This study explores how financial executives retrospectively account for their crossing the line into financial statement fraud while acting within or reacting to a financialized corporate environment. We conduct our investigation through face-to-face interviews with 13 former C-suite financial executives who were involved in and indicted for major cases of accounting fraud. Five different themes of accounts emerged from the narratives, characterizing executives’ fraud immersion as a meaning-making process by which the particulars of the proximal social context and individual motivations (...) collectively molded executives’ vocabularies of fraud immersion. Our executives’ narratives portray their fraud entanglement as typically occurring in small, incremental steps. Their accounts expand our understanding of the influence of socialization on executive-level financial fraud beyond the individualized focus of the fraud triangle model. (shrink)

Tax compliance is a concern to governments around the world. Prior research (Alm, J. and I. Sanchez: 1995, KYKLOS 48, 3–19) has attributed unexplained inter-country differences in compliance rates to differences in social norms. Economics researchers studying tax compliance in the United States (U.S.) (see for example J. Andreoni et al.: 1998, Journal of Economic Literature 36, 818–860) have called for more attention to social (as opposed to economic) influences on tax compliance. In this study, we extend this prior research (...) by explicitly examining the role of social norms [Cialdini, R. and M. Trost: 1998, The Handbook of Social Psychology (Oxford University Press, New York)] on tax compliance in three different countries. We test our research hypotheses using a hypothetical compliance scenario, which was administered in Australia, Singapore, and the U.S. There were differences in compliance rates and social norms among the three countries. Factor analysis of the social norm questions identified three distinct social norm constructs. Two of these factors were significant in explaining tax compliance behavior. The first and most influential factor was taxpayers’ own personal moral beliefs, along with the beliefs of those close to them (e.g., friends and important others). The second significant factor represented societal views of proper behavior. We conclude that social norms help to explain tax compliance intentions and why tax compliance rates are higher than would be predicted by strictly economic models. (shrink)

This experimental study extends prior capital market and environmental accounting research by utilizing the theoretical underpinnings of legitimation through impression management, source credibility bias, perceived trust, and ideology in assessing the influence of discretionary environmental accounting narratives on jurors’ punitive damage award assessments. We utilize mock jurors as environmental stakeholders and find that: jurors in a court case involving corporate environmental malfeasance assess lower punitive damage awards against a firm that provides discretionary disclosure on its website regarding future abatement and (...) control narratives, environmental sensitivity of the firm’s industry moderates the negative relationship between the discretionary disclosure and jurors’ punitive damage award assessments, and juror’s perceived trust toward firm management mediates the prior moderation effect. Further, juror political ideology is found to affect the punitive damage award assessments, with liberal jurors levying comparatively higher awards than conservative jurors. (shrink)

We test competing theoretical perspectives of family firm governance in two separate studies by investigating whether family firm control moderates the detrimental effect of a management training ground on internal auditor objectivity and on the external auditor’s decision to rely on the internal audit function. In Study 1, we assess the objectivity of internal auditors working under an IAF that serves as a MTG or non-MTG and located in a family or non-family firm. A key result of Study 1 is (...) the mitigating role of family firm control, as we find that the objectivity of internal auditors is reduced when the IAF serves as a MTG but only in non-family firms. When the IAF is located in a family-controlled firm, the objectivity of internal auditors is unaffected by the opportunity to be promoted into management positions outside of the IAF. In Study 2, we utilize a controlled laboratory experiment with experienced Big 4 auditors as participants and examine their decision to rely on an IAF when it serves as a MTG. Our analyses indicate that external auditors reduce their reliance on non-family firm IAFs that are also MTGs and their decision is fully mediated by the perceived objectivity of non-family firm internal auditors. In contrast, external auditors’ reliance on family firm IAFs and their perceptions of internal auditor objectivity are unaffected under a MTG regime. The results of Studies 1 and 2 provide support for the alignment perspective of family firms. (shrink)

Games and simulations--from quantitative modeling to immersive, experiential scenarios--as methods for engagement within futures studies have a substantial history. In recent years, there has been a surge of projects using a wide array of tools. As practitioners and researchers have gravitated toward more playful approaches, there is a need to review and evaluate such approaches. This chapter provides an introduction to gaming and simulations as anticipatory processes. Offering a snapshot of contemporary projects from around the world, this chapter utilizes a (...) range of voices and perspectives on gaming and simulations to explore how such tools and methods use the future. (shrink)

continent. 1.4 (2011): 253—278. A Sense of French Politics Politics itself is not the exercise of power or struggle for power. Politics is first of all the configuration of a space as political, the framing of a specific sphere of experience, the setting of objects posed as "common" and of subjects to whom the capacity is recognized to designate these objects and discuss about them.(1) On April 14, 2011, France implemented its controversial ban of the niqab and burqa , commonly (...) referred to as the Islamic veil, in public places. On the coattails of the 2004 prohibition of religious artifacts, including the less concealing hijab or Islamic headscarves, in schools, the veil ban sparked equal outrage across both political and theological spectra, and many on both sides of the debate were quick to inquire about enforcement. As Steven Erlanger reports, “The police do not have the authority under the law to remove full veils, only to fine or require citizenship lessons for those who violate the new law.”(2) While the legal and social implications of this interdiction are ripe for study, the reprisals for breaking the law, notably compulsory citizenship classes, illuminate the strategic governmentality underlying the French government's targeting of the Muslim community, particularly those elements it considers affiliated with fundamentalist factions and/or terrorist organizations, if only through fashion—an integral component of French citizenship. Indeed, in allowing the (fashion) police to mandate instructional courses in citizenship for offenders, France implies that any Muslim choosing to wear the niqab or burqa , perhaps even for those who are already citizens, must not be aware of the subtle nuances of dress indicative of the French citizenry within public space. Furthermore, the degree of instruction requisite to citizenship, which clearly can and must be updated as the state sees fit, cements the imagined relation between citizens and states within the discourses on the veil ban. As Sharma contends, “Concepts of citizenship are the ideological glue that bonds the nation to the state. Citizenship provides the legal framework through which the state performs its role as ruler for the nation.”(3) Speaking for/as the state, French President Nicolas Sarkozy declared in a 2009 presentation before members of the government and other citizens that the burqa “is not welcome on the territory of France.”(4) Although there is nothing unique, especially recently, about a nation-state taking extreme measures to guard itself against what it deems to be threats to its sovereignty, the way in which the ongoing discourses on hijab have (d)evolved, which coincide with recent pronouncements by governmental leaders in Germany, Britain, and France that policies of multiculturalism have “failed,”(5) points toward nationalist reterritorializations, which is also to say physical and ideological re-appropriations, of public space within democratic milieux, which remain predicated upon the mediation of spaces. As Panagia deduces from Rancière, “Democracy […] is not an institutional form of government […], but an appearance whose visibilities and audibilites arise out of the dissonant blur of the everyday.”(6) Ultimately, the veil ban represents a calculated move to regulate the every day, which is to say the micropolitics of, that which is visible and invisible within French society, which makes it nothing short of a struggle to manage (the sensation of) bodies. Re-situating the political within the context of sense, Rancière argues that the fundamental essence of politics lies within the distinction between consensus and dissensus , and whereas most consider politics proper as fundamentally concerned with the fluid operations of the state— consensus , Rancière actually locates the political within events that disrupt the normative sensory order of things— dissensus . He explains, “Politics revolves around what is seen and what can be said about it, around who has the ability to see and the talent to speak, around the properties of spaces and the possibilities of time.”(7) This reformulation of politics centers on agency and, albeit perhaps unintended, representationality and offers a useful formulation for spatializing the discourses surrounding the Islamic veil, which are mired within seemingly senseless policies and practices of objectification. Instituting a normative “regime of visibility,” the French veil ban encapsulates the political economy of agency, now both mediated and representational, under the rule of nationalist governmentalities in increasingly transnational contexts.(8) Adjudicating presence within public space signals a concern with the sensory aspects of agency itself—what Rancière terms the “distribution of the sensible,” which is “a matrix that defines a set of relations between sense and sense: that is, between a form of sensory experience and an interpretation which makes sense of it.”(9) To be concerned with sense is to focus upon the body, and this somatic repositioning of the (fashionable) citizen within the territory of the state augurs the resurgence of nationalist bio-politics within Europe, since, as Hage explicates, “Nationalism, before being an explicit practice or a mode of classification, is a state of the body. It is a way of imagining one's position within the nation and what one can aspire to as a national.”(10) The French government's attempt to make (bodily) sense of public space for its citizens by and through policies aimed against a burqa-clad Muslim minority, which might only apply to “less then 400 to fewer than 2,000” women(11), reveals the necessary, yet mercurial, transmutation of public space into national space through bio-political strategies of sense-making, which, as Hage observes, denotes that “nationalists perceive themselves as spatial managers.”(12) At the center of this concern over public space is the equally contentious dimension of governing female Islamic identity, which has become one of the main critiques levied against Islam from outsiders who view the veil in its various forms as a clear sign of the religion's actual and symbolic violence against women, even if such critiques remain ensconced within nationalist discourses. As Halim and Meyers argue, “Although Western news media may focus their coverage of Muslim women on the debate over whether and the extent to which the veil may by oppressive to the women who wear it, they have exhibited little interest in the physical oppression of violence against women in Islamic countries.”(13) While it falls outside of the scope of this analysis to arbitrate all of the dimensions of this debate, understanding some of the issues related to female identity and hijab within public space are crucial to this study. As these topics are extraordinarily complex, even and perhaps especially within the Muslim community, it is necessary to provide some context concerning the value, purpose, and meaning of the Islamic veil, which has a rich and arduous history. The Art of the Veil At present, there are only two countries, Iran and Saudi Arabia, that require women to wear hijab , which is a decidedly problematic term and concept whose locus is itself caught within a struggle of sensation. Noting the strategic reterritorialization of the term, Berger explains: The choice of the name, hijab , now widely adopted to designate the “Islamic veil,” it itself interesting, although the semantic shift it operates is not directly commented upon by its users. Although the design (both the cut and the symbolic function) of the hijab and the Iranian chador are indeed the same, as opposed, for instance, to the traditional Algerian haik , the word hijab has come to replace the term chador popularized by the Iranian revolution, as a properly Arabic (hence Koranic) designation. This discursive shift points to the successful reclaiming of the national revolution in Iran by a transnational pan-Islamic movement, whose language of reference can only be Koranic Arabic.(14) While the hijab is certainly a point of contention within various countries dealing with immigrant Islamic populations (of which France has the largest in Europe as part of its colonial legacy in Algeria), it is clear that the veil is a historically contextualized artifact of Muslim identity with a variety of manifestations, even as forces outside of and within Islam seek to codify its actual and symbolic value. Ultimately, the varieties of hijab , including the full-faced burqa and niqab , are complex assemblages of meaning that speak to the multitudinous flows of Islamic identities over time and space. As Gökariksel and McLarney observe, “Wearing a certain style of veil may simultaneously be a disciplinary practice crucial to the cultivation of piety (Mahmood 2005; Gokariksel 2009) and a gendered performance of social distinction in terms of class, taste, and urbanity (White 1999; Navaro-Yashin 2002; Gokariksel and Secor 2009) or of ethnicity and race (Dwyer 1999).”(15) The ideological marketplace from which the varieties of hijab ebb and flow serves both as a reflection of the ever-present materiality and dynamic functionality of spiritual economies, which are derivative of the equally ubiquitous flows of transnational capital driving agency and representationality within our historical moment. Keeping these dual, yet deeply interconnected, capital ecologies as the site of exploration for how the veil is represented within public space, one might begin to sense what lurks behind such veiled agendas. Examining the symbolic and representational nature of the Islamic “veil” in its various forms, this project situates the decidedly political contestations of public space at stake in the French ban alongside recent condemnations of multiculturalism as calculated efforts to re-distribute the sensible so as to valorize national identity within increasingly transnational and globalized socio-economic spaces, which collapse exchange values between distinct, yet interwoven, economies of (cultural/material/spiritual) capital. As the discourses on the veil rely upon representational imag(in)ings, it seems fitting to explore the political economy and art of the veil through the phenomenon of street art, which, much like hijab , is a complex assemblage of meaning of sensation mired in representationality and capital exchange. As street artists have taken up hijab in various forms, the movement offers a lens with which to situate critical responses to the veil debate across both spiritual and material economies. Situating this street art both aesthetically and historically, Lewisohn explains, “'Street art' is a sub-genre of graffiti writing and owes much to its predecessor. Though there is a good deal of crossover between the genres, they are distinct and separate in their own right.”(16) Evolving out of the graffiti explosion of the late 1970's and 1980's, street art broke the unspoken rules of the artistic underground by challenging and re-examining one's sensory experience of art in public space by experimenting with both content and form in ways that harken back to the Situationist International, which as a collective challenged one's experience of urban space through various media and experiential phenomena. Again, Lewisohn observes, “It's important to note street art's break with the tradition of the tag, and its focus on visual symbols that embrace a much wider range of media than graffiti writers would use.”(17) From stencils to prints and murals to one-liners, street artists developed a reputation for critical social and political commentary, and while it is certainly the case that not all street art is intentionally political, in challenging the normative “regime of visibility,” as Rancière puts it, of public space, street artists—even if unconsciously—call into question the common sensory experience of the politics underlying the formation of (nationalist) space.(18) Indeed, Rancière refers to the partisan sensory managers as “police,” who ultimately forge “the rules governing the circulation of appearances, of their visibility and audibility, and the proper distribution of bodies therein.”(19) As such, one can sense that street art's relationship with the police is tenous for a variety of reasons. Writing about his own experience as a street artist, Shepard Fairey observes, “With street art, there's no committee deciding whether I can put my work up on the street, there's no censorship, and I have total freedom of expression, and that concept of freedom is expressed just by using the street as a medium.”(20) As Fairey and other street artists demonstrate, the medium, to paraphrase Marshall McLuhan, is the most glaring aspect of street art's message, and even as it now finds itself in galleries and usurped by private collectors, the ethos of the movement remains relavent to politics as it is, first and foremost, concerned with the configuration and experience of space. Just as examining the punishments for breaking the veil ban can map the terrain of French politics, a representational genealogy of street artist's deployment of hijab and female Muslim identity can assist in mining the depths of public space as a site of bio-political control and contestation in light of recent events in France and the rising tide of anti-multiculturalist rhetoric across Europe, even though the Islamic presence there is radically heterogenous. Using the work of Shepard Fairey, Princess Hijab, br1, and Banksy, this paper sets out to answer a number of key questions concerning the deployment of hijab, and female Islamic identity in particular, within street art as a movement now integral to and critical of the economies of exchange underlying global capitalism, which as a force of influence cannot be underestimated as a driver in the resurgence of nationalist biopolitical governmentalities. Although there exists a litany of artists to choose from, the aforementioned quartet of designers integrate hijab into their work in a seminal and critical fashion, and all have been working with the veil in some way prior to the French ban, which grants some additional context to their usage of it as a symbol in regards to the breakdown of multiculturalism across Europe, even if unconsciously. Although each artist depicts various amalgamations of hijab in their respective corpus, they share common tropes that raise significant questions concerning the veil debate, namely: what are the conditions of possibility for hijab to become a marker of Islamic identity within public space? How can we make sense of the representational topologies within street art's utilization of the hijab and female Islamic identity in light of the French ban? How might these aesthetic imag(in)ings simultaneously inhabit and combat normative discourses concerning hijab , multiculturalism, female Islamic identity, and public space? With these considerations as a backdrop, it is first necessary to outline more fully the hijab as a representative marker of female Islamic identity. The (Veiled) Writing on the Wall

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The world of work is undergoing major surgery. Future economic historians may yet describe the cumulative impact of globalisation, technological change and new work patterns that are currently shaking the OECD countries as an economic revolution similar in magnitude and significance to the industrial revolution of the 19th century. There is certainly plenty of pain around, but scattered in so many countries and cultures that this late 20th century revolution will probably prove to have been beyond the capacity of any (...) Charles Dickens, or of a Marx and Engels, to chronicle.From the perspective of the European Union, the pain is clearly visible in two areas: a growing insecurity and stress attending many who are at work in the Union, particularly in occupations and employments where earnings have risen a lot; and the level and persistence of long-term unemployment together with the growing number of discouraged workers, primarily men, who are opting out of the labour force altogether. Not visible within the EU, but no less real of course, is the impact on workers in other countries when the Union adopts protectionist or aggressive trading policies.[...]CONCLUSION :The dislocation that is evident throughout the world of work today, and the insecurity and pain it is causing, is influencing political life in the European Union. What Americans would call the ‘feel bad’ factor tempts some to support protectionist measures, abrupt limits to immigration, cuts in taxation and social services, workfare or — if they are outsiders — abuse of the social welfare system and black market activity. It is important to appreciate that very few people are escaping; the upheavals in the world of work are affecting insiders and outsiders. Making common cause requires forging a fresh consensus on fundamental values of which two key ones are the nature of a business enterprise and the place of a job in a person’s life. These are the key areas where social innovation must match the apparently ceasless innovations on the part of technology. They may, hopefully, prove capable of redirecting the process of technological change itself. (shrink)

The article discusses Albert Einstein’s unique ability to devise, pursue, and exploit imaginary physical situations: his dreams. Although such thought- or gedanken-experiments were always based on commonly held premises, Einstein was able, over and over, to use gedankenexperiments to capture the barest physical essentials of a situation, and to proceed from those essentials to their inescapable consequences, no matter how astonishing, no matter how remote from previous conventional wisdom. The paper describes and discusses the thought-experiments that Einstein used in achieving (...) his most notable successes, the Special and General Theories of Relativity. It discusses the origins of each, their physical meaning, and some of the ways in which the principles embodied in the thought-experiments contributed to his subsequent discoveries. The paper concludes by contrasting Einstein’s Special and General Relativity campaigns with his search for a theory describing gravity and electromagnetism as part of a greater whole, a Unified Field Theory. In almost thirty years of trying, he made little or no progress. Notably, Einstein never reported devising a thought-experiment to motivate or guide him in this, the longest effort of his career. (shrink)

In I'd Rather Be Dead Than Be a Girl, John Marcus Sweeney explains a threefold thesis of a study that language influences how human beings perceive reality, that the development of theoretical constructs can help explain resistances to and possibilities for inclusive language, and that the implementation of inclusive language is an important goal for religious education." "The study begins with a description of the problem to be considered, that is, the role of sexist language in perpetuating sexual discrimination. Beginning (...) in the third chapter, insights from Alfred North Whitehead's philosophy of organism, Benjamin Lee Whorf's principle of linguistic relativity, and Jean Piaget's genetic epistemology are used to investigate the stubbornness of sexist linguistic habits and the bases for developing inclusive linguistic habits. Finally, inclusive language is shown to be important for religious education, and some strategies for implementing inclusive language are presented."--Jacket. (shrink)

This article examines the link between economic success at the national level and a population’s sense of well-being. It argues that a society where economic success is based on adaptation to the demands of competitiveness in global markets readily develops patterns of work and consumption which reduce the efficiency of economic growth in generating well-being.The perspective of the article is welcoming of economic growth and globalization.Until the 1990s, the Republic of Ireland, on whose experience the article is based, provided abundant (...) evidence that a preoccupation with economic self-sufficiency and, subsequently, incomplete adaptation to international economic integration was undermining of societal well-being. This judgement appears unavoidable given the large percentage of the Irish population who could not find satisfying work on a sustained basis until the economic boom of the 1990s; significant numbers emigrated, remained in subordinate positions in their households, worked in jobs far below their potential, or were openly unemployed.The evidence explored here, therefore, is not fuel for those seeking to build the funeral pyre of globalization. It is consistent with believing that Ireland’s embrace of a set of social and economic policies in pursuit of strong economic growth under conditions of globalization has increased well-being in net terms, and probably substantially so. However, the evidence reviewed does suggest that patterns of work and consumption have developed which significantly lessen the well-being quotient of additional economic growth. The more nuanced thesis of the article, therefore, is that economic growth becomes steadily less efficient in generating well-being, unless certain specific patterns in work and consumption are challenged and corrected. (shrink)

Most ethics studies employing accounting subjects have utilized the Defining Issues Test, generally finding the moral judgment abilities of accounting students and accountants to be less advanced than those of the general population. This study assesses the validity of the DIT by examining whether an individual can achieve a higher moral judgment score on the DIT by responding from the role of a political liberal. Accounting undergraduates, defining themselves as liberal, moderate or conservative, completed the DIT once from their own (...) perspective and once from either an "extremely conservative" or "extremely liberal" perspective.The results indicate that DIT scores can be influenced by an aspect of political ideology not reflecting maturation in moral judgment. Subjects decreased their moral judgment scores when responding to the DIT dilemmas from a conservative perspective. Contrary to moral development theory, subjects were able to increase their moral judgment scores when responding from the perspective of a political liberal. These results imply that, given the generally conservative political orientation of the profession, the DIT may systematically understate the moral judgment abilities of accounting students and accountants. (shrink)

This research consists of two studies with interrelated objectives. The purpose of the first study is to develop and validate scales measuring whistle-blowing subjective norms, attitudes, and intentions. The objective of the second study is to test a model of whistle-blowing intentions, motivated by the theory of reasoned action, across two contrasting cultures: the collectivist Thai and the individualistic American. To achieve cross-cultural comparisons, we first perform measurement and structural invariance tests. Tests of latent mean differences lend support for our (...) prediction that individuals in the collectivist Thai culture have higher means on subjective norms, attitudes, and intentions for whistle-blowing than members of the individualist American culture. Our models indicate that subjective norms for whistle-blowing, even though significantly different for American and Thai participants, have a direct effect on whistle-blowing attitudes as well as direct and indirect effects on reporting intentions for both subject groups. Compared to American subjects, the whistle-blowing intentions of Thai participants are more strongly influenced by subjective norms for whistle-blowing. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Intimacy or Integrity: Philosophy and Cultural DifferenceDavid Jones and John A. SweeneyIntimacy or Integrity: Philosophy and Cultural Difference. By Thomas P. Kasulis. Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2002. Pp. xii + 183. Paper $14.95.Back in the early days of cross-cultural inquiry, scholars gained some territory in the understanding of cultural difference by focusing their attention on the distinction between the individualistic and the collective. Asians, especially East Asians, (...) were seen as motivated by collectivism, whereas Westerners were firmly rooted in individuality. This distinction afforded some comprehension of cultural difference and served a limited purpose in those early days of trying to understand Asia as a whole and the vast reach of difference among various Asian groups. However, we quickly outgrew our dependence on this distinction, although we continued to insist on making use of it. Thomas Kasulis offers us a new heuristic in his recent book Intimacy or Integrity: Philosophy and Cultural Difference, which is based on his 1998 Gilbert Ryle Lectures at Trent University.The book begins with a series of anecdotes, which is most fitting for what the author has in mind. These seemingly simple stories of cultural misunderstanding actually point to profound differences between Asian and Western cultural perspectives. Kasulis, however, rightly extends the boundaries of his discussion to traverse not only Asian/Western differences but also variations between cultures and subcultures as well. The thesis of the book addresses the too simplistic notion that Asians are simply more collectivist than their Western counterparts, and this thesis applies as well to differences within the structure of any culture's grand narrative. Put directly, the thesis is that there are recursive cultural patterns that orient themselves in two basic ways: "intimacy" and "integrity." These patterns reiterate themselves into complex theoretical manifestations through understandings of fact/value, what is and what should be (p. 11).Aware that he might easily fall into the old trap of a simplistic differentiating between "them and us," Kasulis is quick to point out that "it is unlikely that any culture is ever a perfect example of either an intimacy-dominant or integrity-dominant culture" (p. 11). In other words, "intimacy" and "integrity" (unlike collectivism and individualism) are both positive terms that continually, and recursively, foreground and background themselves in any given culture. For example, Americans, with their penchant for individuality and the benefits arising from it, such as the notion of rights, also value and understand intimacy as a feeling that is primary to one's being either a member of a family, a member of a group, or a citizen of a country. And to think that individuality has no value whatsoever in Asia or that there are no "individuals" in Asia is just being simpleminded. These two different ways of relating—intimacy and integrity—are explored in connection to the key relations of self/world, self/other, knower/known, thing/thing, and so forth (p. 13) throughout the book, as reflected in the chapter titles: "Cultural Orientations," "What Is Intimacy?" "What [End Page 603] Is Integrity?" "Intimacy and Integrity as Worldviews: Epistemology, Analysis and Argument, and Metaphysics," "The Normative Dimensions of Intimacy and Integrity: Aesthetics, Ethics, and Politics," and "Intercultural Conflict: When Intimacy and Integrity Collide."An important concern of this book, and an issue that is often overlooked by philosophers, is that philosophy is both a product and a producer of culture. If culture even becomes a matter of philosophical discussion, it is often cast in terms of a "philosophy of culture," that is, a part of our understanding of the role that culture plays in the more universal context of human existence (p. 13). Kasulis reminds us, however, of another (and perhaps more important) dimension of the study of what he calls "cultural philosophy," and that is that "philosophy itself is a cultural enterprise" (p. 14). By viewing philosophy in this way philosophers are able to check their tendency to believe erroneously that philosophy is a discipline that can achieve an understanding of, or even attempt to search for, universal, eternal, and transcultural truths. Kasulis points out that this too is a "tendency... related to cultural conditions" (p. 14); hence, "philosophy and... (shrink)

Social integration is a basic ingredient of any description of a good society. We feel that all people should get the opportunity to realise their full human potential, i.e. to realise their own goals and aspirations. In this paper we claim that this is also part of the responsibility of private sector firms and, therefore, an integral aspect of business ethics. We first argue against the (popular) conviction that the situation of the unemployed is their own responsibility, either because they (...) choose to be unemployed (section 2), or because they choose to be low skilled (section 3). As a consequence, we do not believe that the dismantling of the social security system or the restructuring of the educational system can fully solve the problem of the least skilled in our societies. Nor do we think that the integration of the least skilled is a matter for government policy alone. In section 4 we argue that job creation remains indispensable for a real attack on the problem of social exclusion. In section 5, we highlight the important role of the private sector in this regard. Such job creation will require a lot of effort and imagination at the micro-level of the firm and a lot of creative thinking about how to structure the macrosocial market environment within which private firms operate. (shrink)