In this paper, I argue that in the Eudemian Ethics, Aristotle proposes a strong version of the unity of the virtues. Evidence in favor of this strong version of the unity of the virtues results from reading the common books within the EE rather than as part of the Nicomachean Ethics. The unity of the virtues as defended in the EE includes not only practical wisdom and the character virtues, but also all the virtues of practical and theoretical thinking. Closely (...) related, in the EE, Aristotle proposes a different best agent from the one of the NE. The best agent of the EE is the kalos kagathos. The person who is kalos kagathos has “all” the virtues. Kalokagathia is a whole and the virtues are its parts. I investigate how we should understand this whole and the relation between the individual virtues within this whole. (shrink)

In Eudemian Ethics 8.3, Aristotle treats a virtue that he calls kalokagathia, ‘nobility-and-goodness’. This virtue appears to be quite important, and he even identifies it with “perfect virtue” (1249a17). This makes it puzzling that the Nicomachean Ethics, a text that largely parallels the Eudemian Ethics, does not discuss kalokagathia at all. I argue that the reason for this difference has to do with the role that the intellectual virtue practical wisdom (phronêsis) plays in these treatises. The Nicomachean Ethics, (...) I argue, makes use of a more expansive conception of phronêsis than does the Eudemian Ethics. Hence, the work that is done by kalokagathia in the Eudemian Ethics -- crucially, accounting for the unity of the virtues -- is done in the Nicomachean Ethics by phronêsis. (shrink)

Příspěvek se věnuje problematice antického řeckého sportu, konkrétně významu sportovních zápolení a jejich výchovné a vzdělávací roli. Pozornost autor věnuje rozboru pozic filosofů Sókrata, Platóna a Aristotela. Po nastínění kontextu tématu představuje a interpretuje základní filosofické a náboženské premisy sportovního výkonu a jeho výchovné role. Řadí mezi ně úsilí o dosažení božské přízně, nesmrtelnosti, vyššího společenského postavení, ale i ideálů kalokagathia, areté a dalších ctností. Důležitý rozměr antického sportu spatřuje rovněž v jeho formativním potenciálu směřujícímu k přípravě na duševní (...) život. Hlavní část příspěvku se věnuje přístupu k pohybovým zápolením u filosofů Sókrata, Platóna a Aristotela, kteří svými úvahami k chápání výchovné role sportu podstatně přispěli. Následně se autor zaměřuje na identifikaci dobrého sportu podle zmíněných myslitelů a na zkoumání role sportu v kontextu dobrého života, který nahlíží v aristotelském rámci jako dosahování blaženosti. Cílem textu je identifikovat a vyzdvihnout výchovný smysl sportování, poukázat na jeho filosofické konotace a možnou roli sportu v otázce vedení dobrého života. ----------- This manuscript deals with the problematics of ancient Greek sport, specifically with the significance of sporting practices and their educational role. Attention is given to a detailed analysis of the positions of the philosophers Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle. After demonstrating the context, the author presents and interprets fundamental philosophical and religious premises of the athletic performance and its educational role. Among the identified features are the effort of acquiring divine favour, immortality, higher social status, but also the ideals of kalokagathia, areté, and other virtues. Important dimension of ancient Greek sport is also found in its formative potential which aims at the preparation for intellectual life. The main part of the article is focused on the approaches of the philosophers Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle towards the sporting practices. These thinkers made an important contribution to the understanding of the educational role of sport. Then, the author identifies a good sport according to these thinkers and examines the role of such sport in the context of a good life, which is considered in the Aristotelian perspective as achieving beatitude (eudaimonia). The aim of this article is to identify and highlight an educational purpose of sport, underlines its philosophical connotations, and demonstrate its possible role in the context of a good life. (shrink)

In 1906, Henry Stephens Salt published a short collection of essays that presented several rhetorically powerful, if formally deficient arguments for the vegetarian position. By interpreting Salt as a moral sentimentalist with ties to Aristotelian virtue ethics, I propose that his aesthetic argument deserves contemporary consideration. First, I connect ethics and aesthetics with the Greek concepts of kalon and kalokagathia that depend equally on beauty and morality before presenting Salt’s assertion: slaughterhouses are disgusting, therefore they should not be promoted. (...) I suggest three areas of development since Salt’s death that could be fruitfully plumbed to rebuild this assertion into a contemporary argument: an updated analysis of factory farm conditions, insights from moral psychologists on the adaptive socio-biological benefits of disgust as a source of cognitive information, and hermeneutical considerations about the role of the audience that allow blameworthiness for slaughterhouse atrocities to be laid upon the meat-eater. (shrink)

Classical Greece is famous for its athletic art, particularly the image of the nude male athlete. But how did the Greeks understand athletic beauty? Plato, Aristotle, Xenophon, and others discuss athletes’ beauty, while the educational ideal of kalokagathia conceptually connects athletic beauty with the good. More questions need to be answered, however, if we are to understand ancient athletic beauty. We need to ask ourselves what the Greeks appreciated when they looked at athletic bodies. What did those qualities mean (...) to them? In what way was it erotic? How did it differ for females and males? In this paper I argue that the beautiful athletic body is framed in ancient Greek thought, not just as an aesthetically pleasing image, but as an ideal expression of a certain kind of soul. (shrink)

ABSTRACTWhen Aristotle praises pentathletes’ beauty at Rhetoric 1361b, it is not the idle observation of a sports fan. In fact, the balanced and harmonious beauty of athletes’ bodies reflects Aristotle’s ideal of a virtuous soul in the Nicomachean Ethics: one which discerns noble ends and means, then acts accordingly. At Eudemian Ethics 1248b, he takes it a step further, characterizing kalokagathia as ‘the virtue that arises from a combination’ of virtues. These passages raise important questions about the relationship between (...) ethics, athletics, and aesthetics. In this paper, I argue that Aristotle’s ideal of kalokagathia is compatible not just with athletic training, but also with an ideal of citizenship that rejects traditional ideas about inborn virtue and superficial beauty. (shrink)

Was in Theorien an Auflösungsvermögen verkraftet werden kann und muß, findet in der Welt, die durch Theorie rekonstruiert werden soll, eine Parallele: Was der Mensch sei, ist nicht einmal menschen- und lebensweltlich eine klare Kante. In den Humankatastrophen der letzten hundert Jahre wird er zu einer verfeuerungsfähigen Biomasse. Man kann kaum den Eindruck gewinnen, daß sich daran etwas wirklich geändert hat. Es wird Tag für Tag hekatombenweise gestorben, gemordet, gefoltert. Der Mensch wird definiert als das Wesen, das man töten kann (...) durch Hunger, Krankheit, Folter, Mord und Krieg, namenlos, zahllos, heute hier, morgen dort. Man könnte sich denken, daß die Lehre vom Menschen, die Anthropologie, ihren Grund verliert und eigentlich zur Thanatologie konvertieren müßte. Und dank Gentechnologie erscheint am Horizont die Vision, der Mensch sei nicht mehr jemand, der nach dem Bilde eines Gottes geformt sei, sondern nunmehr jemand, der in den Stand versetzt wurde, sich ein machbares Bild von sich selber zu schaffen, die Exemplare der humanen Population so zu formatieren, daß sie dem alten Ideal der Kalokagathia entsprechen: tugendhaft, schön, alters- und behinderungslos, krankheits-, rausch- und drogenfrei, angemessenen Verstandes eine Idee der Devianzausmerzung, könnte man sagen, die Idee einer leid- und schicksalsfreien Ruhewelt, einer Re-Animation des Paradiesgedankens ohne Adam und ohne Eva. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Why music? The Foundations of Music Education from Plato until Today by Øivind VarkøyDaniela BartelsØivind Varkøy, Warum Musik? Zur Begründung des Musikunterrichts von Platon bis heute [Why music? The Foundations of Music Education from Plato until Today], Stefan Gies, trans. with the assistance of Hanne Fossum (Innsbruck, Esslingen, Bern-Belp: Helbling, 2016)Øivind Varkøy's book Why music? was first published in Norway in 1993 and translated into Swedish three years (...) later. In 2016, a newly revised edition was published in German. This review refers to the German edition and a special focus will be on the third chapter, because Varkøy's convincing interpretation of Kant's theory of aesthetic judgement presents a counter narrative to other interpretations of this theory that have been in circulation in North America for quite some time.In the introduction, Varkøy explains that it is his intention to present a diverse array of reasons for teaching music. He also explains why (future) music teachers should reflect on these reasons and the possible values of their professional actions: "A clear stance on the value of one's own work will have a positive effect on one's professional identity and the psychological and physical well-being."1 In the first chapter, he takes the readers back to the world of "the old Greeks"—an [End Page 224] expression that is often used in Europe—and he specifically addresses the values Plato and Aristotle have ascribed to music. The chapter starts with the mythos about mousiké as a gift from the gods and Varkøy explains that this term used to stand for much more than music. It included diverse forms of art such as language, poetry, and dance which were seen as means that can express order and beauty as well as a realization of harmonia which "holds the world together."2 As far as philosophies of music education are concerned, both Plato and Aristotle stress that music education serves the character formation of young people and both are quite strict concerning the way music should be taught to the young. To give an example, Plato rejects that the aulos is used in schools, because it is a woodwind instrument that served as a means of intoxication in rituals. Plato's point was that it would make the youth soft and therefore unable to contribute to the establishment of a 'good' state system. Varkøy stresses that Plato did not differentiate between the aesthetic and the ethical dimension of music, since the term kalokagathia stands for both 'the beautiful' and 'the good.' It almost seems as if Varkøy had the North American debate between the so-called 'aesthetic' and 'praxial educators' in mind when he wrote this chapter, and it is a pity that he does not go into more detail concerning the terms 'the beautiful' and 'the good.' On the other hand, he gives a clear summary of the different functions Aristotle has ascribed to music. He emphasizes that Aristotle mentions the three functions of music as a source of well-being and enjoyment, as a means of character formation, and as an intellectual activity that can lead to a "higher level" of experience.3 In Aristotle's thinking, all of these functions are of value. Concerning the functions and values of music that are discussed, Varkøy abstains from passing his own judgment which leaves a welcome space for one's own thinking.In the second chapter, Varkøy focuses on the functions of music between the time of early Christianity and the time of Comenius. He puts forward an intriguing argument when he states that the Church Father Augustine, who saw the fact that people can enjoy music just for pleasure as a danger, has already pointed to the notion of music as a phenomenon with its own, intrinsic value. At the end of this chapter, Varkøy asks the readers to reflect on Comenius' distinction between "useful" knowledge and knowledge that serves "the way of making one's living."4 He returns to this distinction later on in his book.In the chapter "Progress and Reason," the focus is on... (shrink)

In the significant body of existing research on the notion of kalokagathia – an ideal of the accomplished man who combines physical beauty with social status and moral goodness –, the focus has so far been on the history of the formation of the terms that denoted this quality in ancient Greece, on their usage during the classical period and – to a lesser extent – on the changes in their meaning during the Hellenistic period. Our history of this (...) concept therefore lacks a mediaeval chapter. I propose to address this gap by analysing how Albert Magnus understood the Latin terms corresponding to kalokagathia in the Aristotelian texts of practical philosophy made accessible by Latin translators at the time. I also offer a reflection on the factors that determine how a text is understood within the contingency space left open between its translation and its interpretation by the reader. (shrink)

Zbigniew Herbert studied philosophy at the Nicolaus Copernicus University in Toruń in the years 1949–1951 and attended seminars conducted by prof. Henryk Elzenberg, whose philosophical stance had a relevant impact on the poet’s oeuvre. This work analyses Stoic heritage present in the works of both the Philosopher and the Poet, as well as presents the axiological system of Elzenberg and its meaning for the attitude of “Mr. Cogito”. Elzenberg, following Seneca, divided values into the utilitarian and perfect ones, where the (...) latter possessed the quality of dignitas (“nobleness”). The perfect values referred to the Greek notion of kalokagathia and they were of primary importance in the creation of high culture that constituted the sphere of human dignity and freedom as opposed to the existential dread, indifference of nature or historical necessity. Herbert shared his Master’s stand on the meaning of culture and the table of values in human life, which is depicted, inter alia, in the poem dedicated to the Professor To Henryk Elzenberg on the Centenary of His Birth. Elzenberg claimed that axiologization the the world equals its substantialization. Finally, the acme of his axiology became natural mysticism and the source of perfect value the “transempirical” reality which Elzenberg used to call “the Undefined”. The Professor was distanced and sceptical towards the world and society. Herbert, on the other hand, remained faithful to the Christian heritage with its confirmation of the world as it is, as well as the everyday human reality, which he treated with sympathy and uderstanding, according to the idea of Christian agape. (shrink)

within western philosophy, there is a long and rich tradition of treating the beautiful and the good as closely related and mutually reinforcing.1 Different models of the relation have been proposed. An ‘identity’ model can be seen in Plato’s identification of the beautiful and the good in the Symposium and perhaps in the Greek notion of kalokagathia.2 Yet, according to Plato’s Republic, the form of the good illuminates, and differs from, the forms of beauty and truth: “both knowledge and (...) truth are beautiful things, but the good is other and more beautiful than they,”3 suggesting that beauty is a mode of the good. Likewise, according to Plotinus’s chronologically first treatise, “On... (shrink)

This article discusses Leo Tolstoy’s view of the Russian revolutionary movement. Taking as a focal point the writer’s lifelong interest in the Decembrist uprising of 1825 and particularly in the personalities of the gentry revolutionaries, the article argues that Tolstoy’s fascination for these figures was due to their superior moral qualities, rather than to their political and socioeconomic doctrines. Following Alexander Herzen, Tolstoy came to regard the Decembrists as full-fledged individualities and “beautiful souls”. Thus, Tolstoy’s much debated “conversion” and subsequent (...) attempts to transform literary art into a medium of religious and moral reform can also be viewed as extensions of his project of self-understanding and self-formation according to the model of kalokagathia provided by Russia’s aristocratic revolutionaries. (shrink)

This article discusses Leo Tolstoy’s view of the Russian revolutionary movement. Taking as a focal point the writer’s lifelong interest in the Decembrist uprising of 1825 and particularly in the personalities of the gentry revolutionaries, the article argues that Tolstoy’s fascination for these figures was due to their superior moral qualities, rather than to their political and socioeconomic doctrines. Following Alexander Herzen, Tolstoy came to regard the Decembrists as full-fledged individualities and “beautiful souls”. Thus, Tolstoy’s much debated “conversion” and subsequent (...) attempts to transform literary art into a medium of religious and moral reform can also be viewed as extensions of his project of self-understanding and self-formation according to the model of kalokagathia provided by Russia’s aristocratic revolutionaries. (shrink)

In this paper I will argue that, in Aristotle’s thought, the political commitment of authentically wise men is ultimately motivated by an intellectual rather than by a merely practical interest. Through analysis of Eudemian Ethics A 4. 1216 a 23-7 and Q 3. 1248 b 8-37 I shall contend that the socalled “true politician” is to be identified with a kalos kai agathos man, i.e. with an individual who – rather than being driven by mere desire for the promotion of (...) the common good – acts in the ultimate analysis out of a deep concern for the inherent worth of moral virtue. I shall propose that, while acting “for the sake of the fine”, the true politician aims not only to reach an appreciation of moral virtue independent of the possible benefits this can bring about, but also to maximize contemplative activity within the political sphere. After a preliminary introduction to the issue of true statesmanship, I try to understand in what respect the good differs from the fine , and I shall offer an account of the relationships between the two notions at issue by reference to their occurrences in the Eudemian Ethics and in the Metaphysics. I will suggest that the fine, if predicated of the practical good, expresses its intelligibility and liability to contemplation. In the second part I concentrate on the issue of kalokagathia and enquire into to kalon from the point of view of the lawgiver’s intentions and motives of virtuous action. (shrink)

In this paper I will argue that, in Aristotle’s thought, the political commitment of authentically wise men is ultimately motivated by an intellectual rather than by a merely practical interest. Through analysis of Eudemian Ethics A 4. 1216 a 23-7 and Q 3. 1248 b 8-37 I shall contend that the socalled “true politician” is to be identified with a kalos kai agathos man, i.e. with an individual who – rather than being driven by mere desire for the promotion of (...) the common good – acts in the ultimate analysis out of a deep concern for the inherent worth of moral virtue. I shall propose that, while acting “for the sake of the fine”, the true politician aims not only to reach an appreciation of moral virtue independent of the possible benefits this can bring about, but also to maximize contemplative activity within the political sphere. After a preliminary introduction to the issue of true statesmanship, I try to understand in what respect the good differs from the fine, and I shall offer an account of the relationships between the two notions at issue by reference to their occurrences in the Eudemian Ethics and in the Metaphysics. I will suggest that the fine, if predicated of the practical good, expresses its intelligibility and liability to contemplation. In the second part I concentrate on the issue of kalokagathia and enquire into to kalon from the point of view of the lawgiver’s intentions and motives of virtuous action. (shrink)

The focus on this article is to analyze the concept of beauty in Kierkegaard’s thought, starting from some questions that I try to answer in these pages: How does Kierkegaard understand beauty? What role does beauty play in the inner constitutive process? All this to argue that, as regards beauty, Kierkegaard recovers the Greek concept of kalokagathia to give it a modern interpretation; thus, distancing himself from the modern understanding of beauty as a mere object of study of aesthetics (...) or the mere contemplation of an ideal; beauty is defined as the telos of the inner self and is related to freedom and choice. It is, therefore, as I will argue, an ethical beauty, rather than an aesthetic one. (shrink)