Russkai︠a︡ t︠erkovʹ i drugie statʹi -- V temnykh religioznykh luchakh.

Zusammenfassung Der Beitrag widmet sich der Entstehung des Faches Religionsgeschichte in Frankreich. Die Vorgeschichte zu diesem Prozess beginnt mit Benjamin Constants Religionsphilosophie der 1810–1820er Jahre, in der die lokalen und diachronen Veränderungen des allgemein menschlichen religiösen Gefühls als ein Schlüssel zur Religionsgeschichte verstanden wurden. Nach einer langen Pause wird das Thema des religiösen Gefühls in Albert Révilles liberaltheologischem Projekt wieder aktuell. Ausgehend von Schleiermachers Voraussetzungen hoffte Réville dadurch die Apologetik zu modernisieren wie auch den Weg zum theologischen Inklusivismus zu bahnen. (...) Sein Sohn Jean, ebenfalls Theologe, neutestamentlicher Forscher und Sentimentalist, arbeitete mit dem Vater zusammen an der Institutionalisierung des Faches Religionsgeschichte in Frankreich. Albert Réville leitete von 1886 bis zu seinem Tod 1906 die fünfte (religionswissenschaftliche) Sektion der École Pratique des Hautes Études, gleichzeitig war Jean Réville seit 1884 Herausgeber der Fachzeitschrift Revue de l’histoire des religions. Révilles theoretischer Standpunkt wurde von É. Durkheim und seinen Gleichgesinnten H. Hubert und M. Mauss, die die weitere weltanschauliche Säkularisierung förderten, nach 1898 stark kritisiert. Diese Serie von Erwiderungen zeigt die Kluft zwischen der Methodologie der (dem Ursprung nach) evangelischen Religionsgeschichte und der durkheimischen Religionssoziologie. (shrink)

This set reprints volumes that were orginally published by Routledge and Kegan Paul Ltd. in 1953. Landmark volumes at the time of their original publication, these titles do not merely expound the theoretical constructions of Russian philosophers, but also relate these constructions to the general conditions of Russian life. Volume One examines the historical conditions of the development of philosophy in Russia and explores the general features of Russian philosophy. It also surveys the principal works on the history of Russian (...) philosophy. Volume Two includes biographies and examination of the themes of the following philosophers; Vladimir Solovyov, V.D. Kudryavtsev, N.F. Fyodorov and Later Hegelians such as Chicherin, Debolski and Bakunin. This volume also provides analysis of various schools of thought in Russian philosophy in the twentieth century, for example; Neo-Leibzianism, Modern Positivism and New-Marxism to name but a few. (shrink)

Sexuality education is fundamental in higher and tertiary education institutions (HTEIs). Evidence suggests that its effective education is through translations into the first language of learners. However, in global and multilingual cultural communities such as HTEIs, the foundations for these translations are still a researchable area. Notably, in HTEIs adolescents, young adults and adults co-exist and therefore, any translations must be toned to balance across these groups. The aim of this study was to establish strategies that could enable sexuality educators (...) to effectively transfer information that is steeped in indigenous language, religious and cultural meaning without precipitating stigma and taboo issues. The study setting was the National University of Science and Technology where a cross section of indigenous cultures, languages and religions co-existed with other global cultures. A University Community-based Participatory Research (CBPR) methodology was administered by the researchers using a Delphi research approach to students and staff. Multilingual, multilayered, multireligious, and multicultural nature of the setting presented serious challenges that compromised the prevention of stigma and taboo issues when dealing with sexuality education. We recommend that the strategy to present sexuality education in indigenous languages to the generality of HTEIs population should, in the first instance, involve systematic identification of appropriate interventions that are religious, cultural, and language-specific. Contribution: This research reveals paramount ethical and religious violations that have a potential to precipitate opportunistic sexual relationships that may lead to impediments in capacity building for learners. This research can be utilised by academics on the field of Practical Theology, specifically youth ministry and pastoral care. (shrink)

Wedin considers the relation between the ontological commitment in the Categories and the semantical theory of underlying ontological configurations for standard categorical statements. According to Wedin, Aristotle's fourfold division of beings, which divides things according to whether they are, or are not, said of, and/or present in a subject, is a meta‐ontology that is concerned with beings per se, i.e. the fundamental things that are. Wedin explains that the primacy of c‐substance involves an asymmetry in the relation between c‐substance and (...) everything else, or between the substantial and the nonsubstantial. This is because there is an ontological dependence of non‐substances, and also of secondary substances, on substances: everything is either said of, or in, primary substance. The argument of this chapter, then, is that the world of the Categories is a world of individuals: all ontological relations needed for semantics can be accommodated by appeal to individuals only. (shrink)

Wedin argues that Aristotle makes form the substance of c‐substances because it is the essence of the c‐substance. Much of this chapter consists of a careful examination of a passage in Metaphysics Zeta 4, which Wedin calls the ‘New Primacy Passage’, that is crucial to Wedin's overall thesis, because here Aristotle appeals to a notion of definitional primacy, as opposed to the ontological primacy of the Categories. Z.4 focuses on this claim that form must be essence: Wedin argues that essence (...) is a certain kind of form, a form of a genus ; this does not mean ‘species’, as some commentators have thought. This is because the species is a combination of form and matter, whereas the genous eidos, Wedin argues, is the formal part only of the definition that applies to the thing. On Wedin's account, Aristotle introduces the notion of explanatory primacy of form in Z.4. (shrink)

Aristotle claims in Metaphysics Z.17 that form is both a cause and principle of c‐substances. In this chapter, Wedin argues that the explanatory, or causal, role of form is in the background of the entire discussion, and indeed directs much of the argumentation of Metaphysics Zeta. Form is the cause of some matter being a unity and not a heap, because form alone explains how the material parts of a thing are united in a single whole. Wedin draws together the (...) main results of the preceding investigation of Zeta—that form is essence, that form must not contain matter or actual parts, and that form must not be a certain kind of universal—and he argues that these constraints on form are designed to serve the explanatory role that Aristotle explicitly gives to form in Z.17. Wedin emphasizes that the notions isolated in the examination of the earlier chapters, such as the purity of form, weak proscription, and dual complexity, each contribute to the account of form as the explanatory principle of c‐substance. (shrink)

Wedin offers an interpretation of Metaphysics Zeta 13, a very important and difficult chapter, where Aristotle apparently denies that substance is a universal, having, on most accounts, already claimed that form is substance, and that form is a universal. This interpretation of the argument of Z.13, Wedin argues, threatens the possibility of attaining a definition of substance, and places in doubt what has gone before in the treatise. According to Wedin, what Aristotle is concerned with in Z.13 is not the (...) denial that substance is a universal but rather with the denial that anything predicated universally of a c‐substance is the substance‐of the c‐substance, which Wedin calls ‘Weak proscription’. In Wedin's account of Z.13, then, Aristotle is continuing to pursue issues first raised in Z.10–11 that have to do with the relations between form and definition, and form and the universal. Wedin also argues that the dilemma at the conclusion of Z.13, regarding the definability of substance, is resolved in Z.16, with the notion of ‘Dual Complexity’, according to which the parts of a form exist potentially in the form, just as the parts of the c‐substance exist potentially in the c‐substance. (shrink)

Wedin's main point in this book is that the question of Metaphysics Zeta, ‘what is substance?’, should be understood as the question, ‘what is the substance of c‐substances?’. In other words, in virtue of what are the substances of the Categories the sort of things they are—in virtue of what do they have the central, salient features mentioned but not explained in the Categories? Aristotle's answer is that it is in virtue of a structural component of the c‐substance—the form: form, (...) then, is primary substance, but this primacy is explanatory and not ontological. Thus, in Zeta, c‐substances are subjected to hylomorphic analysis, i.e. in terms of form and matter, two entities that are not even mentioned in the Categories: for Wedin this shows that Aristotle in the Categories has no interest in the structure of primary substances, because it is irrelevant to the purpose of the treatise. Hence, the treatises are complementary because ontological primacy is given to c‐substances, and explanatory primacy to their forms. (shrink)

Wedin addresses the debate over whether nonsubstantial individuals, that inhere in a subject but are not said of a subject, i.e. accidents, such as the pallor of Socrates, are nonrecurring particulars or a kind of determinate universal. Wedin examines the secondary literature on this topic and divides it into two schools of thought, determined by the contributions of J.L. Ackrill and G.E.L. Owen. According to Ackrill, individuals in non‐substance categories are particular to the substance they are in; Owen critiques Ackrill's (...) view, and proposes that these items can recur in more than one subject and hence are a sort of universal. Wedin finds Owen's thesis unsatisfactory, even after supplementing it with an improved version due to Michael Frede; instead, Wedin argues for a revised version of Ackrill's interpretation of nonsubstantial individuals as nonrecurrent particulars. According to Wedin, Aristotle is committed to individuals only—e.g. to Socrates and to the particular bit of pallor in him: this conclusion has an important bearing on the ontological status of individuals and on the primacy of substance to nonsubstantial items. (shrink)

Wedin considers the problem of the compatibility of the Categories account of primary substance with the theory of substantial form of the Metaphysics. Wedin collects from the secondary literature the most important arguments for incompatibilism, and offers some proposals for restoring their harmony. While admitting the evident differences in the way Aristotle treats the question of substance in each treatise, Wedin is keen to argue that these differences are not sufficient to conclude that the treatises are incompatible. Wedin singles out (...) for particular attention, and criticism, Michael Frede and Gunther Patzig's account of Metaphysics Zeta, according to which the primary substance of the Metaphysics and the basic subject of predications is the form. Wedin considers two ‘philosophical’ arguments and one ‘Aristotelian’ argument for the subjecthood of forms, and argues that the textual evidence does not support the claim that form is the subject of accidents. (shrink)

Chapters 10 and 11 are critical to the argument of Metaphysics Zeta: these chapters are concerned with the purification of form. Z.10 introduces the apparatus of part and whole and consists of an argument to the end that form and its parts have priority over the other internal structural components of c‐substances, i.e. matter and the compound of form and matter; while in Z.11 Aristotle argues that form and its parts cannot involve any admixture of matter. Wedin argues that the (...) causal role of form presupposes its purity: if form is to explain why a certain portion of matter constitutes a c‐substance of a given kind, then matter—whether this latter is understood as functional, or remnant matter—cannot already be contained in the form. This is the ‘purity thesis’, as Wedin calls it: matter cannot be included in the definitions of natural organisms, Wedin points out, because that would make the explanandum a part of the principle that explains it. Wedin also argues that form must be sufficiently complex to provide definitions of the natures of particular compounds, which are complex, even though form itself is a kind of universal. (shrink)

In the Metaphysics, Aristotle often says that ‘form is substance’: in this chapter, Wedin argues that ‘substance’ in this context means the ‘substance‐of’ c‐substances. Wedin begins by examining Aristotle's use, and retention, of the framework of the Categories in Metaphysics Zeta, before turning to discuss Z.3, which is crucial to understanding the relation between the Categories and Metaphysics theories of substance, because it is usually thought that here Aristotle departs from the substance of the Categories. Wedin denies that Z.3 involves (...) a rejection of the Categories subjecthood criterion for primary substance: Aristotle rejects only the claim that one thing is the substance of another simply if it is the primary underlying subject of the other. Wedin argues that in Z.3 Aristotle introduces the idea of the ‘substance‐of’ a thing, and identifies as candidates for the substance of c‐substances the internal structural components form, matter, and the compound of form and matter. (shrink)

Wedin discusses Aristotle's claims in Metaphysics Zeta 6 that the essence of a thing is to be sought among its per se attributes, and that each thing that is primary and spoken of per se, e.g. primary substance, is the same as its essence. Wedin argues that the Zeta 6 Thesis, i.e. that the essence of a thing is the thing's immediate essence, is a crucial requirement of the explanatory role of essence as the substance of c‐substances. According to Wedin, (...) Aristotle introduces this requirement in order to establish that a thing's essence cannot depend on another essence. Form must be the essence; if form cannot explain the nature of the thing of which it is the form, there would be the threat of a regress of explanatory forms. At the end of the chapter, Wedin considers the problem that the identity of a thing and its essence is a requirement that can be met by non‐substance items, but he denies that this leads to a dilution of the conception of substance. (shrink)

This essay explores the aspects of the Aristotelian psuchē that accounts for its contemporary appeal. The poverty of the notion of the mind is discussed. The superiority of the psuchē over the mind is emphasized.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:BOOK REVIEWS 375 7he Westminster Dictionary of Christian Ethics. Edited by JAMES F. CHILDRESS and J mrn MACQUARRIE. Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1986. Pp. xvii + 678. $29.95. This is a second, revised edition of The Dictionary of Christian Ethics, prepared by John Macquarrie and published in 1967. This new edition follows Macquarrie's conception of a dictionary, but expands it. It includes several subject areas, basic ethical concepts, biblical (...) ethics, theological ethics, philosophical ethics, non-Cbistian ethics; psychological, 8ociological, political, and other relevant concepts; and articles on substantial issues such as war and abortion. The criterion for selection, as stated by the editor, was the importance of the topic for Christian ethical reflection. The aim was to indicate both what is agr.eed upon and what is controversial. About 40% of the entries from the first edition have been included. These are generally updated so as to include recent developments. The selection of subjects, the way in which they are treated and the list of contributors, reflect the ecumenical character of contemporary Christian ethics. The dictionary includes a host of valuable contributions. Readers who consults the work will no doubt evaluate the entries in terms of their particular purposes. This reviewer found most useful the entries which expla~ned particular basic concepts, for example Autonomy; those dealing with schools of thought, for example, Platonic Ethics, Marxist Ethics, or the contribution of particular traditions, for example, Jewish Ethics, Puritan Ethics, Official Roman Catholic Social Teaching, Eastern Orthodox Christian Ethics, and the many entries dealing with Biomedical Ethics and peace issues. 'rhere are a number of articles on topics which are most important, but for which it is often difficult to find a succinct and comprehensive treatment; such are the contributions on "Embodiment," and " Feminist Ethics." There are a number of useful entries on urg.ent contemporary questions such as Energy and Environmental Ethics. Practical questions such as the care of the aged and the ethics of counseling are also addressed. Each article has a short bibliography appended. Numerous cross-references to other relevant entries are most helpful in providing complementary information. There is a thorough index of names. The dictionary is not conceived as a compendium of the accepted or " official " ethical teachings of churches or religious traditions. Mention could be made, however, of the entry on " Official Roman Catholic Social Teaching." '¥here such teachings exist, they am usually indicated. There are some cases where the churches and/or traditions clearly differ. The approach which is most helpful to ethical debate is to acknowledge such differences clearly, with an appropriate statement of the relevant teaching. The editor himself (James F. Childress), in his own contributions, fol- 376 BOOK REVIEWS lows this p1'0cedure. Some Roman Catholic readers may find the articles on Abortion and Contraception, while excellent in other ways, less satisfactory in this respect. The general focus seems intended to be " middle of the road "; more conservative or radical groups may find their views insufficiently represented. No doubt some of the positions presented would be disputed by Christian ethicists. But the treatment of difficult points is balanced and fair. There are, unfortunately, some inaccuracies. The following examples deserve mention. In the article on Nullity, the Roman Catholic annulment is wrongly equated with papal dissolution of the marriage bond. In the article on Virtue, it is said that St. Thomas held that along with the infused supernatural virtues there are "infused natural virtues." St. Thomas spoke ratht>r of infused theological virtues and infused moral virtues (I. II, Q.63, 3.) In the article on deterrence, it is stated that the strategy of "mutual assured destruction ", dating from the 1960s, still provides the framework of American deterrence strategy. This point would be challenged by some representat.ives of the military, who claim that M.A.D. has not been policy for some years. The same article interprets the U.S. Bishops' Pastoral Letter, The Challenge of Peace. as basing its (conditional) acceptance of nuclear deterrence on the distinction between threatening to do an immoral aet without intending to do it, and threat coupled with the intent. That is, deterrence is aceepted as a "bluff." This is not a correct reading... (shrink)

In his article Evgeny Borisov offers an original solution to Kripke’s sceptical problem of meaning. Its conceptual core is the point of view of the participant of speech acts. He believes that first-person statements of speech act participants like “I know for certain that the expression ‘e’ is used by me in the meaning of m” cannot carry any epistemic fallacies. As a criticism, I propose to point out that non-factual Cartesian semantics have serious epistemic flaws that make it vulnerable (...) to sceptical attacks and accusations of petitio principii. (shrink)

The paper deals with the questions of whether naturalization of ethical theory is possible and how radical it should be. The answer to these questions depends largely on the scientific explanations of the process of moral evaluation. The author concentrates on a moderate version of naturalization, which involves merely correcting the conclusions of normative ethics by appealing to scientific evidence. A good example of moderate naturalization is the project of debunking deontological moral principles of J. Green. From J. Green’s point (...) of view, the most important of such principles (“it is impermissible to harm other people as a means of achieving a utilitarian goal, but it is permissible to cause such harm as a side-effect of its achievement”) reflects the functioning of the emotional alarm system, which in the early ages of human history protected small groups from internal violence using contact means of harm. The means of harm have since expanded, but the inflexible emotional part of our psyche still dictates the limits of permissibility. This dictate has no reasonable grounds, and the abovementioned principle cannot claim to be objective and universal. The author shows that the data used by J. Green is different from the results of studies by Yu.I. Aleksandrov and K.R. Arutyunova on the impact of alcohol intoxication on making deontological and utilitarian moral evaluations. These results indicate that both the deontological and the utilitarian principles are partly based on the emotional subsystem. Accordingly, a normative ethicist is forced to choose as the scientific basis of his or her research some of the opposing scientific models that explain the process of making moral evaluations. Some of the models are consistent with the moderate naturalization project, others are not. The choice between models depends exclusively on already taken metaethical and normative preferences. (shrink)

The article shows that Borisov’s direct solution to the problem of skepticism about meaning using a special type of introspection is associated with the assumption of the agent’s direct access to their own consciousness. This assumption has two complicating consequences: the analogy with Moore’s paradox and the Platonic concept of meaning. It is also shown that direct access to meaning as a way of Borisov’s direct solution of the skeptical paradox significantly uses the performativity of the speech act, narrowing the (...) scope of analysis of the original problem. The little-studied problem of distinction in the analysis of the skeptical paradox of meaningful and formalized mathematics is noted. (shrink)