This article examines women’s rights to property in marriage, upon divorce, and upon the death of a spouse in Uganda, highlighting the problematic aspects in both the state-made (statutory) and non-state-made (customary and religious) laws. It argues that, with the exception of the 1995 Constitution, the subordinate laws that regulate the distribution, management, and ownership of property during marriage, upon divorce, and death of a spouse are discriminatory of women. It is shown that even where the (...) relevant statutory laws are protective of women’s rights to property, their implementation is hindered by customary law practices, socialization, and the generally weak economic capacity of many women in the country. The article delves into the even weaker position of women’s rights to matrimonial property at customary and religious laws. In many homes, wives provide labor to support their husbands without having a stake in the use or monetary benefit from it. Under Islamic law regulating intestate succession to property, the entitlements for widows fall short of the constitutional standards on equality and non-discrimination. Polygyny is widely practiced by Muslims implying that the widows share the one eighth whenever there are children or one fourth in cases when there are no children. Radical reforms such as adopting an immediate community property regime instead of the present separate property regime are inevitable if women’s rights to property are to advance. (shrink)

Kin marriages have been a subject of literary, historical, sociological, religious, and medical studies from past to present. Such a marriage has been discussed within the science of fiqh in terms of religion. Ḥanafī and Mālikī mujtahids stated that this marriage is permissible. While Shāfiʿī and Ḥanbalī mujtahids did not recommend kin marriage by seeing it permissible. Based on the fundamental doctrines of Islamic law, they argued that marrying a foreign candidate is mustahabb and answered the (...) related criticisms against their fatwa. In scientific studies, genetic risks in kin marriages were found to be twice as high. Therefore, the kin marriage was not recommended and it is suggested that those who will marry with relatives should undergo carrier tests. In some contemporary religious studies, it has been argued that the families established by kin marriages are stronger, the genetic research does not have absolute precision, and it may be ideological in the form of weakening the family-society structure. Besides, the ijtihads distant to close kin marriage is weak in terms of evidence and opposing evidence has been put forward to defend kin marriage. On the other hand, in some sociological studies, it has been argued that kin marriage is predominantly caused by religion and that it wekaned the social solidairty. This study analyzes the classical and contemporary approaches to kin marriage in detail within the framework of thesis-antithesis in terms of fiqh, uṣūl al-fiqh, and evidence, and evaluates such studies from a fiqh point of view by including medical research results and some sociological studies on kin marriage. A generally accepted deterministic link cannot be established between kin marriage and genetic disorders. Because, the same risks are found in marriages with foreigners and also arise from harmful substance addiction. However, the genetic risk rate in marriage with close relatives is twice that of marriage with a foreign candidate. The least of the two possible losses is preferred. So it is very sensible that a marriage that is twice as likely to take such a risk should not be recommended by religion. Because, the main purpose of religion in marriage is to protect the generation and ensure its continuation. The fact that such a marriage is not religiously prohibited does not mean that it was recommended. Because it is left to individuals and public authority to limit the ibaha on the grounds of maṣlaḥa. On the grounds that the hereditary risk rate is high, kin marriage is not recommended in the fiqh and an effort has been made to prevent such a marriage from becoming widespread. Sociologically, marriages with a foreign candidate who is equivalent to a close relative are more appropriate in terms of strengthening the social organization. It is seen that Shafi'i and Hanbali ijtihad, which do not recommend close relatives marriage, are supported by current medical and genetic research. It is understood that the ijtihads that does not recommend marriage with close relatives is inaccurate in terms of evidence, and the views that argue that such marriages are stronger in terms of benefits are not in place. In general, it is seen that religion is distant from kin marriage, and such marriages are mostly caused by psychological, sociological, and cultural reasons. The fact that such marriages are common in areas belonging to the Shāfiʿī and Ḥanbalī schools that do not recommend marriage with close relatives, on the other hand, the fact that marriages between close relatives are less in Hanafi regions, which state that the same marriage is only permissible, supports this. In this respect, some claims arguing that such a marriage stems from religion based on the understandings that refer to that kin marriage is recommended by religion, are not accurate. For this reason, it is difficult to establish a connection between the disintegration of social unity, the spread of hereditary diseases, and the claims that religion recommends consanguineous marriage. Today, enlightening the religious aspect of kin marriage will be beneficial in protecting society against hereditary risks. (shrink)

Examining James M. Gustafson's views on the relationships between the sciences, theology, and ethics from a scientifically based naturalistic philosophical perspective, I concur with his rejection of separatist and antagonistic interactionist positions and his adherence to a mutually supportive interactionist position with both descriptive and normative features. I next explore three aspects of this interactionism: religious empiricism, the connections between facts and values, and the centering of objective values in the divine. Here I find much accord between Gustafson's (...) theocentrism and a scientifically based naturalistic philosophical account of the relationships between the sciences, theology, and ethics. (shrink)

Summary: Sexuality and marriage in the philosophy of religion of Emanuel Swedenborg.

In this article I will explore some mythological and ritual aspects related to a pair of trees, the aśvattha and the śamī. In India, since the time of the Vedic culture, these two trees have often been the protagonists of myths and rituals in which they are conceived of as a couple. In various contemporary religious contexts, one finds dendrolatric practices (vanaspatipūjā), which sometimes result in the celebration of actual tree marriages (vr̥kṣa vivāha), whereby trees grow by intertwining (...) with each other. The aśvattha and the śamī, though in today's context separately, are also subject to dendrogamic practices. In particular, the aśvattha is subject to a gender-shift whereby in some contexts, though traditionally regarded as the male tree, it acquires a female role within the couple. This phenomenon finds a parallel in various myths and rituals handed down in the Vedic texts. In fact, the araṇis, that is, the two sticks that were rubbed together during the ritual of lighting the fire, were made from the wood of the two trees. The analysis of the symbolic values linked to the coupling of the two araṇis and the many variants that this motif generated allows us to highlight, on a mythical level, the emergence of a sexuality that is not necessarily heteronormative. These versions, in fact, lead us to reflect on an arboreal nature that alludes to a sexuality that bypasses and transcends the gender binary and accounts for the fluidity found in certain contemporary arboreal ‘marriages. (shrink)

These essays explore the religious dimensions to a number of key features of well-being, including marriage, crime and rehabilitation, work, inequality, mental ...

The aim of this article is to investigate the phenomenon of cohabitation in Italy through Istat data on the cohabitation trends in the last decades and the results of a qualitative research, based on in-depth interviews among people who cohabited or married after cohabitation, with or without children. The analysis of the interviews shows that the meaning of cohabitation changes according to the experiences of leaving the parental home and the life course stages crossed by interviewees. Marriage is valued (...) for its legal and functional aspects, as a protection of the less financial independent partner. So it becomes a necessity only if the financial condition between partners is unbalanced in order to redress this asymmetry. If the partner conditions are equal - which is the case of the interviewees - marriage does not add benefits. Therefore all social and religious aspects of marriage are excluded by interviewees who were married or plan to marry only for instrumental reasons. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Christianity and Human Rights: Influences and IssuesJohn D’Arcy MayChristianity and human rights: Influences and issues. Edited by Frances S. AdeneyArvind Sharma. Albany: State University of New York Press, 2007. xi + 228 pp.The existence of the “Universal Declaration of Human Rights by the World’s Religions” (UDHRWR) deserves to be more widely known, and this book not only reproduces the text, drawn up for a conference in Montreal to (...) mark the fiftieth anniversary of the UN’s Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UNUDHR, 1948), but offers a point-by-point comparison of the two documents by Frances Adeney and a series of papers that illuminate the issues raised by such declarations from very different points of view. The premise of the whole undertaking is that religious perspectives were not adequately represented in the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights, though even this is questioned by some of the contributors. The UDHRWR explicitly mentions the right to change one’s religion, asserting in article 18 (1): “There shall be no compulsion in religion. It is a matter of choice,” and it includes “the rights of nature and the earth” (art. 29 [1]; see also 24 [2]). Article 12 (4 and 5) also asserts the duty and the corresponding right of not denigrating the religions of others. Article 16 (5) mentions monasticism as an institution worthy of protection alongside marriage. [End Page 172]In an extremely detailed examination of the work of the Third Committee, which brought the original UN document to the floor of the General Assembly, Sumner B. Twiss finds abundant evidence that religious issues were debated at great length, with great respect, and from a wide range of cultural and religious backgrounds. The committee included representatives of Christian, Confucian, Marxist, Hindu, Buddhist, and Muslim traditions, and Twiss claims that it is a mistake to regard the document they produced as either Western or secular in intent. The question of the relationship between rights and duties was thoroughly debated, as were the social dimensions of both and the underlying theological and ideological issues. Although religious terminology was eventually omitted, this was agreed in an atmosphere of exemplary tolerance and mutual understanding. Twiss concludes: “The UDHRWR is redressing a nonexistent problem presumably posed by the UDHR” (p. 69).Nevertheless, in the present context of the desecularization or resacralization of the world, a more explicit treatment of religious aspects of human rights seems appropriate, and the papers collected here raise problems that are still with us. Frances Adeney introduces several of them: the distinction between public and private spheres, the relative weighting given to creation and sin, and the relationship between rights and duties. The specifically Christian contribution to the debate, in her view, is the insistence on the universality of human rights derived from the biblical conception of the human as the “image of God,” so that “Christians through the ages have assigned a transcendent worth to human beings” (p. 20). The dimension of community is signaled by the extension of the covenant from ethnic group to faith community, thus linking the covenant family of God to the unity of humankind. Whether this link is strong enough to secure the universality of human rights, however, remains an open question.The Christian ethicist Max Stackhouse counterposes to this the “profound individualism” implicit in human rights thinking: it is this, rather than abstract or absolute universals, that lays the basis for civil society and, in its Christian variants, “provides the safest havens for non-Christian religions to flourish without political control” (p. 49). It is the rights of each individual, not of communitarian entities, that are to be respected. The religions tend to be particularistic, but this does not mean that the sources of human rights thinking are necessarily secular humanist. Stackhouse leaves us with two very significant questions: “... whether we can form a global civil society that does not have a theologically based inner moral architecture,” and whether “human rights principles become more effective without attention to their roots and justifying ultimate legitimations” (p. 50). Terry Muck also confronts us with the tensions between universality and cultural specificity, the individual and the communal, arguing that religions all... (shrink)

The Scottish scholar James McCosh was a champion of the Free church, a successful and much-published philosophy professor at Belfast for 16 years, and an energetic and innovative President of Princeton University from 1868 to 1888. The Religious Aspect of Evolution was published in 1888, and this second edition from 1890 took account of A. R. Wallace's latest work, Darwinism. McCosh, who already in Ireland had developed a 'theory of the universe conditioned by Christian revelation' was one of very (...) few clergymen in America who defended evolutionary theory. He impressed upon his students that while there seemed to be great truth in Darwin's theory, the work of the coming age must be to separate that truth from the error springing up around it. This would enable scholars to follow and even embrace science while also retaining their faith in the Bible. (shrink)

The project : naturalist, theistic, and religious approaches to natural law -- Neo-Aristotelian naturalist ontology and anthropology and element 3) -- NAVE element 2) Anthropology and 3) the wish for wellbeing and its ingredients -- Element 4) Principles, precepts, and virtues -- Element 5) of NAVE -the method of determination in moral reasoning -- Physicalism is not proven -- Bringing back God and religion -- Select applications : organisational agency and ethics : states, churches, corporations -- Applying natural law (...) to violence : the NAVE and DGE positions -- Global poverty : the moral obligations of persons, organisations, and states to relieve poverty -- Natural law applications : sexuality and marriage -- Concepts of justice, benevolence and agape -- Justice and Satygraha/Agape Caritas : the rationality of unconditional non-violence (Ahisma). (shrink)

This study examined cross-sectional links of the theistic and non-theistic sanctification of marriage and positive and negative religious coping with marital adjustment for 316 married Muslims from Iran. Perceiving marriage to be a manifestation of God and reflective of sacred qualities as well as engaging in positive and negative religious/spiritual coping strategies each uniquely contributed variance to marital adjustment, after controlling for each other and global indicators of devotion to Islam, and demographic variables. Specifically, theistic sanctification, (...) non-theistic sanctification, and positive r/s coping were uniquely tied to higher marital adjustment whereas negative r/s coping was uniquely tied to lower marital adjustment theistic in a hierarchical regression model with all primary variables and controls entered. These findings replicate and extend prior findings on the perceived sanctity of marriage with US samples of predominantly Christians to Muslims living in the Middle East, and offer novel cross-cultural insights into the possible roles that sanctification of marriage and r/s coping may play for marital well-being for non-distressed married Muslims. (shrink)

This Is A New Release Of The Original 1913 Edition.

The national hero of the present-day Albania is Skanderbeg’s father, Gjon (Yuvan) Kastrioti. Despite the fact that the Albanians tried to resist the Ottomans expeditions during the reign of Gjon, they were eventually defeated. As a result of this defeat by Sultan Murad II in 1423, Gjon was forced to give his four sons as captives. The youngest of his children was Skanderbeg, who together with three older brothers was given as captive due to the defeat by the Ottomans, had (...) to reside in the palace for many years. During this time, he had the opportunity to obtain a remarkable Ottoman education and to benefit from other privileges provided for them. It is obvious that the facilities provided by the Ottomans as well as the personal abilities and skills he gained in the Ottoman Empire enabled him to achieve successes in various fields. Therefore, he was able to be promoted to important positions within the Ottoman Empire. However, some of his demands were rejected and he became deprived from some of privileges granted to him due to the promises and incentives of the opponents of the Ottomans and some small victories resulting from his father's dominance in the direction of rebellion. During this rebellion against the Ottomans, they have received both material and spiritual aid Western powers as result the warm relations they enjoyed with the Western powers. In addition, these warm relations gave the opportunity to be acquainted with the Western culture. In the course of events, it can easily be said that Skanderbeg became a renowned figure not only in the Eastern culture but also in the Western culture. After his rebellion against the Ottomans, he denounced Islam and returned to his former Christian faith. There have always been controversies about the sect he adopted related to the Christian belief whether became a Catholic or Orthodox Christian. Although he had close ties with the Pope, the greatest enemy of the Ottoman Empire, his rebellions against the Ottomans did not originate from his religion.In this study, we appealed mostly to the daily reports of the priests of the time, primarily in Albanian and Turkish and English as well. In terms of Ottoman and Turkish - Albanian relations, the issue is a very important one and therefore has occasionally been evaluated in view of the historical perspective of religions. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:On Thomas Aquinas’s Two Approaches to Female RationalityElisabeth Uffenheimer-LippensAlthough the female human being was never at the center of his daily and intellectual attention, Thomas Aquinas as a religious thinker had no choice but to consider her in a wide range of different contexts. She is found in theoretical-speculative discussions (about creation, original sin and its punishment, resurrection) and in more practical ones (about marriage, reproduction, ordination (...) of women, women as teachers, as witnesses). Thomas’s ideas about the female human being have been investigated by theologians, philosophers, and historians. Often, but not always, the research has been inspired and even distorted by one form or another of feminism.In this article I shall not discuss all the different aspects of the topic “woman” as they can be found in Thomas’s works, but limit myself to one of them, namely, his understanding of female rationality. I have become intrigued by the fact that he thought about the rationality of woman in two different ways which he never integrated or explicitly connected. In the majority of his texts Thomas describes woman’s rationality as “inferior” in comparison to the “superior” male rationality. This justifies her subordination to the male human being and is expressed in her inability to control her passions. There are, however, other texts in which Thomas discusses the human mind in general, without specifying whether he means the mind of the male or the female human being. He recognizes in the human mind two aspects or functions of rationality, namely, a ratio superior which he labels symbolically “masculine” and a ratio inferior which he calls “feminine.” The meaning of this is [End Page 191] that woman’s rationality is not of an inferior kind, but includes both aspects of rationality.The thesis underlying this article is that not enough attention has been paid to the fact that two fundamentally different ways of understanding female rationality can be found in the work of Thomas Aquinas. His symbolic use of male and female has too often been confused with what one could call the “real” relationship between man and woman. The aim of this article is to present these two different understandings in Thomas, without making any detailed attempt to trace their historical origins. In addition, I want to show the new perspectives that are opened up by his second approach.The first part of this article will focus on the “inferior rationality” of women and try to understand what is meant by inferiority. The discussion will develop around an analysis of the words mollis and mollities. This will lead me to the relationship between inferior rationality and bodily weakness on the one hand, and between inferior rationality and the passions on the other hand. The practical consequences of woman’s inferior rationality shall also be treated. The second part of this article will focus on the human mind, and on the difference between ratio inferior and ratio superior. The definition of these two functions of human rationality will be followed by an analysis of texts where Thomas describes original sin as a paradigm for concrete sin, and where he connects ratio inferior to woman/feminine and ratio superior to man/male. The discussion will be completed by a study of the relationship between the ratio inferior and the vis cogitativa. This will allow me to bring out the importance of this second understanding of female rationality.I. Woman’s Inferior RationalityWoman’s intellectual capacity is repeatedly described by Thomas with the unflattering comparatives debilior (debilis meaning, among other things, “disabled, infirm, feeble, frail, [End Page 192] weak”)1 and inferior. Almost every woman does not have a “firm judgment of reason”; she is “unstable of reason.”2 She does not possess “sufficient strength of mind” (to resist concupiscence).3 There is clearly a “deficiency of reason”4 because she has an overall “weakness of nature.”5These descriptions of female rationality can only be understood insofar as they stand over and against the male rationality which is described in almost bodily comparatives as fortior, firmior, robustior. The male has more “strength of soul.”6 In him “the discretion... (shrink)

In this essay, the author tries to show the religious aspect of Rawls's work using a condition of religiosity that he himself endorsed. Section 1 looks at the passage in which Rawls asserts his condition of religiosity. In section 2, the author argues that Cohen's and Nagel's observation itself rests on a religiosity condition. In section 3, he shows how Rawls argued that Kant satisfied the religiosity condition and why Rawls thought Kant's moral philosophy has “a religious aspect.” (...) Section 4 explains that justice as fairness as presented in TJ has a religious aspect as well. In section 5, the author asks whether the religious aspect of justice as fairness survives Rawls's political turn. The chapter concludes by observing that the significance Kant gives to the moral law and our acting from it has an obvious religious aspect, and that his text occasionally has a devotional character. (shrink)

Based on the concept of community, Kant's conception of religion may be connected, on my view, to the question of which mental attitude is suitable for the collective life of human society. It is possible to imagine a successful community, even if such a community does not exist in the empirical world, and to be oriented toward this ideal without ever being able to realize it. According to Kant, human moral self-understanding is developed by human reason, and this explains the (...) structural similarity between the secular republic and the Kingdom of God under the specific conditions of the enlightened consciousness of a person who thinks for herself. Thus the anthropological "fact": the self-understanding of the human being characterised by his faculty of reason. (shrink)

As much as we would prefer otherwise, conflict seems woven into the very fabric of life. On a daily basis, we find ourselves dealing with difficult people, facing unhealthy relationships, or suffering marriage problems. We might say that some of our relationships are the very definition of conflict! While asking ourselves how to adjust in these circumstances, and how to handle conflict, we remain confused and perplexed. In the book “Life Without Conflict”, Gnani Purush (embodiment of Self knowledge) Dada (...) Bhagwan offers ultimate conflict resolution skills in the form of spiritual conflict resolution strategies. His spiritual teaching on how to resolve conflict - or to avoid it altogether - is offered in the context of common and everyday relationship challenges. Whether seeking relationship tips, marriage advice, or simply to learn how to stay healthy and to cultivate happy homes, this book will prove an invaluable resource. (shrink)

Lifestyle refers to a set of personal and group behaviours related to normative and semantic aspects of social life. Any coherent set of behavioural patterns derived from religious teachings that exist in life can be considered a religious lifestyle. Considering that the dominant religion in Jordan is Islam, the present study focused on the Islamic lifestyle. In addition, given that the correct relationship between couples has been compared to life-giving blood in marriage, and since the quality (...) of marital role plays a determining role, the existence of communication skills in any of the couples can generate satisfaction and compatibility, whereas lack of awareness of these skills could cause misunderstandings and tension. Therefore, the current study aims to study the role of the Islamic lifestyle in communication skills of 250 Muslim couples of Jordan (Amman, Zarqa and Irbid) in 2022. Data were collected using questionnaires during four months, and the validity and reliability was confirmed. In addition, data analysis was performed in Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS) and Linear Structural Relations (LISREL) using mean tests and structural equation modelling. According to the results, Islamic lifestyle had a positive, significant effect on the improvement of communication skills in Muslim couples in Jordan (P-value: 0.76; T-value: 7.92). Therefore, it is recommended that more attention should be paid to this issue by families, researchers and cultural authorities in the country.Contribution: Our findings revealed that Islamic lifestyle improved communication skills in Muslim couples, which demands special attention. By adhering to the Islamic lifestyle, couples can influence each other’s knowledge, emotions, education and growth, and try to have a realistic understanding of each other’s desires, needs, living environment and perceptions that each has in life issues. Furthermore, they can organise their role in the common life in appropriate ways to prevent problems and solve them in the event of problems. (shrink)

칸트 윤리학에서 도덕이 종교를 필요로 하는지에 대해서 크게 두 가지 해석이 가능하다. 첫째 해석은 칸트가 『도덕형이상학 기초놓기』나 『실천이성비판』과 같은 자신의 윤리학 저술에서 윤리학의 토대를 신이 아니라 인간 이성의 자율성에서 발견한 것을 근거로 칸트 윤리학을 세속적인 비종교적 윤리학으로 이해한다. 그러나 칸트 윤리학에 대한 다른 해석은 칸트가 『실천이성비판』 변증론에서 최고선의 실현 가능성 문제를 다루면서 최고선의 현세적 실현을 주장하는 에피쿠로스학파와 스토아학파의 윤리학을 비판하는 한편, 최고선의 내세적 실현을 주장하는 기독교 윤리학을 옹호하고 있다는 사실에 근거하여 칸트 윤리학을 종교적 윤리학으로 이해한다. 본 논문은 지금까지 많이 다루어지지는 (...) 않았지만 칸트 윤리학 연구를 위해 중요한 자료인 칸트의 『윤리학 강의』를 이용하여 칸트 윤리학 해석을 둘러싼 이 논란을 해결하려고 시도하였다. 자신의 다른 윤리학 저술들에서와 마찬가지로 칸트는 『윤리학 강의』에서 무엇이 도덕적으로 옳은 행위인지를 알기 위해서 신에 의존할 필요가 없음을 강조한다. 그러나 『윤리학 강의』에서 칸트는 도덕이 하나의 관념에 머무르지 않고 구속력을 갖기 위해서는, 도덕적 행위를 통해서 행복할 자격을 갖춘 사람이 실제로 행복을 희망할 수 있게 해주는 존재인 신에 대한 믿음이 필수적임을 동시에 강조한다. 우리가 칸트 윤리학을 이해할 때 도덕법의 근거가 신이 아니라 인간이성이라는 사실에만 초점을 맞춘다면 칸트 윤리학을 인간 중심의 세속적 윤리학으로 보는 것은 타당하다. 하지만 이러한 이해는 칸트 윤리학의 전체 모습이 아니라 일부만을 반영한 것임을 『윤리학 강의』를 통해 알 수 있다. (shrink)

Basic characteristic of Islamic heritage law, principally it has accepted the two-to-one ratio between the male and the female children/siblings in division of heritage. In Islamic inheritance law, the main/basic reason why the share of the male is twice the share of the female is no “value” judgments given to female/women in creation and gender in Islam, on the contrary, are real realities related with the roles and financial obligations that man and woman have undertaken, in other words, related with (...) “socio-economic structure/fact” in the family and society structure foreseen by Islam. As a matter of fact, “need principle” is based on in division and succession of heritageand a fair arrangement has been made in accordance with the rights and responsibilities of the husband and wife in Islamic Law. In some classical tafsīr books, the concept of “degree” in the verse “... Men have a degree (right) over women” (Al-Baqara 2/228) mentioning the mutual rights and responsibilities of women and men; and the expression of “lil al-dhakari mithlu haẓẓ al-unthayain” in the verse –the inheritance of man is the share of two women– (Al-Nisā 4/11) mentioning the inheritance shares of boys and girls is interpreted against the woman by disregarding the intended purpose and socio-economic contexts of these verses. As a result of this interpretation, the share of men in inheritance is twice the share of women in Islamic law is ontologically (existential/creation) based on a justification that “man is superior to woman”. In this article/study, an analyticallook atthe interpretations in some classical tafsīr books on the axis of “daraja/degree” and “lil al-dhakari mithlu haẓẓ al-unthayain” that today sheds light on the sociological-historical background of depriving the daughter from the heritage will be made. Summary: Just as there is no way to determine a person’s sex, it is not either possible by reason to have such an opportunity. - With the possibility of medical intervention nowadays - sex is determined by the discretion of the Supreme Creator rather than will. Indeed, it is mentioned in the Qur’ān: To Allah belongs the dominion of the heavens and the earth; He creates what he wills. He gives to whom He wills female [children], and He gives to whom He wills males (Al-Shūrā 42/49.)In addition to human biological sex, there is also social gender. Indeed, the term “sex” refers to being biologically female or male, while the term "gender" refers to the social and cultural identity of a woman or man, or the social roles that occur in the historical process.Accordingly, while it is not possible to determine biological sex (in normal circumstances in advance), determining gender is shaped by the cultural will of individuals and societies. As a matter of fact, gender is shaped according to the religions, customs and cultures of the societies and it shows differences according to time, culture and family structure. In this context, in the pre-Islamic Arab society, the gender of the girl or the woman was shaped by the custom of the ritual and customs. Indeed, it is a known fact that during the period of Jahiliyyah, in terms of social gender, the girl/woman has been deprived of many social and economic rights, especially heritage. The Qur’ān has brought the girls who, in the period of Jahiliyyah, were oppressed in terms of gender, deprived of many social and economical rights, treated as second class human, embarrassed of themselves and buried alive, to the same position as man. In this context, as it is in every field in the direction of social structure and social conditions of that day, also in the field of inheritance law, a number of regulations were made in the Qur’ān and the Sunnah being the main sources of Islam. The divisions of the inheritance were connected with religious and legal rules and the shares of the inheritance of the sons and daughters were determined by naṣṣ (verses and hadiths).However, in Islamic inheritance law, as a requirement of the structure of family and society accepted by Islam, in principle, “two-to-one” measures have been adopted between male and female children. As a matter of fact, in this aspect, it is mentioned in the Qur’ān: Allah instructs you concerning your children: for the male, what is equal to the share of two females (Al-Nisā 4/11.)On one hand, the principle that Islamic law brings between boys and girls; Seems to be an inequality in terms of the arrangement in which "the inheritance share of the male child is twice the share of the female child", while on the other hand, within the border of in the family foreseen by Islam, this regulation has not been seen as an injustice and inequity by Muslim societies, because in Islamic family law, a man is obliged to ensure the livelihood of the family after marriage. He is also obliged to give his wife her mahr when marrying.In Islamic inheritance law, “necessity principle” is taken as the basis of responsibility that women and man have undertaken in family and society. Therefore, even though giving nothing at all to those who are not in need and giving less to those who are in less need, giving too much to those who are in much need might seem contrary to the principle of equality, it is a necessity of the principle of justice and fairness. As a matter of fact, while "law equality, necessity in sharing" principle, law is arranged according to people's qualifications, goods and wealth sharing is divided according to the needs of people. In this context, there has been a fair division in Islamic heritage law based on the necessity, (distributive) justice and fairness principle. Indeed, the French philosopher Roger Garaudy (1913-2012), who chose /converted to Islam, evaluates the following about the proportion of male child in the Qur'an to that of female child: “When we consider that in the Arab society all the obligations of the family and of the care of the parents and of all the things that we call ‘social security’ today are put on the shoulders of the husband, the hereditary male child's share must be twice as high as the female child’s is”.As Garaudy argues, the difference in the inheritance of women and men in Islamic inheritance law is not a legal discrimination/inequality, but a form of divisiveness stemming from a need based on the role and responsibility that women and men have undertaken in the family and society. Therefore, giving nothing to those who need nothing, giving little to those who need little, and giving a lot to those who need a lot,even though may seem contradictious to the principle of equality, it becomes a necessity of equity and (distributive) justice principle. In this case, in Islamic inheritance law, the basic reason why the share of the male child is twice the share of the female child, is social and economic reasons and it is possible to rank them as follows:1) According to Islamic law, women are not obliged to make their own economic livelihoods. The woman’s economic responsibility belongs to her father or brothers before marriage, and then to her husband after marriage. 2) When a woman is married she is not responsible for herself or other family members’ livelihood. The male is obliged to make a living for himself, his wife and his children.3) While married, the male is obliged to give the wife mahr. The woman has no such responsibility.As it is understood from the above explanations, in Islamic inheritance law, the basic reason why the share of the male child is twice the share of the female child is not about the ontologically “value” based on creation and sex given to the woman (girl child) in Islam. On the contrary, it is the real facts concerning the family and society structure that Islam predicts, the roles and financial obligations that man and woman have undertaken, namely “socio-economic structure/fact”.In some commentaries in classical commentary books, the rights and responsibilities of women and men are referred to, like: the word “degree” mentioned in: …but the men have a degree over them [in responsibility and authority (Al-Baqara 2/228), and the talk about the inheritance shares of boys and girls in: for the male, what is equal to the share of two females (Al-Nisā 4/11). Eventually, the concepts “lil al-dhakari mithlu haẓẓ al-unthayain” have been associated with the gender of the woman/girl child ontologically (based on social fact) by ignoring the referent purpose and socio-economic contexts of these verses. As a result of these interpretations, it was desired that the Islamic law principle of inheritance share of male child being twice the share of female child, ontologically, should be based on a justification that “man is superior to woman”.In this study, some of the era’s dominant culture classical interpretations grounding women's inheritances share on her gender and based on the axis of the concepts of "degree" and “lil al-dhakari mithlu haẓẓ al-unthayain” in the related verses of the Qur'ān will be elaborated. (shrink)

This article evaluates demands for privatized diversity that destabilize traditional notions of separation of state and religion, by asking secular authorities to adopt a hands-off, non-interventionist approach, placing civil and family disputes with a religious or cultural aspect beyond the official realm of equal citizenship. This potential storm to come must be addressed head on because it mixes three inflammatory components in today’s political environment: religion; gender; and the rise of a neo-liberal state. The volatility of these issues is (...) undisputed; they require a mere spark to ignite. The standard legal response to this challenge is to seek shelter behind a formidable ‘wall of separation’ between state and religion, even if this implies turning a blind eye to the concerns of religious women — especially those caught in the uncoordinated web of secular and religious marriage bonds. I will advance a different approach. By placing these once-ignored agents at the centre of analysis, this article explores the idea of permitting a degree of regulated interaction between religious and secular sources of identity and obligation, so long as the baseline of citizenship-guaranteed rights remains firmly in place. (shrink)

Religion is intrinsically social, and hence irretrievably organizational, although organization is often seen as the darker side of the religious experience--power, routinization, and bureaucracy. Religion and secular organizations have long received separate scholarly scrutiny, but until now their confluence has been little considered. This interdisciplinary collection of mostly unpublished papers is the first volume to remedy the deficit. The project grew out of a three-year inquiry into religious institutions undertaken by Yale University's Program on Non-Profit Organizations and sponsored (...) by the Lilly Endowment. The scholars who took part in this effort weree challenged to apply new perspectives to the study of religious organizations, especially that strand of contemporary secular organizational theory known as "New Institutionalism." The result was this groundbreaking volume, which includes papers on various aspects of such topics as the historical sources and patterns of U.S. religious organizations, contemporary patterns of denominational authority, the congregation as an organization, and the interface between religious and secular institutions and movements. The contributors include an interdisciplinary mix of scholars from economics, history, law, social administration, and sociology. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Journal of the History of Ideas 62.3 (2001) 505-522 [Access article in PDF] Mary Astell's Ironic Assault on John Locke's Theory of Thinking Matter E. Derek Taylor Mary Astell (1666-1731), most famous today for her call for the establishment of Protestant nunneries in Serious Proposal to the Ladies, Part I (1694) and for her acute Reflections Upon Marriage (1700), has lurked for years at the edges of that (...) infinitely contentious category "feminism," but she is only now beginning to receive her rightful inheritance as a theological and philosophical thinker, probably the title she would most have preferred. 1 This is not to say that Astell's Christian-Platonism has been ignored. In her 1986 biography Ruth Perry gave cogent expression to the centrality of Astell's idealist Christianity to all aspects of her thought 2 and in the same year, Bridget Hill thoughtfully warned her readers against attempting to force Astell, a religious conservative, "into some preconceived idea of what late seventeenth and early eighteenth century feminism ought to have been." 3 More recently, Patricia Springborg has written two significant essays that rely in part on Astell's more neglected theological-philosophical works, Letters concerning the Love of God (1695), a collection of Astell's correspondence with John Norris of Bemerton (1657-1711), and The Christian Religion, As Professed by a Daughter of the Church of England (1705; 3d edition 1730), far and away her most developed theological-philosophical [End Page 505] statement. 4 Despite these important forays, however, both Letters and Christian Religion continue to be largely ignored, as is suggested by the relative dearth of scholarly work on either text and the short shrift each receives in anthologies of Astell's works. 5 Despite the great popularity of Letters throughout the eighteenth century and despite the fact that, as Springborg points out, Astell considered Christian Religion "her magnum opus," neither text has found new life in a modern edition. 6This omission creates a rather vexing problem for would-be scholars of Astell's philosophical and theological ideas. The major primary texts themselves not being available, we have little choice but to rely on the limited accounts of other scholars for our information. Over a decade ago, for instance, The Journal of the History of Philosophy published a long note by Kathleen M. Squadrito on "Mary Astell's Critique of John Locke's View of Thinking Matter," and hers has since been the standard (if not quite only) account of this historically fascinating and important philosophical comment in Christian Religion.7 Squadrito wants, she writes, to "present a short account of [Astell's] work and her criticism of Locke's view of thinking matter." 8 Unfortunately, Squadrito's account of Astell's "work" is significantly flawed, which leads her to serious mischaracterizations of Astell's "criticism" of Locke's hypothesis. Briefly put, Astell's "own philosophy" in Christian Religion does not, as Squadrito claims, emerge "as an attempted reconciliation of the views of Norris and Locke" 9 ; because she supposes it does, however, Squadrito is able to present Astell's critique of Locke's theory [End Page 506] of thinking matter as a respectful, even-handed philosophical analysis, a theoretical bridge, as it were, between the Platonism of Norris and the Empiricism of Locke. As we shall see, Astell's critique of Locke's hypothesis actually amounts to a bitterly ironic assault, wherein Astell does not so much build bridges as burn them. Just why Astell in Christian Religion decided not to strike a middling position between Locke and Norris, and how this decision invigorated her attack on Locke's materialist hypothesis, are the primary questions this essay seeks to answer. In order to arrive at such answers, however, it is necessary first to examine the text in which Astell does attempt to carve out a position between Locke and Norris, namely Astell and Norris's Letters.The basic history of Letters is well enough understood. Mary Astell, a well-read young woman of significant perspicacity, first wrote in... (shrink)

Ten years after over half a million Christians signed their names to a statement of conscience clarifying where they stood, the three issues dealt with in the Manhattan Declaration are of more cultural importance than ever. The main difference now, as opposed to then, is the state has since claimed authority, not only over life, but also over marriage and religious liberty." -- Amazon.com.

Evaluating demographical changes in Poland and Europe at the turn of 20th century, researchers more often use the expression „family crisis”. The increase in the number of divorces and in the number of extra-marital births, prevalence of pre-marital cohabitation, as well as its increased acceptance in the society and the increase in the scope of voluntary childlessness make up such an approach to the situation. This article presents and discusses the results of a survey concerning ethical matters of family life (...) conducted in April 2010 amongst students of Lodz’s colleges. The responses were contrasted with the declared influence of Pope John Paul’s II pontificate. A vast majority of students claim to decide upon religious wedding while entering into marriage. They also declare bringing up their potential off springs in catholic tradition. The students of Lodz are also critical of abortion. It needs to be highlighted that in almost all aspects of family life people, who declared a positive influence of the teaching and life of the Polish Pope on their behaviour, more often than others supported the teaching of Roman Catholic Church. On the basis of the conducted survey it may be noticed that the students of Lodz remember about the Polish Pope and his teaching, however, do not support all of his views as far as family life is concerned. Also the majority of the students would say they belong to „the generation of JPII”. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Dharma Bums: The Beat Generation and the Making of Countercultural PilgrimageP. J. JohnstonI believe in the sweetness of Jesus And Buddha— I believe, In St. Francis, Avaloki Tesvara, the Saints Of First Century India A D And Scholars Santidevan And Otherwise Santayanan Everywhere.(Kerouac 1959: 15)Preliminary Polemics“PILGRIM, n. A traveler that is taken seriously.”—Ambrose Bierce, The Devil’s Dictionary 2007: 133As Beat commentator Stephen Prothero describes in his article “On the (...) Holy Road: The Beat Movement as Spiritual Protest” (1991), the Beats and their pilgrimages have most emphatically not been taken seriously. Both critics and scholars have been unkind to members of the Beat generation, and this unkindness has manifested itself in relative neglect of the Beats in all possible aspects of scholarly investigation. But nowhere does this appear more pronounced than in the area of Beat religion. Though some recent scholarship has been picking up from this earlier neglect and it is now [End Page 165] possible to find serious biographies of most of the major Beat writers and some belated attention to the movement as a literary phenomenon, the only book-length treatment of Beat Buddhism I was able to locate (Tonkinson 1995) hardly qualifies as a scholarly work and was published not by an academic press but as a special feature of the Buddhist magazine Tricycle. Prothero hypothesizes that this is because of the movement’s reputation as rebellious and antinomian—in its heyday the movement was characterized in identical unsavory terms by publications representing interests as diverse as Life and Playboy, with the latter describing the Beats as “nihilists” and the former claiming that the Beats were at war with “Mom, Dad, Politics, Marriage, the Savings Bank, Organized Religion, Literary Elegance, Law, the Ivy League Suit and Higher Education, to say nothing of the Automatic Dishwasher, the Cellophane-wrapped Soda Cracker, the Split-Level House and the clean, or peace-provoking H-bomb” (Prothero 1991: 206). Norman Podhoretz of Partisan Review went further still, claiming that the Beats were “hostile to civilization” and that the movement as a whole amounted to “a revolt of the spiritually underprivileged and crippled of soul” and “an affirmation of death” (ibid., 206). One couldn’t ask for a more passionate disavowal of the Beats or a more thorough polemic that the movement was profoundly antireligious.This could not contrast more with the Beats’ representation of their movement and its aims, with Jack Kerouac going so far as to reinterpret the crucial term “Beat” (a term for someone down and out originally borrowed from criminal street jive) as a noun derived from the adjective “beatific,” a specifically religious term familiar from such phrases as “the beatific vision” (ibid., 206–207). Several of the representative Beat writers were practicing Buddhists, influencing the entire movement to such an extent that Buddhist ideas and imagery suffused Beat literature as a whole. Ginsberg and Kerouac especially emphasized the positive and constructive elements of their spiritual vision, arguing that literature such as On the Road and Howl should be understood as religious affirmations of what is good and holy rather than as purely critical undertakings: “For the crucifix I speak out, for the Star of Israel I speak out, for the divinest man who ever lived who was German (Bach) I speak out, for sweet Mohammed I speak out, for Buddha I speak out, for Lao-tse and Chuang-tse I speak out” (ibid., 206–207). Or, as Allen Ginsberg put it less lyrically (and rather more bluntly): “Howl is an ‘Affirmation’ by individual experience of God, sex, drugs, and absurdity... the poems are religious and I meant them to be” (ibid., 207).But for the most part, Beat asseverations in no way diminished scholarly wariness about the Beat movement and its spirituality—as Prothero concludes, “the tendency among literary scholars is to see these [religious] concerns as tangential rather than constitutive” while “historians of American religion who have explored beat spirituality have tended to focus almost exclusively on the beats’ engagement with Zen and then to dismiss that engagement as haphazard” (ibid., 207).It is my contention that the mainstream scholarly neglect of Beat spirituality is in some part... (shrink)

The impact of culture and religion on sexual and reproductive health and behavior has been a developing area of study in contemporary time. Therefore, it is crucial for people using reproductive procedures to understand the religious and theological perspectives on issues relating to reproductive health. This paper compares different perspectives of three Abrahamic faiths, i.e., Judaism, Christianity, and Islam on ARTs. Procreation, family formation, and childbirth within the context of marriage have all been advocated by these three major (...) religions of the world. Judaism permits the use of all assisted reproductive technologies when the oocyte and sperm come from the husband and wife, respectively. The different denominations of Christianity have diverse views on reproductive practices. Although the Vatican does not approve of assisted reproduction, Protestant, Anglican, and other religious groups are free to use it. ARTs are acceptable in Sunni Islam, although they can only be carried out if the couples are married. Shia Islam, however, permits third-party donations to married couples under specific restrictions. This comparison reveals that while the three major world religions utilize assisted reproduction in distinct ways, there are also many comparable aspects of each religion. (shrink)

The theory of Markov decision processes (MDP) can be used to analyze a wide variety of stopping time problems in economics. In this paper, the nature of such problems is discussed and then the underlying theory is applied to the question of arranged marriages. We construct a stylized model of arranged marriages and, inter alia, it is shown that a decision maker's optimal policy depends only on the nature of the current marriage proposal, independent of whether there is recall (...) (storage) of previous marriage proposals. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:_Russell_ journal (home office): E:CPBRRUSSJOURTYPE2601\REVIEWS.261 : 2006-06-05 11:55
eviews AN EPISTOLARY BIOGRAPHY S A Theology and Religious Studies / U. of Lund   Lund, Sweden @. Nicholas Griffin, ed., assisted by Alison Roberts Miculan. The Selected Letters of Bertrand Russell. Vol. : The Public Years, –. London and New York: Routledge, . Pp. xix, . Prices in : £. (pb £.); . (pb .). ith the publication (...) of the second volume of The Selected Letters of WBertrand Russell, Nicholas Griffin has completed a work of impressive scholarship. The first volume came out in  and contains  letters, the second  letters. The Bertrand Russell Archives at McMaster University hold between thirty and forty thousand of Russell’s letters. Griffin does not claim to have looked through all of them, but apart from our editor he has probably read more of them than any other person. This provided him a unique perspective on Russell of which he has made the best. The letters have been intertwined with extensive commentaries and supplied with informative footnotes amounting to approximately  pages in the first volume and  pages in the second. Together with the prefaces and the introductions, they supply us with an epistolary biography of Russell that covers most aspects of his life. There are some differences between the first and the second volume due to the availability of letters. In the first volume there are many letters to Russell’s first wife, Alys, and his lover, Lady Ottoline Morrell. Griffin writes in the preface to the second volume that these touched on almost everything that was important to Russell, which made it unnecessary to look for letters elsewhere. The letters to Ottoline continued their pace until , but he kept on writing to her until she died in . Griffin relies heavily on these letters up to her premature death. When Colette O’Niel came into the picture in , she took over Ottoline’s role, but Russell’s letters to her are not quite as revealing as those to Ottoline. The Russell Archives have close to , letters to Ottoline and   Reviewed by Katharine Tait in Russell, n.s.  (): –. russell: the Journal of Bertrand Russell Studies n.s.  (summer ): – The Bertrand Russell Research Centre, McMaster U.  - _Russell_ journal (home office): E:CPBRRUSSJOURTYPE2601\REVIEWS.261 : 2006-06-05 11:55  Reviews to Colette, and they contain much information for anyone interested in Russell. For the second volume Griffin has therefore been forced to search further afield for letters. At the same time there are many more letters to choose from. Another complicating factor has been the variety of Russell’s interests after . Before the First World War Russell had mainly devoted his energy to logic and the foundations of mathematics. When the war broke out, he channelled his energy into anti-war work. After the war his interests grew in many directions, as did the number of correspondents. Towards the end of his life he returned to political activism; still, his correspondence in the s covers a wider range of topics than at any other time. Given the variety of Russell’s interests, Griffin had to decide which interests should be included. This must have been a difficult task, but Griffin argues convincingly for why he has excluded letters directly related to Russell’s involvement in world government organizations, letters concerning the Indo-Pakistani border dispute and technical letters about philosophy. He has also excluded— although not totally—letters concerning religion, people he had known earlier, events he had been involved in and opinions he had held. Some topics had to be excluded due to the lack of suitable letters. In spite of all these restrictions, Griffin has been able to produce a most interesting, if not complete, epistolary biography. The book is divided into six chapters: () War (–),  letters; () Children, Companionship, and Joint Work (–),  letters; () Starting a School and Ending a Marriage (–),  letters; () Marriage, Poverty, and Exile (–),  letters; () Respectability at Last (–),  letters; () Peace (–),  letters. The titles and the periods are aptly chosen and give a good hint about the major projects in which Russell was involved. As can be deduced from the number of letters given for each chapter, Griffin devotes most attention to... (shrink)

Aspect-perception is a phenomenon described in detail by L. Wittgenstein in part XI of Philosophical Investigations. The most famous example is the duck-rabbit figure, which can be viewed either as a duck or a rabbit, but the phenomenon extends well beyond visual Gestalt pictures and permeates various fields of human life, including aesthetic, moral and linguistic experience. Recently there have been attempts to apply the notion of aspect-perception to religious faith. It has often been observed that religious faith (...) involves a particular way of ‘seeing’ different objects and events (recall the famous phrase from the hymn Amazing Grace, ‘I once was lost, but now am found; Was blind, but now I see’). For this reason, the attempt to use the category of aspect-seeing to analyze religious faith may appear promising. My aim in this paper to analyze critically one such attempt, made by N. K. Verbin in ‘Religious Belief and Aspect seeing’ and ‘Can Faith be Justified?’. In these papers Verbin argues for two closely related theses regarding religious belief. The first is conceptual; she proposes that we should understand ‘certain kinds of religious beliefs which we view as central to a person having a living faith’ as ‘a type of aspect-seeing’. The second follows from the first: we should modify accordingly the way we construe justification for religious belief. In what follows I expound Verbin’s conceptual claim and present arguments against equating religious belief with seeing religious aspects. Basing myself on examples of people who see religious aspects but do not reach religious belief, I conclude that the two categories should not be conflated. Although I reject Verbin’s overall claim, however, I concede that aspect-seeing does play a significant role in justifying religious belief, although not in the way Verbin proposes. (shrink)