First published in 1973. Few concepts in the modern age have created more controversy in the discussion of social, moral, and political issues than that of ideology. Ever since the term was coined by Destutt de Tracy to refer to a scientific study of the origin of ideas, its meaning has undergone a series of mutation, until we have reached the stage where ideology can now be used to refer to almost any organized body of beliefs. Amidst these changes in (...) the meaning of the term certain common preoccupations are detectable and certain fundamental problems remain. Is human reason capable of comprehending reality 'as it is'? Or is its approach necessarily influenced by the thinker's values, personal or class interests and personal or social prejudices? Is human reason a culturally neutral instrument or a socially acquired capacity that is unconsciously shaped by a particular historical age or society or class? There are fundamental problems too concerning the internal structure and rationale of specific ideologies such as conservatism, pluralism, and apartheid. This title will be of great interest to students of philosophy and politics. (shrink)

It is a safe prediction that, especially now with cultural contacts freely flowing between East and West in both directions, the Hungarian thinker Istvan Bibo will soon be given full accolade as one of the most outstanding political theorists of this century, in stature equal to the �greats� in the entire European tradition of political thought. Bibo's significance far exceeds local, parochial interests. While profoundly original and organically stemming from Hungarian culture, Bibo belongs also to the �West�. If his political (...) thought is to be epitomized in one succinct phrase, it is �the realism of moralism�, or the almost flawless synthesis of a deeply radical, morally infused vision and value-system with the hard-nosed, unsentimental realist-s insight into enduring problems of politics and society. This synthesis is �almost� flawless: in the closing section of this article I will advance a few constructively critical remarks concerning some questionable points in the trajectory of Bibo's thought. (shrink)

The Morality of Politics addresses the issues of politics and morality. The book asks the questions, has politics got a moral basis? Has morality anything to do with politics? Comprised of a collection of unique essays, the book looks at the idea that politics shies away from the discussing the morality of actions and confronts evasion by clarifying some of the basic moral problems of political life. It is a unique collection in which academics holding different political and philosophical views (...) have come together to examine some of the burning and topical issues of contemporary society. The book will appear to all interested in the contemporary political environment and especially students of politics and moral and political philosophy. (shrink)

I would like to develop a few critical observations on some substantive moral ideas propounded in Professor R. M. Hare's Freedom and Reason a work where formal and substantive moral arguments are blended in an attractive and plausible, though at times somewhat exasperating, mixture. Hare's formal doctrines, the celebrated theses of prescriptivity and universalizability, will not as such interest me here, though I shall have to take notice of at least one of them, viz. universalizability, in so far as it (...) has a bearing on what I take to be Hare's substantive position. The arguments in Freedom and Reason are compounded of Kantian and utilitarian elements, and culminate in Hare's conceptualization of two antithetical types of person, whom he calls respectively the ‘liberal’ and the ‘fanatic’. This distinction itself is based on a rigid and uncompromising dichotomy of ‘interest’ and ‘ideal’, and it is on this dichotomy that Hare's substantive moral doctrine hinges. Hare's argument is that the morally good person is one who subordinates his ideal to a moral principle that takes interests into account, in contradistinction to the fanatic who allows interests to be overridden by his ideal. There is much to recommend in this doctrine, and distinctions of this nature can and ought to be drawn. But the way in which it is done in Hare's work opens up fresh doubts and fails to solve some fundamental problems. As I do not think that his distinction between ‘interest’ and ‘ideal’ is tenable, I cannot agree wholly to the predominantly formal manner in which Hare deals with the important question of distinguishing between liberalism and fanaticism. The upshot of my arguments is that this distinction can only be made intelligible in substantive terms. Although I cannot here offer a positive alternative to Hare beyond some oblique hints at the end, my critical remarks on Hare's doctrine ought at least to go some way in establishing the need for such an alternative. (shrink)

Professor Kelly has produced a most delectable collection of essays, all distinguished by great felecity of style, profound erudition in the areas covered and topics discussed, and highly thought-provoking arguments and lines of interpretation - features which do not come as a surprise to those familiar with his previous work. The book will be of considerable interest to political philosophers, historians of ideas whether or not closely concerned with Hegel, and to Hegel-scholars, probably in this order. To wit, the conspicuous (...) dualism of title and sub-title truly reflects, not merely a duality of levels and orientation which could fairly have been expected, but also, more seriously, a preponderant weighting in favour of what seems to be covered by the sub-title. Kelly’s own explanation is that he is dealing with three topics: Hegel’s development, the relationship of politics, history and philosophy in Hegel’s thought, and aspects of Hegel’s theory of the state. Of these three only the first belongs to the topic suggested by the title, and to be sure only two essays out of eight are concerned with this. There is nothing in the book about Hegel’s “eleusis” and relatively little, and little that is consequential or strikingly novel in biographical terms, about his “retreat” from this position, his growing maturity. What there is, to be sure, is full of interest and pertinent information; one may question the author on small points of detail, but one ought readily to acknowledge the value and overall validity of his interpretive glosses. The two essays belonging in this category are concerned, respectively, with “Hegel’s Lordship and Bondage” and “Social Understanding and Social Therapy in Schiller & Hegel”. The latter, replete with interesting detail on Schiller’s diagnoses of and remedies for the modern age, and comparatively reserved on Hegel’s, concludes by pointing out Hegel’s decisive rejection of “aestheticism” in favour of reason and politics. The former, cast mainly in the form of a polemic with Kojeve’s Marxistic interpretation, makes the timely and perfectly valid point that Hegel’s lordship-bondage dialectic should be understood in psychological, and not merely in socio-historical terms. Kelly argues, while stimulatingly filling in the relevant intellectual background with reference to Rousseau, Kant and Fichte, that Hegel’s topic is “Platonic in foundation” and has, essentially, to do with the simultaneous process of man’s liberation from external oppression and his enslavement by himself: the Lutheran-Kantian scenario. Of course, for Hegel this is not the end of the matter: just as it is erroneous, with Marx and commentators influenced by him, to explain lordship and bondage by proclaiming the “victory of the slave”, it is also un-Hegalian to remain rooted on the level of unreconciled internal suppression. Kelly could have been more explicit on this point. (shrink)

Professor Kelly has produced a most delectable collection of essays, all distinguished by great felecity of style, profound erudition in the areas covered and topics discussed, and highly thought-provoking arguments and lines of interpretation - features which do not come as a surprise to those familiar with his previous work. The book will be of considerable interest to political philosophers, historians of ideas whether or not closely concerned with Hegel, and to Hegel-scholars, probably in this order. To wit, the conspicuous (...) dualism of title and sub-title truly reflects, not merely a duality of levels and orientation which could fairly have been expected, but also, more seriously, a preponderant weighting in favour of what seems to be covered by the sub-title. Kelly’s own explanation is that he is dealing with three topics: Hegel’s development, the relationship of politics, history and philosophy in Hegel’s thought, and aspects of Hegel’s theory of the state. Of these three only the first belongs to the topic suggested by the title, and to be sure only two essays out of eight are concerned with this. There is nothing in the book about Hegel’s “eleusis” and relatively little, and little that is consequential or strikingly novel in biographical terms, about his “retreat” from this position, his growing maturity. What there is, to be sure, is full of interest and pertinent information; one may question the author on small points of detail, but one ought readily to acknowledge the value and overall validity of his interpretive glosses. The two essays belonging in this category are concerned, respectively, with “Hegel’s Lordship and Bondage” and “Social Understanding and Social Therapy in Schiller & Hegel”. The latter, replete with interesting detail on Schiller’s diagnoses of and remedies for the modern age, and comparatively reserved on Hegel’s, concludes by pointing out Hegel’s decisive rejection of “aestheticism” in favour of reason and politics. The former, cast mainly in the form of a polemic with Kojeve’s Marxistic interpretation, makes the timely and perfectly valid point that Hegel’s lordship-bondage dialectic should be understood in psychological, and not merely in socio-historical terms. Kelly argues, while stimulatingly filling in the relevant intellectual background with reference to Rousseau, Kant and Fichte, that Hegel’s topic is “Platonic in foundation” and has, essentially, to do with the simultaneous process of man’s liberation from external oppression and his enslavement by himself: the Lutheran-Kantian scenario. Of course, for Hegel this is not the end of the matter: just as it is erroneous, with Marx and commentators influenced by him, to explain lordship and bondage by proclaiming the “victory of the slave”, it is also un-Hegalian to remain rooted on the level of unreconciled internal suppression. Kelly could have been more explicit on this point. (shrink)