Theodor Oizerman’s article “On The Meaning of the Question‘What is Philosophy?’” was first published in the journal “Voprosy filosofii”, 1968, vol. 11. Since that the issue has become a bibliographical rarity and still does not exist in a digital form. Other versions of the article were rewritten in the form of book chapters and transformed in the context of the current situation. This proposed publication bases on one of the older versions, which, is, on the one hand, close to (...) the original author’s intention, and on the other hand, lacks a certain dependence on the ideological context. The text, however, includes some critically important arguments appearing only in later editions. In general, the article is of central significance in terms of its place in the Metaphilosophy concept proposed by Oizerman, which later the following books have manifested: “The Problem Of The History Of Philosophy”(1969, 1983), “The Foundations For The Theory Of The Historico-Philosophical Process” (1983, in co-authorship with A.S. Bogomolov), “Philosophy As A History Of Philosophy” (1999), “Ambivalence Of Philosophy” (2011); “Metaphilosophy: Theory Of The Historico-Philosophical Process” (2009). A number of references due to the difficulty of reading the archived article text have been omitted or taken from new editions. The text has been prepared and edited by Ilya T. Kasavin. (shrink)

This article offers an analysis of dialectical materialism. The author, being a supporter of this theory, offers a self-critical assessment of its foundations. He argues that the predecessors of Marxism constructed their systems with the confidence that they were building the true and only true philosophy. This utopian idea shared by Marx, Engels, and their successors was refuted by subsequent developments in philosophy. Indeed, philosophy by its very nature is pluralistic and interminable. Self-critical Marxism must recognize the legitimacy not only (...) of dialectical materialism, but also of other philosophies no matter how much they may differ in their content. This is supported by analysis of the main categories and problems of dialectical materialism—the laws of dialectics, matter, evolution, consciousness, and truth. (shrink)

The author considers the claim about the existence of a unified subject matter of philosophy in the light of the existence of a diversity of philosophies. It is shown that a unified subject matter of philosophical inquiry for all historical periods is unfounded, and that Marxist attempts to give a universal definition of the subject matter of philosophy is inadequate. The author defends the position of a qualitative change in the subject matter of philosophy in the course of its development. (...) The article provides an overview of major philosophical themes through the prism of the subject-object relationship. The themes under discussion include: nature, the human agent, personality, individuality, subjectivity, and the topic of a cognitive and active relationship between the human and the world. The article shows that the unity of the subject matter of philosophy can be defined only in the most general terms, since the above main themes are only partially and idiosyncratically reflected in different philosophies. (shrink)

The fact that production, and above all the production of material goods, is an indispensable, one may even say absolute, condition for the existence of society and human life was, of course, known long before Marx. There is no need to list the thinkers who stated this idea, to which people's ordinary consciousness, incidentally, inevitably arrives independently of science on the basis of their everyday experience. Historical materialism has nothing in common with such a commonplace assertion, which is essentially a (...) generally known fact, although insufficiently appreciated by our predecessors. (shrink)

The author examines the philosophical doctrines of Kant and Hegel, and puts forward a thesis concerning the inner ambivalence of these doctrines. The thesis is supported with concrete examples demonstrating the internal contradictions in the philosophical systems of Kant and Hegel. The more a philosophical doctrine is meaningful and innovative, the more it is contradictory, ambivalent, and aporiastic, in spite of the efforts of its founder and followers to reconcile all of its major claims. This ambivalence, however, turns out to (...) be a positive quality, because it allows philosophers to transcend their philosophical system, and if not directly, then indirectly raises the questions: Should philosophers continue building systems? And do not all self-contained systems fetter philosophical discourse? (shrink)

The article discusses the intellectual biography of Teodor I. Oizerman. The main stages of the formation and development of Oizerman’s philosophy are considered within the context of the historical changes of twentieth-century Russia. The author identifies five main stages of Oizerman’s philosophical evolution and offers an overview of the main ideas that define each of these stages.

It is customarily assumed that paracomplete and paraconsistent solutions to liar paradoxes require a logical system weaker than classical logic. That is, if a logic is not fragile to liar paradoxes, it must be logically weaker than classical logic. Defenders of classical logic argue that the losses of weakening it outweigh the gains. Advocates of paracomplete and paraconsistent solutions disagree. We articulate the notion of fragility with respect to the liar paradox and show that it can be disentangled from logical (...) strength. Strength and resilience to paradox do not force a trade-off with respect to liars: there can be logics which are not weaker than classical logic and are solid to the liar. (shrink)

The question that arises in this article is whether we can find elements of phenomenology in Bernard Lonergan’s Trinitarian theology.With help of other Lonergan scholars, I have discovered that modern thinking plays an important role in the theology and philosophy ofthis Jesuit author. Moreover, the terminology of modern philosophy coexists with the terminology of classical and especially Tomisticthought. This article is interested in the elements that Lonergan takes from the modern philosophy and emphasizes the centrality ofHusserlian phenomenology among the other (...) modern authors used by Lonergan. Following the research of the Jesuit thinker, I speakabout two parallel realities coexisting in his Trinitarian theology. Lonergan tries to realize their synthesis, but at the same time healso recognizes their distinctiveness. The most relevant result of this coexistence is obtained through the replacement of the metaphysical differentiation between the level of substance and the level of the three Persons, so that, instead of having the elements of classical theology, Lonergan predicates at the same time that God subsists as well as the Trinitarian Persons subsist. Through this assertion he emphasizes the identity between God’s existence and the existence of the three divine Persons, and eliminates the classical differentiation that might be closer to the danger of subordinating the three Persons to the one God. (shrink)

In the paper we give a sucient condition of the Interpolation Property in propositional calculi; then we establish the power of the class of the systems with Craig's property. Next we show that there does not exist a minimal R0-system with Craig-Godel-Lindenbaum's property. Finally, we generalize Sobocinski-Tarskis theorem concerning Sobocinski-Tarski's property.

. In this paper we propose a new definition of entailment and construct a system S of predicate calculus based on this entailment. It is also shown that all well-known set theories can be based on the system S.

The present paper is a continuation of [6] and [7]. Thus the content of this paper is the following. At first we establish properties of systems S 2 n and S 2∗ n , where systems S 2 n and S 2∗ n are extensions of Rasiowa-S lupecki’s systems Sn and S ∗ n . Then we shall show that for every cardinal number m there exist a system ST 4 m of propositional calculus and a system SP 4 m (...) of predicate calculus such that the system ST 4 m has exactly m Lindenbaum’s oversystems and the system SP 4 m has exactly m Lindenbaum’s oversystems, where 1 ≤ m ≤ 2 ℵ0. (shrink)