The affirmative answer to the title question is justified in two ways: logical and empirical. The logical justification is due to Gödel’s discovery that in any axiomatic formalized theory, having at least the expressive power of PA, at any stage of development there must appear unsolvable problems. However, some of them become solvable in a further development of the theory in question, owing to subsequent investigations. These lead to new concepts, expressed with additional axioms or rules. Owing to the so-amplified (...) axiomatic basis, new routine procedures like algorithms, can be reached. Those, in turn, help to gain new insights which lead to still more powerful axioms, and consequently again to ampler algorithmic resources. Thus scientific progress proceeds to an ever higher scope of solvability. The existence of such feedback cycles –in a formal way rendered with Turing’s systems of logic based on ordinal – gets empirically supported by the history of mathematics and other exact sciences. An instructive instance of such a process is found in the history of the number zero. Without that insight due to some ancient Hindu mathematicians there could not arise such an axiomatic theory as PA. It defines the algorithms of arithmetical operations, which in turn help intuitions; those, inturn, give rise to algorithmic routines, not available in any of the previous phases of the process in question. While the logical substantiation of the point of this essay is a well-established result of logico-semantic inquiries, its empiricalclaim, based on historical evidences, remains open for discussion. Hence the author’s intention to address philosophers and historians of science, and to encourage their critical responses. (shrink)

Artykuł referuje poglądy amerykańskiego filozofa Daniela C. Dennetta, dotyczące językowego charakteru świadomości. W pierwszym kroku autor rekonstruuje Dennettowską strategię naturalizacji świadomości, pokazując, jak język umożliwia powstanie świadomości w toku ewolucji ludzi. Naturalizacja ta jest możliwa, wedle Dennetta, jedynie przy behawiorystycznym założeniu, zgodnie z którym świadomość jest ukrytym zachowaniem językowym. Autor pokazuje, jak Dennett przyswaja i przekształca pierwotne pomysły behawiorystów Meada, Skinnera i Jaynesa, wpisując je w ewolucyjny scenariusz. Inskrypcja ta prowadzi do konkretnych problemów, rozważanych w ostatniej części pracy: a) w (...) filozofii Dennetta występują właściwie dwie definicje świadomości: pierwsza głosi, że świadomość jest pewnego rodzaju zachowaniem językowym, druga natomiast, że jest wirtualną maszyną memetyczną; b) Dennett nie wyjaśnia zasady rozstrzygalności, która pokazywałaby, jak dana treść umysłu może zostać uświadomiona, zamiast tego podaje tylko metaforę rywalizacji, w której pewne zdarzenia w mózgu wygrywają z innymi; c) wpisanie możliwego scenariusza rozwoju świadomości w pejzaż ewolucji nie oznacza jeszcze, że teoria może zostać empirycznie sprawdzona. (shrink)

Most discussions of the reproducibility crisis focus on its epistemic aspect: the fact that the scientific community fails to follow some norms of scientific investigation, which leads to high rates of irreproducibility via a high rate of false positive findings. The purpose of this paper is to argue that there is a heretofore underappreciated and understudied dimension to the reproducibility crisis in experimental psychology and neuroscience that may prove to be at least as important as the epistemic dimension. This is (...) the communication dimension. The link between communication and reproducibility is immediate: independent investigators would not be able to recreate an experiment whose design or implementation were inadequately described. I exploit evidence of a replicability and reproducibility crisis in computational science, as well as research into quality of reporting to support the claim that a widespread failure to adhere to reporting standards, especially the norm of descriptive completeness, is an important contributing factor in the current reproducibility crisis in experimental psychology and neuroscience. (shrink)

We argue that Yarkoni's proposed solutions to the generalizability crisis are half-measures because he does not recognize that the crisis arises from investigators' underappreciation of the roles of theory in experimental research. Rather than embracing qualitative analysis, the research community should make an effort to develop better theories and work toward consistently incorporating theoretical results into experimental practice.

La compréhension de la raison humaine a été déterminante pour la phénoménologie de Husserl. Des Recherches logiques à la Krisis , le problème de la raison semble l'un de ses principaux thèmes de réflexion. Husserl aborde la question sous plusieurs angles distincts, évoquant les concepts de monde, de temps et de responsabilité. Ses découvertes l'ont conduit à identifier la crise de la culture. Les commentateurs doivent aujourd'hui mettre en question le concept husserlien de raison, s'ils veulent comprendre pleinement cette thèse. (...) Cet article fait valoir que le concept de raison de Husserl est élaboré en corrélation avec celui de non-raison, conduisant les phénoménologues à adopter une division binaire entre rationalité et irrationalité. Par contraste avec les commentateurs qui accentuent le caractère rationnel de la phénoménologie husserlienne, cet article affirme que l'introduction du concept d'irrationalité dans l'investigation phénoménologique élargit significativement la compréhension initiale de la phénoménologie telle qu'elle est définie dans les Recherches . Husserl fut confronté à cette question par ses propres recherches. En conséquence, on affirme ici que la phénoménologie a connu un développement immanent menant de la thèse de la raison objective à celle de la corrélation entre raison et non-raison. (shrink)

Inequality of incomes is one of the significant factors forming the social capital. Two views dominate among economists dealing with the influence of inequality of income on economic growth. On the one hand, a too low inequality of income does not motivate people to increase the labour productivity. A low inequality of income might result from an extended social care system and overloading GDP with social transfers. A good example of it may be a situation when the unemployed refuses to (...) accept a job offer and prefers the unemployment benefit rather to a slightly higher salary. Moreover, a lack of incentives for the employee who fails to acknowledge the economic sense of increasing the productivity of his work might lead to the slower growth of economy. On the other hand, a contrary view suggests that an increase of the inequality of income has a negative impact on the economy. The accumulation of wealth by a small number of citizens raises doubts about good use of that wealth for investments necessary for the growth of the economy. An excessive inequality of income is confronted with disapproval of the significant part of society and regarded as unfair and unjustified. It may also increase the crime level and decrease the trust and, more generally, lead to the weakening of social capital. The arguments above lead to a hypothesis that the influence of the inequality of income on the growth of the economy has a non-linear character. We confirmed this hypothesis in growth models of the US and Swedish economies. We assess the historically optimal inequality of income measured by the Gini coefficient at 46% and 24% for the US and Sweden respectively. The optimal inequality of income in Poland was assessed previously at 29%. The dissimilarities may result from the cultural differences, educational level differences, ethnic differences and differences in diligence. (shrink)

Autor przedstawia krytyczną analizę pewnych idei nominalistycznej teorii N. Goodmana w interpretacji R. Eberlego. Teoria ta, czyli „rachunek indywiduów", oparta jest na trzech podstawowych pojęciach, zasadzie sumowania, relacji „część-całość" i zasadzie indywidualizacji. Owe pojęcia wzięte razem charakteryzują przedmioty, które chcemy zaliczyć do indywiduów, przy czym charakterystyka ta określa raczej czym jest pewien zespół indywiduów, niż to czym jest pojedyncze indywiduum. Według Eberlego na specjalną uwagę zasługują tzw. atomistyczne uniwersa indywiduów. Definicja takich uniwersów ma stanowić właśnie określenie tego, czym są indywidua. (...) W ogólności „atomistyczne uniwersum indywiduów" to podzbiór pola relacji „część-całość", w którym są spełnione odpowiednie warunki dotyczące sumowania i indywidualizacji przedmiotów. Pojęcie to autor wiąże z atomizmem logicznym B. Russella oraz rozważa jego możliwe zastosowania. (shrink)

The paper is a comment on distributed cognition treated as an approach to the study of all cognition. This account is presented by E. Hutchins in the article “The cultural ecosystem of human cognition”, as well as in other works.

In 1951–1952 a selected committee appointed by the US Congress investigated the circumstances of the so-called Katyn Crime. The reasons why the highest US legislative body undertook the issue hale to be sought in the international situation of the day, which was determined by the Korean War.The “Katyn Committee” was called up on September 18, 1951 by the House of Representatives of the 82nd Congress on the strength of Resolution 390. Sitting on it were Daniel L. Flood, Thaddeus M. Machrowicz, (...) George A. Dondero, Foster Furcolo, Alvin K. O’Konski, Timothy P. Sheenan and Ray J. Madden, who was also appointed its chairman. The committee began interrogating witnesses on October 11, 1951 and closed the interrogations on November 14, 1952. Simultaneously, the committee inspected 183 material exhibits pertaining to the Katyn event. In all the committee took down the testimonies of 81 main and about 200 secondary witnesses as well as about a hundred written testimonies and accounts.The committee’s final report to the House of Representatives clearly stated the responsibility of the Soviet NKVD for the 1940 massacre of around 15,000 Polish officers from POW camps in Kozielsk, Starobielsk and Ostaszków.In response to the committee’s proceedings the east bloc staged a propaganda campaign aimed at discrediting its work and upholding the so-called Katyn Lie—a 1943—originated false version of the events whereby the executions of the Polish officers had been carried out by the Germans in the latter half of 1941.The Soviet government took an official stand on the committee on February 29, 1952. It rejected all possibility of cooperation and underscored the Germans’ responsibility for the massacre. On March 1, 1952 the Polish government issued a statement condemning the committee and reiterating the false version of the Katyn incident. This statement appeared in the March 1 edition of the national daily Trybuna Ludu under the heading, The Polish nation indignantly condemns the cynical provocations of American imperialists, who are feeding on the tragic deaths of thousands of Polish citizens in Katyn.The main wave of attacks on the Madden Committee rolled through the Eastern European press in March, 1952. It was most intense in the Soviet Union and Poland, but also penetrated to other countries like Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria. In the USSR most of the related coverage was published in the communist party daily Pravda. In Poland articles attacking the Madden Committee and propagating the false version of the Katyn events appeared in all dailies and periodicals, including the party, military, youth, branch and satirical press. Especially avid in this respect were papers brought out by the Czytelnik publishers, notably Życie Warszawy. Also published was a deceitful book The Truth About Katyn by Boleslaw Wójcicki.Simultaneously to the press campaign against the Madden Committee the eastern countries launched broad scale repressions involving the prosecution, courts and intelligence services. (shrink)

1. Phenomenology is first and foremost about intentionality. As Husserl puts it, “Intentionality is the name of the problem encompassed by the whole of phenomenology”.1 Broadly understood, the phen...

The paper presents two objections against Putnam’s Twin Earth argument, which was intended to secure semantic externalism. I first claim that Putnam’s reasoning rests on two assumptions and then try to show why these assumptions are contentious. The first objection is that, given what we know about science, it is unlikely that there are any natural-kind terms whose extension is codetermined by a small set of microstructures required by Putnam’s indexical account of extension determination. The second objection is that there (...) may not be a plausible concept of a speech community whose adoption would classify Oscar and Twin Oscar as members of different speech communities and, at the same time, render Oscar and Twin Oscar as being in the same psychological state. I contend that Putnam’s argument fails because both objections are justified. (shrink)

Theories of discursive integration form a group of theories that see the principles responsible for the integration of experience data (apperception) in the practices and schemes of discourse. These theories indicate that the use of language unites and organizes experience data. Their main assumption can be expressed as follows: this integration does not inhere in objects and cannot be derived from them; hence this integration cannot be secondarily expressed in language, but results exclusively from the use of language (or discourse). (...) In this article, Witold Marzęda gives an overview of narrativist theories, script theories, Gazzaniga and Dennett’s models, which refer to evolutionary psychology, and the theories of Lakoff and Johnson – all these being theories of discursive integration. Marzęda’s main objective is to formulate a paradox, which consists in a trap of self-referentiality into which these theories fall: they postulate some general properties of discourse, which, firstly, do not have to become at once the properties of individual models and which, secondly, do not admit of falsification. (shrink)

This volume is written jointly by Witold Marciszewski, who contributed the introductory and the three subsequent chapters, and Roman Murawski who is the author of the next ones - those concerned with the 19th century and the modern inquiries into formalization, algebraization and mechanization of reasonings. Besides the authors there are other persons, as well as institutions, to whom the book owes its coming into being. The study which resulted in this volume was carried out in the Historical Section (...) of the research project _Logical Systems and Algorithms for Automatic Testing of Reasoning,_ 1986-1990, in which participated nine Polish universities; the project was coordinated by the Department of Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science of the Bia??l??ystok Branch of the University of Warsaw, and supported by the Ministry of Education 1987). The major part of the project was focussed on the software for computer-aided theorem proving called Mizar MSE ) due to Dr. Andrzej Trybulec. He and other colleagues deserve a grateful mention for a hands-on experience and theoretical stimulants owed to their collaboration. (shrink)

There seems to be something mysterious about applications of for- mal systems, including those of logic, to empirical reality 1 . If logic is to be applied to empirical situations, like those described in an ordinary lan- guage, then { it seems to some people { its statements cannot be necessary, or analytic, propositions. However, they are both applicable and necessary. This supposed puzzle constitutes a signicant part of the problem of philo- sophical foundations of logic 2 . To this (...) mind of the present writer, there is no mystery of applications, since any empirical, or even ostensive, predicate can be involved in cer- tain meaning postulates, e.g. \No red is green", which are both empirical and necessary propositions; empirical as they involve ostensibly dened predicated; necessary, as it is enough to know their meaning to state, their validity. The case of logical theorems can be considered at the same footing, logical constants being treated as dened ostensively. Nevertheless, not an individual state of mind but the actual state of scholarly discussions makes something a problem; in the present state of foundational discussions on logic, the \mystery of applications" preserves its vitality, hence any new way of dealing with it proves welcome. (shrink)

This paper seeks to define the main trends, arguments and problems regarding the question of method formulated by Twardowski and his students. In this regard, the aim of the paper is twofold. First, I situate Brentano’s project of descriptive psychology within the context of disputes in the school of Twardowski concerning the method of both psychology and phenomenology, arguing that descriptive-psychological analysis was dominant in this respect. Second, the study explores the notion of eidetic phenomenology, as founded on a methodological (...) procedure, which supposed to guarantee infallibility of its descriptions. To show this, I first reconstruct Brentano’s concept of descriptive psychology, its object, its method and aims. Second, I track the changes and reinterpretations provided by Twardowski in his view of descriptive-psychological analysis. Third, I explore Witwicki’s and Bandrowski’s—both early students of Twardowski—discussions of the descriptive approach. I try to show that the former accepted psychologism, while the latter overcame it by means of logical analysis. Fourth, I suggest that the only student of Twardowski who renounced the Brentanian method was Ingarden, who developed eidetic phenomenology. Finally, I present Blaustein’s—one of the last students of Twardowski—reappraisal of descriptive psychology and his critique of Ingarden’s method. This controversy over the method of descriptive psychology reveals how one can situate Twardowski’s legacy within early phenomenology in Poland. (shrink)