity of war and informed by actual commemorative practices. In this article, however, I expand Fabre's (...) list of desiderata that a good account of war remembrance must meet. I argue that Fabre's account needs to be refined and, at least in one respect, revised in light of these new desiderata. (shrink)

How should the fact that a given policy offers people choice bear on policy selection? Should we favour choice-granting policies even if choices lead to harmful outcomes, and even if the causal thesis is true and people are not fully in control of how they choose? T.M. Scanlon and Alex Voorhoeve have tried to locate the significance of choice in the value or potential value that it has for choice-bearers. I show that this leaves them vulnerable to a general dilemma: (...) either they can explain the significance of choice by supposing the causal thesis is false, or they cannot explain it when faced with certain policy cases. I argue that we should locate the significance of choice in the fact that having a choice means being in a position to treat others as they are due or not. My view can be summed up in a slogan: ask not only what choice can do for you; ask what having the choice means you can do to others. (shrink)

The aim of my article is to analyze the concepts and phenomena of diagnosis and recognition, often considered to be semantically identical. While in psychiatric practice such an identity does not necessarily have adverse effects, in the anthropological and cultural domains identification of diagnosis and recognition may cause stigmatization, or other undesirable consequences. The article attempts to justify this thesis.

In his life and work, Leszek Kołakowski traversed many paths, some more and some less well-known. The main focus here is on Kołakowski’s involvement in what one may call an anthropological variant of philosophy of culture. Anthropological philosophy of culture bases on the following assumptions:1. Human conduct is determined by culture. There is neither humanity without culture nor culture without humans.2. Human conduct is by nature referential, in other words, the factual alone is not enough for humans who tend to (...) reach beyond it in their search for the most elemental and ultimate truths.3. Culture is a dynamic phenomenon and a challenge on the path to self-awareness.4. Axiological sensitivity.5. The culture philosopher is immersed in the culture he studies and, by revealing that which it conceals, is a source of reflection on this culture. All these assumptions lie at the core of the philosophy of Leszek Kołakowski. (shrink)

For nearly 80 years Biblical gardens have been present in the natural and cultural landscape. The first gardens came into existence in the US. The idea to create such gardens spread from the US mainly across Europe, Australia and Israel. These gardens are being made all the time; recently we have observed their dynamic development. This study is to show the effects of the 20 years long scientific work to formulate the original genesis of the Biblical garden idea. The characteristics (...) of 64 facilities situated in 14 countries has been presented for the first time so widely. This enabled us to show both the history of these gardens and how they are situated in the cultural and social context. The effect of various factors inspiring people of various professions to create Biblical gardens both near sacral buildings and within the secular areas has been evidenced. Biblical gardens exercise the principles of gardens of senses and learning gardens. And it is the highly developed semantic layer that makes them stand out. (shrink)

Is there a duty to do more than one’s fair share of solving collective problems? If there is, can those who do less than their fair share coerce others to do more? These questions arise urgently in relation to the problem of refugee protection. The fact that various states host refugees to a dramatically different extent is due to a range of factors but the most prominent one is that, on the whole, states devote their differential capabilities to the aim (...) of not hosting them. When some states fail to host – or otherwise assist – as many refugees as they should, must other states do more than their fair share in order to solve the problem of providing refugees with an appropriate place to live? I examine what I call the conservative, moderate and responsive answers to this question. I defend the responsive view and argue that there is a duty to do more than one’s fair share here and that such a duty is always enforceable. (shrink)

We formulate a Π1 sentence τ which is a version of the Tableau consistency of GlΔ0. The sentence τ is true and is provable in GlΔ0 + exp. We construct a model M of GlΔ0+Ω1+τ+BGs1 which has no proper end-extension to a model of GlΔ0+Ω1+τ. Also we prove that GlΔ0+Ω1+τ is not Π1 conservative over GlΔ0+τ.

We prove that any 1-closed (see def 1.1) model of the Π 2 consequences of PA satisfies ¬Cons PA which gives a proof of the second Godel incompleteness theorem without the use of the Godel diagonal lemma. We prove a few other theorems by the same method.

We define a special family of Brouwerian logics determined by linearly ordered frames. Then we prove that all logics of this family have the finite model property and are Kripke complete.

We prove that the Gödel incompleteness theorem holds for a weak arithmetic T = IΔ0 + Ω2 in the form where Cons H (T) is an arithmetic formula expressing the consistency of T with respect to the Herbrand notion of provability.

The two main questions addressed in the chapter are “What is the point of (good) nonideal theory?” and “Can (good) nonideal theory be done in isolation from ideal theory?” To address them, I distinguish between different types of nonideal theory and locate nonideal theory vis‐à‐vis ideal theory as well as realism and applied philosophy. I argue that nonideal theory is useful but some of its versions need to concede that they are defeatist. I also argue that nonideal theory builds on (...) ideal theory, though not in all the ways suggested by defenders of ideal theory. (shrink)

The article is an attempt to reconstruct the Stanisław Lem’s views on the relationship between science and faith presented in his The star diaries. The author discusses three stories: The twenty­‑second voyage, The twenty­‑first voyage, and The twentieth voyage. The following questions are considered during the analysis of these novels: Does theology (as depicted by Lem), despite having no competence in the area, attempt to solve scientific problems? Does Lem suggest that Christian claims are potentially falsifiable? Can science lay the (...) foundations of theodicy? The answers to these questions appear helpful in explicating three models of the relationship between science and faith embedded in Lem’s stories: conflict regarding content, conflict regarding form, and cooperation. (shrink)