On liberty, by J. S. Mill.--Morals and the criminal law, by P. Devlin.--Immorality and treason, by H. L. A. Hart.--Lord Devlin and the enforcement of morals, by R. Dworkin.--Sins and crimes, by A. R. Louch.--Morals offenses and the model penal code, L. B. Schwartz.--Paternalism, by G. Dworkin.--Four cases involving the enforcement of morality: Shaw v. Director of Public Prosecutions; People v. Cohen; Repouille v. United States; Commonwealth v. Donoghue.--Bibliography (p. 149).

The question 'Why should I obey the law?' introduces a contemporary puzzle that is as old as philosophy itself. The puzzle is especially troublesome if we think of cases in which breaking the law is not otherwise wrongful, and in which the chances of getting caught are negligible. Philosophers from Socrates to H.L.A. Hart have struggled to give reasoned support to the idea that we do have a general moral duty to obey the law but, more recently, the greater number (...) of learned voices has expressed doubt that there is any such duty, at least as traditionally conceived. (shrink)

In his article entitled “Moore and Philosophical Analysis”, Professor Morris Lazerowitz selects Hume's analysis of causality as an example of the way in which philosophers have in the past misleadingly stated what they were trying to do. Professor Lazerowitz asserts at least three things of Hume's analysis. (1)Since Hume insisted that there was no impression of necessary connection, it follows that Hume could not have been examining sequences of events. (2)Therefore, Hume must have been doing something else; namely, misleadingly calling (...) attention to the fact that it always makes literal sense to say of any two supposedly causal events that they are only accidentally connected. Hume, in other words, deprived causal verbs of their use “by linguistic fiat” so that he could more pointedly illustrate the likeness between causal and accidental-occurrence statements. (shrink)

In his article entitled “Moore and Philosophical Analysis”, Professor Morris Lazerowitz selects Hume's analysis of causality as an example of the way in which philosophers have in the past misleadingly stated what they were trying to do. Professor Lazerowitz asserts at least three things of Hume's analysis. Since Hume insisted that there was no impression of necessary connection, it follows that Hume could not have been examining sequences of events. Therefore, Hume must have been doing something else; namely, misleadingly calling (...) attention to the fact that it always makes literal sense to say of any two supposedly causal events that they are only accidentally connected. Hume, in other words, deprived causal verbs of their use “by linguistic fiat” so that he could more pointedly illustrate the likeness between causal and accidental-occurrence statements. (shrink)

Many persons who consider the variety of moral and legal problems that arise in respect to war come away convinced that the firmest area for judgment is that of how persons ought to behave in time of war. Such persons feel a confidence about dealing with questions of how war ought to be conducted that is absent when other issues about war are raised. They are, for example, more comfortable with the rules relating to how soldiers ought to behave vis-a-vis (...) enemy soldiers and enemy civilians - the laws of war - than they are with the principles relating to when war is permissible and when it is not. Thus, most commentators and critics are uneasy about the applicability to the American scene of that part of Nuremberg that deals with crimes against peace and crimes against humanity. But they have no comparable uneasiness about insisting that persons who commit war crimes, violations of the laws of war, be held responsible for their actions. (shrink)