In today's conditions of postmodern space the most significant resource of the modern economy, which is being formed in the leading countries of economic development, is human capital. The main goal of the article is to study the process of managing the formation of human capital in the functioning postmodern society as the basis of the national economy and ensuring the economic security of the enterprise. The basic components of human capital are determined on the basis of the analysis. It (...) is established that the basic component is knowledge that affects others and in postmodern conditions of development of the national economy and determines the process of development of human capital. At the same time, the process of forming knowledge, in accordance with the principles of the functioning of the knowledge economy, is associated with the availability and possibility of obtaining information. The object of study is the enterprises of Eastern Europe. The subject of the study is human capital, the economic security system of the enterprise The results of the study allowed us to develop a model for the formation of human capital and to form a mechanism for ensuring the economic security of the enterprise through management of the formation of human capital under the conditions of the postmodern society. (shrink)

Ce texte a déjà paru dans Диалог со временем, Dialogue with time. Intellectual history review, Issue 49, 2014, p. 14-27. Nous remercions Zinaida Tchekantseva de nous avoir autorisé à le reproduire ici. Историческое событие и время в контексте « ритмической парадигмы » В последние десятилетия концепт ритм чрезвычайно популярен в науке и искусстве. Известно, что ритм как одно из организующих начал жизни не только порождает вопросы, связанные с темпоральными и пространственными характеристиками происходящего, но и вплетен в - Histoire – (...) Nouvel article. (shrink)

This text was presented at the 12th International Seminar in Budva – Montenegro (May 31 - June 7, 2014) – Zinaida Chekantseva is Dr. of Science (History), Professor and Chief Researcher at the Institute of World History, Russian Academy of Science – [email protected]. Summary : “There is an inextricable link between power and rhythm. What power imposes in the first place is a rhythm (rhythm of everything – life, time, thought, discourse)” Roland Barthes wrote. In light of “the rhythmic (...) (...) - Comment penser le pouvoir dans le monde contemporain ? – Nouvel article. (shrink)

Hermann Cohen, as it is well known, criticised the Kantian notion of the thing-in-itself. And before him the Kantian thing-in-itself was criticised by Fichte and other German idealists. Probably for this reason, Hermann Cohen is sometimes regarded as a person who said things similar to Fichte. This gives a completely wrong perspective, making it impossible to understand the philosopher's ideas. The basis for his critique of the Kantian thing-in-itself is quite different from the motives, determining the criticism of Kant in (...) the classical German Idealism. Such interpretation does not allow to see close connection of Cohen's theoretical philosophy with revolution in physics which took place at the turn of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The article explains how Cohen's demand that pure thinking must form its own content is connected with transformations taking place in physics and mathematics, and the peculiarity of Cohen's understanding of idealism is demonstrated: for him, correct idealism must realize that autonomous, free thinking should work seriously with sense data. The closeness of Cohen's ideas to the postpositivist thesis of the theory-ladenness of observation is explained. For Cohen, serious work with sense data is opposite to uncritical acceptance of them as given. The origin of scientific thinking is thinking itself. It responds to the challenge of sensory material by creating its own constructs. Mathematized natural science becomes for Cohen both an example and a confirmation of this thesis. For him, what is real is what is described in the language of mathematical analysis, i.e. continuous processes, in spite of the fact that any data are discrete. It is shown that the source of Cohen's assertions on this issue is in Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, namely in the doctrine of the Principles of pure natural science and, more specifically, in the Anticipations of Perception. Cohen's conviction of the constructive character of the theories of mathematized natural science is confirmed in the article by references to the authority of A. Einstein. (shrink)

In public and political practice, argumentation involves verbal manipulations, which have not been sufficiently studied in modern argumentation theory. This paper proposes to analyse such manipulations as speech acts, by means of the pragmadialectical theory of argumentation.

It is proved that the basic framework of the premises and reasoning of Wittgenstein's “Tractatus Logico-philosophicus” corresponds quite well to the transcendental method (as formulated by H. Cohen). Whereas Kant’s philosophy proceeds from the fact of existence of mathematics and mathematised natural science and investigates their conditions of possibility, Wittgenstein proceeds from the fact that propositions of language describe reality and reveals the conditions of possibility of such descriptions. Kant, answering the question about the conditions of possibility of the named (...) sciences, comes to the idea of the transcendental subject and the distinction between the world of phenomena and the thing in itself. Wittgenstein's investigation of the conditions of possibility that the world is described by propositions leads to the assertion that both the world and language are together in logical space. The latter constitutes the a priori and transcendental condition of the possibility that language “reaches out” to reality. For both the theories - in the “Critique of Pure Reason” and in the “Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus” - the idea of the boundary is important. In the “Critique of Pure Reason” it is the boundary of possible experience and cognition, while in the “Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus” it is the boundary of what can be thought and expressed by meaningful propositions. Related to the different definitions of the boundary is the difference in the treatment of mathematised natural science. For “The Critique of Pure Reason” was created in the era of unconditional acceptance of Newtonian mechanics. And the “Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus” was created at the time of the crisis of the Newtonian paradigm and its replacement by other notions of time and space. However, the idea of boundary, which is present in both doctrines, determines closeness in the attitude towards metaphysics between the author of “The Critique of Pure Reason” and the author of “The Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus”. The study also shows that Wittgenstein did not follow logicism in his philosophy of mathematics. For him, both mathematical objects and propositions of logic are constructions. The conviction about the constructive character of mathematical and logical objects shows an affinity with the Kantian tradition in the philosophy of mathematics. (shrink)

Interest in Slavophilism has undergone a notable resuscitation in recent decades in the Soviet literature. In the seventies and eighties, collections of works of some of the Slavophiles were published for the first time since the October Revolution. Books and articles on Slavophilism have appeared. Archival materials have been put into scholarly circulation, scholars find their attention being drawn to works of modern foreign authors on Slavophilism, and certain aspects of Slavophile views are often touched upon in current literary criticism. (...) We can agree with the conclusion drawn by I. A. Dudzinskaia in 1983 and shared by N. I. Tsimbaev, namely, that a review of the literature in the recent period "evidences a new stage in the study of Slavophilism." However, various aspects of Slavophilism have by no means been dealt with equally, and there are quite a number of disagreements among scholars in their assessments. (shrink)

The connection of Hermann Сohen’s “The Logic of Pure Knowledge” with the revolutionary transformations in physics and mathematics at the end of the 19th century is shown. Сohen criticised Kant’s answer to the question “How is mathematics possible”? If Kant refers to a priori forms of pure intuition, Сohen sees in it a restriction of freedom of mathematical thinking by limits of intuition. It has been shown that Cohen's position is in accordance with the main development of mathematics in the (...) last decades of the 19th century, in particular, with K. Weierstrass’ striving to get rid of geometrical or mechanical images and intuitions in the mathematical analysis. Cohen was also well informed about the latest ideas in physics of his time. They are also discussed in “The Logic of Pure Knowledge.” The revolutionary spirit of physics and mathematics was appealing to Cohen, and he felt a corresponding enthusiasm for it. The ongoing scientific revolution is consonant with Cohen’s assertion that the foundations of science are hypotheses. The purity of pure thinking does not guarantee the correctness of any of its constructions. Each step in the development of science requires a critique of existing notions. The development of knowledge from the naive to the critical one shows a movement from a picture of the world as a set of stable things to a picture of continuous movement and change, where change is more important than what changes. Cohen sees such a development in an evolution of the concept of substance in modern physics and he welcomes the replacement of material substance by energy, seeing this movement as a confirmation of critical idealism. Finally, it is discussed whether we can speak of the actuality of Cohen’s logic of pure knowledge. (shrink)

The author clarifies the thesis of the social constructivists and shows how it is overlapping with some ideas of its critics. Based on established agreement between social constructivism and evolutionary epistemology, she argues that the conceptual elements of mathematical knowledge are social constructs.

Levinas aborde les questions de la chose et de la possession surtout dans le Carnet 4 dans sa théorie du besoin comme dans ses ébauches de romans. On voit dans ses ébauches un attachement humain aux choses qui semble absurde. La philosophie a désapprouvé presque toujours un tel attachement au nom de la liberté et de l’autonomie humaines. Quant à Levinas, il refuse le concept classique du sujet et commence dans les Carnets l’élaboration du sujet charnel. C’est dans un camp (...) de prisonniers qu’il développe sa théorie du besoin grâce à laquelle il crée la doctrine du sujet, qui n’est ni autosuffisance, ni le centre de lui-même. Son attitude principale envers le monde extérieur est de « manger ». Connaître et voir, c’est aussi « manger ». Dans ce contexte, les notions de l’il y a, d’intervalle et de lumière sont envisagées. Le sujet de la théorie du besoin transforme en « mangeant » l’extériorité en intériorité, et c’est pourquoi la solitude est son destin. Mais la théorie du besoin est suppléée dans les Carnets par la théorie de l’eros. Levinas écrit parfois l’eros, parfois l’amour. C’est dans sa théorie de l’amour qu’il parle du plaisir du plaisir de l’Autre et de la douleur de la douleur de l’Autre. On voit que dans une première ébauche de la philosophie lévinassienne Autrui est une personne aimée. (shrink)

Interview with Robert K. Logan by Marcin Trybulec.

Street festivals such as The Night of Culture (Noc Kultury) are aimed at fostering cultural participation. The growing popularity of such festivals raises the question, whether The Night of Culture creates an environment facilitating knowledge popularization. The paper explains that The Night of Culture creates an experience of engagement and immersion. The experience of immersion and engagement is grounded in blurring the clear distinction between representational objects and elements of so-called ordinary reality. Since the art installations at The Night of (...) Culture are often designed to be treated as an extension of the physical space in which the participant is located, from the participant’s perspective they lose the standard representational function. The paper explains that blurring the distinction between representation and reality impose serious limitation on treating the installations at The Night of Culture as the objects with a cognitive function. (shrink)

The problem of the Toronto School’s theoretical identity emerges from the recognition that the most influential figures of this orientation do not agree regarding the general idea of the School as a coherent theoretical trend. Moreover, the idea of “medium” central to this orientation is fundamentally ambiguous. Therefore the aim of the paper is to consider the identity of the Toronto School by referring to the so called materialistic interpretation of the media. The paper supports the thesis that the minimal (...) definition of communication technologies in terms of physical artifacts comprises the conceptual core of the Toronto School’s identity. The failure to consider the minimalistic definition of media results in the general blurring of the Toronto School’s theoretical identity. (shrink)

The problem of the Toronto School’s theoretical identity emerges from the recognition that the most influential figures of this orientation do not agree regarding the general idea of the School as a coherent theoretical trend. Moreover, the idea of “medium” central to this orientation is fundamentally ambiguous. Therefore the aim of the paper is to consider the identity of the Toronto School by referring to the so called materialistic interpretation of the media. The paper supports the thesis that the minimal (...) definition of communication technologies in terms of physical artifacts comprises the conceptual core of the Toronto School’s identity. The failure to consider the minimalistic definition of media results in the general blurring of the Toronto School’s theoretical identity. (shrink)

The concept of an extended cognitive system is central to contemporary studies of cognition. In the paper I analyze the place of the epistemic subject within the extended cognitive system. Is it extended as well? In answering this question I focus on the differences between the first and the second wave of arguments for the extended mind thesis. I argue that the position of Cognitive Integration represented by Richard Menary is much more intuitive and fruitful in analyses of cognition and (...) knowledge than the early argument formulated by Andy Clark and David Chalmers. Cognitive Integration is compatible with virtue epistemology of John Greco’s agent reliabilism. The epistemic subject is constituted by its cognitive character composed of an integrated set of cognitive abilities and processes. Some of these processes are extended, they are a manipulation of external informational structures and, as such, they constitute epistemic practices. Epistemic practices are normative; to conduct them correctly the epistemic subject needs to obey epistemic norms embedded in the cultural context. The epistemic subject is not extended because of the casual coupling with external informational artifacts which extend his mind from inside the head and into the world. Rather, cognitive practices constitute the subject’s mind, they transform his cognitive abilities, and this is what makes the mind and epistemic subject “extended”. (shrink)

The problem of the Toronto School’s theoretical identity emerges from the recognition that the most influential figures of this orientation do not agree regarding the general idea of the School as a coherent theoretical trend. Moreover, the idea of “medium” central to this orientation is fundamentally ambiguous. Therefore the aim of the paper is to consider the identity of the Toronto School by referring to the so called materialistic interpretation of the media. The paper supports the thesis that the minimal (...) definition of communication technologies in terms of physical artifacts comprises the conceptual core of the Toronto School’s identity. The failure to consider the minimalistic definition of media results in the general blurring of the Toronto School’s theoretical identity. (shrink)

The claim that the invention of literacy has cognitive consequences, so-called Literacy Theory, is subject to the criticism that it implies a form of technological determinism. This criticism, however, assumes an outdated Cartesian model of mind, a mind independent of the body and the external world. Such an internalistic framework leaves unexplored the cognitive consequences of the material dimension of writing. Therefore, in order to dismiss the accusations of technological determinism, the Cartesian model of mind and cognition needs to be (...) reconsidered. The paper demonstrates how the framework of situated cognition helps to account for the cognitive consequences of written artifacts themselves. Material characteristics of written vehicles such as spatial and temporal stability of the content, fixity of information with reference to page boundaries, lightness and small size of paper sheets, and spatial layout of documents make up the most relevant material factors enabling the distribution of cognitive work. (shrink)

In the paper, I distinguish the bottom-up strategy and the intentional stance strategy of analyzing group intentional states, and show that the thesis of distributed group subject of knowledge could be accommodated by either of them. Moreover, I argue that when combined with virtue reliabilism the thesis satisfactorily explains the phenomenon of group knowledge. To justify my argument, in the second part of the paper, I distinguish two accounts of justification pointing to conditions of group knowledge. The first, which I (...) call the belief-centered approach to group intentional states, determines the concept of group belief and group justificatory reason. The second, the process-centered approach represented by S. Orestis Palermos, employs the theory of virtue reliabilism and focuses on the group knowledge-conducive process. In the paper, I argue in favor of the latter as the internalism associated with the former appears to lack sufficient explanatory power. The theory of virtue epistemology runs into considerable difficulties when trying to deal with an extended epistemic subject composed of one individual and her cognitive artifact. In the two last parts of the paper, I consider the most important difficulties and argue that these obstacles are overcome once one adopts an approach combining virtue epistemology and the thesis of distributed group epistemic subject. (shrink)

The study poses the question about the consequences of incommensurability for the problem of linguistic relativity. One can reasonably argue that if two languages are incommensurable, contradiction cannot exist between the judgments formulated inside them. Therefore it is possible to compile linguistic worldviews of two incommensurable languages into one coherent cognitive perspective. The latter view is called into question; hence the article examines the problem of relation between linguistically determined incommensurable worldviews. In order to analyze the issue there are distinguished (...) three dimensions of incommensurability: linguistic incommensurability, incommensurability of experience and ontological incommensurability. Conclusion excludes possibility of compilation of two ontologically incommensurable into one coherent cognitive perspective. (shrink)

The topic of the paper is to be the problem of normativity within naturalised epistemology. I pose a question whether naturalism can be conducted as a normative enterprise or whether it is merely descriptive as traditional epistemologists and some naturalists maintain. The article consists of two parts. The first one is an introduction to the main theses of naturalised epistemology, and the second one presents and disputes arguments against naturalised epistemology introduced in Jonathan Knowles’ book Norms, Naturalism and Normativity. In (...) the first part of the paper I indicate main differences between traditional and naturalised epistemology, especially I analyse their answers to the most important epistemological questions: What is the source of epistemic norms? When are beliefs valuable and how to gain such beliefs? What are criteria of justified belief and knowledge? The reason of differences in solutions of these problems is rotted in a different attitude to the naturalistic fallacy taken by the two sides of the discussion. Naturalists treat this fallacy as something that cannot be avoided and this approach deeply influences their account of normativity. To justify this thesis I firstly recall the traditional meaning of “normativity” on the bases of Descartes’ epistemology, post-Cartesian internalists’ and neopositivits’ works. Secondly, I present how and why the meanings of “epistemic norm” and “justified belief” have changed within naturalism. In this part I refer to Quine’s and Goldman’s naturalism. The second part of the paper discuses Knowles’ argument that the task of delivering genuine epistemic norms by naturalism is misguided and unreachable, for norms which naturalists refer to are reducible to descriptive statements. Naturalism, therefore, cannot be normative and consequently it cannot be an epistemology. I do not agree with this statement and in the last part of the paper I present how naturalised epistemic norms could be understood as different from descriptive statements, what functions they could perform and why naturalised epistemology is not redundant. (shrink)

The aim of the paper is to distinguish and explain some imprecise expressions indicated by prof. Anna Jedynak. Moreover the paper is focused on the fundamental disagreement between the author and his critic, which is the meaning of the term "incommensurability".

There are at least two reasons for the wide spread of CAI: 1. that the student is able to control his own process of learning due to immediate evaluation of his work and progress and 2. that evaluation is homogeneous, i.e. independent of subjective fac- tors, which compensates for possible lack of depth. Also, the psychology of man is such that he is less ashamed to be reprimanded for his errors by a machine than by another human being. It is (...) a specic feature of computer aided instruction of logic, particulary the art of proving, that such a system cannot be made other than open. Fortunately, in the case of logic its language makes such a creation possible. An open system is a system that permits arbitrary proof of theorems as long as the former conform to the requirement of a given formal language. The discussed system, Mizar-MSE, evolved, roughly speaking, the above line of thought. It is a natural deduction system practically applied to student instruction. Here I would like to present some of more specic features. (shrink)

The paper undertakes the problem of normativity within naturalized epistemology. The following issue is analyzed: can naturalism be developed as a normative enterprise, and if it can, what conditions it must satisfy to achieve a status of epistemology? According to “the standard condition”, in order to give a substantial account of normativity naturalism must present a theory of epistemic norms which are derived from descriptive statements about facts but which are not reduced to them. The thesis is that although naturalism (...) cannot present the conception of genuine epistemic norms which satisfy “the standard condition” it is still normative. Namely, within naturalism epistemic norms are descriptive statements about empirical phenomena which are expressed in normative form for the sake of everyday life and scientific practice. (shrink)

This volume is written jointly by Witold Marciszewski, who contributed the introductory and the three subsequent chapters, and Roman Murawski who is the author of the next ones - those concerned with the 19th century and the modern inquiries into formalization, algebraization and mechanization of reasonings. Besides the authors there are other persons, as well as institutions, to whom the book owes its coming into being. The study which resulted in this volume was carried out in the Historical Section of (...) the research project _Logical Systems and Algorithms for Automatic Testing of Reasoning,_ 1986-1990, in which participated nine Polish universities; the project was coordinated by the Department of Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science of the Bia??l??ystok Branch of the University of Warsaw, and supported by the Ministry of Education 1987). The major part of the project was focussed on the software for computer-aided theorem proving called Mizar MSE ) due to Dr. Andrzej Trybulec. He and other colleagues deserve a grateful mention for a hands-on experience and theoretical stimulants owed to their collaboration. (shrink)