In addressing the fundamental issues of Merleau-Ponty’s last ontology, for which Being is an expressive movement, this paper focuses on Merleau-Ponty’s reflections on painting, sculpture and, mainly, cinema. Two reasons justify such a choice. The first one is that Merleau-Ponty’s reflections on films as artistic objects are starting to become better known, while an exclusive privilege has been too long given to his texts on painting, sculpture and literature. An enrichment of our reading of his aesthetics and ontology is thus (...) made possible. The second reason is that, although it is true that Merleau-Ponty’s general aesthetic doctrine introduces us to the question of movement, of its meaning and its ontological status as “expression,” it is even more true that, in the framework of this general aesthetic doctrine, his analyses of the mode of expression of cinematographic images become especially significant. (shrink)

In addressing the fundamental issues of Merleau-Ponty’s last ontology, for which Being is an expressive movement, this paper focuses on Merleau-Ponty’s reflections on painting, sculpture and, mainly, cinema. Two reasons justify such a choice. The first one is that Merleau-Ponty’s reflections on films as artistic objects are starting to become better known, while an exclusive privilege has been too long given to his texts on painting, sculpture and literature. An enrichment of our reading of his aesthetics and ontology is thus (...) made possible. The second reason is that, although it is true that Merleau-Ponty’s general aesthetic doctrine introduces us to the question of movement, of its meaning and its ontological status as “expression,” it is even more true that, in the framework of this general aesthetic doctrine, his analyses of the mode of expression of cinematographic images become especially significant. (shrink)

This volume focuses on Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s important contribution to the phenomenology of corporeity and affectivity, and it explores the various influences his work had and still has on other disciplines.

Le XXe siècle a été celui d'un éclatement sans précédent des formes traditionnelles de l'art, et donc aussi de son essence ou de son "idée". Est-ce à dire qu'un héritage entier de sens et de culture a été dilapidé en cet âge qu'on a dit être celui de la "fin de l'art"? Doit-on au contraire penser qu'héritage il y a bel et bien eu, sur un mode critique et selon des logiques qui ne firent peut-être pas sans raison? Loin d'être (...) dépourvus de sens, les signes contemporains de l'art - restes, bribes, traces, "symptômes" divers - sollicitent en fait plus que jamais les interprétations. C'est pourquoi nous avons estimé pouvoir, et même devoir, poser les questions suivantes : - Que fait donc l'art, de lui-même et de son histoire, à l'époque de son an-archie eidétique? - Que peuvent en dire aujourd'hui les théories esthétiques et philosophiques? - Sous quelle forme de fidélité critique à leur tradition respective le peuvent-elles? (shrink)

Ce recueil vise à interroger un versant moins connu, mais essentiel, de la pensée de Gadamer, sa méditation des philosophes grecs, des Présocratiques à Plotin, qui occupe un tiers de ses œuvres complètes.

L'omniprésence des images dans la société mass-médiatique est corrélative de leur évanescence et du constant renouvellement qui conditionne le processus de leur consommation. Leur omnipotence se réduit ainsi à celle de stimuli destinés à induire des comportements. Or, il convient d'autant plus de revenir d'une telle exténuation de l'image que cette dernière constitue l'une des dimensions essentielles du déploiement de la vie humaine. L'image est traditionnellement rapportée à l'activité imaginante d'un sujet. Mais, s'il est vrai que l'étoffe des hommes et (...) des choses qui se donnent à voir dans le paraître sensible d'une image n'existe pas coupée d'un tel paraître, l'esthétique relève aussi de l'ontologie et sa tâche est de nous ré-apprendre à contempler les images. Au regard de la clarté et de la distinction conférées par la théorie à notre appréhension des choses, la détermination positive des images ne tient-elle pas en effet au fait que c'est dans leur dimension qu'il nous est donné de faire l'expérience vive du paraître de ces choses, jusqu'à l'extrême de l'horreur, du merveilleux et du sacré? (shrink)

Patočka discusses «the disaster of the rejection of metaphysics» by Heidegger. In this critique, he has claimed that «Merleau-Ponty, Ricoeur, Waehlens and others» could neither be satisfied with the Heideggerian closure of the ontological sphere onto itself nor be content with Husserlian transcendentalism. In fact, there is a convergence between Patočka and Merleau-Ponty on this point, as demonstrated by a note from The Visible and the Invisible in which Merleau-Ponty affirms “I am for metaphysics” ...We show that these two thinkers (...) have seen that phenomenology always faces, by eidetic necessity, what remains essentially irreducible for it: being. One thing toremember with Patočka, however, is that «we must not forget that the phenomenon is precisely phenomenon of being» even if «the structure of the appearing is entirely independent of the structure of beings.» But another thing is to thematize the relation between the appearing of the phenomenon and the manifestation of being. This implies that “after” phenomenological description a new type of correlation is analyzed. (shrink)

“Flesh” and “Figure” in Merleau-Ponty and DeleuzeGilles Deleuze points out, in his work on Francis Bacon, that “the phenomenological hypothesis is perhaps insufficient because it invokes only the lived body. But the lived body is still very little in relation to a more profound and almost unlivable Power.” The present study fi rst seeks to specify what is this intensive Power of a life carried out at the limit of the unlivable. This leads to an analysis of Deleuze’s notion of (...) Figure. Thus, we come back to the explicitly anti-phenomenological position of Deleuze, in other words, to his will, which he constantly reaffirms, to liberate philosophy – by following the path opened by Bergson – from the ruinous presupposition of a merely human measure of appearing, which would still be the presupposition of phenomenology. In particular, we are asking ourselves if Merleau-Ponty’s notions of “being in depth” and of “pregnancy” do not escape from Deleuze’s critique, and if it is also substantiated that Deleuze was able to assert that phenomenology “erects as a norm ‘natural perception’ and its conditions.” It is the confrontation of Deleuze and Merleau-Ponty’s theses on art and the world, which finally allows us to put forward an answer.“Carne” e “Figura” in Merleau-Ponty e DeleuzeGilles Deleuze fa notare, nella sua opera su Francis Bacon, che «l’ipotesi fenomenologica è forse insufficiente, in quanto si rifà solamente al corpo vissuto.Ma il corpo vissuto è ancora poca cosa rispetto ad una Potenza più profonda e quasi invivibile». Il saggio presente cerca innanzitutto di precisare che cosa sia questa Potenza intensiva di una vita portata al limite dell’invivibile. Questo condurrà in un secondo momento ad un’analisi della nozione deleuziana di Figura.Il saggio ritorna quindi sulla posizione esplicitamente anti-fenomenologica di Deleuze, in altri termini sulla sua volontà, incessantemente riaffermata, di liberarela fi losofi a, nel solco di Bergson, dal pericolo di una misura semplicemente umana dell’apparire, premessa che a suo giudizio starebbe ancora al fondo del progetto della fenomenologia. Ci chiederemo, in particolare, se le nozioni merleau-pontiane di “essere della profondità” e di “pregnanza” non sfuggano alla critica di Deleuze, al di là del fatto quest’ultimo abbia affermato che la fenomenologia “erige a norma la ‘percezione naturale’ e le sue condizioni”. È il confronto tra le tesi di Deleuze e di Merleau-Ponty sull’arte ed il mondo che permetterà, in ultima analisi, di avanzare una risposta a questo insieme di interrogativi. (shrink)

“Flesh” and “Figure” in Merleau-Ponty and DeleuzeGilles Deleuze points out, in his work on Francis Bacon, that “the phenomenological hypothesis is perhaps insufficient because it invokes only the lived body. But the lived body is still very little in relation to a more profound and almost unlivable Power.” The present study fi rst seeks to specify what is this intensive Power of a life carried out at the limit of the unlivable. This leads to an analysis of Deleuze’s notion of (...) Figure. Thus, we come back to the explicitly anti-phenomenological position of Deleuze, in other words, to his will, which he constantly reaffirms, to liberate philosophy – by following the path opened by Bergson – from the ruinous presupposition of a merely human measure of appearing, which would still be the presupposition of phenomenology. In particular, we are asking ourselves if Merleau-Ponty’s notions of “being in depth” and of “pregnancy” do not escape from Deleuze’s critique, and if it is also substantiated that Deleuze was able to assert that phenomenology “erects as a norm ‘natural perception’ and its conditions.” It is the confrontation of Deleuze and Merleau-Ponty’s theses on art and the world, which finally allows us to put forward an answer.“Carne” e “Figura” in Merleau-Ponty e DeleuzeGilles Deleuze fa notare, nella sua opera su Francis Bacon, che «l’ipotesi fenomenologica è forse insufficiente, in quanto si rifà solamente al corpo vissuto.Ma il corpo vissuto è ancora poca cosa rispetto ad una Potenza più profonda e quasi invivibile». Il saggio presente cerca innanzitutto di precisare che cosa sia questa Potenza intensiva di una vita portata al limite dell’invivibile. Questo condurrà in un secondo momento ad un’analisi della nozione deleuziana di Figura.Il saggio ritorna quindi sulla posizione esplicitamente anti-fenomenologica di Deleuze, in altri termini sulla sua volontà, incessantemente riaffermata, di liberarela fi losofi a, nel solco di Bergson, dal pericolo di una misura semplicemente umana dell’apparire, premessa che a suo giudizio starebbe ancora al fondo del progetto della fenomenologia. Ci chiederemo, in particolare, se le nozioni merleau-pontiane di “essere della profondità” e di “pregnanza” non sfuggano alla critica di Deleuze, al di là del fatto quest’ultimo abbia affermato che la fenomenologia “erige a norma la ‘percezione naturale’ e le sue condizioni”. È il confronto tra le tesi di Deleuze e di Merleau-Ponty sull’arte ed il mondo che permetterà, in ultima analisi, di avanzare una risposta a questo insieme di interrogativi. (shrink)

The Hiatus of Sense. Framing and Cinematic Montage according to Eisenstein and Merleau-Ponty“Cinema portrays movement, but how? Is it, as we are inclined to believe, by copying more closely the changes of place? We may presume not, since slow motion shows a body floating between objects like seaweed, but not moving itself.” This interrogation constitutes the only allusion to the cinema in Eye and Mind, and, by reading the argumentation developed in this work, one cannot help thinking that the role (...) which it reserves for cinema is, finally, to be the simple revelation of the illusions of naïve consciousness in relation to movement. Nothing is said about the expressive movement of cinema itself. Nothing is said about the logic of cinematic sense and therefore of cinematic language. Does this mean that Merleau-Ponty, up to the end of his life, had a relationship to cinema that was merely supplementary, that he always privileged the analysis of pictorial, musical, or literary aesthetic experiences?In contrast, we propose to establish that his philosophical position cannot be characterized by the idea that he held the cinema in an ancillary role and status because, in other texts, Merleau-Ponty knew how to decipher in cinema, to a large degree, the enigma of movement as the form of expressivity. But we will argue here that he knew it only up to a certain point. This is what a discussion with the theoretical writings of Sergei Einstein will have to establish. We shall seek to rediscover the philosophical – and even ontological – reasons for this state of things which, if one wants to preserve for cinema the characteristic that allows it to be stimulating for thought, must not under any circumstances be interpreted as the simple result of Merleau-Ponty not having enough interest in the cinema.Lo scarto del senso. Inquadratura e montaggio cinematografico secondo Eisenstein e Merleau-Ponty«Il cinema ci dà il movimento, ma come? Forse, come generalmente si crede, riproducendo il più ravvicinatamente possibile il cambiamento di luogo ? Pare proprio di no: infatti il rallentatore ci mostra un corpo che fluttua tra gli oggetti come un’alga, ma che non si muove»Questa interrogazione costituisce la sola allusione al cinema ne L’occhio e lo spirito e, leggendo l’argomentazione sviluppata in quest’opera, non si può evitare di pensare che il ruolo che essa riserva al cinema sia, in fin dei conti, quello di essere un semplice rivelatore di illusioni della coscienza ingenua di fronte al movimento. Nulla viene detto a proposito del movimento espressivo del cinema in se stesso. Nulla viene detto della logica del senso cinematografico e dunque del linguaggio cinematografico. Questo significa forse che Merleau-Ponty ha avuto, fino alla fine della sua vita, solo un rapporto accessorio con il cinema, e che ha sempre privilegiato l’analisi delle esperienze estetiche pittoriche, musicali o letterarie?Ci proponiamo, al contrario, di stabilire che la sua posizione filosofica non può essere caratterizzata dal mantenimento del cinema in un ruolo ed in uno statuto ancillare, poiché, in altri testi, Merleau-Ponty ha saputo in gran parte decifrare l’enigma del movimento come forma d’espressività al cinema. Questo è quanto un confronto con gli scritti teorici di Sergei Eisenstein ci dovrà permettere di stabilire. Cercheremo di reperire le ragioni filosofiche – ed ontologiche – di questo stato di cose, che non deve essere in nessun caso interpretato, se si vuole conservare il suo carattere stimolante per il pensiero, come il semplice risultato di uno scarso interesse di Merleau-Ponty per il cinema. (shrink)

The Hiatus of Sense. Framing and Cinematic Montage according to Eisenstein and Merleau-Ponty“Cinema portrays movement, but how? Is it, as we are inclined to believe, by copying more closely the changes of place? We may presume not, since slow motion shows a body floating between objects like seaweed, but not moving itself.” This interrogation constitutes the only allusion to the cinema in Eye and Mind, and, by reading the argumentation developed in this work, one cannot help thinking that the role (...) which it reserves for cinema is, finally, to be the simple revelation of the illusions of naïve consciousness in relation to movement. Nothing is said about the expressive movement of cinema itself. Nothing is said about the logic of cinematic sense and therefore of cinematic language. Does this mean that Merleau-Ponty, up to the end of his life, had a relationship to cinema that was merely supplementary, that he always privileged the analysis of pictorial, musical, or literary aesthetic experiences?In contrast, we propose to establish that his philosophical position cannot be characterized by the idea that he held the cinema in an ancillary role and status because, in other texts, Merleau-Ponty knew how to decipher in cinema, to a large degree, the enigma of movement as the form of expressivity. But we will argue here that he knew it only up to a certain point. This is what a discussion with the theoretical writings of Sergei Einstein will have to establish. We shall seek to rediscover the philosophical – and even ontological – reasons for this state of things which, if one wants to preserve for cinema the characteristic that allows it to be stimulating for thought, must not under any circumstances be interpreted as the simple result of Merleau-Ponty not having enough interest in the cinema.Lo scarto del senso. Inquadratura e montaggio cinematografico secondo Eisenstein e Merleau-Ponty«Il cinema ci dà il movimento, ma come? Forse, come generalmente si crede, riproducendo il più ravvicinatamente possibile il cambiamento di luogo? Pare proprio di no: infatti il rallentatore ci mostra un corpo che fluttua tra gli oggetti come un’alga, ma che non si muove»Questa interrogazione costituisce la sola allusione al cinema ne L’occhio e lo spirito e, leggendo l’argomentazione sviluppata in quest’opera, non si può evitare di pensare che il ruolo che essa riserva al cinema sia, in fin dei conti, quello di essere un semplice rivelatore di illusioni della coscienza ingenua di fronte al movimento. Nulla viene detto a proposito del movimento espressivo del cinema in se stesso. Nulla viene detto della logica del senso cinematografico e dunque del linguaggio cinematografico. Questo significa forse che Merleau-Ponty ha avuto, fino alla fine della sua vita, solo un rapporto accessorio con il cinema, e che ha sempre privilegiato l’analisi delle esperienze estetiche pittoriche, musicali o letterarie?Ci proponiamo, al contrario, di stabilire che la sua posizione filosofica non può essere caratterizzata dal mantenimento del cinema in un ruolo ed in uno statuto ancillare, poiché, in altri testi, Merleau-Ponty ha saputo in gran parte decifrare l’enigma del movimento come forma d’espressività al cinema. Questo è quanto un confronto con gli scritti teorici di Sergei Eisenstein ci dovrà permettere di stabilire. Cercheremo di reperire le ragioni filosofiche – ed ontologiche – di questo stato di cose, che non deve essere in nessun caso interpretato, se si vuole conservare il suo carattere stimolante per il pensiero, come il semplice risultato di uno scarso interesse di Merleau-Ponty per il cinema. (shrink)

« Qui nous sauve d’une réification de la conscience est le sauveur de la philosophie, voire son créateur ». Un phénoménologue ne peut que souscrire à une telle affirmation, dont la paternité revient à Husserl et dont la clairvoyance est tout à fait frappante. Renaud Barbaras rappelle souvent cette formule et il lui est même arrivé d’écrire qu’elle constitue « en quelque sorte [sa] boussole théorique ». Puisque boussole il y a, je vais suivre son cap pour tenter de ressaisir (...) ce qu’il en est de... (shrink)

The present paper investigates the late ontology of Maurice Merleau-Ponty, which considers being as expressive movement. The paper takes as its point of departure Merleau-Ponty’s reflections on painting, sculpture and especially cinema. Two reasons justify this choice. On the one hand, Merleau-Ponty’s reflections on film as a work of art are now starting to be better known, after they have been overshadowed by his writings on painting, sculpture or literature for a long time. This entails a considerable enrichment of our (...) interpretation of Merleau-Ponty’s aesthetics and his ontology. On the other hand, if Merleau-Ponty’s general theory of aesthetics leads to questions concerning the sense and the ontological status of movement, it is certain that, within this theory, the analysis of the particular mode of expression of cinematic images gains an extraordinary relevance. (shrink)

L'idée directrice de cet ouvrage est qu'une inflexion décisive caractérise les avancées théoriques proposées par Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Jan Patocka et Renaud Barbaras. S'il s'agit bien encore, en effet, avec ces trois auteurs de refonder la phénoménologie (geste classique depuis Husserl), ce mouvement de refondation n'implique plus le strict recentrage de la phénoménologie sur ses possibilités propres. Il y va bien plutôt d'une refondation-extension (par là même post-phénoménologique) exigeant un déport, un mouvement vers une métaphysique, vers une autre métaphysique à déterminer. (...) On verra que l'écart entre phénoménologie et métaphysique n'en est pas pour autant annulé, mais qu'il est bien plutôt pensé à nouveaux frais comme lieu toujours reconfiguré du dépassement de l'opposition initiale - un lieu aux bordures mouvantes qui a la particularité d'entretenir, d'aggraver même le polemos entre post-phénoménologie et métaphysique non substantielle. C'est en thématisant ce lieu que les post-phénoménologies que nous étudions ici révèlent le lien intime entre phénomènes-de-monde et être non positif. (shrink)