The issue of wiping over socks is part of the more general issue of wiping over leather socks (khuffayn) for ablution (wuḍū’). Washing feet or wiping over them is a debate whose sides bases their claims on the verses of the Qur’an and supports these claims with narrations. When performing ablution, if shoes or socks are on the feet, whether one can wipe over them without taking these off and the qualities that these clothes should have is a debate based (...) on hadith narrations. Most Muslims except for the Ja’farite are of the opinion that either washing the feet or wiping over a khuff or similar clothing that was put on while a person already had ablution can be done during ablution, while the Ja’farite think that wiping over bare feet is enough but wiping over khuff is not. There is a consensus that shoes, boots, buskins and other leather footwear qualify as khuff. However, there is disagreement over whether clothing from materials like cotton, linen, wool, and felt -usually referred to as socks- qualify as khuff. For this reason, some Muslims of the world wipe over socks while others do not. There are contemporary fatwas (legal opinion) that are supportive of either of the positions. However, there are those who treat this issue beyond choosing a side in an ijtihad (process of juristic legal reasoning) and some who wipe on socks are censured strongly. In this research based on an examination of the fiqh heritage, the goal is to contribute to making this issue better understood and its fiqh ruling clearer.Summary: The sixth verse of Surah Ma’idah in the Qur’an clearly states that wuḍū’ requires washing the face, arms up until elbows, and wiping over the head. However, when it comes to the fourth element of wuḍū’, the feet, there has been disagreement about whether it should be wiped or washed. Arabic grammar rules and narrations have been interpreted in ways that support both views; in general Sunni sects, Zaydis, and Kharijites argue the feet should be washed while Shia Ja’farites are in favor of wiping over bare feet. There have also been efforts among faqihs (jurists) to reconcile washing and wiping; washing slightly; choosing the better one between the two; washing when not covered, wiping when covered; washing if there is dirt, wiping if it is clean; viewing at least wiping as fard (obligatory), washing as a Sunna (recommended) that includes the fard as a way to unify the two approaches have also been proposed.According to widely accepted narrations, the prophet and his companions washed their feet when performing wuḍū’ and once they put on their shoes having had wuḍū’, the next time they only wiped over the shoes without taking them off. In less commonly accepted narrations, which some hadith authorities regard as authentic, the Prophet is said to have wiped over his socks. In narration sources, it has been narrated that about fifteen faqih companions, among them ʿUmar b. al-Khaṭṭāb, ʿAlī b. Abī Ṭālib, ʿAbdallāh Ibn Masʿūd, ʿAbdallāh b. ʿAbbās, ʿAbdallāh b. ʿUmar, saw wiping over socks as appropriate. However, there are no narrations about the companions disapproving of wiping over socks. Among those who approved of wiping over socks are tābiʿūn (successors) faqihs like Saʿīd b. D̲j̲ubayr, Saʿīd b. al-Musayyab, Ibrāhīm al-Nakhaʿī, ʿAṭāʾ b. Abī Rabāḥ, al-Ḥasan al-Baṣrī ve al-Aʿmash, and Mujtahid Imams like Zufar, Sufyan al-Thawri, al-Ḥasan b. Ṣāliḥ, Ibn al-Mubārak, Abū Yūsuf, Muḥammad al-Shaybānī, Aḥmad b. Ḥanbal, Isḥāq b. Rāhawayh. Considering their most prominent positions, we can say that Ḥanafis and Shafis allow wiping over socks that are thick and opaque, Hanbalis allow it over socks that cover the foot even if thin, while Mālikīs do not allow wiping over socks at all.As far as it is understood from narrations from the Prophet’s time, due to both climate conditions and weaving possibilities, socks were used only rarely. Also, footwear like shoes or slippers made of leather were very hard to find and narrations suggest that prayers were performed at houses and the masjids over soil base on either bare foot or with shoes. For these reasons, the issue of wiping over socks did not arise at the time and at later periods different opinions on the issue led to disagreements. When carpets were placed on the ground at later periods, performing the prayer with shoes was abandoned and a second layer of shoes (khuff) was placed inside the shoes as khuff. Since removing the shoes would invalidate wuḍū’ performed over that shoe, those who wanted to avoid the difficulty of having to wash their feet each time they needed wuḍū’ have instead wiped over this second layer once they put them on after performing wuḍū’.Ḥanafīs and Shāfiʿīs, who tend to approach the issue of wiping over socks with hesitation and make this conditional on some strict rules, emphasize that the socks to be wiped over should be similar to shoes in terms of thickness, based on the idea that it is certain that the Prophet has wiped over shoes made of leather but his wiping over socks is weaker and that the qualities of those socks are not clear. Among the thickness criteria expressed for the socks are being waterproof, the ability to walk for at least a league with it, and its ability to hold on to feet without being tied at the wrists. Due to these criteria, which have been developed to protect the wuḍū’ and whose boundaries are not well specified, especially among Ḥanafis the idea that wiping over socks is not allowed has gained popularity. As opposed to this, in circles dominated by Ḥanbalīs opinions allowing wiping over any type of socks have been expressed.At times when the Prophet had his shoes on and did not want to take off his shoes, he used to wipe over the shoes. The equivalent of this act today is to wipe over socks since prayer with shoes on is not common any more. While nowadays wiping over socks is an ease for everybody when performing wuḍū’, it is something that is especially needed under certain circumstances. Cold weather and the lack of drying possibilities for the feet leading catching cold and illness, socks that are put on when feet are wet leading to bad smell and fungus on feet, the hardship of elevating the feet high enough to the sink and of changing socks on one foot when there are no special wuḍū’ places, the fact that at societies distant from Islamic culture it is seen against the etiquette to wash feet in the sink are among the reasons why this need arises. Because most of the time we are not in a position to determine the circumstances of our work and travels at modern times, it can be said that today this need is more than it was in the past.Some scholars of today use a precautionary principle and argue that the Qur’an commands to wash the feet, and the only narration powerful enough to make an exception to this rule is about masts made of leather, and extending this to include socks would go against the precaution principle and some other principles of uṣūl al-fiqh (Islamic legal theory). However, some other scholars who use the ease in religion principle argue that the permission to wipe over masts also include wiping over socks and that they are of the same nature, that there are authentic narrations that show wiping over socks are allowed and that one can even talk of an ijmāʿ (consensus) among the companions on this issue, and that seeking additional qualities socks on which one is to wipe over, such as thickness, ability to walk with it, its ability to hold on to the feet, being waterproof, have no merit in the sharīʿa. Jamaleddīn Qāsimī, who wrote a special research book on the topic, and scholars like Abū l-Aʿlā Mawdūdī, Yūsuf al-Qaradāwī, ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz b. Bāz, Ibn al Uthaymeen think that one can wipe over daily socks that do not show the skin beneath it, while scholars predominantly of the Ḥanafi opinion hold that one cannot wipe over the thin daily socks. (shrink)

The sciences of kalam and fiqh, which have a special importance in the history of Islamic thought and science, became prominent with their interactions with other sciences in their formation processes and their contributions to the evolution of religious thought. In the literature, the field representing the linguistic, religious, mental and practical aspects of fiqh has become widespread with the concepts of usūl-i fiqh and fürū-i fiqh, and the part about creed as usūlü'd-dīn or fiqhu'l-akbar. It has drawn our attention (...) that Imam Abū Ḥanīfa and Imam Shāfiʿī's ijtihads, fatwas and thoughts have remained up to date in every century without exception in the vortex of overdoing and understatement in these two disciplines. However, there are some narrations stating that although these imams were interested in kalam, they kept a distance from it. Their, famous students also indicated that they gave them advice in this sense. Therefore, this study has been prepared in order to examine the background of the aforementioned issues. For this purpose, the reasons why two imams preferred the science of fiqh in the main axis of the subject were subjected to a general criticism. Consequently, it has been seen that both imams had similar concerns and their ideas have been overlapping in the face of the creed developments of the period. (shrink)

The scholars of Ahl as-Sunnah, who are united in the view that sin will not nullify faith and other good deeds, dissented from opinion on the status of the deeds of the person who converted to Islam after his apostasy, in the first Muslim period. In general, Ḥanafī/Māturīdīs argued that those deeds would be in vain with direct apostasy, while Shāfiʽī/Ash'arīs also stipulated death for this purpose, and claimed that a person's previous deeds would not be lost with apostasy alone. (...) Comprehensive interpretations on this issue have found a place for itself mostly in tafsir rather than disciplines such as kalam, fiqh and usûl. Here, while Ḥanafī/Māturīdīs grounds on verse 5/5 of the Surah al-Ma’idah, which only mentions that deeds will be in vain through apostasy; Shāfiʽī/Ash'arīs is based on verse 2/217 of Surah al-Baqarah, which connects this futility to death as apostasy. The parties made different inferences against each other over the relevant verses and gave various answers. The most fundamental point of disagreement among these was the question of whether the first verse, which is muṭlaq in terms of usūl, should be attributed to the second verse, which is in the position of muqayyad. While Ḥanafī/Māturīdīs objected to this process with the thought that the conditions for attributing muṭlaq to the muqayyad were not met in the relevant verses, Shāfiʽī/Ash'arīs, which took a more flexible stance on this issue, approved this attributing process within the framework of the conditions and accordingly reached their relevant views. When the parties evaluated the relevant verses, they made their explanations mostly in the explanation of the 2/217 verse of the Surah Baqarah, which is prior to the arrangement and is in the position of a muqayyad. Since Shāfiʽī/Ash'arī scholars are already based on the relevant verse, it is quite understandable that the place where they examine the subject is the interpretation of this divine word. Ḥanafī/Māturīdīs, on the other hand, examined the issue here in order to respond to the meaning attributed to the verse by Shāfiʽī/Ash'arīs. Shafi'i/Ash'aris based their judgments on one of the two verses, Surah Baqara, 2/217, as a requirement of attributing mutlaq to the muqayyad, and in fact, accepted a single verse as a criterion. On the other hand, Ḥanafī/Māturīdīs, made separate judgments from both of them, claiming that the conditions for attributing muṭlaq to the muqayyad, were not fulfilled in the two related verses. In this context, they concluded from the first verse that death as apostasy necessitates eternal disappointment, and from the second verse, apostasy absolutely wastes deeds. Here, the most typical result of the separation between the two sects emerges as to whether a person will repeat the pilgrimage, for example, he performed while he was a Muslim when he returns to Islam after apostasy. While the Shāfiʽī/Ash'arīs, who thought that deeds will be wasted only by death due to apostasy, did not consider it necessary to go on pilgrimage again, while Ḥanafī/Māturīdīs, who thought that deeds will be lost directly with apostasy even if death does not occur, held the person responsible for pilgrimage. In this study, it will be tried to explain the basic intellectual framework of the view advocated by the parties and the background of what kind of criticism they brought to their opponents. (shrink)

Sunnah is the second main source for Islamic law following the Qur’ān. Sunnah in the books on the Methodology of Islamic Law (Usūl al-fiqh) is examined in two main parts, one of which is as the source for religious commands and the other is being as religious/taklīfī commands. Sunnah is divided into three categories in terms of being the source for Islamic commands: qawlī (verbal), fi‘ilī (behavioral) and taqrīrī (approval). In the Islamic literature, when the word “sunnah” is mentioned, first (...) of all, it is understood as a verbal appeal, which is qawlī sunnah (hadith). Verbal sunnah has a rhetoric/wording that includes demand (amr/order-nahy/prohibition) or freedom (mubāḥ). And ultimately to the wording of this verbal address, some religious commands, such as farḍ/wājib, sunnah/mandūb, and permissible/mubāḥ are attributed. The behavioral sunnah (the acts of the Prophet Muḥammad), on the other hand, does not have a rhetoric that includes demand (amr/order-nahy/prohibition) or freedom (mubāḥ). The command/judgment is based on rhetoric. In other words, if there is an address, there is a command; if there is no address, there is no command/judgment. Therefore, it is problematic that the acts of the Prophet are decreed in the form of farḍ/ wājib, sun-nah/mandūb and mubāḥ. For this reason, the acts of the Prophet in the books on the Method-ology of Islamic Law (Usūl al-fiqh) have been particularly examined under the title of Afʿāl al-Rasūl. While some of the acts of the Prophet Muḥammad have a religious character, some of them are the acts that he performed completely in accordance with the customs and traditions in the society he lived in. Therefore, not all of the Prophet’s deeds/acts (behavioral sunnah) are at the same level in terms of obligation. Therefore, while some of the acts/deeds of the Prophet express wucūb, some other mandūb (sunnah-mustaḥab) and still some other ibāhā/mubāḥ. On the other hand, the acts of the Prophet Muḥammad, in terms of being the source of religious commands, are divided into two categories: the tashrīī (religiously) qualified and non tashrīī (religiously) qualified. What is meant by a religious act is the actions of the Prophet, which he performed as being a prophet, for the purpose of worshiping and that he wanted his followers act accordingly. What is meant by a non-religious act is the behavior of the Prophet as a human being or as a requirement of the society he lived in. Sunnah, in terms of being a religious com-mand, refers to commands other than fard and wājib. Ḥanafī scholars are of the opinion that sunnah as a religious decree is divided into two parts as sunnah-i hudā and sunnah-i zawāid. The acts of the Prophet, in accordance with his being a human or the custom of the society he lived in, are included in the scope of sunnah zawāid. In other words, sunnah zawāid generally means the actions of the Prophet that he did not do with the intention of worship. In this con-text, the acts of the Prophet Muḥammad are important. Because, the acts of the Prophet are not the same in terms of qualification (command), nor are they the same in terms of their nature (being religious or humanly natural). The acts of the Prophet Muḥammad with a religious nature are divided into two as known qualities and unknown qualifications. In principle, the religious acts of the Prophet, whose qualities are known, are also obligation for the ummah (Muslims). Therefore, when it is known for what purpose the Prophet Muḥammad made a deed/behavior, that act is accordingly is binding for the ummah (Muslims). Accordingly, if the attribute of a deed/behavior made by the Prophet is wājib/farḍ, it is also wājib for the ummah and permissible (ibāḥā) for the ummah if it is permissible. On the other hand, the acts of the Prophet in the Qur’ān as a mujmal (ambiguous nass /verse) are also subject to the command of mujmal. There is a dispute regarding the verdict of the Prophet’s acts of religious nature whose qualifications are unknown. According to the majority of Hanafī scholars, what is essential in the actions of the Prophet whose qualifications are unknown and that contain the characteris-tics of worship, is that it is mustahab/mandūb. According to Kerkhī (d. 340/952), what is es-sential in such deeds/behaviors is that it is permissible. Jassās (d.370 / 980) expresses the same opinion with Kerkhī. Opinions on this issue are conveyed from Imām Mālik and Imām Shafiī that he declared permissibility. The preferred opinion in Hanbalis is to declare permissibility. Non-religious acts of the Prophet Muḥammad as a human being or as per the custom of the society he lives in are not obligation for the ummah. Therefore, what is essential in such deeds/behaviors is that it is permissible. (shrink)

Abu Muhammad Ali b. Ahmed b. Hazm al-Andalusi (d. 456/1064), the greatest exponent of the Ẓahiriyya school, was a scholar producing important works with his identity as a jurist, hadith scholar, historian, literary man, and poet. He also persistently defended the understanding of Ahl as-Sunna against the sects that emerged within Islamic thought as he defended the superiority of Islam against other religions. In his works, he covered almost every topic of the kalam science; in this context, he was especially (...) interested in topics related to the possibility of prophethood, the prophethood of Muhammad and his being the last representative of the prophethood chain. Therefore, this study, based mainly on his works such as al-Fasl, al-Usul wa'l-Furu, ad-Durr fi ma Yecibu i'tikaduhu and Ilm al-Kalam ala Mazhab Ahl al-Sunnah wa'l-Jama'a, deals with the topics of the possibility of prophecy, the prophethood of Prophet Muhammad, and the role and importance of miracles in proving it in the view of Ibn Hazm. Almost all Islamic scholars have based their systems for recognizing prophets on the evidence of miracles. According to them, a person who claims to be a prophet must bring extraordinary evidence to confirm his claim, and it is necessary for him to do so in order to make his opponents religiously responsible. For an event to be considered evidence that confirms the prophet's claim and to be called a miracle, it must have some characteristics, such as: it must be a divine act; it must appear in an extraordinary manner; it must occur together with the claim of prophecy and challenge; and it must occur immediately after the claim of the prophet. Therefore, it is believed that evidence that possesses these characteristics can prove the correctness of the claimant without needing any other evidence. The kalam scholars only call those events as miracles, which have the characteristic of challenging the dozens of evidences that prove the prophet's truthfulness. Therefore, it is without a doubt that the concept of miracle is a special concept invented by kalam scholars. When looking at Ibn Hazm’s views on the subject, which form the backbone of the study, it is necessary to state the following: Firstly, Ibn Hazm explains that prophecy is possible, that God chooses and sends messengers among the people, and that there is no difference among the prophets in terms of belief principles. Ibn Hazm emphasizes the role of miracles in identifying prophets and bases his system on this principle. However, he does not show much care in using the term "miracles" in the way that Kalam scholars accept it and does not aim to explain or list the characteristics or attributes of miracles as seen in Kalam books. He uses the term "miracles," which have been conceptualized over a long period of time, for every extraordinary event that belongs to the prophets, without considering these sensitivities. The most striking aspect of Ibn Hazm's understanding of miracles is that he does not consider the attribute of challenge, which is defined as a condition of a miracle, as necessary. He criticizes those who accept the attribute of a challenge as an essential part of miracles and argues that such an understanding would limit the miracles of the Prophet Muhammad. If the attribute of the challenge is accepted as a condition, then extraordinary events such as the blessing of food and drink, the moaning of wood in the mosque, and some animals coming and expressing their complaints would be excluded from the scope of miracles. This would mean limiting the evidence of Prophet Muhammad's prophecy. According to him, the creator of extraordinary events is God, and He creates them only to confirm His messengers. The events that occur in the hands of a person who claims to be a prophet should be considered a miracle. Therefore, he has named every event that occurred through the prophets as a miracle, regardless of its context and nature. In conclusion, according to Ibn Hazm, there are two types of events that occur in nature: Normal events and miraculous events. He refers to the latter as miracles and limits them to only occurring in the hands of prophets. He believes that events that occur in the hands of prophets, whether they possess the characteristic of tahaddî or not, should be referred to as miracles. Events that occur in the hands of people other than prophets do not possess the characteristics of miraculous events. If such events are claimed to be miraculous, the evidence of the prophets will be damaged. Therefore, Allah creates these events only for His messengers. Therefore, in the view of Ibn Hazm, concepts such as miracles of saints (karamat), magic, and divine help (maunat) do not have a counterpart. In fact, his attitude coincides with the Mu'tazilite tradition. He tries to prevent criticism that can be directed at miracles by assigning miraculous events only to prophets. (shrink)

There is burgeoning interest in the field of “Islamic” bioethics within public and professional circles, and both healthcare practitioners and academic scholars deploy their respective expertise in attempts to cohere a discipline of inquiry that addresses the needs of contemporary bioethics stakeholders while using resources from within the Islamic ethico-legal tradition. This manuscript serves as an introduction to the present thematic issue dedicated to Islamic bioethics. Using the collection of papers as a guide the paper outlines several critical questions that (...) a comprehensive and cohesive Islamic bioethical theory must address: (i) What are the relationships between Islamic law (Sharīʿah), moral theology (uṣūl al-Fiqh), and Islamic bioethics? (ii) What is the relationship between an Islamic bioethics and the lived experiences of Muslims? and (iii) What is the relationship between Islamic bioethics and the state? This manuscript, and the papers in this special collection, provides insight into how Islamic bioethicists and Muslim communities are addressing some of these questions, and aims to spur further dialogue around these overaching questions as Islamic bioethics coalesces into a true field of scholarly and practical inquiry. (shrink)

In Islamic theological writings, under the heading of sustenance, the focus is generally on issues such as who is the provider of sustenance, whether haram is considered sustenance, and whether Allah’s consent exists for haram sustenance. Another issue that can be found between the lines of the subject of sustenance is whether it is haram for a person to work for sustenance or not. In fact, the pursuit of means of livelihood in order to sustain one’s life is, according to (...) the general and predominant acceptance of Muslim scholars, permissible and, in cases of necessity, wajib. According to a record in Uṣūl al-niḥal, during the formative period of itizālī thought, there were Mu‘tazilite sufis (ṣūfiyyat al-Muʿtazila) such as Bishr b. al-Mu‘tamir’s disciple Abū Imrān Mūsā b. al-Raqqāshī, al-Naẓẓām’s apostate disciple Fadl al-Hadathī, and Husayn al-Kūfī, about whom no information is available. These names, who seem to have earned their livelihood through almsgiving, defended the forbiddenness (taḥrīm al-makāsib) of all kinds of endeavour for sustenance, contrary to the acceptance of Muslim thinkers. However, it should be noted that for them, the forbiddenness in making an effort for sustenance does not cover the definition of sustenance, which is ‘all the benefits’, but only the effort in obtaining sustenance through means such as trade and agriculture. It is interesting to find such an extreme tendency among the Mu‘tazilites, who came to the fore with their rationalist discourses. “How could a Mu‘tazilite defend tahrīm al-makāsib?”, the issue of abandonment of striving for sustenance (tark al-makāsib), from which the idea of tahrīm al-makāsib is thought to have evolved, is mentioned, and then the Mu‘tazilite sufis views on tahrīm al-makāsib are tried to be based mainly on Mu‘tazilite sources and the criticisms of Mu‘tazilite authors against them are included. It has been determined that Mu‘tazilite sufis justifications for defending tahrīm al-makāsib concentrate on three points: (i) the absence of a just order due to the absence of a just imam and the possibility of supporting the oppressors (rulers) intentionally or unintentionally, and as a result of this, some of them describe the land of Islam as dār al-kufr, (ii) again in relation to the issue of imamate, in an environment where there is no justice, i.e. legal/moral order, the halāl and harām are so intertwined that they cannot be separated from each other, and in order to protect oneself from harām, the things that are subject to sustenance can only be purified through charity and become halāl, and (iii) the fact that trust in Allah is obligatory and any effort to pursue sustenance is contrary to tawakkul. The Mu‘tazilite authors criticised the proponents of tahrīm al-makāsib on the grounds that it is permissible to trade while maintaining a rational and ethical attitude, that one’s intention and interest in trade are important, and that tawakkul cannot be built on the right ground. As a result, the proponents of tahrīm al-makāsib disappeared because they could not gain a foothold in the Mu‘tazilite intellectual climate due to their erroneous reasoning. (shrink)

Muʻtazilite thinkers put forward the first systematic ideas for the relationship of essence and attributes, one of the most fundamental and complicated issues of Islamic theology, and comprehensive explanations to the question of God’s names. Although almost all the thinkers agreed on uṣūl al-khamsa, they differed in their approach to the principle of unity (tawḥīd). ‘Abbād b. Sulaymān, who lived in the period when these approaches emerged, is a scholar who reveals his distinctive view of God’s names and attributes in (...) which heslightly differs from his contemporaries such as Abu al-Hudhayl al-‘Allāf, Mu‘ammar b. ‘Abbād al-Sulamī and Ibrāhīm b. Sayyār al-Naẓẓām from the Basran Muʻtazila, by his extreme opinions on the Muʻtazilite principle of tawḥīd. He is one of thefour principle thinkers who presented original opinions in the early Basran Muʻtazila. Also he is the only known student of Hishâm al-Fuwaṭī and constitutes the last major circle of this tradition of knowledge that ended after him. This article aims to reveal the relationship between essence and attributes, the names and attributes of God in a holistic and systematic way in the thought of ‘Abbād b. Sulaymān. Unfortunately, his works have not survived to the present day and has not received the attention he deserves. Since his views were scattered in the classic books, our study was focused primarily on these classical sources. The modern literature was not ignored, either. The relevant records, analysis and criticism were re-contextualized. According to ‘Abbād b. Sulaymān, the view that “Allah is a thing” is the same with the view that “Allah is other (ghayr)”, he draws attention to a definite distinction between Allah and human beings. In his thought about the relationship between Allah and space, he rejects the idea that God could be related to space or anything spatial in order to refrain from an anthropomorphic conception of God. In the case of visibility (ru’ya) of Allah, he radically opposes the idea of “seeing Allah with the heart,” which was adopted by the majority of the Muʻtazila. He tries to solve the issue in his own terms by avoiding the terms essence (dhāt) and nafs in the relationship between God’s essence and His attributes. He reveals a unique classification of names and thus adopts the method of analogy. He does not accept essential attributes as the majority of the Mu’tazila did. On the other hand, he tacitly accepts that Allah’s names have their own meanings in a way that they are not merely words (aqvāl). By a true comparison or perfect analogy (fī ḥaqīqati’l-qıyās), while he rejects that God is ālim, qadīr etc., he tries to ground that human beings is ālim, qadīr etc. He does not admit that God is eternally samʻi and baṣīr. Without interpreting samʻi as His knowledge or baṣīr as His power, he accepts that each name has a distinctive functionality. He rejects the assumption that God knows conditionally. Regarding the issue of whether living beings are in the knowledge of Allah before they exist, it makes a dual distinction: “a direction that can be subject to the eternal knowledge” and “the direction in which it actually came to existence”. Because of his view of non-existent and creatures, Ibn al-Rāwandī and modern resources refer the view of the eternity of objects to him. However, when the relevant records are examined, it is seen that this claim is not valid. According to ‘Abbād, Allah is capable of creating possible things that he knows, although He does not create impossible things that he knows, even though He is capable of creating them potentially (bi-al-quwwa). Allah has not created evil, neither literally nor figuratively; so much so that He created only man, not faith and unbelief. It is not possible to talk about any good that he did not create. He defends the createdness of the Qur’an (Khalq al-Qur’ān) by saying that the Qur’ān was created of accidents. About God’s names, he states that God has the names indicating His relationship to the universe. He does not accept that in eternity He is a willing agent, creator etc. However, he also does not accept the otherwise. He emphasizes that creation is reserved only for Allah. On the other hand, according to him, Allah creates without secondary causes and thus does not create things for a specific purpose. Regarding the revealed attributes (or informative attributes, khabarī), he recites these expressions only when reading of the Quran.He states that these expressions should not be used for Allah under any circumstances. He avoids naming Allah as wakīl, kafīl, laṭīf, kā’in, fard and mutakallim as he says that the name wāḥid should be used only for praising Him. (shrink)

Fıkıhta bir mesele hakkında hüküm verilirken, mevzu belirli usûl ve kaideler çerçevesinde değerlendirilmektedir. Hüküm verilirken temel bakış açısı ve değerlendirme yöntemi genel hatlarıyla fıkıh usûlü ve kavaid kitaplarında mevcut olmakla beraber, bunun karmaşık güncel meselelere uyarlanması her zaman kolay olmamaktadır. Bu makalede konunun işleyişi ortaya konulmaya çalışılarak fıkhî açıdan ilgili konulara değinilecektir. Çalışmada Bitcoin meselesi, garar, bey’ul ma’dûm, kumar, miras ve akit teorisi çerçevesinde değerlendirilerek okuyucuda bir kapının aralanması hedeflenmektedir. Konunun nihai hükmü ise ilgili kurumlar ve fıkıh (...) meclisleri tarafından verilmelidir. Nihayetinde bu çalışma konunun belirli yönleri etrafında şekillenmiş ve sübjektif bakışı açısı potansiyeli taşıyabilmektedir. Kapsamlı bir değerlendirme ve objektif bir nihai karar ancak kurumsal yapılar tarafından gerçekleştirilecek kolektif çalışmalar neticesinde şekillenecektir. (shrink)

Erken dönemlerden itibaren fıkhî meseleler üzerindeki tartışmalar, bir yönteme bağlı kalınarak icra edilmiştir. Tartışmalarda belirli soru ve cevap türlerine başvurulmuş, soruların tertibine özen gösterilmiştir. Bu sayede taraflar kendi görüşlerinin doğruluğunu, karşıt görüşün yanlışlığını çelişkiye düşmeden ortaya koymaya çalışmıştır. Bu çalışmada ilk olarak cedelden ve cedelin fıkha tatbikinden bahsedilmiş, sonrasında münâzaracı kimlikleriyle meşhur olan Hanefî fakihi Kudûrî ile Şâfiî fakihi Ebu’t-Tayyib et-Taberî arasında geçtiği rivayet edilen talâka dair bir münâzara inceleme konusu edilmiştir. Bu münâzarada, muhâlea ile boşanılan kadına, kadının iddeti esnasında (...) tekrardan ricî talâk yapılabileceğini savunan Kudûrî ile bu durumda talâkın geçersiz olacağını söyleyen Taberî’nin karşılıklı istidlal ve itirazları yer almaktadır. Bu tartışmanın temelini Kudûrî’nin muhâlea yapılan kadını ricî talâkla boşanan kadına kıyas etmesi oluşturmaktadır. Taberî bu kıyasın illetine yönelik mutâlebe, itirâz ve muâraza türü sorulara başvurmuş, Kudûrî ise kendi illetinin sıhhatini savunmaya çalışmıştır. Yer yer tartışma kurallarına atıfların yapılması yönüyle de önemli olan bu münâzara incelenirken, cedelin fıkha tatbikine dair kısımda zikredilen bilgilerin pratikte nasıl uygulandığına işaret edilmiştir. (shrink)

: The medieval Karaite grammarian and exegete Abū l-Faraj Hārūn b. al-Faraj was a broad reader of the literature available in Arabic, in a variety of genres. Earlier studies have demonstrated that in his grammatical works on the Hebrew language, Hārūn adapted discussions from well-known compositions focused on Arabic and the Qurʾān. The following examination of Hārūn’s treatment of the subject of biblical majāz, non-literal language, aims to show that in constructing his sophisticated and innovative discussion of the topic, the (...) Karaite scholar read widely – and adapted creatively – incorporating the methods of a variety of genres in Arabic, including uṣūl al-naḥw, uṣūl al-fiqh and even iʿjāz al-Qurʾān and combining them together with earlier Jewish and Karaite scholarly tradition to produce what seems to be the first comprehensive discussion of non-literal language in Judeo-Arabic. (shrink)

Māzarī al-Tamimī (d. 536/1141) was one of the last jurists who lived in North Africa before the fall of al-Andalus. He is the author of Izāḥ al-Mahsūl, which is considered to be an important turning point in the formation of the uṣūl al-fiqh structure of Mālikī jurisprudence. The lack of studies on the uṣūl al-fiqh of al-Māzarī, who had considerable knowledge in the fields of ḥadīth, fiqh, theology, medicine, and fatwā, made this study necessary. This study examines al-Māzarī's understanding of (...) uṣūl through his work Izāḥ al-Mahsūl in the field of uṣūl al-fiqh. Izāḥ al-Mahsūl is al-Māzarī's commentary on the Shāfiʿī scholar al-Juwaynī's (d. 478/1085) al-Burhan fi uṣūl al-fiqh on uṣūl al-fiqh. The commentary on al-Juwaynī's al-Burhān is one of the fundamental texts of Shāfiʿī usūl al-fiqh. In his commentary on this important work, al-Māzarī followed his teacher al-Juwaynī's subject classification and systematization and applied the method of the mutakallim in writing uṣūl al-fiqh. Although it bears similarities with his teacher's work, this commentary, even in its incomplete form, is an independent work with the opinions and evaluations it includes. Al-Māzarī did not hesitate to oppose his teacher in the work and put forward his own method of ijtihād. Izāḥ al-Mahsūl, which is the subject of this study, is an important example of the influence of Shāfiʿī uṣūl al-fiqh on Mālikī uṣūl al-fiqh in terms of method and content. With this work, the Mālikī uṣūl al-fiqh literature and texts were modelled after Izāḥ al-Mahsūl. This work, which was a source for post-Māzarī Mālikī jurists, is also the subject of this study because it contains the traces of the Shāfiʿī-Mālikī interaction in Islamic jurisprudence. Within the scope of the study, the principles that stand out in al-Māzari's understanding of uṣūl al-fiqh in his work Izāḥ al-Mahsūl were tried to be identified. In this way, it is aimed to reveal on which issues the Mālikī uṣūl al-fiqh is based. It is impossible for al-Māzarī's understanding of uṣūl al-fiqh cannot to be influenced by the intellectual and political environment in which he grew up. With this in mind, we have tried to briefly touch upon al-Māzarī's life, his teachers, his works, and the intellectual and political atmosphere of the Maghreb region during his lifetime. We have tried to understand the impact of all the details of his life on al-Māzarī's scholarly life and his uṣūlism in particular. In addition, determining the prominent elements of al-Māzarī's understanding of uṣūl is also important in terms of understanding the jurisprudential structure in the Maghreb region and illuminating the region in terms of Islamic legal history. This study aims to present al-Māzarī's understanding of uṣūl in terms of its basic features. Thus, it aims to shed light on al-Māzarī's contribution to the Mālikī understanding of uṣūl al-fiqh and its literature. The document analysis method, one of the qualitative research methods, was used in the study. In this context, the textual analysis was applied by comparing al-Māzarī's views with those of his teacher al-Juwaynī, by whom he was influenced. (shrink)

It is widely acknowledged that two methods of writing have emerged in the history of usūl literature: Juristic method (usūl al-fuqahā) and theological method (usūl al-mutakallimīn). Although there are some attempts to determine the typical features of these methods, we do not have a comprehensive explanation regarding the criteria of this distinction, the motivation behind it and the period when these methods have become prevalent. This paper aims to shed light to certain dimensions of the issue and focuses especially on (...) the impact of juristic disputations and khilāfiyāt on the emergence of juristic method. The discussions about the sources and methods of religious knowledge were a significant part of the heated intellectual debates in the early period of Islamic scholarships. These discussions made by scholars interested in theological matters in kalām context were the matters of usūl, which would have turned into a separate discipline thereafter. The aforementioned period also witnessed Hanafīs completing the first fiqh compilation by recording the body of masā’il in fiqh that they had developed and codified. Hanafīs then involved in the methodological discussions of theologians in the context of justifying their juristic views. The tradition of scholarly discussion that had widely contributed to the earlier period took a new dimension by the introduction of jadal to the Islamic world. First theologians and later jurists adopted the method of jadal in their debates and scholarly works. By the 4th and 5th centuries AH, fiqh became popular more than ever and promoted the juristic disputations in such a way that those disputations turned into a common and significant performance among Islamic intellectuals. Meanwhile, the khilaf genre, in which the disputed juristic matters have been discussed and justified, improved in those centuries as well. Consequently, a new method of usūl writing, namely the method of fuqahā, which can be applied in the justification of the masā’il and in juristic disputations, emerged. Thus, the first and most typical work of that method, Taqwīm al-Adilla by Dabūsī, perfectly addressed the needs of the disputation tradition in the era, by including many chapters that could be regarded as related to the substantial law and many examples from substantial law, by treating the jadal topics in qiyas and ‘illa chapters in detail and by avoiding the speculative theological disputes. Later, the method developed by Dabūsī attracted attention and many jurisprudents wrote usūl works adopting the method before the end of 5th century AH. Especially the usūl work of Bazdawī served as a model for the later Hanafī usūl literature. However, the juristic method lost its popularity when the Islamic scholarships fell under the influence of philosophy and logic after al-Gazālī and al-Rāzī. Jadal and ‘ilm al-bahth wa’l-munāzara have been treated under the discipline of logic afterwards. Nevertheless, even after the evolution of the usūl perspective, some Hanafīs still wrote usūl works by juristic method and some of them, despite adopting the new philosophical perspective, referred to the usūl of Bazdawī in their “mamzūj” (combined) usūl works. (shrink)

Along with the legal opinions, the juristic proofs presented to underpin these legal opinions also occupy an important place in uṣūl al-fiqh. Thus, scholars of uṣūl al-fiqh strived to propound the proofs indicating the relevant theoretical principles in an apparent and definite way. As a result, the disputed and undisputed proofs ranked among al-adilla al-shar‘iyya have been abundantly addressed in the classical uṣūl al-fiqh works. However, although it is not mentioned as a part of legal sources in the uṣul literature, (...) there has been another proof subjected to legal reasoning (istidlāl): the practice of the companions. In this study, “the practices of the companions” is used in the contextual meaing of the verbal and practical positions of the entire companions or some of them on a specific topic of uṣūl al-fiqh. By this definition, the concept of the practice of the companions is separated from the concepts of qawl al-ṣaḥābī, ʿamal ahl al-Madīnah and the ijmāʿ al-ṣaḥābah. As a matter of fact, the concept of qawl al-ṣaḥābī signifies an opinion narrated from a single companion and neither supported nor opposed by other companions, and subjected to use of legal inference for obtaining practical legal rulings. In return, the concept of the practice of the companions signifies the position that the companions hold on a topic of uṣūl al-fiqh and does not stipulate the conditions that it must be an opinion of a single companion and be neither supported nor opposed by other companions. In addition, as being related to the legal theoretical issues and not restricted to a certain region, the concept of the practice of the companions is distinct from the ‘amal ahl al-Madīnah. Likewise, it also differed from the ijmāʿ al-ṣaḥābah because the latter concept indicates the consensus of all companions on a practical legal ruling whereas the practice of the companions amounts to both the consensus of the companions and their individual opinions on the matters of uṣūl al-fiqh. Having said that, the concept of the practice of the companions has some overlaps with the qawl al-ṣaḥābī and ijmāʿ al-ṣaḥābah. It is observed in the Hanafi tradition of uṣūl al-fiqh that the practices of the companions are presented as a proof of many principles of uṣūl al-fiqh. This is because of the fact that the companions have a significant role as being the first practitioners of the revelation and the leading figures of the tradition of fiqh. Due to these significant roles of the companions, a central position is given to their interpretation method of the divine text and the technique of issuing legal opinions in determination of theoretical principles. In this study, I examine the impact of the practices of the companions on the Hanafi legal theory focusing on the work of al-Sarakhsī (d. 483/1090), al-Uṣūl, and try to identify how Hanafi legal theory was grounded, departing from, overall or particular, companions’ practices. This study consists of two main parts. First, I provide the conceptual framework by analyzing the concepts of the companion and the companions’ practice. Second, I discussed the theoretical issues rested evidentially on the companions’ practice. Hence, this study excludes the instances of qawl al-ṣaḥābī, ijmāʿ al-ṣaḥābah and the companions’ practice if they are not resorted in proving the uṣūl al-fiqh principles. This work deals with issues on which theoretical principles grounded in reference to the practice of the companions under the headings; Kitāb, Sunnah, qıyās, naskh and alfāz. When instances of the companions’ practice are in abundance in a case, I just focus on the highly representative ones and shortly refer to the others. In the conclusion part, I provide the consequences achieved by this research and some final remarks on the topic. (shrink)

This study includes an analytical study of the term "Qiyās al-Adna” among the Scholars of Uṣūl al-Fiqh. It is known that the Qiyās is divided into the following types: an analogy of higher order (Qiyās al-Awla), an analogy of an equivalent order (Qiyās al-Musawi), an analogy of a lower order (Qiyās al-Adna). However, Qiyās al-Adna raised issues and objections among some scholars, in past and present; hence, there is an urgent need to present a comprehensive study that shows the meaning (...) of Qiyās al-Adna for those who advocate it, discusses the objections and issues that have been raised about it, and clarifies its connection to other Qiyās types. Moreover, the study will concern the applied side of Qiyās al-Adna by explaining how jurists used it. The researcher used the analytical method and referred to the most important, ancient and modern Uṣūl al-Fiqh sources and references. The study concluded with results, the most prominent of which is that the Qiyās al-Adna has two meaning: the first is that in which the original case is more deserving of legal ruling than the new or parallel case, so the new case is considered as a lower order, and the second is that the effective cause in the new case is weaker than in the original case. Among the results of the study is that the objections directed to the Qiyās al-Adna are weak, and that it is not limited to the presumptive Qiyās on the most correct opinion, also, that the jurists used the term Qiyās al-Adna in the second meaning, which says that the lower order is in its effective cause, not the legal ruling. (shrink)

The early period Ismaili jurist Al-Qādî al-Nu'mān appears as an important figure in the formation of Ismaili jurisprudence. There is very little information about Kadı Nu'mân's family, childhood, education and intellectual environment. His full name is Abû Hanîfah Nu'man b. Muhammad b. Mansûr al-Qādî at-Tamîmî Al Qayrawānî. He was born around 290/903 (late 3rd (9th) century) into an educated family in Qayravan in North Africa. There are different opinions about the sect he belonged to when he was growing up. On (...) the other hand, it is difficult to say for certain whether Nu’mān received education in the Ismaili sect due to the understanding of taqiyya in the madhhab. However, it is understood from the basic jurisprudence texts Nu’mān wrote that he most likely did not receive a Sunni education. Historians refer to him as 'Qadi Nu’mān or Abu Hanifah al-Shi'i' in order not to confuse him with the imam of the Hanafi school. Qādî Nu’mān served at different levels of the Fatimid State. Around 313/925, he entered the service of the first Fatimid caliph, Mahdi (r. 909-934 CE/297-322 AH), as a copyist and secretary. During the reigns of the third caliph Mansur and the fourth Fatimid caliph Mu’izz (d. 365/975), Qādî Nu’mān first served as a judge in Tripoli and then in Mansouriya, the Fatimid capital. After the Fatimids conquered Egypt and the center of government was moved to Cairo, Qādî Nu’mān was appointed by the fourth caliph Mu’izz as the head of the appellate courts (maẓālim). Qadi Numans career was at the peak in the period of Caliph Muiz. Qādî Nu’mān worked as a judge in the Fatimid State for about twenty-six years and continued this duty until his death in 363 (973). After the fall of the Fatimid caliphate, there haven’t been any other Fatimid or Ismaili jurists. Qādî Nu’mān is considered by contemporary Ismaili writers as a figure who systematically transformed Ismaili fiqh into an independent sect of fiqh. It can be said that Ismaili fiqh was developed through his works in the Fatimid period. His works continued as the main references in the fiqh studies and after the Fatimid period. With the death of Qādî Nu’mān, the period of ijtihad in Ismaili fiqh and its the establishment phase of Ismaili fiqh came to an end; The sect, in which esoteric interpretations were at the forefront, emerged as a distinctive school of fiqh by discarding ambiguity. Qādî Nu’mān was a very productive writer. He wrote important works related to the field of furu al-fiqh and usûl al-fiqh. Among his works, Ikhtilāf uṣūl al-madhāhib is undoubtedly one of the most important works in the early history of fiqh methodology. The work in question, which was originally written with the aim of rejecting the Sunni fiqh method, discusses the approaches of the Sunni schools of fiqh on ikhtilāf, taqlid, ijma, nazar, qiyas, istihsan, ijtihad and ra’y in a polemical manner. It reveals the differences of the Ismaili method from the Sunni method in terms of the sources on which the fiqh is based, the authority to make ijtihad and the theory of interpretation of the texts. Qādî Nu’mān examined the relationship between reason and revelation in general and the role of religious authority in comprehending and interpreting the texts while criticizing Sunni methods. Ikhtilāf uṣūl al-madhāhib has the characteristics of the works of development period as a form. It is possible to observe the question-answer and dialectic form which can be seen in the works of the development period throughout the work in question. Qādî Nu’mān endeavoured to persuade his opponents with a dialectical and argumentative style. Again, he replied to the Sunnis, who were his interlocutors, with their own proofs. In addition to these, Ikhtilāf uṣūl al-madhāhib has a unique feature in the matter of content. Because it is not very familiar to any Sunni handbook of usûl al-fiqh. It does not mention the hâss, âmm, ijma, qiyas, amir, nahy, alfaz bets, etc. The text is very similar to the Ahbari movement of the Jafari sect for it rejects all forms of ijtihad. It was written at a time when fiqh was not yet stable. Ikhtilāf uṣūl al-madhāhib gives us crucial information about the development of different usûl and fiqh sources in the middle of the fourth century. However, what is interesting here is that the information he gives about Ismaili method and fiqh is very little compared to the one about Sunni method and fiqh. Much of it centered on Sunni thought and its rejection. However, his ultimate goal was to defend the Ismaili doctrine. (shrink)

In a seminal modern work of uṣūl al-fiqh, al-Ākhund al-Khurāsānī (d. 1911) argues that the two terms ṭalab (seeking) and irāda (willing) are coined to refer to a single concept. Within the argument he implies that the Ashʿarīs, and some modern Twelver Shīʿa who lean towards their position, fall foul of a linguistic fallacy when they assert that ṭalab and irāda are distinct. For al-Khurāsānī, both ṭalab and irāda may be used in two distinct modes, a real (ḥaqīqī) mode or (...) an initiating mode (inshāʾī). The former denotes a real seeking or willing within the essence of an actor, whereas the latter simply seeks to initiate the meaning of seeking or willing. Accordingly, an initiating ṭalab may be distinct from a real irāda, and a real ṭalab may be distinct from an initiating irāda, without undermining the position that ṭalab and irāda are conceptually identical. Analysis of al-Khurāsānī’s arguments, and some criticisms of it by later modern and contemporary scholars of uṣūl al-fiqh, will aim to broaden our understanding of the category of inshāʾ in Arabic, hitherto analysed through the lens of J. L. Austin’s notion of performatives. More generally, the paper takes the treatment of this linguistic issue as an example affirming the continued importance of modern and contemporary uṣūl al-fiqh for engaging with Arabic philosophy of language and argument. (shrink)

Understanding the nusus and the interpretation of their texts has been at the center of the activities of many schools and ulama in fiqh studies, and as a result, each school of usool has sought to find a method suitable for their own understanding in order to understand and interpret the nusus in a sahih way. For this purpose, fiqh schools have developed some unique methods. It can be said that the main differences among the hukms that fiqh schools rely (...) on are generally due to these methodological differences. One of the efforts to understand and interpret through the linguistic structures and patterns of the nusus is tawīl. For this reason, it is necessary to know conceptions of tawīl in order to accurately determine the hukm giving methods of fiqh schools. In this context, the thought of Zâhiri Ṭawīl, which is based on the zâhiri meaning of the words in the language and aims to solve the meaning pattern of the nusus within the framework of the rules of the language, is important. To this end, the tawīl understanding of Ibn Hazm (d. 543/1148), one of the leading ulama of Zâhiri thought, has an important position in the determination of their understanding of fiqh and usool. For this purpose, by searching the works of Ibn Hazm, how his understanding of tawīl, which he used as a method, is reflected in his fiqh thought, will be examined through his fiqhi inferences. The Qur’an used their language when addressing the societies. The Qur'an especially, on the one hand, has used the language they use to convey its messages to its interlocutors in a correct and understandable way, on the other hand, it has used a unique style without departing from the natural structure of the language in unseen matters due to the nature of religious language. Therefore, it is necessary to take into account the words of the texts in order to understand and interpret the language used. The word tawīl was used by the ilm circles in the first period to mean the same as the word tafsir and in naming the works written as the Qur’an tafsir, the word tawīl was preferred instead of tafsir. Mâturîdî, the writer of the first dirayah tafsir, which points to the distinction between tafsir and tawīl, defines the word tafsir as 'to express exactly what is the meaning and purpose of the Qur'an, which is the divine word' and states that tafsir can be done only by the the Ṣaḥābah who knows Quran and Sunnah well. According to one of the many theses about the origin of language, it is God given. In other words, language has been taught to man by a supreme power (Allah). Ibn Hazm also defends this view. According to Ibn Hazm, the basic elements / elements of the language were taught by Allah to Adam (a.s), and then people developed this language in proportion to their needs. Therefore, the indications of the words depend on the declarations of God and linguistic experience. As a matter of fact, Allah has attributed new meanings to words such as salat, allegiance, hajj and similar words used for other meanings in the custom of language, and the new meanings attributed to them are accepted as the truth for the meanings of these words. Usûlists who adopted the method of fuqaha in usool, in the methods of istinbat of hukm out of sharii dalils, have generally made the taqseem of the words in terms of the meaning they were given to as âm, khâs, mushtarak and muavval while their taqsseem in terms of the words’ being used or not in the sense they were given was haqiqat, majaz, sarih and kinayah. Compared to other schools, the issue of tawīl has a different meaning according to the Zâhirî usûlists and faqih who base on the zâhiri khitab. Since the zâhir of the nusus is primary and essential, there should be a certain usool, principle and rule to give up the zâhir of the nusus and to switch to another possible meaning. Ibn Hazm states that there are different opinions among the usûlists about whether the imperative form is indicant of hukm. He also says that according to some Hanafi, Malikî and Shafii usûlists, as long as there is no evidence showing that it is wujub, tahrim, nedb, ibahâ and karahah, then the imperative form cannot be views as indicating a hukm. (shrink)

In this article, the meaning of concept of sharʿī science gained in the conception of education, which was established in Islamic civilization, was studied. The main problem of the research is to evaluate the idea of education in Islamic Civilization, which is closely related to the concept of sharʿī science, with a false perception that it consists entirely of religious education. The beginning of Islamic Civilization is traced back to descent of the Qur'an. The conception of education that started to (...) emerge after this period is based on the understanding of the Qur'an and hadiths at first. In later times, a wide variety of fields, such as language, literature, logic, wisdom, riyāzat, nature, and astronomy, have been included in the concept of education to encompass the whole existence of the entity. In the following centuries, these fields, which were included in the course curriculum of the madrasahs, were examined in detail in the works of classification of sciences. Therefore, the false perception needs to be reconsidered. For this reason, the article focuses on how the concept of sharʿī science is defined. Historical data analysis method was used to solve the problem. The claim of the article is that the concept of shar′i science has wide perspective to cover the world of meaning, mind and essence of man. As a result, this article, it was determined that the concept of sharʿī science has a meaning to cover the majority of information fields that are subject to instruction in our educational conception.Summary: The formation of the conception of education in Islamic civilization has emerged in the long term through a scientific process. During this time, a rich curriculum on the concept of education was shaped. The sciences that form the curriculum have been diversified in later periods compared to the early periods of Islam. With the advent of the different sciences, which provided this diversification and which were not at first, all the existing sciences were classified according to different perspectives by the ulama (muslim scholars). In the classifications, which have important contributions to the conception of education, the sciences were tried to be introduced and their position in the education life was tried to be explained. The sciences classified have not been dealt with against each other but rather to complement each other in different ways. The distinction of sciences in classification; different approaches such as linguistically, religious, secular, mental, transportation, philosophical and sharʿī have been developed.The concept of sharʿī science, which can be expressed as a general definition of the sciences, is given in almost all of the works related to the classification of sciences, even under the name or different titles. When we look at the classification, it is seen that sharʿī sciences are handled in four different approaches. As the first approach, the sharʿī sciences are among the main elements of main division in the classification. Here, the sharʿī sciences, in general, with the linguistic sciences and mental sciences were included in the top title. In the second approach, there are works in their classification that do not include the sharʿī sciences and the distinction between it. In addition, these works collect the sciences within this scope under other scientific compositions or other names. In the third approach, among the works that give information about the general of the sciences, there are those who mentioned all together without classifying these sciences and others. In the last approach, the sharʿī sciences are seen as the upper description of the knowledge fields that are included in the teaching, which covers the majority of the other sciences except for the linguistic sciences.The approaches presented in the classification of sciences indicate the diversity of the issue. In order to have better understanding of the issue, it is useful to look closely at the meaning of the concept of sharʿī sciences. At this point, three definitions of 2nd, 4th and 12th centuries are given respectively. Firstly, for Jābir b. Hayyān sharʿī science is the most useful politics in terms of religion and the world, because it contains the benefits of the world's interests after death.Secondly, al-Ghazali (d. 505/1111) describes the sharʿī science as the knowledge learned from Şārī ʿ and prophets, but not by the experience and hearing. According to this, the sharʿī science is defined as the knowledge of the sunnah that only gives information about revelation. The information fields outside this definition are also considered as the sciences, which are instrumental in reaching to sharʿī science.The perspective of the third definition of sharʿī science is given by Saçaklızāde (d. 1145/1732). He lists the three definitions made before the time of his life from the specific (hās) to the general (ām). Saçaklızāde gave the aforementioned definition of al-Ghazali in the first sense of the concept of sharʿī science. He points out that the meaning given here is allocated. The second definition belongs to Molla Husraw (d. 885/1480). According to him, the sharʿī science is the sciences that can be reached through the sciences of the Şārīʿ. In other words, it is the sciences that are not used except for obtaining the sciences obtained from Şārīʿ itself. This meaning is a bit more extensive since there are no records as described in al-Ghazali. This definition is also included in the sciences benefited from it. Although it is not the first, there is usūl-i fiqh (Islamic legal theory) within this meaning.In the third definition, sharʿī science is the sciences that form the basis for things arising from Şārīʿ or originating from Şārīʿ. This definition belongs to Ibn Hajar el-Haytamī. He did not consider the partial allocation of the second meaning as given above, and included all the instrument sciences in the definition of sharʿī science. Based on the definitions he gave, three sharʿī science approaches made before the time he lived were listed from specific to general. Thus, in a sense, he depicts the general shape of the sharʿī science perspective. With the approach to generalization, we can say that a sharʿī science perspective that encompasses the majority of the fields involved in education is developing. In the third meaning of sharʿī science, it is seen that the majority of the fields of knowledge in education and training are gathered under one roof. The most important factor gathering the sciences together is the effort to understand the purpose of Şārīʿ, who owns the whole area of existence. The fields of knowledge and sciences needed to achieve this aim can be included in the definition of sharʿī science. The effort to understand the purpose of Şārīʿ is also at the center of the idea of Islamic education. Since there are various dimensions of being, each step taken to understand and learn them is directed in a way to Şārīʿ itself. Whether it is language and literary sciences or other sciences, such as mathematics, physics and philosophies, the aim is to recognize and understand Şārīʿ for the collection of things that fall within the scope of all educational activities. With sharʿī science approach, teaching the whole of the area of existence owned by Allah is possible within the concept of education. In the works written for the education curriculum, it is seen that the perspective covering the majority of the sciences in the definition of third sharʿī science is preserved. First of all, the meaning integrity of the sharʿī science concept has been determined. In the definitions of three different periods given here, it is seen that the approach to the sciences, which are the subject of instruction in education is not exclusive but inclusive. Especially because of the width in the third sense, the majority of the instrument sciences and mental science fields in the curriculum are included in the definition of sharʿī science. (shrink)

Al-Shāfi’ī has been unreservedly credited as one of the designers, if not the “master architect,” of uṣūl al-fiqh. His most important scholarly work, Al-Risālah, clearly demonstrates his cognitive creativity in this field. One of the methodologies for the decision of cases under Islamic law that Al-Shāfi’ī championed is qiyās, which he equated with ijtihād. His balanced approach invites further enquiry into the extensive use of qiyās in general and in criminal law in particular. The extent to which qiyās can be (...) applied to Islamic criminal law depends upon the degree or typology of qiyās being used, taking into account the Islamic theory of criminology. This article will analyse the position of al-Shāfi’ī in this regard. It will critically examine al-Shāfi’ī’s complex views on the use of qiyās as a method for establishing culpability under Islamic criminal law. It will then explore how his position corresponds to the human rights paradigm in the contemporary age. This article concludes that, while the use of qiyās in criminal law, especially in law of retaliation and predetermined punishments in accordance with al-Shāfi’ī’s approach is tantamount to incriminating a person based on less than certainty, it also represents the most promising way of protecting the right of victim. (shrink)

Sünnî usulcülere göre sahih olan haber-i vahid zan ifade etmekle birlikte, böyle bir haberle amel etmek naklî ve kat’î delillerin bir gereği olarak vaciptir. Şiî-Usûlî geleneğin temsilcilerinden Şerif Murtazâ ise haber-i vâhidle amel etmenin aklen caiz olduğunu, ancak bunun dinî açıdan vacip olmadığını iddia etmiştir. Ona göre Kur’an, mütevâtir haber ve masum imamın dâhil olduğu icmâ kesin bilgi kaynağı olduğundan bağlayıcıdır. Haber-i vâhid ise zann ifade etmektedir. Böyle bir haberle amel etmeyi gerektiren naklî kat’î bir delil ise bulunmamaktadır. Bu nedenle (...) haber-i vâhid amelî konularda hüccet değildir. Şerif Murtazâ, Sünnî usulcülerin haber-i vâhidin hüccet olduğuna dair naklî kat’î delillerini eleştirmiş, usulcüler ise bu eleştirilere cevap vermişlerdir. Araştırmamız Şiî-Usûlî geleneğin haber-i vâhide yaklaşım evreninden Şerif Murtazâ örneğini ele almayı ve Sünnî usulcülerin görüşleriyle mukayese etmek suretiyle değerlendirmeyi hedeflemektedir. Şerif Murtazâ’nın âhâd haber konusundaki yaklaşımı özü itibarıyla masum imam teolojisine dayanmakta-dır. Araştırmada masum imam teolojisinin ve haber-i vâhidle amel etmeyi gerektiren kat’î bir delilin bulunmadığı iddiasının nas, icmâ, tevâtür ve makul açısından vakıaya aykırı tutarsız bir görüş olduğu tespit edilmiştir. (shrink)

Dâwûd al-Qarisî (Dâvûd al-Karsî) was a versatile and prolific 18th century Ottoman scholar who studied in İstanbul and Egypt and then taught for long years in various centers of learning like Egypt, Cyprus, Karaman, and İstanbul. He held high esteem for Mehmed Efendi of Birgi (Imâm Birgivî/Birgili, d.1573), out of respect for whom, towards the end of his life, Karsî, like Birgivî, occupied himself with teaching in the town of Birgi, where he died in 1756 and was buried next to (...) Birgivî. Better known for his following works on Arabic language and rhetoric and on the prophetic traditions (hadith): Sharḥu uṣûli’l-ḥadîth li’l-Birgivî; Sharḥu’l-Ḳaṣîdati’n-nûniyya (two commentaries, in Arabic and Turkish); Şarḥu’l-Emsileti’l-mukhtalifa fi’ṣ-ṣarf (two commentaries, in Arabic and Turkish); Sharḥu’l-Binâʾ; Sharḥu’l-ʿAvâmil; and Sharḥu İzhâri’l-asrâr, Karsî has actually composed textbooks in quite different fields. Hence the hundreds of manuscript copies of his works in world libraries. Many of his works were also recurrently printed in the Ottoman period. One of the neglected aspects of Karsî is his identity as a logician. Although he authored ambitious and potent works in the field of logic, this aspect of him has not been subject to modern studies. Even his bibliography has not been established so far (with scattered manuscript copies of his works and incomplete catalogue entries). This article primarily and in a long research based on manuscript copies and bibliographic sources, identifies twelve works on logic that Karsî has authored. We have clarified the works that are frequently mistaken for each other, and, especially, have definitively established his authorship of a voluminous commentary on al-Kâtibî’s al-Shamsiyya, of which commentary a second manuscript copy has been identified and described together with the other copy. Next is handled his most famous work of logic, the Sharhu Îsâghûcî, which constitutes an important and assertive ring in the tradition of commentaries on Îsâghûcî. We describe in detail the nine manuscript copies of this work that have been identified in various libraries. The critical text of Karsî’s Sharhu Îsâghûcî, whose composition was finished on 5 March 1745, has been prepared based on the following four manuscripts: (1) MS Kayseri Raşid Efendi Kütüphanesi, No. 857, ff.1v-3v, dated 1746, that is, only one year after the composition of the work; (2) MS Bursa İnebey Yazma Eser Kütüphanesi, Genel, No.794B, ff.96v-114v, dated 1755; (3) MS Millet Kütüphanesi, Ali Emiri Efendi Arapça, No. 1752, ff.48v-58r, dated 1760; (4) MS Beyazıt Yazma Eser Kütüphanesi, Beyazıt, No. 3129, ff.41v-55v, dated 8 March 1772. While preparing the critical text, we have applied the Center for Islamic Studies (İslam Araştırmaları Merkezi, İSAM)’s method of optional text choice. The critical text is preceded by a content analysis. Karsî is well aware of the preceding tradition of commentary on Îsâghûcî, and has composed his own commentary as a ‘simile’ or alternative to the commentary by Mollâ Fanârî which was famous and current in his own day. Karsî’s statement “the commentary in one day and one night” is a reference to Mollâ Fanârî who had stated that he started writing his commentary in the morning and finished it by the evening. Karsî, who spent long years in the Egyptian scholarly and cultural basin, adopted the religious-sciences-centered ‘instrumentalist’ understanding of logic that was dominant in the Egypt-Maghrib region. Therefore, no matter how famous they were, he criticized those theoretical, long, and detailed works of logic which mingled with philosophy; and defended and favored authoring functional and cogent logic texts that were beneficial, in terms of religious sciences, to the seekers of knowledge and the scholars. Therefore, in a manner not frequently encountered in other texts of its kind, he refers to the writings and views of Muhammad b. Yûsuf al-Sanûsî (d.1490), the great representative of this logical school in the Egyptian-Maghrib region. Where there is divergence between the views of the ‘earlier scholars’ (mutaqaddimûn) like Ibn Sînâ and his followers and the ‘later scholars’ (muta’akhkhirûn), i.e., post-Fakhr al-dîn al-Râzî logicians, Karsî is careful to distance himself from partisanship, preferring sometimes the views of the earliers, other times those of the laters. For instance, on the eight conditions proposed for the realization of contradiction, he finds truth to be with al-Fârâbî, who proposed “unity in the predicative attribution” as the single condition for the realization of contradiction. Similarly, on the subject matter of Logic, he tried to reconcile the mutaqaddimûn’s notion of ‘second intelligibles’ with the muta’akhkhirûn’s notion of ‘apprehensional and declarational knowledge,’ suggesting that not much difference exists between the two, on the grounds that both notions are limited to the aspect of ‘known things that lead to the knowledge of unknown things.’ Karsî asserts that established and commonly used metaphors have, according to the verifying scholars, signification by correspondence (dalâlat al-mutâbaqah), adding also that it should not be ignored that such metaphors may change from society to society and from time to time. Karsî also endorses the earlier scholars’ position concerning the impossibility of quiddity (mâhiyya) being composed of two co-extensive parts, and emphasizes that credit should not be given to later scholars’ position who see it possible. According to the verifying scholars (muhaqqîqûn), it is possible to make definition (hadd) by mentioning only difference (fasl), in which case it becomes an imperfect definition (hadd nâqis). He is of the opinion that the definition of the proposition (qadiyya) in al-Taftâzânî’s Tahdhîb is clearer and more complete: “a proposition is an expression that bears the possibility of being true or false”. He states that in the division of proposition according to quantity what is taken into consideration is the subject (mawdû‘) in categorical propositions, and the temporal aspect of the antecedent (muqaddam) in hypothetical propositions. As for the unquantified, indefinite proposition (qadiyya muhmalah), Karsî assumes that if it is not about the problems of the sciences, then it is virtually/potentially a particular proposition (qadiyya juz’iyyah); but if it is about the problems of the sciences, then it is virtually/potentially a universal proposition (qadiyya kulliyyah). This being the general rule about the ambiguous (muhmal) propositions, he nevertheless contends that, because its subject (mawdû‘) is negated, it is preferable to consider a negative ambiguous (sâliba muhmalah) proposition like “human (insân) is not standing” to be a virtually/potentially universal negative (sâliba kulliyyâh) proposition. He states that a disjunctive hypothetical proposition (shartiyya al-munfasila) that is composed of more than two parts/units is only seemingly so, and that in reality it cannot be composed of more than two units. Syllogism (qiyâs), according to Karsî, is the ultimate purpose (al-maqsad al-aqsâ) and the most valuable subject-matter of the science of Logic. For him, the entire range of topics that are handled before this one are only prolegomena to it. This approach of Karsî clearly reveals how much the ‘demonstration (burhân)-centered’ approach of the founding figures of the Muslim tradition of logic like al-Fârâbî and Ibn Sînâ has changed. al-Abharî, in his Îsâghûjî makes no mention of ‘conversion by contradiction’ (‘aks al-naqîd). Therefore, Karsî, too, in his commentary, does not touch upon the issue. However, in his Îsâghûjî al-jadîd Karsî does handle the conversion by contradiction and its rules. Following the method of Îsâghûjî, in his commentary Karsî shortly touches on the four figures (shakl) of conjuctive syllogism (qiyâs iqtirânî) and their conditions, after which he passes to the first figure (shakl), which is considered ‘the balance of the sciences’ (mi‘yâr al-‘ulûm), explaining the four moods (darb) of it. In his Îsâghûjî al-jadîd, however, Karsî handles all the four figures (shakl) with all their related moods (darb), where he speaks of fife moods (darb) of the fourth figure (shakl). The topic of ‘modal propositions’ (al-muwajjahât) and of ‘modal syllogism’ (al-mukhtalitât), both of which do not take place in the Îsâghûjî, are not mentioned by Karsî as well, either in his commentary on Îsâghûjî or in his Îsâghûjî al-jadîd. Karsî proposes that the certainties (yaqîniyyât), of which demonstration (burhân) is made, have seven, not six, divisions. After mentioning (1) axioms/first principles (awwaliyyât), (2) observata/sensuals (mushâhadât), (3) experta/empiricals (mujarrabât), (4) acumenalia (hadthiyyât), (5) testata (mutawâtirât), and (6) instictives (fitriyyât), that is, all the ‘propositions accompanied by their demonstrations,’ Karsî states that these six divisions, which do not need research and reflection (nazar), are called badîhiyyât (self-evidents), and constitute the foundations (usûl) of certainties (yaqîniyyât). As the seventh division he mentions (7) the nazariyyât (theoreticals), which are known via the badîhiyyât, end up in them, and therefore convey certainty (yaqîn). For Karsî, the nazariyyât/theoreticals, which constitute the seventh division of yaqîniyyât/certainties, are too numerous, and constitute the branches (far‘) of yaqîniyyât. Every time the concept of ‘Mughâlata’ (sophistry) comes forth in the traditional sections on the five arts usually appended to logic works, Karsî often gives examples from what he sees as extreme sûfî sayings, lamenting that these expressions are so widespread and held in esteem. He sometimes criticizes these expressions. However, it is observed that he does not reject tasawwuf in toto, but excludes from his criticism the mystical views and approaches of the truth-abiding (ahl al-haqq), shârî‘â-observant (mutasharri‘) leading sufis who have reached to the highest level of karâmah. (shrink)

The legal-ethical dynamism in Islamic law which allows it to respond to the challenges of modernity is said to reside in the institution of ijtihād (independent legal thinking and hermeneutics). However, jurists like Mohsen Kadivar and Ayatollah Faḍlalla have argued that the “traditional ijtihād” paradigm has reached its limits of flexibility as it allows for only minor adaptations and lacks a rigorous methodology because of its reliance on vague and highly subjective juridical devices such as public welfare (maṣlaḥa), imperative necessity (...) (ḍarūra), emergency (iḍtirār), need (ḥāja), averting difficulty (‘usr) and distress (ḥaraj), hardship (mashaqqa), and harm (ḍarar) without interrogating the fundamentals (uṣūl) of ijtihād. In contrast, in the “foundational ijtihād” model theology, ethics, intellect, epistemology, linguistics, hermeneutics, modern sciences, history, cosmology, anthropology, and the sources of Islamic legal theory (uṣūl al-fiqh) interact with one another to obtain resolutions that are just and non-discriminatory. (shrink)

Fıkıh literatüründe sünnet önemli bir yere sahiptir. Çünkü fıkhın temeli Hz. Peygamber tarafından atılmış ve fıkhın gayesini en iyi bilen ve uygulayan kendisi olmuştur. Bu sebeple şer’î amelî konularda hüküm istinbatı için müctehid imamlar, Kur’an’dan sonra sünnete başvurmuşlardır. Bununla birlikte müctehid imamlar, Hz. Peygamber’den gelen rivayetlerin bazılarını kabul ve onlarla amel etmede görüş ayrılıkları yaşamışlardır. Görüş ayrılıklarının temelinde ise sünnetin ekseriyetini teşkil eden haber-i vâhid vardır. Çünkü haber-i vâhid yapısal açıdan yalan, yanlışlık ve vehm ihtimali bulundurması yanında doğruluğu zan (...) ile sabit olması sebebiyle özellikle Hanefî usûlcülerine göre bilgi ifade etmez. Bu yönüyle haberi vâhid, mütevâtir haber kadar kuvvetli ve bağlayıcı olmayıp zannî bir bilgi ifade eder. Bu doğrultuda haber-i vâhid, “bilgi gerektirmez, zan gerektirir” şeklinde ifade edilmiştir. Bu ifade bağlamında şöyle bir soru ortaya çıkmaktadır: Haber-i vâhid, bilgi ifade etmediği halde, onunla amel edilmesi mümkün müdür? Bu sorudan hareketle zan ifade eden haber-i vâhidin hücceti ve onunla amel edilmesinin mümkün olup olmadığını, mezheplerin haber-i vâhide yaklaşımlarının nasıl olduğunu ve bu durumun cenaze bahsine ilişkin hükümlere nasıl yansıdığını ortaya koymak amacıyla bu çalışma ele alınmıştır. Dolayısıyla bu çalışmanın konusu, haber-i vâhidin hücceti için mezheplerin ileri sürdüğü farklı şartlar ve bu şartların hükümlere -cenaze namazı özelinde- etkisi ile sınırlıdır. Yöntem olarak öncelikle kavramsal çerçevede haber-i vâhidi tanımlamak, bilgi değerini ortaya koymak ve mezheplerin onunla hücceti noktasında benimsedikleri şartları tespit etmek amacıyla ilgili mezheplerin usûl eserleri incelenmiştir. Daha sonra mezheplerin benimsediği bu usûlî yöntem, cenaze bahsindeki yerini belirlemek üzere ilgili mezheplerin fürû kitapları taranmıştır. Bu metottan hareketle mezheplerin usûlde benimsediği ilkenin fürû meselelerine nasıl yansıdığı, haber-î vâhidin zannî bilgi ifade etmesine rağmen onunla amel etmenin gerekçesi ve cenazeye ilişkin bazı hükümlerde mezheplerin farklı hüküm benimsemelerinin nedeni ortaya konulacaktır. (shrink)

Ikhtisâr refers to the process of compilation a work by summarizing short and concise information or a large volume of work through abbreviation. It is intended to facilitate reading, learning and memorization, or to eliminate difficult parts in a book written in the form of Ikhtisâr. The compilation of concise works that fulfilled their purpose has become widespread over time and transformed into a tradition and also concise works have been compiled in fiqh as in other disciplines of sciences. In (...) particular, the work entitled Ghayâ fi’l-Ikhtisâr by Abu Shudjâ al-Isfahânî (d. after 500/1107), which is one of the concise works written in the Shafi'î madhhab, constitutes an important part of this tradition. In this study, primarily, the concise works written in the field of usûl/ancestor and furû/descendant in the Shafi’î madhhab were identified and given in chronological order, right after that, Ghayâ fi’l-Ikhtisâr and Ahmad bin Omar al-Shatirî’s (d. 1360/1941) work entitled Al-Yaqut al-Nafis were examined in terms of the ikhtisâr method. The comparative method was employed in order to determine the common and different aspects of these two works, which are among the basic sources of the Shafi'î madhhab, in terms of content and method. In this context, primarily, basic information regarding Ghayâ fi’l-Ikhtisâr and Al-Yaqut al-Nafis was presented, and right after that the classificcations and information in both works were compared and evaluated in terms of style. In this respect, it was determined that some of the topics in one of the aforementioned works are not included in the other work, and that there are certain differences between them in terms of the arrangement of the topics and the way they are explained. Based on this, in Ghayâ fi’l-Ikhtisâr the topics are dealt with in a brief manner and jurisprudential rulings are presented without giving much space to their evidences. In Al-Yaqut al-Nafis, on the other hand, each topic is dealt with in a detailed manner, and the elements, conditions and provisions related to the topics are mentioned as sub-headings. In particular, issues related to fiqh other than worship are explained with examples. Nevertheless, as in Ghayâ fi’l-Ikhtisâr the evidences of fiqh provisions are not included much. The topics in both works are arranged according to the Shafi'î fiqh methodology. (shrink)

This study seeks to investigate the treatise of Abū al-Hasan b. Abd al-Rahman b. Muhammad al-Khatīb al-Shirbīnī al- Shāfiʻī (d. after 1028/1619) entitled Fatḥ al-Raḥīm al-Raḥmān fī tafsīr Āyat "inna Allāha yaʼmuru bi al-ʻadl wa al-iḥsān" based on the manuscript of the author. Shedding light on the translation of this unknown scholar, as it is evident from the title of the treatise that it contains the interpretation of this verse, which is well known among scholars and commentators as the most (...) comprehensive verse in the Qur’ān. In this tafsīr, Shirbīnī used many exegetical methods such as exegesis of the Qur'ān with the Qur'ān, exegesis of the Qur'ān with the Sunnah, exegesis of the Qur'ān with the sayings of the Companions, and al-tafsīr bi-al-raʼy, as well as tafsīr approaches such as linguistic tafsīr, the science of munāsabāt, and causality of nuzūl to analyze the meanings of the verse in depth. Another feature that increases the importance of this treatise is that al-Shirbīnī refers to the primary source tafsīr books together with their glosses, sometimes quoting from the commentators verbatim, and sometimes making meaning-based quotations from them, which is the most obvious indication of his exegetical ability and scholarly competence. In this work, he adopted a syncretic approach while emphasizing the meanings of the verse and followed an analytical-critical method while examining the subject. For this reason, he analyzed all the words in the verse one by one, dwelt on the meanings and interpretation of the words, and criticized their views after including the views of the commentators. Therefore, he applied the analytical exegesis method very successfully in this work. Accordingly, he analyzed the narrations related to tafsīr and mentioned the Companions' names during the narration. In particular, he analyzed the narrations from Ibn 'Abbas (d. 68/687-88) about the words al-ʻAdl and al-iḥsān, and stated that there was a dispute between the narrations about the phrase al-iḥsān. He took a scientific stance on the derivation of the word "Allah,” debated between those who accepted it and those who rejected it. He stated that the derivation of the word was not satisfactory and reliable. In the tafsīr of the words al-ʻAdl and al-iḥsān, he discussed the isnāds in Muqātil b. Sulayman’s (d.150/767) tafsīr emphasizing that he received the tafsīr of al-ʻAdl from Ibn 'Abbas and the tafsīr of al-iḥsān from 'Ali b. Abī Tālib. This approach is an important example for the isnād analyses of Muqātil b. Sulayman who was criticized for neglecting isnād chains in his tafsīr. He also criticized al-Baydāwī for being influenced by some of Zamakhsharī's sectarian and theological views. He classified the issue of kinship according to usūl, furū', and hawāshī, expanded the meaning of the verse, and insisted that the message of this verse encompasses all relatives, regardless of the degree of kinship. He was influenced by Latāʾif al-Ishārāt, al-Kashshāf, Mafātīhu al-ghayb, al-Baydawī, Hāshiya al-Jurjānī ala al-Kashshāf, and his grandfather al-Khatīb al-Shirbīnī’s (d.977/1570) al-Sirāj al-munīr. (shrink)

The newly updated Right and Wrong 2nd Edition is an accessible introduction to the major traditions in western philosophical ethics, written in a lively and engaging style. It is designed for entry-level ethics courses and includes real-life ethical scenarios chosen to appeal directly to students. Greatly expanded and improved, this successful text introduces students to the major ethical traditions, and provides a simple methodology for resolving ethical dilemmas Treats teleological and deontological approaches to ethics as the two most important traditions, (...) but now includes chapters on virtue ethics and the ethics of care The very accessible writing style speaks directly to students’ own experience Draws examples from three types of real-life ethical scenarios submitted by students: academic dishonesty, partying, and personal relationships Provides a concise treatment of this notoriously complex subject, perfect for entry-level ethics and applied ethics courses. (shrink)

Al-Shafi'i (d. 820) is clearly one of the most important figures in the early history of Islamic jurisprudence. His Risala or "Treatise" on the "principles of jurisprudence" (usul al-fiqh) is also of interest as an example of an approach to ethics that focuses on divine commands. Following a brief introduction, I offer the reader a few comments about al-Shafi'i's context. I summarize the content of the Risala and then analyze it as an example of divine command reasoning in ethics. Finally, (...) I present some observations on the place of al-Shafi'i's theory in the history of Islamic ethics, particularly with respect to his comments on ikhtilaf, "disagreement.". (shrink)

The foundations of almost all Islamic sciences were laid in the first and second centuries of hijra. With the expansion of the Islamic world since the first century of hijra, the existence of a collective effort to transfer oral information into writing is notable. With the invitation of the prophet Muḥammad to Islam, an unprecedented increase in the culture of writing has been observed. Since the emergence of Islam, the world history scene has witnessed feverish writing activity. Especially in the (...) 2th/8th century, when the transition from oral culture to written culture accelerated, the founding texts of the science of language and religion, which were the carriers of these sciences related to aqāid-kalām, fiqh and uṣūl al-fiqh, tasawwuf, tafsir, and hadith, were compiled. Thanks to the founding texts containing the basic principles, the sciences have had the opportunity to develop by deepening. In this study, the contribution of Fiqh al-akbar, the founding text of the science of creed, to the science of kalam, which has made significant progress, will be discussed. In order for a text to be considered a founding and root, there must be a system that it establishes as the fruit of the tree. In this sense, Fiqh al-akbar established a moderate and defensible belief system. There is an organic link between the most concise faith texts and the most voluminous kalām books. While the creed texts, which consist of writing the goals at the end of the road, are the counting of the principles of faith, the texts of the kalām represent the walking of the road that leads to the goal of faith. Fiqh al-akbar, which marks the end of the road by finishing the roads to be walked, is the first and most important of the milestones of Islamic thought. In this study, the contribution of Fiqh al-akbar, the founding text of the science of aqāid, to the science of kalām will be discussed in the context of its belonging to its author. This text gave direction to Ahl al-Sunna theology, which would be written in the later stages of Islamic thought. In this study, the internal and external contexts of the founding text mentioned will be confirmed in terms of its relative acumen to Abū Ḥanīfa. In addition, the reason for the increase in the commentaries (Sharḥ) of Fiqh al-akbar during the Ottoman period will be shown. As a matter of fact, each annotation strengthens that it belongs to the author. In the annotations, there is no sentence stating that the text does not belong to Abū Ḥanīfa, on the contrary, the authenticity of the belonging is emphasized. Of course, not all the annotations of the relevant text will be included here, but mostly printed works will be emphasized. Theology, prophecy and the hereafter are discussed in Fiqh al-akbar. Here, how theological debates and problems related to the history of theological concepts are handled in the commentaries will be shown. In this article, within the framework of the method discussed as an example, a preparation will be made for further studies to evaluate the topics and concepts of prophecy and the hereafter in the context of commentaries. The point that should be emphasized here is that none of the scholars who commented on the text pointed out that the subject or concept was not discussed in the period of Abū Ḥanīfa. Moreover, from the early period until as late as the 7th/13th century, both theology and bibliography books did not have any doubts about the belonging of Fiqh al-akbar to Abū Ḥanīfa. Moreover, since the early period, both theological and bibliographical works did not have any doubts about Fiqh al-akbar’s belonging to Abū Ḥanīfa. (shrink)