This Companion provides a comprehensive guide to ancient logic. The first part charts its chronological development, focussing especially on the Greek tradition, and discusses its two main systems: Aristotle's logic of terms and the Stoic logic of propositions. The second part explores the key concepts at the heart of the ancient logical systems: truth, definition, terms, propositions, syllogisms, demonstrations, modality and fallacy. The systematic discussion of these concepts allows the reader to engage with some specific logical and exegetical issues and (...) to appreciate their transformations across different philosophical traditions. The intersections between logic, mathematics and rhetoric are also explored. The third part of the volume discusses the reception and influence of ancient logic in the history of philosophy and its significance for philosophy in our own times. Comprehensive coverage, chapters by leading international scholars and a critical overview of the recent literature in the field will make this volume essential for students and scholars of ancient logic. (shrink)

The paper deals with the art of cross-examination or probe (peirastiké) wich is, according to Aristotle, a part of dialectic and aims at revealing falle pretensions to knowledge. A detailed discussion of the relevant passages from the Sophistical Refutations shows that "peirastic" argumenta were not easily distinguishablc forro the arguments used by the sophists against the scientists in order to undermine their reputation. It is also shows that the difficulty of telling dialectic from sophistry is a theme Aristotle inherits frorn (...) Plato's Sophist. (shrink)

In Sophistical Refutations 8 Aristotle claims that every sophistical refutation depends on a false belief which is implicitly held by the victim of the fallacy and can normally be elicited from him as an explicit additional premiss. In this case the fallacious argument will be turned into a valid one, albeit with a false premiss. The paper discusses the nature of the FVP and tries to discover how it works when it tacitly causes the false appearance of a fallacious argument.

The paper examines Posterior Analytics II 11, 94a20-36 and makes three points. (1) The confusing formula ‘given what things, is it necessary for this to be’ [τίνων ὄντων ἀνάγκη τοῦτ᾿ εἶναι] at a21-22 introduces material cause, not syllogistic necessity. (2) When biological material necessitation is the only causal factor, Aristotle is reluctant to formalize it in syllogistic terms, and this helps to explain why, in II 11, he turns to geometry in order to illustrate a kind of material cause that (...) can be expressed as the middle term of an explanatory syllogism. (3) If geometrical proof is viewed as a complex construction built on simpler constructions, it can in effect be described as a case of purely material constitution. (shrink)

The list of katēgoriai presented at the start of Top. I 9 was traditionally interpreted as a version of the canonical Aristotelian list of categories, and as largely equivalent to the list we find in Categories 4. Accordingly, its first item, the ‘what it is’, was identified with the category of substance. This interpretation has been challenged by several scholars, all sharing the view that the ‘what it is’ in Top. I 9 cannot be substance, since it collects items belonging (...) to all Aristotelian categories (e. g. human being, colour, length). Rather, they say, it is a manner of predication – i. e. essential predication – and can only determine an ontologically miscellaneous class of items. Against this family of proposals, I argue afresh that the traditional interpretation is almost entirely correct. To this purpose, I take advantage of the distinction between kinds of predicate and kinds of predication. (shrink)

This is a comprehensive introduction to the two great logical systems of antiquity, Aristotelian logic and Stoic logic. Although advanced undergraduate and graduate students are the intended primary readership, classical and philosophy scholars with non-specialist interests in the subject will find the fresh approach useful and stimulating. A conscious effort has been made to create a fruitful dialogue between the Aristotelian and Stoic systems both in terms of theoretical content and in terms of methodological issues and approaches. In all sections (...) emphasis is placed on broader questions concerning the distinctive nature of ancient logic, its relation with modern logic and the study of the history of logic, and the methodological difficulties posed by the reconstruction, analysis and assessment of ancient views, both in themselves and in the light of modern logic. (shrink)

In the Posterior Analytics (I 6, 75a18–27) Aristotle discusses a puzzle which endangers the possibility of inferring a non-necessary conclusion. His solution relies on the distinction between the necessity of the conclusion's being the case and the necessity of admitting the conclusion once one has admitted the premisses. The former is a factual necessity, whereas the latter is meant to be a normative or deontic necessity that is independent of the facts stated by the premisses and the conclusion. This paper (...) maintains that Aristotle resorts to this distinction because he thinks that, as long as it is conceived as a factual relation, logical consequence cannot exist independently of the facts expressed by the premisses and the conclusion. As a corollary, the necessity of such a consequence relation always requires the necessity of these facts. Aristotle holds this factual conception of logical consequence responsible for the puzzle, since it cannot account for valid syllogisms with contingent or false premisses. The alternative conception of necessity is then introduced by him in order to make good this deficiency. The distinction between the necessity of being and the necessity of saying was revived by the Oxford logician E. W. B. Joseph, and taken over by Frank Ramsey in his seminal Truth and Probability, but has not received attention from recent interpreters of Aristotle's logic. This paper, however, argues that, in spite of its intrinsic interest, the distinction bore no significant fruit in Aristotle's logical doctrine. (shrink)

Aristotle's Organon received sedulous attention throughout late antiquity. This is reflected in the surviving corpus of commentaries written, in different exegetical and didactic styles, by peripatetic and Platonic authors. Does this collection constitute a single tradition? Beatrix Freibert is confident that the answer to this difficult question is yes, and sets out to explain the differences and vindicate the connectedness of what she takes to be a unified intellectual construction. She insists that, despite the many peculiarities, all commentators participate in (...) a progressive effort to discern the purpose of the Organon, and, with its purpose, understand its unity and achieve some fundamental exegetical... (shrink)

Review of Jonathan Barnes, Truth, etc.: Six Lectures on Ancient Logic, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2007.

Les réfutations sophistiques ont joui, au cours du Moyen Âge, d’une considération peut-être même supérieure à leurs mérites, mais par un juste retour des choses, elles ont été presque complètement négligées pendant l’époque contemporaine. Cet ouvrage — dont l’analyse avait été plus l’occupation préliminaire des médiévistes que l’intérêt central des aristotélisants — est maintenant l’objet d’une excellente étude par Louis-André Dorion, une étude qui réintroduit cet ouvrage «dans le courant de la recherche», fournissant une introduction tant historique que systématique, une (...) traduction fidèle et lisible à la fois et un commentaire constitué de quatre cent quatre-vingtune notes qui abordent des problèmes philosophiques, linguistiques, logiques et philologiques avec une compétence admirable. L’introduction traite de plusieurs questions qui nécessitaient une mise au point: l’origine et la signification du titre, la place originale des RS parmi les œuvres logiques d’Aristote, la chronologie, le contexte historique et culturel, la division du texte des RS, les problèmes liés à la taxinomie des paralogismes, les dettes d’Aristote à l’égard de Platon, etc. (shrink)

L'objet principal de l'ouvrage d'Aristote intituléRéfutations sophistiquesest la théorie de la réfutation apparente, c'est-à-dire de l'argumentation qui, se développant dans le cadre d'un échange dialectique, masque quelque erreur. Aristote propose une taxinomie des réfutations apparentes d'après laquelle elles se rangent en deux groupes: celles qui relèvent du langage et celles qui n'en relèvent pas. Dans le premier groupe tombent six types de réfutation, l'homonymie, l'amphibolie, la liaison, la séparation, la forme de l'expression et l'accent; dans le deuxième l'accident, la conséquence, (...) l'ignorance de la réfutation, la fausse cause, l'interrogation multiple, la pétition de principe et la confusion de l'absolu et du relatif. Il s'agit de la fameuse table des treize paralogismes oufallaciœque la tradition a consacrée. Dans le cadre de ces treize types de sophisme le texte d'Aristote nous offre la discussion de maints exemples parmi lesquels certains étonnent pour leur difficulté, d'autres pour leur trivialité. (shrink)

Le traité aristotélicien intitulé Les réfutations sophistiques (RS), un ouvrage indépendant mais rangé comme dernier livre des Topiques, classifie les argumentations trompeuses et discute leur « résolution », c’est-à-dire l’explication de l’erreur qu’elles cachent. Il s’agit d’un travail encore peu étudié en dépit des intéressants aperçus qu’il fournit sur la philosophie du langage et de la logique d’Aristote. Le volume de Myriam Hecquet nous offre une nouvelle édition critique, avec introduc...

Ancient Philosophy Today, Volume 3, Issue 1, Page 126-132, April, 2021.