The Earth is facing pressing societal grand challenges that require urgent managerial action. Responsible management learning has emerged as a discipline to prepare managers to act as responsible leaders that can effectively address such pressing challenges. This article aims to extend current knowledge on RML in the domain of corporate sustainability through the application of threshold concepts, novel ideas which provide a doorway to new knowledge and transform a learner’s mindset. Specifically, after conducting a systematic review of the management literature, (...) we identify 33 CS threshold concepts that are useful for mainstream managers and practitioners in their RML process. We group them into six CS threshold concept themes that can help managers understand the complexities and interconnectedness that characterize CS. Finally, we map CS threshold concepts with key competences for effective RML. Therefore, our contribution relies on translating existing CS theoretical frameworks into transformative, specific, understandable and applicable pieces of knowledge that might help mainstream managers to embed CS principles in their daily management practices. (shrink)

The Earth is facing pressing societal grand challenges that require urgent managerial action. Responsible management learning has emerged as a discipline to prepare managers to act as responsible leaders that can effectively address such pressing challenges. This article aims to extend current knowledge on RML in the domain of corporate sustainability through the application of threshold concepts, novel ideas which provide a doorway to new knowledge and transform a learner’s mindset. Specifically, after conducting a systematic review of the management literature, (...) we identify 33 CS threshold concepts that are useful for mainstream managers and practitioners in their RML process. We group them into six CS threshold concept themes that can help managers understand the complexities and interconnectedness that characterize CS. Finally, we map CS threshold concepts with key competences for effective RML. Therefore, our contribution relies on translating existing CS theoretical frameworks into transformative, specific, understandable and applicable pieces of knowledge that might help mainstream managers to embed CS principles in their daily management practices. (shrink)

This paper offers several new insights into the epistemology of immunity to error through misidentification, by refining James Pryor’s distinction between de re misidentification and wh-misidentification. This is crucial for identifying exactly what is at issue in debates over the Immunity thesis that, roughly, all introspection-based beliefs about one’s own occurrent psychological states are immune to error through misidentification. I contend that the debate between John Campbell and Annalisa Coliva over whether the phenomenon of thought insertion provides empirical evidence against (...) claims like Immunity has wrongly focused on de re misidentification and largely overlooked the role of wh-misidentification. I argue that, once we properly distinguish the two notions, subjects of thought insertion can be seen to make an error of wh-misidentification in their judgments. I argue that this disproves the Immunity thesis, properly understood, and show what broader implications this has for our understanding of IEM and the first person. (shrink)

Lackey’s (2007) class of “selfless assertions” is controversial in at least two respects: it allows propositions that express Moorean absurdity to be asserted warrantedly, and it challenges the orthodox view that the speaker’s belief is a necessary condition for warranted assertibility. With regard to the former point, I critically examine Lackey’s broadly Gricean treatment of Moorean absurdity and McKinnon’s (2015) epistemic approach. With regard to the latter point, I defend the received view by supporting the knowledge account, on which knowledge (...) is the necessary condition for warranted assertion. After examining two defenses of KA, by Montminy and Turri, I propose two alternative approaches. Although I remain neutral between them, I develop in more detail the view which classifies “selfless assertions” as “presentations”, a type of assertives distinct from genuine assertions. This account is motivated further by allowing for the expansion of the normative approach to other assertives, a feature we may be interested in, in the light of a recent wave of normative accounts of speech acts. (shrink)

Stewart Shapiro has objected to the epistemicist theory of vagueness on grounds that it gives counterintuitive predictions about cases involving conditional obligation. This paper details a response on the epistemicist’s behalf. I first argue that Shapiro’s own presentation of the objection is unsuccessful as an argument against epistemicism. I then reconstruct and offer two alternative arguments inspired by Shapiro’s considerations, and argue that these fail too, given the information-sensitive nature of conditional obligations.

This paper investigates a limitation of the model of belief and knowledge prevailing in mainstream economics, namely the state-space model. Because of its set-theoretic nature, this model has difficulties in capturing the difference between expressions that designate the same object but have different meanings, i.e., expressions with the same extension but different intensions. This limitation generates puzzling results concerning what individuals believe or know about the world as well as what individuals believe or know about what other individuals believe or (...) know about the world. The paper connects these puzzling results to two issues that are relevant for economic theory beyond the state-space model, namely, framing effects and the distinction between the model-maker and agents that appear in the model. Finally, the paper discusses three possible solutions to the limitations of the state-space model, and concludes that the two alternatives that appear practicable also have significant drawbacks. (shrink)

Epistemicists claim that if it is vague whether p, it is unknowable whether p. Some contest this on epistemic grounds: vague intuitions about vague matters need not fully preclude knowledge, if those intuitions are response-dependent in some special sense of enabling vague knowledge. This paper defends the epistemicist principle that vagueness entails ignorance against such objections. I argue that not only is response-dependence an implausible characterization of actual vague matters, its mere possibility poses no threat to epistemicism and is properly (...) accounted for by the epistemicist’s own principles. (shrink)

Multiple selves is a conventional assumption in behavioural welfare economics for modelling intrapersonal well-being. Yet an important question is which self has normative authority over others. In this paper, we advance an argument for what we call the ‘ontological approach’ to personal identity in behavioural welfare economics. According to this approach, ethical questions – such as which preference should be granted normative authority over another – can be informed by the ontological criterion of personal persistence, which aims at determining what (...) it takes for an individual to persist from one time to another. (shrink)

Sorensen has argued that one can exploit the vagueness of an ordinary predicate like ‘small’ to induce a sort of vagueness in ‘vague’, by constructing a series of predicates of the form ‘n-small’, where x is n- small if and only if x is small or x n. The resulting ‘Sorensen’ed’ predicates present a Sorites case for ‘vague’ ; hence the vagueness of ‘vague’. Hyde argues that this demonstrates that all vague predicates are higher-order vague. Others doubt whether Sorensen’s series (...) really delivers such a result, claiming Hyde’s argument to be either: unsound, because it misidentifies the true source of vagueness in Sorensen’s Sorites ; invalid, because it fails to generalize to all vague predicates ; or circular, because it presupposes the very thing it tries to prove, namely, higher-order vagueness. This paper contributes to the Sorensen-Hyde vs. Tye-Deas-Hull-Varzi debate by clarifying the relations between vague vagueness and higher-order vagueness. I show how claims of higher-order vagueness are derivable from claims of vague vagueness. This is the missing piece needed to complete Hyde’s argument and overcome the objections presented by Deas, Hull, Tye, and Varzi. I then show how Sorensen’s considerations, once properly generalized, pose more far-reaching consequences about the vagueness of ‘vague’ than either defenders or critics of Hyde’s argument have appreciated. (shrink)

We use this editorial essay as a call for a more effective use of new technologies, such as mobile apps and Web 2.0 tools, to educate students and other relevant stakeholders on business ethics, corporate social responsibility, and sustainability topics. We identify three overarching reasons that justify the need for new ways of teaching that further incorporate technology to foster the innovative thinking needed to tackle imminent societal grand challenges such as climate change and increasing inequality. First, we are facing (...) a new generation of millennials and Generation Z students who are digital natives and more likely to search for educational content on their electronic devices. Second, new technologies offer opportunities to reach students globally, helping to democratize education. Third, we posit that the intrinsic characteristics of societal grand challenges, which are complex, uncertain, and evaluative, can benefit from technology as an effective translator of multilayered concepts into more digestible action items. Our essay ends with a brief summary of the four essays included in the thematic symposium: “There is an App for that! The Use of New Technologies and Apps in Ethics, Corporate Social Responsibility and Sustainability Education.”. (shrink)

Voluntary sustainability standards that establish global rules for firms’ environmental and/or social conduct and allow for verification of firm compliance via third-party certification hold the promise to govern firms’ sustainability conduct in a globalizing world economy. However, the recent proliferation of competing and overlapping global sustainability standards that have been developed by various stakeholders with different agendas, creates uncertainties for firms that likely reduce their propensity to adopt any standard. Without widespread adoption these standards cannot effectively govern firm conduct and (...) in contrast create barriers for firms’ access to export markets. We suggest that the uncertainties associated with competing standards and the effect of these uncertainties on standard certification decisions are especially large for firms in emerging economies because these firms lack access to information about current and future standards and the resources to obtain certifications to multiple standards. We theoretically propose and empirically identify three distinct sources of sustainability standard uncertainty: diversity of customer requirements, dynamism of customer requirements, and the unpredictability of the future evolution of standard and propose that each of these sources reduces firms’ propensity to obtain certification to any standard. Our empirical results based on certifications to food safety standards by a sample of 97 Mexican food exporting firms confirm that three distinct sources of sustainability standard uncertainty exist and that all of them negatively impact certification. We discuss ethical implications and offer recommendations for both suppliers as well as standard setting organizations. (shrink)

In virtue of what does a linguistic act count as an insult? I discuss five main approaches to this question, according to which an insult is determined by (i) the semantic properties of the expression used; (ii) the insulter, her intention, or attitudes; (iii) the addressee and her personal standard; (iv) the features of the speech act performed; and (v) the standard of the relevant social group. I endorse the last, objectivist account, according to which an act x counts as (...) an insult if and only if x is assessed as demeaning when addressed at A by the standard of the relevant social group at t. (shrink)

This article analyzes the adoption of voluntary environmental management programs by firms operating in Mexico. Mexican firms can obtain national certification (Clean Industry) and/or international certification (ISO 14001). Based on institutional entrepreneurship theory, we posit that the role played by first movers as institutional entrepreneurs is crucial if these programs are to become established with sufficient strength and appeal. This understanding is especially important in an environment where more than one program can be adopted. We tested several hypotheses on the (...) behaviors of 1328 facilities operating in Mexico, half of which (664) had certified environmental management programs. Of the 664 certified facilities, 217 were classified as early adopters. Three variables predicted the likelihood of a facility being an early adopter: (1) connected to international market, (2) in the maquila sector, and (3) linked to an industry association that offers free resources. (shrink)

En este artículo examinamos a grandes rasgos la alternativa a la idea de lucha en el proceso de reconocimiento mutuo. Analizamos los conceptos que en nuestras sociedades modernas han dado lugar a estados de paz concretos, y que habiendo emergido de la tradición cristiana, tienen una sedimentación semántica que nos invita a desentrañarla. La philia, el eros y el ágape son aquí nuestros conceptos clave. Descubrimos cómo el ágape se distancia del eros platónico y de la philia aristotélica en la (...) forma de la infinitud y de la incondicionalidad, cómo se dona a sí mismo sin esperar la reciprocidad y sin resistirse a llevar la iniciativa en el establecimiento de las relaciones pacíficas, pudiendo llegar a tener suma importancia en el orden democrático. (shrink)

An agent A blames B hypocritically for violating a moral norm N if and only if: A is likewise blameworthy for violating N, and A is not disposed to blame herself for violating N. Normally, an assertion involving blame is retracted following the objection that and hold. I discuss two prima facie explanations for such a withdrawal: that the objection hampers the speaker’s assertoric authority, rendering and the necessary condition to assert, and that the joint condition is, instead, merely a (...) regulative rule. Having shown that the former option is too revisory as it requires reformulation of all normative accounts of assertion on the table, and the latter false, I proceed to argue that and do not target assertions to begin with. An assertion involving blame is, instead, a clear case of a double speech act: after arguing for this claim, I proceed to show that qua assertion, the act is correct given one’s preferred normative account, whereas it is incorrect qua blaming, as in order to perform such an act, the speaker needs to satisfy the conditions and. (shrink)

The paper offers a semantic and pragmatic analysis of statements of the form ‘x is beautiful’ as involving a double speech act: first, a report that x is beautiful relative to the speaker’s aesthetic standard, along the lines of naive contextualism; second, the speaker’s recommendation that her audience comes to share her appraisal of x as beautiful. We suggest that attributions of beauty tend to convey such a recommendation due to the role that aesthetic practices play in fostering and enhancing (...) interpersonal coordination. Aesthetic practices are driven by a disposition towards the attunement of attitudes and aesthetic recommendations contribute to forwarding such attunement. Our view is motivated by an attempt to satisfy the following set of desiderata: to account for the experiential nature of aesthetic judgments, disagreements in aesthetic debates, and the normative aspirations of aesthetic discourse, as well as to avoid appealing to error theory and realist ontological commitments. (shrink)

In her book Democracy and Truth: The Conflict between Political and Epistemic Virtues, Snjezana Prijic Samarzija advocates a stance that not only political, but also epistemic values are necessary for justification of democracy. Specifically, she mounts defense for one particular type of public deliberation on epistemic grounds. In this paper, I will discuss the following issue: What connects this type of public deliberation to the wider context of justification of democracy? I will attempt to explain why Prijic Samarzija's stance can (...) be understood as a version of deliberative epistemic instrumentalism and to discuss the role played by the public deliberation within this framework. (shrink)

The paper reconstructs the connections between the evolution of Patrick Suppes’ measurement theory from 1951 to 1958 and the research in utility analysis he conducted between 1953 and 1957 within the Stanford Value Theory Project. In particular, the paper shows that Suppes’ superseding of the classical understanding of measurement, his endorsement of the representational view of measurement, and his conceiving of an axiomatic version of the latter were prompted by his research in utility analysis.

An assertion is existentially known if and only if: (i) the speaker knows that the sentence she uses to make the assertion expresses a true proposition; (ii) she makes the assertion based on that knowledge; and (iii) she does not believe, have justification for, or know the proposition asserted. Accordingly, if existentially known assertions could be made correctly—as argued by Charlie Pelling in his ‘Assertion and the Provision of Knowledge’—this would show that the norm of assertion cannot be the speaker's (...) belief in, justification for or knowledge of the proposition. In this paper, I try to show that Pelling's argument is inconclusive, as it rests on two assumptions which can be resisted. In turn, I offer a pair of alternative strategies to explain how we can deal with existentially known assertions under the assumption that the speaker's knowledge is the norm of assertion. (shrink)

In this paper I analyze Cecile Laborde's conception of justificatory secularism. Laborde points out that in her formulation and defense of the conception of justificatory secularism, she follows Rawls' conception of political liberalism to a certain extent. For that reason, I first provide a sketch of Rawls' conception of political liberalism. Then I focus on justificatory secularism, trying to show to what extent it displays similarities with the conception of political liberalism, but also how it differs. I am interested in (...) whether justificatory secularism represents a better alternative to the conception of political liberalism or whether these two conceptions should be considered complementary. (shrink)

I examine some behavioural and heuristic models of individual decision-making and argue that the diverse psychological mechanisms these models posit are too demanding to be implemented, either consciously or unconsciously, by actual decision makers. Accordingly, and contrary to what their advocates typically claim, behavioural and heuristic models are best understood as ‘as-if’ models. I then sketch a version of scientific antirealism that justifies the practice of as-if modelling in decision theory but goes beyond traditional instrumentalism. Finally, I relate my account (...) of decision models to the recent controversy about mentalism versus behaviourism, reject both positions, and offer an alternative view. (shrink)

Cosa accade se filosofi del presente e del passato, personaggi di finzione e romanzieri di fantascienza si mettono a dialogare su alcuni dei temi fondamentali del mondo sociale? La discussione sulla natura della realtà documentale origina un caleidoscopico divertissement incentrato sulla disamina della supposta irrealtà degli oggetti videoludici.

Why the social ontology uses the game as paradigmatic example of social object? Is social reality a game? In this short essay, shared characteristics and differences of ludic and social acts are explored to explode the myth of the normative structure of social reality. In order to explain and demonstrate their theories, major authors of our research sector as Searle and Smith appeal to ludic phenomenons as unmistakable evidences of regulated social activities. Nevertheless well valued theorists don’t recognize that there (...) are tens of different typologies of games, about which it should be appropriate to draw up a regional ontology, as much there are tons of rule types, not always prescriptive and not always descriptive. The instant article demonstrates that social reality is not explainable by appealing to regulated behaviors, opening in this way a research context that involves the Interactive Fiction of play. Therefore the ludic phenomenon rests the base of social reality, however disconnecting it from the concept of rule, which too much influenced the research on mind, language and culture. (shrink)

Religious Remembrance. Professor Valentin Vandishev.

I propose a novel solution to the Sorites Paradox. The account vindicates the tolerance of vague predicates in a way that properly addresses the normativity of vagueness while avoiding sorites contradiction, by treating sorites reasoning as a type of defeasible reasoning. I show how this can be done within the setting of a nonmonotonic deontic logic. Central to the proposal is its deontic interpretation of tolerance. I draw a key distinction between two types of tolerance, based on different deontic notions, (...) and show how the account captures key differences between these types of sorites reasoning. I compare the resulting theory to various existing contextualist proposals and argue that it better accounts for the normative aspects of sorites reasoning. (shrink)

In this paper I will discuss a recent attempt of justifying democracy and its authority. It pertains to recently published papers by Niko Kolodny, which complement each other and taken together practically assume a form of a monograph. It could be said that Kolodny's approach is a non-standard one given that he avoids typical ways of justifying democracy. Namely, when a justification of democracy is concerned, Kolodny maintains that it is necessary to offer a kind of an independent justification. It (...) is not so much that he insists that the usual approaches are wrong as much as that an independent justification is necessary in order to discern what it is that gives them their significance. Kolodny's independent justification of democracy is based on the idea of social equality. In this paper I will try to reconstruct and critically assess Kolodny's approach by paying special attention to the question of democratic authority. (shrink)

La flexibilidad y la mercantilización de lo espiritual ¿son aspectos característicos de la cultura contemporánea? Centrado en los casos de Alemania, Inglaterra y Francia, el artículo detalla cómo el romanticismo literario se articula como un movimiento pionero de la espiritualidad flexible, proceso que se entrelaza con su rol seminal en la formación del campo literario moderno. El crecimiento económico y demográfico sostenidos en Europa desde el s. XV, así como la alfabetización impulsada por el protestantismo, construyen un moderno público lector (...) que da pie —durante el s. XVIII— a la revolución y diversificación de la lectura, lo que promueve la difusión de incipientes tendencias modernas (ciencia, Ilustración, prensa). Oponiéndose parcialmente a estas tendencias y extendiendo la diversificación de lo impreso, surge la tendencia romántica. Sus autores flexibilizan la espiritualidad más allá de las convenciones religiosas de la época —y aportan a la formación del campo literario— (1) caracterizando el desencanto y otras formas de malestar moderno; (2) multiplicando el lenguaje imaginario-trascendente; (3) brindando connotaciones metafísicas al genio artístico; (4) promoviendo la autonomía y libertad expresiva del arte. La evidencia indica que el mercado fue una condición histórica básica para la EF. Se sugiere que esta flexibilidad se muestra como una adaptación de la espiritualidad a las circunstancias empíricas de la modernidad, la cual conlleva nuevas necesidades de sentido y una mayor capacidad para divergir de los relatos religiosos tradicionales. (shrink)

En la t eoría de la acción comunicat iva habermasiana nos enf rentamos al problema de la validez de cat egorías del ent endimiento comunicativo, que est án fácticamente enormemente cuestionadas. Es decir, Habermas ha definido al in terior del apart ado “Desacoplamiento de sistema y mundo de la vida” una sist emática de las f ormas de entendimiento. Allí aparecen doce f ormas de entendimiento que art iculan la di ferenciación de esf eras de validez con á mbitos de (...) acción que evolucionan socialmente desde f ormas de ent endimiento primitivas preconvencionales hacia las má s avanzadas postconvencionales, llegando así hasta las dos últimas categorías (11 y 12) que Haberma s denomina forma moderna de entendimiento y que es el punto de partida de su teoría de la modernidad. Sin embargo, a este sistema categorial, debe hoy enfrentar una realidad completamente distinta a la del mundo moderno t ardo-capitalismo, que opera como ref erente fáctico de la t eoría. La nueva realidad consiste en una globalización sist émica que ha puest o en espacios nacio nales específicos a una pluralidad de mundos de la vida que van desde el preconvencional al postconvencional. Es decir, hoy, en el cuadro de la figura 28 presentado por Habermas en TAC 1981, II, todas las categorías aparecerían juntas, aunque diferenciadas en grados de evolución, y en un espacio y tiempo presente y continuo. Por tanto, hoy, cuando Habermas habla de Europa y del Estado de derecho democrático habla d esde el principio del discurso, o desde presupuestos teóricos comunicativos; cuando aborda temáticas referidas a integración social intercultural lo hace de sde una racionalidad del sentido común democrático (common sense) al que deben subordinarse esas otras tradiciones culturales. Cómo opera este common sense en la raciona lidad comunicativa de J. Habermas es el t ema de nuest ra exposición. Es de cir, nuestro objetivo será determinar génesis y estructura de la categoría de common sense en la obra de Habermas, y sus implicancias e pistemológicas y socio-éticas para pensar sistemáticamente una integración social int ercultural. Y con ello evaluar críticamente si t anto, la t eoría de la acción comunicativa como el discurso int ercultural de Habermas basa do en este common s ense, son apropiados o no, para pensar las patologías de exclusión social presentes hoy en América Latina. (shrink)

In this thesis, I propose and defend a theory according to which committing oneself to knowing the proposition expressed counts as an assertion of that proposition. A consequence of this view is the knowledge account of assertion, according to which one asserts that p correctly only if one knows that p. In support of this approach, I offer a strategy of identifying an assertion’s “normative consequences”, types of act that normally take place as a result of one’s making an assertion (...) incorrectly. I outline two such phenomena: retraction and disavowal of knowledge. In continuation, I put the theory to test and critically examine four sets of objections against it, arguing that it can convincingly defuse them. Finally, I discuss two related issues: I maintain that by performing “aesthetic assertions” one also normally performs a non-assertoric speech act of recommendation, and argue for the possibility of “non-linguistic assertions”, whose content is expressed by gestures in appropriate contexts. (shrink)

The enigmatic thought of Charles S. Peirce (1839-1914), considered by many to be one of the great philosophers of all time, involves inquiry not only into virtually all branches and sources of modern semiotics, physics, cognitive sciences, and mathematics, but also logic, which he understood to be the only useful approach to the riddle of reality. This book represents an attempt to outline an analytical method based on Charles Peirce's least explored branch of philosophy, which is his evolutionary cosmology, and (...) his notion that the universe as made of an 'effete mind.' The chief argument conceives of human discourse as a giant metaphor in regard to outside reality. The metaphors arise in our imagination as lightning-fast schemes of acting, speaking, or thinking. To prove this, each chapter will present a well-known metaphor and explain how it is unfolded and conceptualized according to the new method for revealing meaning. This original work will interest students and scholars in many fields including semiotics, linguistics and philosophy. (shrink)

The enigmatic thought of Charles S. Peirce, considered by many to be one of the great philosophers of all time, involves inquiry not only into virtually all branches and sources of modern semiotics, physics, cognitive sciences, and mathematics, but also logic, which he understood to be the only useful approach to the riddle of reality. This book represents an attempt to outline an analytical method based on Charles Peirce’s least explored branch of philosophy, which is his evolutionary cosmology, and his (...) notion that the universe is made of an ‘effete mind.’ The chief argument conceives of human discourse as a giant metaphor in regard to outside reality. The metaphors arise in our imagination as lightning-fast schemes for acting, speaking, or thinking. To illustrate this, each chapter will present a well-known metaphor and explain how it is unfolded and conceptualized according to the new method for revealing meaning. This original work will interest students and scholars in many fields including semiotics, linguistics and philosophy. (shrink)

Partiendo de la crítica a la metafísica dualista entre vida/otra vida propia del cristianismo desde Pablo de Tarso, el presente artículo pretende demostrar cómo Lessing reexamina la concepción de la muerte siguiendo la tradición del panteísmo helenista (Bruno, Spinoza, Leibniz…). La teoría lessingniana sobre la muerte cristaliza en una antropología de carácter optimista que permite el continuo perfeccionamiento del individuo y de la humanidad toda, evitando el sentimiento de culpa y miedo que emana desde la escatología cristiana.

The article deals with some problems of formalization of Russell's example with a yacht and Eugeniy Borisov's proposal concerning the usage of “object" affitudes. This idea seems wrong to me in terms of its contents, besides its formal realization fails. I believe that formalization of the example with a yacht must, firstly, take into account the pragmatics of the phrase's usage and, secondly, point at the mental representations of the objects. To do this, one can use propositions reflecting a technical (...) aspect of semantic relations. (shrink)

The article presents a concept apparatus of identifying and eliminating non-compositionality on the basis of intended sense reconstruction. First, two types ofnon-compositionality are delineated: pragmatically adoptable and logical. Thenon-compositionality ofthe first type has its source in underspecification of the meaning of an expression components, which is connected with non-expressible context-pragmatic conditions ofthesituation of an expression. The variants ofsuch non-compositionality are various, nevertheless allof them can be adopted with logical and semantic means. Non-compositionality ofthe secondtype is linked to the cyclic references (...) which occur during the realisation ofthe procedure of defining the meaning. Sucha procedure is regarded as a semantic program which is capable of calculating the meaning of an expression with semantic and context-pragmatic parameters being given. The main question: howthe agents communication recognise thefactthatthe language expressions they generated are not adequate in regards of those mental representa- tionswhich constitute intended sense, particularly in the cases of non-compositionality. To answer this question the way of reconstructing intended sense is described. It includes differentiation of minimal and full senses of expression, and presupposes juxtaposing of context-pragmatic conditions of a speaker situation with the same conditions an addressee situation. If differences are uncovered which would make it impossible to achieve adequate understanding,then the parameters ofa speaker's situation are verbalised and stop beingnon-expressible turninginto obvious conditions ofthe stated. In the case of pragmatically adopted non-compositionality, full verbalisation of context-pragmatic conditions leads to obtaining full compositional meaning, which does not depend on a situation anymore. If it turns out, that logical compositionality depends on context-pragmatic conditions, then, depending on the aim of communication, it maybe localised and eliminated. (shrink)

In this article, I want to show that the concept “rationality”, which is important for the French school of epistemology of science, has a dual content and is not very successful. This is the main point of my polemic with Tatyana Sokolova. On the one hand, there seems to be general rationality in it, understood as a preference (in the broad sense) for benefits over costs. Benefits include true knowledge. On the other hand, there is a historical socio-cultural context in (...) which scientific knowledge arises and in which the parameters of practice are determined, which serves as the final instance for testing knowledge. At the same time, there are many such contexts in society, which I call human interfaces. The world, for its part, offers many of its interfaces as collections of interaction tools. When some interface of a person and some interface of the world assimilate each other, knowledge arises, that is confirmed by practice. It can be considered rational. But with a change in the sociocultural context, the human interface also changes, so that a search for new assimilation takes place. It is carried out by science. I agree with Tatyana Sokolova’s characterization of the progress of science, but I suggest at least differentiating the levels of rationality. One operates in the historical sociocultural locus, the other ensures the change of such loci and the adaptation of knowledge to them. I consider the progress of science to be an evaluative characteristic; no objectively recorded phenomenon corresponds to it. The disciplinary distinction of science is derived from the concepts of “object” and “method”, which have a performative content. (shrink)

I connect the idea of an existential turn in philosophical science, presented by Ilya Kasavin and Vladimir Porus in their recent article, with the problem of rationality and culture crisis, as well as the opposition of profession and vocation in Max Weber’s famous speech on politics. I offer an analysis of the structure of vocation to politics and to science as affects of a special kind. To do this, I draw on Jacques Lacan’s analysis of hysteria. My conclusions are that (...) the structure of a target affect coincides to that of hysteria. This means that scientist tries to show that the truth exists, seeks to force other people to recognize this fact and submit to science as an only acceptable form of worldview. Until this can be done, the scientist gives his relationship to the community the character of service to the highest entity. At the same time, he waits for the inversion of this service, i.e. a transition to power through acknowledgement. It should be noted that scientific research is never limited by the science itself, no matter how dangerous it may be. The existential choice in science is a choice between the pursuit of truth in natural sciences and exact sciences and maintaining the sustainability of culture in social and humanitarian knowledge. The latter, contrary to Weber, is always intertwined with politics. The first is not political, but affective. This allows me to see the definition of the vocation to the science that Kasavin gives in a new way. At the center of the “cognitive-existential mood” in the search for truth, affect dominates, the engine of which is hysteria, and in its basic attitudes truth and the scientist are opposed to the plausible and the profane. (shrink)