In his 1956 book Das Gemüt, Stephan Strasser presents an original phenomenological investigation into human happiness and pleasure. We will examine Strasser’s theory of happiness in more detail and reveal how he incorporates important phenomenological insights from Thomas Aquinas’ theory of the passions of the soul. Both Strasser and Aquinas view happiness as the fulfilment of intentional striving and differentiate between various feelings associated with the pursuit and attainment of a goal, such as joy and pleasure. However, while Aquinas believes (...) that only an imperfect form of happiness can be attained in this life, Strasser aims to determine the essence of the highest form of happiness possible for human beings as the felt anticipation of perfect happiness in the future. Strasser, therefore, interprets Aquinas’ theory through the lens of an existential-phenomenological approach. (shrink)

Ist der menschliche Intellekt materiell? Oder können wir mit Verweis auf seine intentionalen Tätigkeiten wie allgemeine Erkenntnis oder Selbsterkenntnis zeigen, dass er immateriell ist? Besteht also ein Zusammenhang zwischen Intentionalität und Immaterialität? Mit Philosophie des Geistes im Spätmittelalter bietet Martin Klein eine umfassende Darstellung der Philosophie des Geistes von Johannes Buridan im Zusammenhang seiner Erkenntnistheorie, Metaphysik und Naturphilosophie. Vor dem Hintergrund neuester Editionen wird Buridan im Kontext der spätmittelalterlichen Debatte über die Natur des menschlichen Intellekts und seine kognitiven Vermögen prätsentiert. (...) In this volume, Martin Klein offers a comprehensive account of John Buridan's philosophy of mind in the context of the late medieval debate about the nature of the human intellect and how this influences its cognitive functioning. (shrink)

This issue is dedicated to consciousness in medieval and early modern philosophy of mind. It aims to shed new light on the continuities and innovations during the transition from medieval to early modern philosophy of mind. The four papers, by Sonja Schierbaum, Daniel Schmal, Oliver Istvan Toth, and Philipp N. Müller, focus on consciousness and, more specifically, on one of its less frequently considered aspects: memory.

Almost two decades ago, Prahalad and Hammond [Harv Bus Rev, 80(9):48–59, 2002] introduced the base/bottom of the pyramid (BOP) approach to profitably serving the poor with business models adapted from developed markets while alleviating poverty. In response to disappointing results and ethical criticism, the BOP approach evolved from a just-for-profit approach with a passive role of the poor to an inclusive development approach that integrates the principles of the triple bottom line. A recent review of the BOP literature [Dembek et (...) al., J Bus Ethics 165(3):365–382, 2020], however, reveals a lack of empirical evidence to support the sustainable BOP approach. In this paper, we specify the assumptions underlying the sustainable BOP approach and test them using structural equation modeling with clustered robust standard errors on a unique dataset of 212 firms. Our findings show that BOP business model involvement and adaptive capacity are significant drivers of the triple bottom line at the BOP; however, business model adaptive capacity does not guarantee an ecologically sustainable performance at the BOP. We find that there is a need for further extension of the ethical foundations of the sustainable BOP approach. (shrink)

This paper examins how the medieval distinction between proper and improper signification can give a plausible explanation of both metaphorical use and the usual transformations a language can undergo. I will show how Thomas Aquinas distinguishes between ordinary ambiguous terms and metaphors, whereas William of Ockham and Walter Burley do not leave room for this distinction. I will argue that Ockham’s conception of transfer of sense through subsequent institution of words is best thought of as an explanation of how ordinary (...) usage can contain ambiguities, whereas Burley’s conception of transfer of sense without new imposition is more plausible when it comes to explaining metaphors. If metaphorical use is lumped together with equivocation, the account of how they work cannot do full justice to either, an insight that we already find in Peter Abelard, if not in Boethius. (shrink)

In this chapter, I investigate the metaphysical assumptions that medieval thinkers considered necessary in order to integrate the vegetative powers and processes into their conception of human beings as composed of a material body and an immaterial soul. My aim is to show that vegetative powers and processes are central to the late medieval debate on faculty psychology and on the unity or plurality of substantial forms. The chapter has two parts. First, I present three different accounts of the ontological (...) status of the vegetative powers in relation to the body and the soul, as found in Thomas Aquinas, William of Ockham, and John Buridan. All three maintain that the vegetative powers belong to the soul but disagree as to whether they are identical with it or somehow distinct from it, especially when the soul in question is immaterial. Second, I investigate how medieval thinkers accounted for the metaphysics behind the operations of the vegetative powers in human beings, who are endowed with immaterial souls, in particular when it comes to procreation and digestion. A pressing problem for the vegetative powers of human beings is how they can produce a new substance when this composite is supposed to include an immaterial soul which is not naturally generated. Regarding procreation, one can distinguish two different approaches: dispositional generation of material conditions and substantial generation of the body. A similar problem for human beings arises in nutrition and growth once this process is taken to be some kind of substantial change, namely, the corruption of food and the production of new parts of the living being. Two accounts can be distinguished: “transmateriation” of the matter of food into the nourished body and generation of parts of the body. (shrink)

This paper discusses physician-assisted suicide and voluntary active euthanasia, supplies a short history and argues in favour of permitting both once rigid criteria have been set and the cases retro-reviewed. I suggest that among these criteria should be that VAE should only be permitted with one more necessary criterion: that VAE should only be allowed when physician assisted suicide is not a possible option. If the patient is able to ingest and absorb the medication there is no reason why VAE (...) should be permitted. A brief history of VAE and PAS is given and some of the arguments which have been given are analyzed. The Principle of the Double Effect is briefly discussed and why, in my opinion, it is not a valid principle is briefly discussed. (shrink)