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Maarten Steenhagen
Uppsala University
  1. False Reflections.Maarten Steenhagen - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (5):1227-1242.
    Philosophers and psychologists often assume that mirror reflections are optical illusions. According to many authors, what we see in a mirror appears to be behind it. I discuss two strategies to resist this piece of dogma. As I will show, the conviction that mirror reflections are illusions is rooted in a confused conception of the relations between location, direction, and visibility. This conception is unacceptable to those who take seriously the way in which mirrors contribute to our experience of the (...)
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  2. Must Naive Realists Be Relationalists?Maarten Steenhagen - 2019 - European Journal of Philosophy 27 (4):1002-1015.
    Relationalism maintains that perceptual experience involves, as part of its nature, a distinctive kind of conscious perceptual relation between a subject of experience and an object of experience. Together with the claim that perceptual experience is presentational, relationalism is widely believed to be a core aspect of the naive realist outlook on perception. This is a mistake. I argue that naive realism about perception can be upheld without a commitment to relationalism.
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  3. Fictional Creations.Maarten Steenhagen - 2021 - Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism.
    Many people assume that fictional entities are encapsulated in the world of fiction. I show that this cannot be right. Some works of fiction tell us about pieces of poetry, music, or theatre written by fictional characters. Such creations are fictional creations, as I will call them. Their authors do not exist. But that does not take away that we can perform, recite, or otherwise generate actual instances of such works. This means we can bring such individuals actually into existence, (...)
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  4. Sehen lassen: Die Praxis des Zeigens. [REVIEW]Maarten Steenhagen - 2015 - British Journal of Aesthetics 55 (2):249-252.
  5. Against Adversarial Discussion.Maarten Steenhagen - 2016 - Collingwood and British Idealism Studies 22 (1):87-112.
    Why did R.G. Collingwood come to reject the adversarial style of philosophical discussion so popular among his Oxford peers? The main aim of this paper is to explain that Collingwood came to reject his colleagues’ specific style of philosophical dialogue on methodological grounds, and to show how the argument against adversarial philosophical discussion is integrated with Collingwood’s overall criticism of realist philosophy. His argument exploits a connection between method and practice that should be taken seriously even today.
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  6. Sense and Reference of Pictures.Maarten Steenhagen - 2020 - British Journal of Aesthetics (1):1-5.
    John Hyman insists that Frege-style cases for depiction show that any sound theory of depiction must distinguish between the ‘sense’ and the ‘reference’ of a picture. I argue that this rests on a mistake. Making sense of the cases does not require the distinction.
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    Explaining the Ugly: Disharmony and Unrestrained Cognition in Kant.Maarten Steenhagen - 2010 - Estetica 11.
    In arguing for his theory of pure reflective judgments of taste Kant extensively analyses beauty, but almost wholly disregards ugliness. We commonly take ugliness as paradigmatic when we reflect on our negative aesthetic judgments, and so does Kant. Consequently, there ought to be a more explicit story explaining how Kantian judgments of ugliness are possible. In this paper I argue that a disharmony is the key to understanding Kantian ugliness. This way, an answer to the question of ugliness in Kant (...)
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