In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Wyclif on RightsStephen E. LaheyIn the study of medieval political philosophy the tendency has been to pay attention to thinkers who appear to have contributed to the birth of the modern. While the value in coming to understand how modern political thought developed is undeniable, this tendency is accompanied by an implicit, perhaps unintentional, devaluation of the study of that which did not contribute as obviously to modernity. In (...) the history of the idea of the natural right scholars have distinguished between the objective and the subjective right, characterizing the subjective right as what lies at the heart of the classically modern and liberal. One could get the impression that the good political philosophers, having hit upon the subjective right, dispensed with talk of the old-fashioned objective right just as people abandoned gaslight when Edison’s lightbulb went on the market. 1 But this is not what happened; not only did objective rights discourse continue into the modern period, but it was not necessarily the idiom solely of religious and political conservatives.Some late medieval philosophers, notably Marsilius of Padua, even came up with progressive and unorthodox political visions while adhering to the objective right. I will show that at least one late medieval political theory founded on the objective right, that of John Wyclif, can be argued to be as innovative in several important aspects as that of any of the better-known fourteenth-century advocates of the subjective right. To do that, I will divide this paper into three parts. In the first, I will explain the difference between objective and subjective theories of the right, making note of what we can reasonably expect from a fourteenth-century political theory in the way of toleration and briefly introducing John Wyclif’s life and works. In the second I will recount Wyclif’s view of ius, or the right, as it appears in his political writings, and in the third I will explain how this concept has a bearing on elements in his political thought that are recognizably unorthodox and even tolerant to modern, liberal eyes. Having [End Page 1] shown how Wyclif’s objective right plays out in his innovative and reformative political scheme, I hope to have helped to dispel the dogma that the only early rights theories worth studying are those that evolved into ones we use.I.a. Objective and Subjective RightsThe explicit distinction between objective and subjective rights is a new one, invented by scholars of the history of political thought to distinguish between the sense of the term ius, or right, as that which is just in accordance with a set body of law, and the sense of ius which refers to a licit power or faculty belonging to an individual in accordance with right reason. 2 The objective right is grounded in Roman law and functioned in medieval legal and political thought as it had in antiquity. Generally, an individual had a ius to act or be acted upon if that action was commensurate with the law. Among the Romans, that law was either Roman law, or it was according to objective natural law; with the introduction of Christian monotheism, the ius was “right” according to God’s law. Tuck notes that the concept of dominium had long been of a piece with objective ius and explains that dominium had usually been seen as a species of objective ius. If someone has just dominium over something, it is because their relation of dominium is “(what is) right,” ius, in accord with justice, iustitia. He argues that when dominium, which he understands to mean “property,” is equated with ius, “right,” the foundation is laid for a possessive (subjective) right. 3 While this is problematic on several counts, not the least of which is the restriction of dominium to the ownership of property, it illustrates the relatedness of the two concepts ius and dominium. 4As juristic sophistication grew in the twelfth century, it became useful to distinguish between ius in re, “right in a thing,” and ius ad rem, “right to a thing.” If someone has a ius in re, they can use the thing and/or exercise dominium... (shrink)