Abstract

Autor pita može li se intencionalnost opisati kao unutarnji ili kao izvanjski odnos. Nakon što je pokazao da je nemoguće reducirati intencionalnost na puke izvanjske odnose, on naglašuje da nije moguće niti pojmiti ju ekskluzivno kao unutarnji odnos. Nema intencionalnog unutarnjeg odnosa bez njegova konteksta izvanjskih odnosa koji mu dopuštaju da djeluje. Autor pokušava pokazati primjer za to analizirajući problem determiniranja intencionalnosti kao povezane s anticipativnom strukturom intencionalnosti, s posebnom pozornošću, s jedne strane, prema stvari ambigviteta, te s druge strane, prema onoj nemogućnosti. On pokušava pokazati da sposobnost intencionalnosti da sebe determinira ovisi o uvjetima koji pripadaju okolnostima. Njegova demonstracija je na liniji s nekom vrstom eksternalizma u filozofiji uma.The author asks whether intentionality could be described as an internal or an external relation. Afterhe has shown that it is impossible to reduce intentionality to mere external relations,he emphasizes that it is not possible either to consider it to be an internal relation exclusively.There is no intentional internal relation without its context of external relations that permit it towork. The author tries to make a case for that by analyzing the problem of the determination of intentionalityas related to the anticipative structure of intentionality, with special attention on theone hand to the issue of ambiguities and on the other hand to the one of impossibilities. He tries toshow that the ability for the intentionality to self-determine depends on conditions which pertain tocircumstances. His demonstration is in line with some kind of externalism in the philosophy of mind.