Biologists and philosophers often use the language of determination in order to describe the nature of developmental phenomena. Accounts in terms of determination have often been reductionist. One common idea is that DNA is supposed to play a special explanatory role in developmental explanations, namely, that DNA is a developmental determinant. In this article we try to make sense of determination claims in developmental biology. Adopting a manipulationist approach, we shall first argue that the notion of developmental determinant is causal. (...) We suggest that two different theses concerning developmental determination can be articulated: determination of occurrence and structural determination. We shall argue that, while the first thesis is problematic, the second, opportunely qualified, is feasible. Finally, we shall argue that an analysis of biological causation in terms of determination cannot account for entangled dynamics. Characterising causal entanglement as a particular kind of interactive causation whereby difference-making causes ascribable to different levels of biological organisation influence a particular ontogenetic outcome, we shall, via two illustrative examples, diagnose some potential limits of a reductionist, molecular and intra-level understanding of biological causation. (shrink)

Rather than a return to Bergson, the ‘Kyoto manifesto’ argues for a renewed, expanded Bergsonism: a philosophical inquiry that lives up to the methodological standards set by Bergson, even if this implies prolonging some of his intuitions in different directions—possibly against himself. Several aspects of this endeavour are examined in turn: the meaning of ‘intuition’ and the prospects of speculative empiricism, the ontological scope of scientific theories, emergentism and the virtual, the relevance of space-time for duration, the place of metaphysical (...) imagination and its capacity to probe the utopian potential of a truly open science. (shrink)

Advancing the reductionist conviction that biology must be in agreement with the assumptions of reductive physicalism (the upward hierarchy of causal powers, the upward fixing of facts concerning biological levels) A. Rosenberg argues that downward causation is ontologically incoherent and that it comes into play only when we are ignorant of the details of biological phenomena. Moreover, in his view, a careful look at relevant details of biological explanations will reveal the basic molecular level that characterizes biological systems, defined by (...) wholly physical properties, e.g., geometrical structures of molecular aggregates (cells). In response, we argue that contrary to his expectations one cannot infer reductionist assumptions even from detailed biological explanations that invoke the molecular level, as interlevel causal reciprocity is essential to these explanations. Recent very detailed explanations that concern the structure and function of chromatin—the intricacies of supposedly basic molecular level—demonstrate this. They show that what seem to be basic physical parameters extend into a more general biological context, thus rendering elusive the concepts of the basic level and causal hierarchy postulated by the reductionists. In fact, relevant phenomena are defined across levels by entangled, extended parameters. Nor can the biological context be explained away by basic physical parameters defining molecular level shaped by evolution as a physical process. Reductionists claim otherwise only because they overlook the evolutionary significance of initial conditions best defined in terms of extended biological parameters. Perhaps the reductionist assumptions (as well as assumptions that postulate any particular levels as causally fundamental) cannot be inferred from biological explanations because biology aims at manipulating organisms rather than producing explanations that meet the coherence requirements of general ontological models. Or possibly the assumptions of an ontology not based on the concept of causal powers stratified across levels can be inferred from biological explanations. The incoherence of downward causation is inevitable, given reductionist assumptions, but an ontological alternative might avoid this. We outline desiderata for the treatment of levels and properties that realize interlevel causation in such an ontology. (shrink)

Le concept de nature est reconstruit en considérant le processus d'objectivation à l'oeuvre dans l'expérience systémique du scientifique, qui prend la forme d'une expérience d'immanence redoublée. Ce redoublement est ensuite analysé à l'intérieur des systèmes que le savant analyse par l'étude du passage d'un système physique auto-organisé du type transition de phase à un système biologique. [Electre 2015].

This essay focuses on two philosophical assumptions.According to the first one, biological normativity is not an irreducible property of the living, but rather the living is the historical result of its normative activity. There is therefore a logic of life at work in every living organism that makes it a subject and an agent. It is not the fact that it is already a subject that explains the presence of this logic. It is therefore not impossible to naturalise biological normativity, (...) even if this concept proposed by Georges Canguilhem makes us bifurcate from a world of facts to a world of values.According to the second, we need to extend Varela’s concept of operational closure in order to naturalise biological normativity. We propose a new way of writing it that takes into account the fact that architectural constraints (ϕ1ϕ2) are always at stake in a biological system. By such constraints, we can predict the presence of specific propulsive and repulsive devices in every organism, by which its organisation can be constantly rebuilt, and through which biological disruption can also be amplified. (shrink)

Este manifesto, escrito a quatro mãos no contexto de um colóquio sobre Bergson organizado no Japão, visa inicialmente responder a uma simples questão: que significa, hoje, trabalhar à maneira de Bergson? Não se trata de uma pergunta sobre a dedicação para com o corpus bergsoniano ou quanto a certos temas que o seu pensamento permite renovar a compreensão, mas sim sobre o método que ele próprio recomenda. Este método foi aplicado diligentemente por Bergson no curso de suas investigações, particularmente quanto (...) ao seu trato com as ciências positivas, tanto as da vida quanto às do universo material em sentido amplo. No que diz respeito à função da imaginação metafísica, este manifesto refaz os passos de Bergson quanto a um empirismo não especulativo e verdadeiramente contemporâneo à inteligência científica. (shrink)

Symmetry-based explanations using symmetry breaking as the key explanatory tool have complemented and replaced traditional causal explanations in various domains of physics. The process of spontaneous SB is now a mainstay of contemporary explanatory accounts of large chunks of condensed-matter physics, quantum field theory, nonlinear dynamics, cosmology, and other disciplines. A wide range of empirical research into various phenomena related to symmetries and SB across biological scales has accumulated as well. Led by these results, we identify and explain some common (...) features of the emergence, propagation, and cascading of SB-induced layers across the biosphere. These features are predicated on the thermodynamic openness and intrinsic functional incompleteness of the systems at stake and have not been systematically analyzed from a general philosophical and methodological perspective. We also consider possible continuity of SB across the physical and biological world and discuss the connection between Darwinism and SB-based analysis of the biosphere and its history. (shrink)

Faire de la biologie et penser la biologie constituent deux activités indispensables l'une à l'autre. L'exemple de la " métaphore du programme génétique " nous montre, qu'entre l'explication atomique des physiciens et l'explication vitaliste, il peut y avoir un niveau moléculaire spécifique d'analyse des propriétés du vivant. Cet ouvrage a pour double ambition de montrer comment cette métaphore s'est constituée et quels en sont les éléments discutables. Il se propose d'analyser le processus à travers lequel elle est passée historiquement de (...) l'état de concept dynamique et opératoire à celui d'une image figée de plus en plus décalée de la réalité de la connaissance biologique. (shrink)

이 논문의 첫 번째 목적은 베르그손에서 깡길렘에 이르는 계보적 관계를 보여주는 것이다. 이들은 프랑스철학에서 전개되는 상당히 독특한 문제제기의 한 방식을 보여준다. 그것은 자신의 기초를 자신 안에서 찾을 수 없을지도 모르는 분야인 한에서 철학의 비정초적 특징이다. 철학의 모든 진리는 과학, 임상의학, 기술 등이 철학에 대해 가지는 시선에 의해 조건지어지고 한계지어진다. 우리의 두 번째 목적은 방법론적인 차원만이 아니라 존재론적인 차원에서 무엇보다도 깡길렘의 규범, 정상성, 규범성의 개념들을 분석하는 것이다. 이 개념들은 베르그손에게서 그러하듯이 생물학적 실재성에 대한 일정한 전제 위에서 생명을 연구하는 특별한 방식을 보여준다. (...) 물론 깡길렘의 합리주의적 생기론은 베르그손의 유심론적 생기론과는 다르다. 깡길렘은 일군의 생리적 상수들로 정의된 생명체로부터 시작한다. 그러나 이 결정론적 출발점은 생명을 설명하기에 충분하지 않다. 생명체는 베르그손이 이미 보여주었듯이 자신의 현재 상태를 넘어서는 역동성을 보여 준다. 그것이 환경과의 관계에서 무엇을 하는가 하는 것 역시 그것이 무엇인지에 대한 서술의 일부를 이룬다. 따라서 생명체는 그것이 무엇인가 그리고 그것이 무엇을 하는가 사이의 관계로 정의된다. 이 관계는 불일치의 관계이다. (shrink)

Cet ouvrage est une reprise du livre publié chez Kimé en 2007 : Bergson ou l'imagination métaphysique. J'y introduis pourtant des changements assez importants. Il s'agit essentiellement de mettre en valeur le fait que Bergson n'est pas un simple philosophe de l'immanence. C'est un philosophe de l'immanence redoublée. Ce point apparaît clairement, explicitement à travers l'analogie entre la durée de la conscience et la durée de l'univers qu'il développe dans son ouvrage de 1907. Mais il trouve son origine dans le (...) premier chapitre de Matière et mémoire. C'est pour comprendre ce redoublement que se construit chez Bergson une nouvelle vision des relations entre la philosophie et la science. La connaissance n'est plus relative. Elle participe à l'absolu. Elle engage ontologiquement. Le donné n'est plus directement constitué, il faut pour que l'intuition philosophique le saisisse, qu'elle "chevauche l'intelligence". Enfin ce que ce redoublement engage, c'est une philosophie du devenir fondée sur la théorie des deux ordres. On ne commente souvent que l'aspect négatif de cette théorie : la critique de l'idée de néant. Là n'est pas pour nous le point le plus central. Cette théorie nous engage à ne plus penser l'absolu comme complet, intelligible, ou encore parfait. L'absolu, qu'il soit l'esprit, la vie ou la matière, est toujours défini par l'inachèvement, puisque ce qu'il n'est pas n'est jamais du rien. C'est un autre visage de lui-même. (shrink)

À la page 150 de Matière et Mémoire, Bergson dit déjà du « virtuel » qu’il serait vain de vouloir « chercher l’obscurité sous la lumière ». Il reprend et précise cette idée trente ans plus tard. Promenons « l’idée radicalement neuve » qui « capte plus ou moins une intuition », nous la verrons « elle, obscure, dissiper des obscurités ». Par elle, des problèmes jugés insolubles « vont se dissoudre ». Ainsi « intellectualisée », cette lanterne bergsonie...

Rationality at the Limits and the Limits of Rationality:The Question of the Integrity and Existence of the Human SpeciesThe purpose of this article is to address the question of our responsibility as human beings, by taking into consideration the intersection between ethics and science. I intend to prove that the issues raised by the existence and the integrity of the human species is a new and curious form of power founded on what I call “the principle of non-reciprocity” that unites (...) the humanity of today with the future generations. The question that I address is the following: how to act on the future of humanity so that this action can not be regarded as unfair? (shrink)

에서 선험적 규정은 의지와도 인식과도 관련되지 않는다. 그것은 판단 자체를 다룬다. 그것은 어떻게 무언가가 판단되어야 하는가를 확립한다. 미적 판단은 유쾌함과 불쾌함을 다룬다. 유쾌함은 단순한 감각이 아니라 감정이다. 미적 판단은 나의 본성과 관련되는 판단이지 오성이나 의지와 관련된 것이 전혀 아니다. 그것들은 나로부터 나오는 것이지 자연 자체로부터 나오는 것이 아니다. 그것들은 나로부터 나오지만 유비적인 것들이다. 나는 그것들을 구상하지만 이 일은 마치 나의 자연(본성)을 누군가가 구성하기라도 한 것처럼, 자연이 그것을 구상할 수 있었기라도 한 것처럼 일어난다. 그런 이유로 그 판단들은 반성적인 것이지 규정적인 것이 (...) 아니다. 이 글에서 나는 두 문제를 제기할 것이다. 하나는 단순한 반성으로서의 미적 판단이 어떻게 또한 규정적이고 선험적일 수 있는가? 다른 하나는 단순한 규정적 판단들이 문제가 되든, 아니면 반성적 판단들과 규정적 판단들 사이의 구분이 문제되든, ‘비판’이라는 말은 동일한 의미를 가지는가? 하는 것이다. 나는 과 사이에 칸트 철학의 구조적인 변화가 있다는 것을 보여줄 것이다. (shrink)

Introduction 1) Une épistémologie non fondationnelle § 1. Concernant l?usage philosophique de l?adjectif « vital », on s?attend à voir surgir une distinction entre le vivant et le vécu, comme si d?emblée nous pouvions et devions accepter que le vital soit aussi quelque chose d?éprouvé par la conscience, par opposition au vivant qui serait simplement observé et expliqué par la science. Pourquoi, dès lors, faudrait-il rechercher dans ou chez les êtres vivants quelque chose de vital ? Cela ne reviendrait-il pas (...) à multiplier les entités et à transformer subrepticement le prédicat « vivant » en être ? Cela ne nous engagerait-t-il pas vers une substantialisation de la vie érigée ainsi en réalité métaphysique ? N?est-ce pas justement le défaut des vitalistes comme Bergson (1907) ou Driesch, de créer un tel processus de surdétermination (Mayr, 1961 ; Kim, 1993, 1998) par et à travers lequel, à un phénomène inconnu X devrait correspondre en même temps des causes observables X?, X?? et une force vitale inobservable Y ? Ce processus introduirait ainsi une entité supra­naturelle dans le cours des événements naturels et rendrait impossible toute forme de stabilité et de généralité pour la relation associant X à X?, X?? et X???. § 2. Nous allons pourtant partir d?une position épistémologique in­édite. Il n?est pas question pour nous d?imposer d?emblée aux biologistes l?existence. (shrink)

Qui peut repondre a la question: qu'est-ce que la vie? le biologiste? le geneticien? le naturaliste? l'epistemologue? Comment se reperer dans la jungle des reponses proposees par ces differents specialistes? Ce petit livre met l'accent sur trois points qui sont actuellement l'objet de debats tres vifs. Tout d'abord le cadre de la reponse est celui d'une epistemologie non physicaliste, qui refuse d'accepter la double these de la completude et de la cloture causale du monde physique, et renvoie dos a dos (...) les deux positions metaphysiques intenables du physicalisme et du vitalisme. Ensuite, la vie apparait liee a un systeme d'objets hetero-organise qui ne peut etre completement decrit par l'ensemble de ses contraintes internes, contrairement aux systemes physiques ordinaires. Voila pourquoi la vie n'est pas simplement la replication ou la reproduction, ni l'heredite genetique, mais est liee au metabolisme, a la compartimentation cellulaire, a la selection naturelle, etc. Enfin il faut parler d'un systeme d'agents plutot que d'un systeme d'objets, car un systeme biologique se caracterise par le fait que le temps agit sur lui. Pour cette raison il est difficile d'en degager des invariants internes, la description initiale que nous pouvons en donner n'est pas celle de son fonctionnement. C'est en ce sens que nous nous proposons de parler de proprietes emergentes. Qu'est-ce que la vie, alors? une disposition? une essence? une structure atemporelle? Ne faut-il pas reformuler la question et se demander: d'ou vient la vie? comment la vie evolue? (shrink)

루소는 『에밀』에서 아이가 자신의 욕구를 자연스레 표현할 수 있는 감정교육. 즉 자연교육을 강조한다. 이것은 아이 자신을 위한 교육이자 인간교육이다. 그러나 『에밀』과 같은 해에 출판한 『사회계약론』에서는 일반의지에 복종하는 시민상을 그려준다. 일반의지는 개인적 욕구가 아니라 사회적 의무를 수행하는 시민의 덕목이다. 따라서 인간교육과 시민교육을 각각 강조하는 이 두 저서에는 얼핏 화해할 수 없는 지점이 있는 듯 하지만 두 책의 주장 사이에 비밀스런 조화가 있다. 바로 사회적 의무가 강압적인 것이 아니라 자발적인 것이 될 수 있기 위해 교육이 필요하다는 것이다. 그러므로 필자는 두 책을 연결하고 (...) 지도하는 핵심 이념을 『에밀』에서 찾는다. 『에밀』의 자연교육에서 가장 마지막의 과정이 정의의 자연적 감정을 체득하는 일이다. 정의는 외부에서 강제되는 것이 아니라 타인에 대한 배려와 사랑으로서 마음에 의해 느껴지는 데서 나온다. 교사는 이를 강요하지 않고 아이가 자연스러운 방식으로 스스로 체득하게 해야 한다. 루소는 이러한 자발성을 함양하는 교육이야말로 사회 내의 진정한 정치적 변화에 이르게 하는 길임을 역설한다. (shrink)