La tesis que se defiende en este artículo es que a la dignidad humana le pertenece una libertad contingente. En primer lugar se acota la noción de libertad contingente frente a la noción voluntarista de libertas indifferentiae y a la noción intelectualista de voluntas ut natura. En segundo lugar se analizan las condiciones de posibilidad del pecado y de la mejora moral, y las paradojas que resultan cuando estos fenómenos se intentan explicar desde la libertad de indiferencia o desde la (...) visión intelectualista. La libertad contingente comparece entonces como la voluntad que introduce la contingencia en el obrar porque puede decidirse en pro y/o en contra de una y la misma cosa; puede relacionarse respecto al propio comportamiento. Para terminar, desde lo que se ha explicado se analiza un caso particular, a saber, si es posible decidirse a creer algo o creer en algo. (shrink)

I must admit that I was long tempted to choose a different title for this lecture—one which seemed to give a better idea of its contents. On the other hand, the title I found so attractive did not seem suited to the note of solemnity which normally accompanies an inaugural lecture. I was forced to suppress it—until today, at any rate; for today I have the opportunity of justifying it, and I hope to make the most of it. The title (...) I wanted to use was ‘The Thing with the Thing’. (shrink)

As regards the issue of futura contingentia, Aquinas's interpretation turns on a phrase that has sometimes been dismissed as irrelevant or even confused: "...non tamen haec vel illa determinatae...". It is shown that this clause is in complete conformity with Aquinas's interpretation of the principles of non-contradiction and of excluded middle. According to this interpretation the meaning of propositional negation derives from the first two principles considered collectively but is not presupposed by them. With respect to time-relative modalities this implies (...) that at the time of announcement, say, of a sea battle both parts of the contradiction could be true, provided one understands "could" in the sense of a counterfactual possibility with respect to the final outcome. It is also shown that Aquinas's interpretation allows one to avoid some perplexities in connection with the controversial beginning of Met. IX, 4. Some final considerations are meant to show the rationale of that interpretation. (shrink)

Republicanism is contrasted with liberalism with special reference to the notions of presence, absence and representation. The contrast is more conspicuous in the Platonic tradition of republicanism than it is in the Aristotelian tradition, the former being more likely to degenerate into some form of totalitarianism. Examples thereof are given in accordance with the distinction between a strong and a soft iconoclasm, as it is found both in Antiquity and in Eastern and Western Europe’s quest for absolute presence or—as in (...) avantgarde art of modernity—for absolute self-presence of the work of art. Having left such political and artistic utopias behind it, the pendulum is now swinging back in the direction of representation, but no longer in the illusionist sense which has dominated Western art form the Renaissance to the beginning of our century. Tied to the question of iconoclasm is the debate about the end of art inaugurated by Hegel in the general introduction to his Aesthetics and resumed in our days. (shrink)

Deconstructivism constantly remits to two metaphysical problems of enormous importance: the reference of the ideal to the real, and the relationship of the changeable to the permanent. Both problems have been the object of concern of professor Millán-Puelles: the first one (reality/the ideal), in his book Teoría del objeto puro; and the second one (change/-permanence), in La estructura de la subjetividad.

The paper deals with he tension between morality and efficacy both from the point of view of economics (and politics) on the one hand and ethics (and politics) on the other.

The paper focuses on the contrast between the ontologies of the subject, such as the Aristotelian one, with the ontologies of the process, such as that of Quine. It attempts to justify the Aristotelian approach paying special attention to Quine's criticism.