While philosophers have been debating for decades on whether different entities—including severely disabled human beings, embryos, animals, objects of nature, and even works of art—can legitimately be considered as having moral status, this question has gained a new dimension in the wake of artificial intelligence (AI). One of the more imminent concerns in the context of AI is that of the moral rights and status of social robots, such as robotic caregivers and artificial companions, that are built to interact with (...) human beings. In recent years, some approaches to moral consideration have been proposed that would include social robots as proper objects of moral concern, even though it seems unlikely that these machines are conscious beings. In the present paper, I argue against these approaches by advocating the “consciousness criterion,” which proposes phenomenal consciousness as a necessary condition for accrediting moral status. First, I explain why it is generally supposed that consciousness underlies the morally relevant properties (such as sentience) and then, I respond to some of the common objections against this view. Then, I examine three inclusive alternative approaches to moral consideration that could accommodate social robots and point out why they are ultimately implausible. Finally, I conclude that social robots should not be regarded as proper objects of moral concern unless and until they become capable of having conscious experience. While that does not entail that they should be excluded from our moral reasoning and decision-making altogether, it does suggest that humans do not owe direct moral duties to them. (shrink)

The paper discusses the myth of the founding of Vilnius as an example of a myth of city foundation. The myth has received two independent semiotic interpretations. Narrative grammar procedures are applied to the analysis of the mythical story and the semantic code generating the story in the paper “Gediminas’ Dream (Lithuanian myth of city foundation: an attempt at analysis)” by Algirdas Julien Greimas (1971). The sovereignty ideology expressed in the myth, which describes religious and spiritual culture of the Grand (...) Duchy of Lithuania, is linked to the tri-functional model of the Indo-European social structure. The semantics of the Vilnius myth is seen as analogous with such Indo-European myths as king’s accession to the throne and creation of a city-state. The Lithuanian myth of Vilnius is linked paradigmatically to the Indo-European mythology in the study “Vilnius, Wilno, Vil’na: City and myth” by Vladimir Toporov (1980). At the level of the signifier, phonological equivalents of toponyms of Vilnius are traced. At the level of the signified, transformations of the “core” Indo-European myth are identified. The myth of the city foundation can be read both as a figurative form of cultural expression and as an ideology narrated as a plot of a story. In this view, the paradigmatic and syntagmatic approaches complement each other. (shrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: Semiotica Jahrgang: 2017 Heft: 214 Seiten: 139-158.

For decades the study of social perception was largely compartmentalized by type of social cue: race, gender, emotion, eye gaze, body language, facial expression etc. This was partly due to good scientific practice, and partly due to assumptions that each type of social cue was functionally distinct from others. Herein, we present a functional forecast approach to understanding compound social cue processing that emphasizes the importance of shared social affordances across various cues. We review the traditional theories of emotion and (...) face processing that argued for dissociable and noninteracting pathways, as well as more recent evidence for combinatorial processing of social cues. We argue here that early, and presumably reflexive, visual integration of such cues is necessary for adaptive behavioral responding to others. In support of this claim, we review contemporary work that reveals a flexible visual system, one that readily incorporates meaningful contextual influences in even nonsocial visual processing, thereby establishing the functional and neuroanatomical bases necessary for compound social cue integration. Finally, we explicate three likely mechanisms driving such integration. Together, this work implicates a role for cognitive penetrability in visual perceptual abilities that have often been ascribed to direct encapsulated perceptual processes. (shrink)

Ovaj rad odgovara na argument modalnog kolapsa protiv božanske jednostavnosti ili klasičnog teizma koji nude neoklasični ili kompleksni teisti. Argument modalnog kolapsa tvrdi da ako je Bog apsolutno jednostavan i apsolutno neophodan, tada je Božji čin stvaranja apsolutno neophodan, pa je stoga postojanje stvorenog svijeta također apsolutno neophodno. To znači da se Bog i njegova kreacija urušavaju u jednu modalnu kategoriju apsolutne nužnosti bez ikakvih kontingentnih bića. Moj odgovor je utemeljen na islamskoj neoplatonstičkoj filozofiji Ibn Sine i islamskoj tradiciji. Nudim (...) četiri argumenta koji dopuštaju muslimanskom neoplatoničaru da apsorbira modalni kolaps u modalitetu mogućih svjetova koji istovremeno može negira modalni kolaps unutar avicenovskog modaliteta: Prvo, prigovor modalnog kolapsa temelji se na okviru mogućih svjetova čiji je pojam nužnosti preširok; ovaj okvir ne uspijeva napraviti razliku između Boga kao ontološki nužnog po sebi, stvorenog bića kao nužno ovisnog o drugome i puke logičke nužnosti, kao što to čine Ibn Sina i islamski mislioci. Drugo, argumenti modalnog kolapsa samo pokazuju da je kreacija neophodna kroz drugost, ali ne uspijevaju dokazati da kreacija ima ontološku nužnost ili aseity––što se odnosi samo na Boga; prema tome, ne dolazi do posljedičnog modalnog kolapsa kada nečiji modalitet prepozna kreaciju kao "ovisno nužno biće" unatoč tome što je modalno nužno. Treće, islamski filozofi imaju nelibertarijanski pojam Božje volje i slobode koji je imun na prigovore modalnog kolapsa. Konačno, tvrdim da svi klasični i neoklasični teisti moraju prihvatiti modalno nužnu kreaciju jer libertarijanski modeli Božje volje za sobom povlače neuzrokovane i primitivno kontingentne učinke. (shrink)

Autor pita može li se intencionalnost opisati kao unutarnji ili kao izvanjski odnos. Nakon što je pokazao da je nemoguće reducirati intencionalnost na puke izvanjske odnose, on naglašuje da nije moguće niti pojmiti ju ekskluzivno kao unutarnji odnos. Nema intencionalnog unutarnjeg odnosa bez njegova konteksta izvanjskih odnosa koji mu dopuštaju da djeluje. Autor pokušava pokazati primjer za to analizirajući problem determiniranja intencionalnosti kao povezane s anticipativnom strukturom intencionalnosti, s posebnom pozornošću, s jedne strane, prema stvari ambigviteta, te s druge strane, (...) prema onoj nemogućnosti. On pokušava pokazati da sposobnost intencionalnosti da sebe determinira ovisi o uvjetima koji pripadaju okolnostima. Njegova demonstracija je na liniji s nekom vrstom eksternalizma u filozofiji uma.The author asks whether intentionality could be described as an internal or an external relation. Afterhe has shown that it is impossible to reduce intentionality to mere external relations,he emphasizes that it is not possible either to consider it to be an internal relation exclusively.There is no intentional internal relation without its context of external relations that permit it towork. The author tries to make a case for that by analyzing the problem of the determination of intentionalityas related to the anticipative structure of intentionality, with special attention on theone hand to the issue of ambiguities and on the other hand to the one of impossibilities. He tries toshow that the ability for the intentionality to self-determine depends on conditions which pertain tocircumstances. His demonstration is in line with some kind of externalism in the philosophy of mind. (shrink)

Pitanja filozofskog razumijevanja i pravednosti bitno su povezana od samih početaka grčkog filozofiranja. Baš kao što filozofska heremenutika ili hJrmeneiva ima svoj pretfilozofski izvor u grčkome bogu Hermesu, platoničko razumijevanje pravednosti ima ga u božici Dike. U svojoj ambivalentnosti Hermes tako naznačuje mogućnost razumijevanja kao i mogućnosti zavođenja ili zloupotrebe razumijevanja, koje – u horizontu sokratičke i platoničke filozofije – znači zapravo nedostatak razumijevanja. U platoničkoj filozofiji, naime, spoznaja i etički stav blisko su povezani. Ali ako se taj etički stav (...) ponajvećma razumije kao pravičnost, potonja se ne smije razumjeti u ponešto reduciranom značenju slaganja ljudskih djelovanja s državnim zakonima; ono čime se trebamo baviti jest unutarnje slaganje i harmonija čovjeka i njegove duše, a što također znači slaganje čovjeka sa svijetom u kojemu živi. S tog gledišta, potencijalni hermeneutički ‘an-arhizam’ može se ponovno – ovoga puta drukčije – usmjeriti prema pitanju ajrchv i transponirati iz sfere puke teorije u samo biće ljudskoga života, koje se – u platoničkoj filozofiji – tretira kroz pitanje o duši. (shrink)

Prema Epikurovoj epistemologiji svi su opažaji istiniti. Ta teza podrazumijeva da naša osjetila nikada ne griješe, te da nam opažaji uvijek daju točne izvještaje o vanjskom svijetu. Iako se na prvi pogled čini vrlo neuvjerljivom, podrobnija analiza Epikurovih tekstova pokazuje da je ona potkrijepljena zanimljivim argumentima. Pokazuje se da je jasna motivacija Epikura za obranu te teze leži u prihvaćanju radikalnog empirizma i težnji da izbjegne skeptičke opasnosti u koje je zapao Demokrit. Nadalje, opravdanje te teze leži u Epikurovu objašnjenju (...) samog opažajnog procesa, tj. u fizikalnom objašnjenju mehanizma opažanja, koje se uklapa u atomističku sliku svijeta. Opažajni proces pokazuje da su opažaji sirovi podaci koji ne mogu biti lažni, budući da su samo puke reakcije osjetilnog organa na vanjske podražaje, te kao takvi ne mogu biti neistiniti.According to Epicurean epistemology all perceptions are true. The thesis implies that our senses do not ever err and that perceptions give us always correct report of the external world. Although it seems very problematic and counterintuitive, careful investigation of the main sources shows us that Epicurus ’ claim for the truth of perceptions is not so hasty but supported with some serious arguments. Epicurus ’ main concern was to show that we can attain knowledge about the external world. In order to secure the possibility of knowledge Epicurus proposed to rely on perceptions as incorrigible foundation of our knowledge and argue that all perceptions are true. The defense of the thesis and explanation how can it be the case that all perceptions are true is provided by the theory of what happens in the process of perceiving a physical object. In this paper I try to show that his epistemological remarks on infallibility of the senses become more convincing and plausible if properly placed within Epicurus ’ general physical theory. His theory explains perceptions as a raw material which cannot be false since it is a mere response of a sense organ on the impact from the outside, namely from g*T8. Because g*T8 are true and secure reports of external objects, truthfulness of all perceptions is guaranteed. The truth of all perceptions simply follows from the mechanical explanation of the way they are produced, so the truthfulness of perceptions must be accepted on the basis of their origin. (shrink)

Autor secira polemiku otvorenu osvrtom Tončija Matulića na knjigu Darka Polšeka Sudbina odabranih objavljenom u Filozofskim istraživanjima 98/2005: 671-693. Okosnica ovoga članka je seciranje Matulićevih stavova kako nema bitne razlike između stare eugenike i nove, i njegovih sveobuhvatnih antiliberalnih, paternalističkih i navodno „bioetičkih“ argumenata. Polšek koristi argumentaciju J. S. Milla iz djela O slobodi i tvrdi da demokratsko i pravedno društvo mora poštivati i „puke želje“ budućih roditelja u ostvarenju njihovih prava da odgajaju djecu, kao i da bude u mogućnosti, (...) između ostalog, izbjeći daleko veće opasnosti kolektivizma i svih vrsta intervencija države u privatne stvari što je i iznjedrilo sve ružne oblike eugenika u prošlosti. Štoviše, Polšek raspravlja o tome da svatko treba poštivati te liberalne principe kako bi ozbiljno shvatio neosporne principe bioetike: osobnu autonomiju, neovisnost i jednakost.The author dissects a polemic by Tonèi Matuliæ against Polšek’s book Sudbina odabranih printed in Filozofska istra®ivanja,98 , pp. 671–693. The main point of the article is a dissection of Matuliæ’s views that thereis no fundamental difference between old eugenics and new, and of his overall anti-liberal, paternalist,and allegedly ‘bioetical’ contentions. Polšek uses J. St. Mill’s arguments from On Libertyand argues that a democratic and a just society has to respect ‘mere wishes‘ of prospective parentswhen fulfilling their right to bear children, as to be able, among other things, to avoid far greaterdangers of collectivism and all sorts of state intervention in private matters, from which ugly formsof eugenics arose in the past. Moreover, Polšek argues that one has to respect these liberal principles in order to take seriously uncontested principlesof bioethics: of personal autonomy, independence, and equality. (shrink)

This reviewer had earlier had the misfortune of reviewing Sarah Jacoby's puerile book on Sera Khandro for Prabuddha Bharata. Jacoby had nearly made this reviewer puke. Same is the case with Bihani Sarkar's monograph. On the basis of this monograph she might win academic brownie points but it is a study which should have been dumped. The existence of the monograph is not only an insult to Hinduism and the Sanatana Dharma; it is technically wrong in its structuralist, iterative hermeneutics (...) which derives from the likes of Mircea Eliade. The reviewer knows that Sarkar will one day be a biggie in the first world peddling Hinduism ; she should have confined herself only to Sanskrit literature and not try to pass herself as a (faux) Hindu theologian. This book does no credit to the publisher. (shrink)