Available for the first time in 20 years, here are two important works from the 1920s by the best-known representative of the Vienna Circle.

Stimulating, thought-provoking text by one of the 20th century’s most creative philosophers clearly and discerningly makes accessible such topics as probability, measurement and quantitative language, structure of space, causality and determinism, theoretical laws and concepts and much more. "...the best book available for the intelligent reader who wants to gain some insight into the nature of contemporary philosophy of science."—Choice.

The ArgumentThis essay attempts to show the decisive importance of the “scientific discipline” for any historical or sociological analysis of modern science. There are two reasons for this:1. A discontinuity can be observed at the beginning of modern science: the “discipline,” which up until that time had been a classificatorily generated unit of the ordering of knowledge for purposes of instruction in schools and universities, develops into a genuine and concrete social system of scientific communication. Scientific disciplines as concrete systems (...) (Realsysteme) arise as a result of (a) the communicative stabilization of “scientific communities” at the end of the eighteenth century and the formation of “appropriate” roles and organizational structures (in universities); (b) the structural differentiation of the new scientific disciplines from the established professions (law, theology, medicine) in Europe; (c) the formation of scientific communication in the standardized form of scientific publication; the distinction of the separate action-type “scientific research” and the differentiation of these two elementary acts of all future scientific endeavor in relation to each other.2. The scientific discipline as primary unit of the internal differentiation of science has, since its genesis, been stabilized by two conditions: (a) The fact of a science differentiated into a plurality of (competing, mutually stimulating) disciplinary perspectives becomes the chief causal factor underlying the developmental dynamism of modern science; (b) Similar to the way in which the discipline functions as a cognitive address within the system of science, science also links the discipline up as a structural unit (utilized in both systems) with curricular structures in the system of education — i.e., it is stabilized by the central system/environment relation of science. (shrink)

First published in 2000. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

First published in 2000. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

Introducing his paper, Slezak (p. 428) proposes “to examine Botha's criticisms in detail with a view to demonstrating that they are without foundation and are based on the most fundamental misunderstandings”. Concluding his paper, Slezak (p. 439) expresses the hope that he has shown “that the conceptions on which these criticisms rest are so seriously flawed as to make it unprofitable to attempt to unravel the rest of his analysis”. These formulations, by all standards, represent rather strong rhetoric. But, as (...) the preceding paragraphs have shown, Slezak's discussion sadly lacks the relevant and accurate analyses needed to give substance to his rhetoric. (shrink)

Excerpt from Worterbuch der Philosophischen Begriffe, Vol. 1: Historisch-Quellenmassig Bearbeitet; A bis N Die Anordnung des Materials ist so getroffen worden, dafs in erster Linie die Ubersichtlichkeit des Stoffes gesichert wurde. Die logisch - systematische und die chronologisch-genetische Dispositions weise wurden nach Moglichkeit miteinander combiniert. Auf allzu subtile Einteilungen kam es hier, in einem Worterbuchs, nicht so sehr an, verfuhrt doch eine solche, die gewohnlich durch allerhand Voraussetzungen und Annahmen bedingt ist, selbst also den Charakter einer Theorie, einer Hypothese hat, (...) zur Subjectiviernug der Darstellung, wahrend doch dem Herausgeber au moglichster Objectivitat lag; diese ist denn auch von der Kritik anerkannt werden. Den eigenen Standpunkt, den der Fachmann als einen in so mancher Beziehung selbstandigen erkennen wird, hat der Herausgeber in den an der Spitze der einzelnen Artikel stehenden Begriffs. Bestimmungen zwar kurz, pracis, aber, wie er glaubt, nicht nu wissenschaftlich, entwickelt. About the Publisher Forgotten Books publishes hundreds of thousands of rare and classic books. Find more at www.forgottenbooks.com This book is a reproduction of an important historical work. Forgotten Books uses state-of-the-art technology to digitally reconstruct the work, preserving the original format whilst repairing imperfections present in the aged copy. In rare cases, an imperfection in the original, such as a blemish or missing page, may be replicated in our edition. We do, however, repair the vast majority of imperfections successfully; any imperfections that remain are intentionally left to preserve the state of such historical works.". (shrink)

Relying on Husserl as well as on the reflections by Merleau-Ponty on Cézanne, Henry on Kandinsky and Deleuze on Bacon, this essay sketches some basic problems that arise in a phenomenological account of non-figurative painting. An investigation of the distinction between phenomenological and pictorial perception, of the transposition of the painter’s mode of perception into a painted image, and of the expressive force of paintings inevitably confronts one with the enigma of the appearing of something invisible. The essay proceeds in (...) three steps. The first step describes pictorial perception in terms of a ‘seeing according to’. Such a mode of perception pays attention to visual ambiguities, to the ‘gaze of things’ and to the conditions of visibility that are ordinarily overlooked. The second step moves on to the issue of the transposition of a pictorial perception in a painted image. Deleuze’s account of “manipulated chance” proves to be very helpful here. In the final step, Henry’s and Deleuze’s emphasis on the painting’s expression of totally invisible ‘forces’ is discussed. (shrink)

The Philosophy of Freedom describes Rudolf Steiner's path to freedom. It contains the nonconformist ideals of his youth that result from his study of mathematics, science, and philosophy culminating in a philosophy of life founded upon individualistic truth and ethical individualism. This is the first English translation and the only one sanctioned by Rudolf Steiner himself. Joint translators Prof. and Mrs. R. F. Alfred Hoernlé were selected for their outstanding qualifications. First published in 1916, it is based on (...) the original 1894 German "Die Philosophie der Freiheit". Other translations have been based on the 1918 revised German edition and renamed "The Philosophy Of Spiritual Activity" and "Intuitive Thinking As A Spiritual Path". This original edition includes inspiring passages about individualism that were removed from the book in 1918 and are missing in later translations: "We no longer believe that there is a norm to which we must all strive to conform." "If only we probe deep enough into the very heart of our being, there dwells something noble, something worthy of development." Learn all about Rudolf Steiner's The Philosophy Of Freedom at https: //philosophyoffreedom.com/. (shrink)

Das Wissen, nach dem die Menschen streben, ist oft nur jenes Mindestmaß, dessen sie bedürfen, um ihr Leben zu fristen. Aber nicht alle Menschen begnügen sich damit. Es gab und es gibt einige, die auch in einem stärkeren und höheren Sinn neugierig sind. Sie empfinden das Bedürfnis, über eine einmal erreichte Stufe ihrer Kenntnisse und Einsichten hinauszukommen. Daher denken sie über Mittel und Methoden nach, die sie bis dahin verwendet haben, und sie trachten danach, jene zu verbessern. Auch verschaffen sie (...) sich Klarheit darüber, was ihnen bis jetzt Erfolg brachte, und sie erkennen, daß es am besten ist, in der bewährten Weise fortzufahren. Es wird ihnen aber auch klar, was sie dar an gehindert hatte, noch erfolgreicher zu sein. Daß sie immer bewußter und immer kritischer werden, ist daher unvermeid lich. Manches, was früher als "Wissen" galt, wird jetzt verworfen. Aber nicht immer be bewahrt und ausgebaut und was aufgegeben werden muß; steht Einigkeit darüber, was denn was Erfolg und was Mißerfolg ist, wird nicht von sämtlichen Beobachtern in gleicher Weise beurteilt. Oft gilt dem einen als Wissen, was der andere für ein Hirngespinst hält; häufig ist gerade das, was der eine am höchsten schätzt und als "absolute" oder "ewige" Wahrheit verehrt, dem anderen fragwürdig oder lächerlich. Damit beschreibe ich nicht nur vergangene, sondern auch gegenwärtige Zu stände. Wir alle wissen, daß gerade in unserer Zeit die krassesten Gegensätze herrschen. (shrink)