According to truth-conditional semantics, to explain the meaning of a statement is to specify the conditions necessary and sufficient for its truth. This book develops a more radical mentalist semantics by shifting the object of semantic inquiry. Classical semantics analyzes an abstract sentence or utterance such as "Grass is green"; in attitudinal semantics the object of inquiry is a propositional attitude such as "Speaker so-and-so thinks grass is green".

The Demonstrative Theory holds that quoted matter is logically external to the quoting sentence, that quotation marks are (demonstratively) referential, and that quotation marks are grammatically required for autonomous mentioning. In contrast, the Identity Theory holds that quoted matter is integral to its quoting sentence, that quotation marks serve merely as disambiguating punctuation, and that mentionings need not be quotation-marked. I support the Identity Theory by pointing out fallacies in the arguments for demonstrative theories and by considering empty quotation, ordinary (...) language as found in casual use and in novels and plays, and historical and developmental facts about quotation. (shrink)

The chapters in this volume address a variety of issues surrounding quotation, such as whether it is a pragmatic or semantic phenomenon, what varieties of quotation exist, and what speech acts are involved in quoting. Quotation poses problems for many prevailing theories of language. One fundamental principle is that for a language to be learnable, speakers must be able to derive the truth-conditions of sentences from the meanings of their parts. Another popular view is that indexical expressions like "I" display (...) a certain fixity -- that they always refer to the speaker using them. Both of these tenets appear to be violated by quotation. This volume is suitable for scholars in philosophy of language, semantics, and pragmatics, and for graduate students in philosophy and linguistics. The book will also be useful for researchers in other fields that study quotation, including psychology and computer science. (shrink)

This note concerns the model theoretic properties of logics extending the first-order logic with monadic second-order variables equipped with the stationarity quantifier. The eight variations of the strong downward Löwenheim–Skolem Theorem down to <ℵ2\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$<\aleph _2$$\end{document} for this logic with the interpretation of second-order variables as countable subsets of the structures are classified into four principles. The strongest of these four is shown to be equivalent to the conjunction of CH and the (...) Diagonal Reflection Principle for internally clubness of S. Cox. We show that a further strengthening of this SDLS and its variations follow from the Game Reflection Principle of B. König and its generalizations. (shrink)

We study combinatorial principles known as stick and club. Several variants of these principles and cardinal invariants connected to them are also considered. We introduce a new kind of side by-side product of partial orderings which we call pseudo-product. Using such products, we give several generic extensions where some of these principles hold together with ¬CH and Martin's axiom for countable p.o.-sets. An iterative version of the pseudo-product is used under an inaccessible cardinal to show the consistency of the club (...) principle for every stationary subset of limits of ω1 together with ¬CH and Martin's axiom for countable p.o.-sets. (shrink)

Quote marks, I claim, serve to select from the multiple ostensions that are produced whenever any expression is uttered; they act to constrain pragmatic ambiguity or indeterminacy. My argument proceeds by showing that the proffered account fares better than its rivals-the Name, Description, Demonstrative, and Identity Theories. Along the way I shall need to explain and emphasize that quoting is not simply the same thing as mentioning. Quoting, but not mentioning, relies on the use of conventional devices.

Although corporate social innovation studies in developing countries acknowledge the importance of firm resources and capabilities for attaining social goals, they overlook the way in which these interact with broader institutions to generate successful outcomes. We address this gap by exploring the relationship between firm resources-capabilities and institutions that is conducive to meeting both business and social interests in developing countries. By employing a fuzzy-set qualitative comparative analysis of corporate social innovation projects performed by joint ventures of Dutch SMEs and (...) their local partners in developing countries, we show that firm resources and/or capabilities complement strong institutions in these countries. Corporate social innovation can also be facilitated by firm capabilities in running highly legitimate projects that substitute institutional voids in these economies, attesting to multiple paths that corporations can take to achieve social innovation. (shrink)

This paper describes the linguistic phenomenon of prospective reference. It is a form of deferred reference exemplified by “my cake is ready to go in the oven”, which is interesting because raw batter generally does not qualify as a cake, and “my baby is kicking,” said of a fetus. Because of its importance in political and commercial discourse, prospective reference demands attention from semantic-pragmatic theories in linguistics and jurisprudence. I argue that in at least some cases prospective reference is not (...) the result of polysemy, indeterminacy, vagueness, or promiscuous breadth of concept; rather it is the result of pragmatics, akin to figurative speech and Donnellan’s “referential” use of language. My conclusion is supported by a philosophical critique of semantic externalism plus experimental work indicating that, for speakers of English, fetuses do not fall into the linguistic categories of children, human beings, or persons. (shrink)

Moral philosophers widely believe that it is a part of the MEANING of 'ought' statements that they imply 'can' statements. To this thesis I offer three challenges, and then I conclude on a broader methodological note. (1) Epistemological Modal Argument: for all we know, determinism is true; determinism contradicts “ought implies can”; therefore we don’t know that 'ought' implies 'can'. (2) Metaphysical Modal Argument: determinism is conceptually possible; determinism contradicts “ought implies can”; therefore “ought implies can” is not an analytic (...) truth. (3) Semantic Argument: “You ought to X” is equivalent to “Do X!”; but “Do X!” does not entail that you can X, according to leading analyses of the imperative. (4) My two modal arguments are epistemologically significant, for they illustrate a general method for refuting a whole class of argument. (shrink)

We study L∞κ-freeness in the variety of Boolean algebras. It is shown that some of the theorems on L∞κ-free algebras which are known to hold in varieties such as groups, abelian groups etc. are also true for Boolean algebras. But we also investigate properties such as the ccc of L∞κ-free Boolean algebras which have no counterpart in the varieties above.

In this paper, we explore the conception of nature as a book in Francis Bacon. On the one hand, using this image and confronting the reading of the book of nature and the reading of the books of established authors, Bacon contrasts two completely different ways of the natural philosophy: the Interpretation of Nature in contrast to the Anticipation of the Mind. On the other hand, by considering the revealed book and the book of creatures, Bacon contends for the specificity (...) of the scientific investigation of nature and its relative autonomy in relation to the sphere of religion, although he indicates the character of continuity and complementation of the two books of the same authorship. (shrink)

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the relationship between collective rationality and permissible collective choice rules using a unified approach inspired by Bossert and Suzumura (J Econ Theory 138:311–320, 2008). We consider collective choice rules satisfying four axioms: unrestricted domain, strong Pareto, anonymity, and neutrality. A number of new classes of collective choice rules as well as the Pareto and Pareto extension rules are characterized under various concepts of collective rationality: acyclicity, transitivity, quasi-transitivity, semi-transitivity, and the interval order (...) property. Further, new concepts of collective rationality, K-term acyclicity and K-term consistency, are proposed and the corresponding characterizations are provided. (shrink)

Continuing, we study the Strong Downward Löwenheim–Skolem Theorems of the stationary logic and their variations. In Fuchino et al. it has been shown that the SDLS for the ordinary stationary logic with weak second-order parameters \. This SDLS is shown to be equivalent to an internal version of the Diagonal Reflection Principle down to an internally stationary set of size \. We also consider a version of the stationary logic and show that the SDLS for this logic in internal interpretation (...) \\) for reflection down to \ is consistent under the assumption of the consistency of ZFC \ “the existence of a supercompact cardinal” and this SDLS implies that the continuum is weakly Mahlo. These three “axioms” in terms of SDLS are consequences of three instances of a strengthening of generic supercompactness which we call Laver-generic supercompactness. Existence of a Laver-generic supercompact cardinal in each of these three instances also fixes the cardinality of the continuum to be \ or \ or very large respectively. We also show that the existence of one of these generic large cardinals implies the “\” version of the corresponding forcing axiom. (shrink)

Leibniz afirma que toda mônada expressa o universo inteiro de uma determinada perspectiva. A partir daí, todas os seres criados harmonizam-se entre si, já que todos representam o mesmo mundo, ao mesmo tempo em que cada um se individualiza por meio de seu ponto de vista próprio que • afirma o autor em alguns textos-chave • é determinado pelo lugar que o seu corpo correspondente ocupa. Entretanto, se a limitaçáo dos graus de distinçáo das representações se dá meramente por uma (...) analogia com o espaço e o tempo, como explicar a capacidade dos espíritos de atingir as verdades necessárias e eternas e de constituir uma ciência? A fim de elucidar esta sobrelevaçáo e destacamento dos espíritos em relaçáo aos demais seres criados, introduziremos a atividade da apercepçáo e sua diferença em relaçáo à percepçáo, atividade comum a todas as mônadas. (shrink)

Descartes concebe que a verdadeira ordem científica é a ordem das razões, na qual se parte das verdades mais fáceis e evidentes em direção às mais difíceis e complexas. Assim, estabelecese uma ordem única, progressiva e irreversível, onde cada membro da cadeia depende daqueles que o antecederam, de modo que cada tese possui um lugar não-intercambiável dentro da doutrina. Leibniz, ao contrário, defende que “[...] uma mesma verdade pode ter vários lugares, conforme as diferentes relações que pode possuir” (Novos Ensaios, (...) IV, XXI, § 4). A fim de evitar as repetições, reunindo-se o máximo de verdades no mínimo de volumes, o autor propõe que a melhor ordem científica é a disposição sistemática das matérias, que consiste em uma organização do saber na qual cada lugar reenvia a outros, tornando clara a conexão entre os conhecimentos. Em contraposição ao modelo de sistema cartesiano, no modelo leibniziano, as teses se fundamentam mutuamente e a ordem das verdades estabelecidas é reversível. Ora, é devido a essas diferenças na concepção de sistema que Leibniz, ao contrário de Descartes, pode pretender tomar o que há de melhor nos sistemas legados pela tradição para constituir o seu próprio sistema, já que para ele há uma certa maleabilidade na constituição do sistema filosófico. (shrink)

Descartes thinks that the true scientific order is that of reasons, in which one starts from the easiest and most evident truths and moves towards those that are more difficult and complex. Thus a unique, progressive, and irreversible order is established, where each member of the chain depends on those that precede it, and each thesis has a non-interchangeable place inside the doctrine. Leibniz, on the contrary, defends the idea that "une même vérité peut avoir beaucoup des places selon les (...) differents rapports qu'elle peut avoir" . In order to avoid repetition, assembling the greatest quantity of truths in a minimum of volumes, Leibniz argues that the best scientific order is a systematic disposition in which each place refers to all the others, so that the connections among knowledge becomes clear. In opposition to the Cartesian model of system, in the Leibnizian model theses are based upon one another, and the order of truths is reversible. It is due to these differences concerning the conception of system that Leibniz, unlike Descartes, can pretend to take the best of each philosophical system in order to constitute his own, given that for him there is a certain malleability in the construction of a philosophical system.Descartes concebe que a verdadeira ordem científica é a ordem das razões, na qual se parte das verdades mais fáceis e evidentes em direção às mais difíceis e complexas. Assim, estabelece-se uma ordem única, progressiva e irreversível, onde cada membro da cadeia depende daqueles que o antecederam, de modo que cada tese possui um lugar não-intercambiável dentro da doutrina. Leibniz, ao contrário, defende que "[...] uma mesma verdade pode ter vários lugares, conforme as diferentes relações que pode possuir" . A fim de evitar as repetições, reunindo-se o máximo de verdades no mínimo de volumes, o autor propõe que a melhor ordem científica é a disposição sistemática das matérias, que consiste em uma organização do saber na qual cada lugar reenvia a outros, tornando clara a conexão entre os conhecimentos. Em contraposição ao modelo de sistema cartesiano, no modelo leibniziano, as teses se fundamentam mutuamente e a ordem das verdades estabelecidas é reversível. Ora, é devido a essas diferenças na concepção de sistema que Leibniz, ao contrário de Descartes, pode pretender tomar o que há de melhor nos sistemas legados pela tradição para constituir o seu próprio sistema, já que para ele há uma certa maleabilidade na constituição do sistema filosófico. (shrink)

A partial ordering P is said to have the weak Freese-Nation property if there is a mapping tf : P → [P]0 such that, for any a, b ε P, if a b then there exists c ε tf∩tf such that a c b. In this note, we study the WFN and some of its generalizations. Some features of the class of Boolean algebras with the WFN seem to be quite sensitive to additional axioms of set theory: e.g. under CH, (...) every ccc complete Boolean algebra has this property while, under b 2, there exists no complete Boolean algebra with the WFN. (shrink)

A Boolean algebra B is said to be openly generated if {A: A ≤rc B, |A| = ℵ0} includes a club subset of [ B]ℵ0 . We show: (V = L). For any cardinal κ there exists an L∞κ-free Boolean algebra which is not openly generated (Proposition 4.1). (MA+(σ-closed)). Every L∞ℵa -free Boolean algebra is openly generated (Theorem 4.2). The last assertion follows from a characterization of openly generated Boolean algebras under MA+(σ-closed) (Theorem 3.1). Using this characterization we also prove (...) the independence of problem 7 in Scepin [15] (Proposition 4.3 and Theorem 4.4). (shrink)